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Abstract 
This dissertation comprises a close analysis of decentralization in Bolivia, employing a 
methodology that marries qualitative and quantitative techniques. It first examines the 
effects of decentralization on public-sector investment and the provision of public 
services in Bolivia using a unique database that includes measures of municipalities' 
social and institutional characteristics and information on its policy-making processes. I 
find that decentralization changed both the sectoral uses of public resources and their 
geographic distribution significantly by increasing government sensitivity to local needs 
in human capital investment and the provision of basic services. I then investigate the 
determinants of central and local government investment respectively in order to 
investigate why the shift in regime produced such large changes in investment patterns. 
I then turn to a much deeper examination of local government via nine case studies, 
selected to broadly represent Bolivia's national diversity. I begin with an account of the 
workings of local government in the best and worst of these, analyzing the character and 
interactions of the major societal actors. I locate fundamental causes of good and bad 
government in the economic structure of a district as it relates to the political party 
system, and the cohesiveness and organizational capacity of its civil society. These ideas 
are used to build a conceptual model of the local government process in which the 
interactions of political, economic and civic actors reveal information and enforce 
accountability. I show how imbalances between them can cripple accountability and 
distort the policy-making process. Lastly, the dissertation tests the model by examining 
government performance in seven additional municipalities. I show that the framework 
can explain the emergence of good or bad government institutions, and thus the quality 
of government a district ultimately receives, through the interactions of key players —
notably civic organizations — deep in the local political economy. 
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1 
Introduction 
Over the past two decades decentralization has become one of the broadest movements, 
and one of the most debated policy issues, in the world of development. It is at the 
center of reforni efforts throughout Latin America and in many countries of Asia and 
Africa. And under the multiple guises of subsidiarity, devolution and federalism it is 
also squarely in the foreground of policy discourse in the European Union, United 
Kingdom and United States. While Manor recently called it "a quiet fashion of our 
time" 1 , Campbell now refers to "The Quiet Revolution"2 , hinting perhaps at the extent to 
which momentum and enthusiasm for decentralization have grown over just four years. 
It is not only the fact of decentralization in many countries which impresses but, as 
Campbell points out, the scope of political authority and economic and human resources 
that have been devolved to sub-national governments: "from Guatemala to Argentina, 
local governments began spending 10 to 50 percent of central government revenues" 3 
effectively reversing decades of control by national governments. 
The literature on decentralization is similarly broad, spanning academic 
disciplines and literally scores of countries. This dissertation focuses on the economics, 
political science, public choice and applied policy literatures. The first three are 
examined in detail in Chapters 2, 4 and 7, which adopt the conceptual tools of each. In 
general, all three have found cause for enthusiasm about decentralization, for reasons of 
heterogeneity in tastes or needs across regions, for example, or based on arguments 
about accountability and democratic representation. Although each discipline also 
contains important arguments against decentralization, as a broad generalization political 
scientists and economists have (recently) found the case in favor more compelling. 
What I loosely term the "applied policy literature" comprises a huge body of 
work, much of it public-management-oriented, which attempts to draw lessons on the 
efficacy of decentralization from particular country or regional experiences, or 
Lecture, Technical Consultation on Decentralization, Rome, 16 December 1997. 
2 The title of Campbell (2001). 
tbid., p.2. 
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increasingly cross-country surveys. It can fairly be said to dominate the literature on 
decentralization, if only in terms of volume, and has had considerable influence on the 
approach of multilateral organizations and international policy analysts to reform. And 
yet its conclusions are far from clear-cut. A number of authors have already produced 
extensive surveys of this literature, and it is not my intent to add to these, but rather to 
quickly summarize the main conclusions, and then focus on the findings that are of 
particular relevance to this study. 
In their wide-ranging 1983 survey, Rondinelli, Cheema and Nellis note that 
decentralization has seldom — if ever — lived up to expectations. Most developing 
countries implementing decentralization experienced serious administrative problems. 
Although few comprehensive evaluations of the benefits and costs of decentralization 
efforts have been conducted, those that were attempted indicate limited success in some 
countries but not others. Nonetheless the authors conclude that guarded optimism is 
warranted, due to the small number of cases where decentralization had brought about 
small but clear improvements. A decade and a half later, surveys by Piriou-Sall (1998), 
Manor (1999) and Smoke (2001) also come to cautiously positive conclusions, but also 
with caveats about the strength of the evidence in decentralization's favor. Manor ends 
his study with the judgment that "while decentralization ...is no panacea, it has many 
virtues and is worth pursuing", after noting that the evidence, though extensive, is still 
incomplete. Smoke asks whether there is empirical justification for pursuing 
decentralization and finds that the evidence is mixed and anecdotal. 
Why has our understanding not advanced? The tentative nature of these 
conclusions contrasts with the sheer size of the literature: hundreds of studies written 
over five decades, ranging from close examinations of individual communities to 
international comparisons. Why, after so much time and given the vast scale of what is 
effectively an international social experiment, is empirical evidence on decentralization's 
effects so mixed? Part of the difficulty in any assessment of decentralization is that the 
claims made on its behalf are so many, and so varied. In the discussion below, I follow 
Inman and Rubinfeld, who nicely collapse the many justifications for decentralization 
into three broad arguments,4 and ask How does decentralization affect (i) public sector 
efficiency, (ii) government responsiveness to local wants and needs, and (iii) political 
participation and a sense of the democratic community? I should note that this 
4 Inman and Rubinfeld (1997), p.44. 
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dissertation will focus squarely on the second question. I consider participation in depth 
as well, not for its own sake but as a means to the end of improved government 
responsiveness. 
The first question, that of decentralization's effect on public sector efficiency, is 
an extremely broad one, ranging from large issues of macroeconomic management to 
specific questions of cost improvements on small-scale projects. On the former, Tanzi 
(1995) and Prud'homme (1995) set out clear examples of the dangers decentralization 
can pose to macroeconomic stability. Treisman (1999) cites recent events in Yugoslavia, 
Russia, Argentina and Brazil to suggest that decentralization can interact with economic 
liberalization to intensify fiscal, macroeconomic and even territorial instability. 
Dillinger and Webb (1999) show that decentralization has led to significant fiscal 
problems in Colombia, at both the national level as central resources are transferred 
outwards, and the sub-national level where unsustainable deficits have accumulated. 
And Wildasin (1998) cites a number of countries where decentralization-inspired deficits 
have put pressure on central banks to monetize debt, placing exchange rates and price 
stability at risk. Shah's (1998a) is practically the lone voice asserting that decentralized 
fiscal systems offer greater potential for macroeconomic management than do 
centralized systems, largely due to better clarity and transparency in the rules of the 
game. 
On the related question of corruption, Fisman and Gatti (2000) — despite 
ambiguous predictions from the theoretical literature — find that fiscal decentralization is 
consistently associated with lower measured corruption across a sample of countries. 
But Blanchard and Shleifer (2000), distinguishing the case of Russia from Weingast's 
(1995) account of China, argue that local governments' capture by existing firms and the 
competition for rents by local officials eliminated incentives to firm entry in Russia, thus 
strangling a nascent economy. They attribute the absence of such behavior in China —
and hence the superior performance of its decentralization — to political centralization 
through the party. 
There is evidence that decentralization can improve cost efficiency at the sectoral 
level. Humplick and Moini-Araghi (1996) use panel data to study the cost of road 
provision; they conclude that concave resource costs are offset by downward-sloping 
"preference costs", so that initial losses in economies of scale from decentralization are 
outweighed by efficiency gains when the locus of roadworks is closer to the people. 
Where road maintenance was decentralized, unit costs were lower and roads were of 
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better quality. In Mexico, World Bank studies of small-scale rural projects managed by 
the Comites de Solidaridad (community groups supported by World-Bank-financed 
projects) have found cost savings of up to 50% relative to similar projects managed by 
state agencies. 5 
Piriou-Sall describes a mixed record on education: in Brazil decentralization 
resulted in increased administrative costs, while Chile managed to avoid this problem. 
Decentralization also boosted the overall cost-effectiveness of health services in the 
latter country. Estache and Sinha (1995) highlight some of the methodological 
difficulties faced by the decentralization scholar. Their study of twenty countries' 
spending on infrastructure over ten years finds that decentralization increased both total 
and sub-national spending on public infrastructure. As they note at the outset, however, 
no conclusions can be drawn from this about whether decentralization made spending 
more or less efficient. They point out various data problems: the absence of information 
on autonomous parastatals' spending; the inability to distinguish between capital and 
recurrent expenditures; and finally the volatility of exchange rates and multiplicity of 
exchange rate regimes, which made data from one of the countries unreliable. To these 
can be added the perils of using measures such as the share of sub-national expenditure 
in total expenditure to define the degree of decentralization. ° 
Research into the question of the effect of decentralization on government 
responsiveness to local need is considerably more scarce. Piriou-Sall and Smoke agree 
that few scholars have systematically assessed the impact of decentralization on service 
delivery. One case study of decentralization in Colombia often cited found that 
satisfaction with government and local services improved notably after decentralization. 7 
 In Brazil, Piriou-Sall notes that decentralization may have increased access to education, 
but might also have worsened inequalities between regions. In a carefully researched 
econometric study, Galasso and Ravallion (2000) show pro-poor program benefits 
increased with decentralization in Bangladesh. Case studies reported in Rondinelli et.al. 
and Manor find that decentralization increased the access of people in neglected rural 
areas to central government resources and institutions in most of the countries studied. 
The former note evidence from Indonesia, Morocco, Thailand, Pakistan, and Tunisia that 
shows "perceptible" improvements in resource distribution, extension of public services, 
World Bank (1994). 
6 See Smoke (2001), p.12 for a specific example. 
7 World Bank (1995) 
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and project identification and implementation. Devolution in Papua New Guinea also 
seems to have made government more responsive to local needs, largely by improving 
the capacity of provincial administrators. 
On this last point Manor stands out for his enthusiasm, citing what he terms 
strong evidence from Colombia, the Philippines, India and Cote d'Ivoire that 
decentralization enhances the responsiveness of government. His claim contradicts the 
World Development Report 1997, which states that little comparative evidence to this 
effect exists. Samoff (1990), on the other hand, finds the evidence negative, asserting 
that decentralization schemes around the world have largely failed to work. They have 
neither enhanced local capacities nor improved local programs, in large part because 
they were neutralized by elaborate mechanisms of central supervision and control. 
Slater (1989) supports this view with the example of Tanzania, where elected councils 
were eliminated and replaced by District Development Councils which reported directly 
to central government, leading one observer to comment that "the state was now moving 
its guns from Dar-es-Salaam to the villages". 8 
Turning to the question political participation and democratic community, a 
cross-country study by de Mello (2000) makes use of indicators of social capital such as 
confidence in government and civic cooperation to suggest that social capital can be 
boosted by fiscal decentralization. He notes various weaknesses in the data as well as 
likely endogeneity problems which make his empirical findings suggestive rather than 
conclusive. Huther and Shah (1998) construct an index of quality of governance for a 
sample of 80 countries and find that indices of political freedom and political 
participation are positively correlated with an index of fiscal decentralization. They also 
find positive correlations between decentralization and indices of social development, 
economic liberalization, a quality index of economic management, and an overall 
government quality index, from all of which they infer causal relationships. 
Various case studies described by Parker (1995) find evidence in Colombia, 
Mexico and Brazil that decentralization increased beneficiary participation in decision-
making in rural development schemes, leading to superior outcomes. Parker also relates 
the suggestive story of decentralization in Bangladesh, where extremes of wealth and 
power allowed local elites to capture nascent local governments. Subsequent elections 
s Slater (1989), p.514, commentator unidentified. 
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overcame this distortion, however, and over 90 percent of local councilmen were ejected 
from office. 9 
The broad range of conclusions on the overall effects, or "performance", of 
decentralization summarized above underline the deeper point that decentralization is 
inherently neither "good" nor "bad", but rather an institutional form which may be useful 
in certain circumstances to achieve certain ends (Bird 1994, among others). The 
question then becomes under what conditions does decentralization flourish? A number 
of authors have focused on what variations in performance can tell us about the 
conditions necessary for successful decentralization. It is important at this stage to make 
a clear distinction between two fundamentally different sets of factors: essentially 
technocratic issues of program design; and the pre-existing, largely exogenous 
economic, political, social and other (geographic? cultural?) attributes of society that 
affect how it is governed. The first category is inspired above all by a concern for legal, 
institutional and political instrumentality, asking if the reforms it examines were 
appropriate to desired results. Parker's "soufflé theory of decentralization", which 
underlines the importance of achieving just the right mix of political, administrative and 
fiscal tools, falls clearly into it, as to a lesser extent do Rondinelli et.al. and Smoke. The 
second category is epitomized by Putnam's (1993) argument that social capital, defined 
as horizontal linkages within society, is the decisive factor for achieving good local 
government. Putnam's contribution is particularly salient to my research, and I return to 
it in Chapter 4. Other contributors include Fisman and Gatti, and Manor. This strain of 
the literature teaches us that decentralization is better suited to contexts with: 
• democratic political traditions 
• relative macroeconomic stability 
• low local socio-economic disparities 
• low levels of pre-existing political conflict 
• high heterogeneity in demand for public services 
• low population density, and 
• legal origins in the common law system. 
This study falls unequivocally into the second camp. I focus on the impact of 
decentralization within a single country, allowing me to take policy design and macro-
institutional context as given, and focus instead on the differing effects of local 
economic, political and social characteristics as they vary across municipalities. 
Although such factors are properly held to be exogenous by theoretical political 
9 Parker (1995), p.25. 
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economy, my research design in a sense endogenizes them as the central object of study. 
This is in explicit contrast to the program design school, which leaves such issues at the 
periphery of research, focusing instead on how policy tools and outcomes vary across 
countries. My approach is consistent with a judgement that social characteristics are 
more important than program design, which I do not disown. 
But even such contingent results regarding when decentralization may be 
appropriate are few, and weak in light of the mass of studies undertaken. This is in large 
part due to a definitional failure at the core of the subject. Instead of articulating a clear 
definition of decentralization from the start, many authors have often allowed themselves 
to be led conceptually by the phenomena they have encountered. The quasi-spontaneous 
definition which has so emerged is thus opaque, malleable and ultimately unstable. It 
ranges from the deconcentration of central personnel to field offices in authoritarian 
systems, to wholesale divestiture of public functions to the private sector (see Ostrom 
et.al. (1993) and Rondinelli, et.al. for detailed discussions). As a result, researchers 
often use the same language to talk about different things, and the literature as a whole 
stagnates. This multiplication of meanings is not entirely incidental, as Slater notes, 
paraphrasing Curbelo. 
The popularity of the concept of decentralization can be linked to a combination of 
elements — its ambiguity, its capacity to conceal more than it reveals, its identification 
with long-established sentiments, its facile justification from purely technocratic points 
of view and the political instrumentality that it potentially engenders. 10 
This study seeks/avoid some of the pitfalls identified above first by proposing a 
definition of decentralization that is conceptually discrete, and so facilitates analytical 
precision. 
Decentralization is the devolution by central (i.e. national) government of specific 
functions, with all of the administrative, political and economic attributes that these 
entail, to democratic local (i.e. municipal) governments which are independent of the 
center within a legally delimited geographic and functional domain. 
I restrict my focus to decentralization under democratic regimes. The reasons for 
choosing this usage are both compelling and fortuitous. First, its restrictiveness aids 
analysis by excluding a number of phenomena which, though superficially similar, are in 
incentive teiiits fundamentally different to that which I study here; t 1 this greatly 
simplifies the identification of endogenous and exogenous variables, and thus the 
10 ibid., p.501. 
" Such as deconcentration and privatization. 
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measurement of ultimate effects. And second, the case of Bolivia involves precisely this 
form of decentralization, implemented vigorously. 
I then seek to push the question of decentralization onto more fertile terrain by 
departing from the main body of literature in two important ways: (1) a one-country 
focus which seeks results that do not have worldwide generality, but are conclusive and 
convincing regarding the effects of decentralization in Bolivia; and (2) an explicitly 
interdisciplinary approach that combines econometric tests for broad questions amenable 
to such techniques with qualitative research that probes deeper into issues where data-
intensive methods are either impossible or inappropriate. By marrying contrasting 
approaches in this way, I seek to generate a higher level of overall methodological rigor 
than either independently could achieve. In addition, the complex nature of 
decentralization processes, as well as the thread of my initial findings and the questions 
that they in turn prompted, argue for focused interdisciplinarity. 
The text is divided into two parts. Part I, which opens with this chapter, relies 
mainly on the empirical and theoretical tools typical of applied economics to study the 
Bolivian experience. Chapter 2 begins describing Bolivia's 1994 reform, and then 
examines whether decentralization changed government responsiveness to local need, 
and if so how, using a unique database that includes measures of municipalities' social 
and institutional characteristics, as well as information on its policy-making processes. 
The tight focus of the question renders it both well-suited to the characteristics of the 
available data, and answerable in an unambiguous way. This methodological approach 
allows me to study variations in local social, economic and institutional characteristics 
while holding constant for national factors, variation in which bedevils cross-country 
studies generally. It also marks a break with the literature by adopting a quantitative 
approach to the question of responsiveness. Evidence to date on this issue is 
overwhelmingly qualitative, based on case study. My empirical tests show that 
decentralization did change the distribution and use of investment across Bolivia, with 
the ultimate effect of making government more sensitive to local need (e.g. education 
investment rises where illiteracy is higher). Impressively, these national changes were 
driven by the smallest, poorest municipalities investing in their highest-priority projects. 
How can we explain such differences in behavior? What institutional or political 
features link policy-making to need at the local level while isolating them at the center? 
The empirical findings of Chapter 2 are consistent with a model of public investment in 
which local government's superior knowledge of local needs dominates the center's 
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technical and organizational advantage in the provision of public services. But in order 
to understand why decentralization has the effects that it does, we must understand how 
central and local government work; we must go beyond ad hoc assumptions and 
investigate the processes by which decisions are taken under each regime. 
Chapter 3 uses econometric models of policy-making to do this. I seek to exploit 
infolmation on the political, administrative and procedural characteristics of government 
to investigate the determinants of central and local government investment separately. 
The complex social and institutional nature of the mechanisms in question imply that 
such attempts push econometrics to the limits of its explanatory power, my extensive 
database notwithstanding. I find that central government investment is regressive both 
economically and in teims of need. Local government investment decisions are 
progressive, and largely determined by a competitive interest group dynamic which 
provides poorer citizens, as well as private sector firms and civic institutions, with 
political voice. This ensures that accountability is binding for elected officials. My 
results highlight the importance of the legal-political "hardware" of an open and 
transparent local political system, in marked contrast to the training and systems 
"software" approach that dominates many donors' good governance programs, which 
appears to have little effect on policy outputs. I also develop a model of government 
which relies on political bargaining between municipal representatives and central agents 
over the allocation of public resources. By invoking central government self-interest, I 
can explain the two central facts of Bolivian decentralization: (1) the sharp fall in the 
geographic concentration of investment, and (2) the sea-change in the uses of investment 
away from infrastructure towards the social sectors. 
Part I underlines that in order to understand decentralization, both its aggregate 
effects and why it appears to work better in some places than others, we must 
comprehend the inner workings of local government. The tools of economic theory 
employed therein can suggest general reasons why certain changes occur, but are not 
adequate for analyzing in depth the social and institutional factors which actually bring 
them about, nor for establishing causality. 
Thus Part II of the dissertation exploits qualitative information from extensive 
field work to conduct a much deeper and more detailed examination of local government 
in nine case studies, selected to broadly represent Bolivia's regional, economic, political 
and social characteristics. Chapter 4 introduces the main issues through the lens of 
political science's understanding of local government, and introduces the conceptual 
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framework of the new institutional economics. Chapters 5 and 6 provide an account of 
the workings of local government in the best and the worst cases, using the tools of 
comparative politics to analyze the character and interactions of the major political, 
economic and social actors in great detail. I seek to establish how democracy at the local 
level actually works — what is the social and institutional dynamic that leads to real 
policy decisions of the sort that generated the patterns found in Part I. I locate the 
fundamental causes of good and bad government in the economic structure of a district 
as it relates to the political party system, and in the cohesiveness and organizational 
capacity of its civil society. Chapter 7 abstracts away from these results to explain the 
local government process through the interactions of political, economic and civic actors. 
I describe a simple model of local government in which control rights over public 
institutions and resources are allocated to politicians in a first stage, and policy is 
determined in a second stage through a series of single issue lobbying sub-games. I then 
operationalize the model for qualitative research by collapsing it into an atemporal 
framework focused on the real institutions of local government, and their interactions 
with the major economic, political and social actors in a given district. I show how 
imbalances between these elements can cripple accountability and distort the policy-
making process. 
Chapter 8 returns to the other seven municipalities, testing the model on a larger 
and more diverse set of districts. It analyzes the economic, social and political 
determinants identified above, and shows that my local governance framework can 
explain the emergence of responsive and accountable institutions of government with 
greater accuracy than competing explanations of government performance. I review 
evidence from all nine case studies and identify the quality of local politics as emerging 
endogenously from interactions between economic structure and the degree of civic 
organization, both exogenously determined. Overall, civil society — and especially its 
coherence and organizational capacity — is the key to explaining local government 
performance. In order to understand where government works and where it doesn't, it is 
necessary to study the insertion of civil society into the governing process. Chapter 9 
concludes by synthesizing the results of the dissertation, and returning to the question of 
why local government proved systematically more responsive to local needs than central 
government. 
Lastly, a few words on the history of decentralization in Bolivia. Readers will 
notice that the subject is mostly absent from the chapters that follow. This is chiefly 
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because the topic is not directly related to the main thrust of my research agenda. Fully 
expecting the opposite, I investigated the economic and political history of reform in 
Bolivia extensively 12 , discovering that the most salient quality of decentralization was its 
ahistorical character. The Law of Popular Participation (LPP), as reform was christened, 
marked an important break with three decades of discourse amongst Bolivia's policy-
making and regional elites. Since the 1960s, the decentralization debate focused on 
Bolivia's nine departments. Regional elites, especially the powerful Comite Pro-Santa 
Cruz, bid for power and resources by appealing to strong regional identities, and 
threatening civic disorder and even secession. 13 Their efforts were largely blocked by 
concerns for the unity of a highly diverse nation with a chronically weak state. 
So ing,r ned was this regional concept of decentralization in the policy discourse 
that, acco - mg to one close observer of the process, the first 30-odd drafts of the LPP 
igno d municipalities entirely. 14 The idea to "go lower" originated late in the process 
ith President Sanchez de Lozada himself, who sought above all to promote accountable 
local government. Remaining details were finalized by a small team of technocrats 
without consultation until the law was ready to be presented to the nation. Hence 
Bolivia represents an episode of discontinuous refolin, and not a process of negotiation 
or accommodation amongst competing interest groups. Although the many local 
contexts of decentralization — historical and otherwise — are central to its success (or 
failure) across 311 districts, the national environment is simply less significant than it 
might be elsewhere. Moreover the history of decentralization — without doubt an 
interesting one — has already been told in accounts which are detailed and insightful. 15 
12 The interviews in La Paz, for example, were mostly on this topic (see Interview List). 
13 For a discussion of Santa Cruz's regionalism and central-local relations, see Rodriguez (1993), and 
Dunkerley (1984) Chapter 3. 
14  David Tuchschneider, World Bank rural development officer, interview, La Paz, 3 May 1997. 
IS See for example Molina (1997), Gonzales-Arana (1992) and Grupo DRU (1996). 
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Does Decentralization Increase Government Responsiveness 
to Local Needs? 
1, Introduction 
Chapter 1 discussed the curious discrepancy between enthusiasm for 
decentralization amongst governments and policy analysts across the world, and the 
weak and contradictory evidence on its effects. In particular the literature records no 
econometric analysis of the effects of decentralization on government responsiveness to 
local needs, and relevant anecdotal evidence is ambiguous. This is especially surprising 
given that increased responsiveness constitutes one of the central claims in favor of 
reform. This chapter seeks to fill the gap by examining this question in a careful, 
methodical way using data from Bolivia. Focusing on one country allows me to control 
for political regime, external shocks, and other exogenous factors more systematically 
than a cross-country approach can. And Bolivia is particularly appropriate since reform 
was comprehensive and sustained, and so constitutes a social experiment. It also 
coincided with a huge upsurge in the collection of local-level and national data which are 
of surprising scope and quality, including political, institutional, and even 
procedural/administrative indicators for all of Bolivia's 311 municipalities. The use of 
such variables constitutes an innovation of this dissertation. 
The remainder of the chapter is organized as follows. Section two discusses 
Bolivia's decentralization program, and then examines the changes in national resource 
flows which it brought about. Section three develops a model to analyze the trade-off 
between local government's knowledge of local needs v. central government's technical 
and organizational advantage in the provision of public services in districts with 
heterogeneous preferences. Section four tests whether decentralization changed public 
investment patterns across Bolivia's 311 municipalities, and then examines the 
determinants of this change focusing on variables of need. Section five concludes. 
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2. Decentralization In Bolivia 
2.1 Popular Participation And The Decentralization Reform 
On the eve of revolution, Bolivia was a poor, backward country with extreme 
levels of inequality, presided over by a "typical racist state in which the non-spanish 
speaking indigenous peasantry was controlled by a small, Spanish speaking white elite, 
[their power] based ultimately on violence more than consensus or any social pact." I 
 The nationalist revolution of 1952, which expropriated the "commanding heights" of the 
economy, land and mines, launched Bolivia on the road to one of the most centralized 
state structures in the region. The government embarked upon a state-led modernization 
strategy in which public corporations and regional governments initiated a concerted 
drive to break down provincial fiefdoms, transform existing social relations, and create a 
modern, industrial, more egalitarian society. To this end the President directly appointed 
Prefects, who in turn designated entire regional governments and associated 
dependencies, forming a national chain of cascading authority emanating from the 
capital. 
Successive governments through the 1950s promoted the unionization of miners, 
laborers, peasants, public servants and professionals into a hierarchical "peak 
association", whose representatives negotiated national policies directly with their 
similars from the private sector and government. Together these three planned the 
exploitation of Bolivia's natural resources, the development of new industries, and 
sectoral and regional policy in a bid to orchestrate a rapid development process from the 
heights of La Paz. The intellectual trends of the 1950s-1970s, Dependencia theory, 
Import Substitution Industrialization, and Developmentalism, only contributed to this 
tendency, as did the military governments which overthrew elected administrations with 
increasing frequency from the 1960s on. 2 With political power so little dispersed, there 
was little point in establishing the legal and political instruments of local governance. 
As a result beyond the nine regional capitals (including La Paz) and an additional 25-30 
cities, local government existed in Bolivia at best in name, as an honorary and 
ceremonial institution devoid of administrative capability and starved for funds. And in 
most of the country it did not exist at all. 
Klein (1993), p.237. Author's translation. 
- See Klein (1993), Chapter 9. 
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Against this background, the Bolivian decentralization reform was announced in 
1994. The Law of Popular Participation, developed almost in secret by a small number 
of technocrats, was announced to the nation to general surprise, followed by ridicule, 
followed by determined opposition of large parts of society. 3 First made public in 
January of that year, the law was promulgated by Congress in April and implemented 
from July. The scale of the change in resource flows and political power that it brought 
about were enormous. The core of the law consists of four points: 4 
1. The share of national tax revenues devolved from central government to 
municipalities was raised from ten percent to twenty percent. More importantly, 
whereas before these funds were apportioned according to ad hoc, highly political 
criteria, after decentralization they are allocated on a strict per capita basis (see 
below). 
2. Title to all local health, education, roads, irrigation, culture and sports infrastructure 
was transferred to municipalities free of charge, along with the responsibility to 
administer, maintain and equip it, and invest in new infrastructure. 
3. Oversight Committees (Comites de Vigilancia) were established to oversee 
municipal spending of Popular Participation funds, and propose new projects. These 
are composed of representatives from local, grass-roots groups who can petition to 
have disbursements from central government suspended if they judge that such funds 
are being misused or stolen. When suspension occurs, the center undertakes no 
arbitration, but simply waits for the two sides to resolve their dispute, relying on 
economic incentives to speed agreement. 
4. 198 new municipalities — 64% of the total — were created, and existing ones 
expanded to include suburbs and surrounding rural areas. 
The reform heralded a new era of municipal government for the overwhelming majority 
of Bolivian towns and cities. In many parts of Bolivia where before the state was 
present, if at all, in the form of a local schoolhouse, health post, or perhaps military 
3 "ParticipaciOn Popular: Se Cierne La Tormenta", Reflejos de la Amami, No.368, 14-21 January 1994; 
"Injertos Tramposos en "Participacion Popular — , Hoy, 19 January 1994; "La Declaratoria de Guerra 
del Primer Mandatario", La Razon, 27 January 1994; "Arrogancia Insultante", Presencia, 27 February 
1994; and "ParticipaciOn Popular: Se Democratiza la Corrupcion?", La Razon, 6 March 1994 are only a 
few of the many articles which appeared in the Bolivian press documenting popular reaction to the 
"Ley Maldita" ("Damned Law"). 
Ley de Participacion Popular, Reglamento de las Organizaciones Territoriales de Base, Secretarla 
Nacional de Participacion Popular, Ministerio de Desarrollo Sostenible y Medio Ambiente, 1994. 
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Figure 1: The Changing Allocation of Public Funds 
City 
Central-to-Local 
Revenue Sharing (Bs'000) 
1993 	1995 	% Change 
% of National 
Total 
1993 	1995 
La Paz 114,292 61,976 -46% 51% 10% 
Santa Cruz 51,278 63,076 23% 23% 10% 
Cochabamba 25,856 38,442 49% 12% 6% 
3 Cities Sub-total 191,427 163,494 -15 % 86% 27 % 
Rest of Bolivia 32,099 444,786 1286% 14% 73% 
Total 223,525 608,280 172% 
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garrison or customs office, each reporting to its respective ministry, there was now for 
the first time elected local government accountable only to local voters. 
2.2 Descriptive Statistics 
The extent of the change is perhaps best appreciated by examining the changes in 
resource flows that it catalyzed. Figure 1 shows that before decentralization 308 
Bolivian municipalities divided amongst them a mere 14% of all devolved funds, while 
the three main cities took 86%. After decentralization their shares reversed to 73% and 
27%. The per capita criterion resulted in a massive shift of resources in favor of the 
smaller, poorer districts. 
A more important and telling change was to the composition of investment. 
Figure 2 shows central and local government investment by sector for the periods 1991-3 
and 1994-6 respectively. The differences are large. In the years leading up to 1994 
central government invested the largest sums in transport, followed by hydrocarbons, 
multisectoral5 and energy. Together these four sectors account for 73% of total public 
investment during 1991-3. But after decentralization local governments invest most 
heavily in education, urban development, and water & sanitation, together accounting for 
79% of municipal investment. Of the sectors accounting for roughly three-quarters of 
total investment in both cases, central and local government have not even one in 
common. The evidence implies that local and central government have very different 
investment priorities. 
$ A hodgepodge of projects including feasibility studies, capital acquisitions, technical assistance and 
emergency relief that is difficult to categorize. 
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Lastly, it is instructive to examine how investment was distributed 
geographically among Bolivia's municipalities before and after decentralization. Figures 
3-5 below give us a rough sense of this by placing Bolivia's municipalities along the 
horizontal axis and measuring investment per capita as vertical displacement. A highly 
skewed allocation would appear as a few points strewn across the top of the graph, with 
most lying on the bottom; an equitable distribution would appear as a band of points at 
some intermediate level. How does Bolivia compare? Figure 3 shows that per capita 
investment before decentralization was indeed highly unequal, with large investments in 
three districts and the vast majority at or near zero. Figure 4 corrects for the skewing 
effect of the highest observations by excluding the upper twelve and showing only those 
below Bs.2000/capita. Though the distribution now appears less unequal, there is still 
monotonically increasing density as we move downwards, with fully one-half of all 
observations on or near the horizontal axis. Investment under centralized government 
was thus hugely skewed in favor of a few municipalities which received enormous sums, 
a second group where investment was significant, and the unfortunate half of districts 
which received nothing. Compare this with figure 5, which shows municipal investment 
after decentralization. This chart shows no district over Bs.700/capita, a broad band with 
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greatest density between Bs.100-200/capita, and only a few points touching the axis. 
Average municipal investment for this period is Bs.208/capita, and thus the band 
contains the mean. 6 These crude indicators imply that central government, with a much 
larger budget and free rein over all of Bolivia's municipalities, chose a very unequal 
distribution of investment across space, while decentralized government distributes 
public investment much more evenly throughout the country. 
Investment sums here are much lower because they exclude central government funds. 
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Figure 5: Local Investment per capita, 1994-96 
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3. Theory 
3.1 Background 
In terms of productive efficiency, central government should be naturally 
superior to local government so long as returns are at least slightly increasing. Any 
economic case for decentralization must therefore invoke a counterbalancing source of 
efficiency in which local government has an advantage. Different authors have 
approached the problem in different ways. Tiebout's (1956) seminal work posits a 
world in which individuals move costlessly amongst localities that offer different levels 
of provision of a public good. The ensuing competitive equilibrium in locational choices 
produces an efficient allocation. But this approach assumes a highly mobile population 
and fixed governments, which is at odds with both anecdotal evidence from Bolivia and 
studies of the (comparatively mobile) United States, as Bardhan (2001) points out.' A 
better assumption would seem to be that government is the mobile element in most local 
democratic systems, changing with relative frequency, whereas the population is 
essentially fixed over typical, four or five year electoral periods. European countries' 
notably low rates of internal migration support this view. Tiebout-style "voting with 
your feet" is undoubtedly a valid mechanism for preference revelation at the margins, 
and may be more important for particular services, such as education. But the principal 
mechanism for joining demand and supply for public goods must involve the political 
process. Indeed this is arguably why local government exists at all. 
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Oates (1972) examines heterogeneity in tastes and spillovers from public goods 
through a model in which local government can tailor public goods output to local tastes, 
whereas central government produces a common level of public goods for all localities. 
He finds that decentralization is preferred in systems with heterogeneous tastes and no 
spillovers; with spillovers and no heterogeneity, centralization is superior on efficiency 
grounds. But Oates' results rest largely on his assumption of uniform central provision 
of public goods which, though it mirrors an empirical regularity, is theoretically 
ungrounded and problematic when viewed in the Bolivian context. Besley and Coate 
(1999) provide a model in which this restriction is lifted. Like Oates, they invoke 
uniform taxation to finance public goods provision. But they then devise a model of 
central policy-making in which elected representatives bargain over public goods 
provision in multiple districts. For heterogeneous districts, they find that 
decentralization continues to be welfare superior in the absence of spillovers, but 
centralization is no longer superior when spillovers are present. They also find that 
higher heterogeneity reduces the relative performance of centralization for any level of 
spillovers. This model is both more representative of how real central governments 
operate, and more in keeping with the facts of the Bolivian transition from centralized to 
decentralized provision. The results below can be interpreted as an indirect test of their 
findings, given reasonable assumptions about representative local utility functions. Thus 
construed, my results weakly support their findings. 
Bardhan and Mookherjee (1998) develop a model of public service provision 
which examines the implications of decentralization for the targeting and cost-
effectiveness of public expenditure. They find that for provision of a merit good 
available on competitive markets to the poor, decentralization dominates with respect to 
inter-community targeting and cost-effectiveness, though not necessarily for intra-
community targeting. For the provision of infrastructure, decentralization dominates 
only if local governments are not vulnerable to capture, local government has adequate 
financing, inter-jurisdictional externalities do not exist, and local governments have all 
the bargaining power vs. public enterprise managers. On a separate but related issue, 
Persson, Roland and Tabellini (1997) examine how the separation of powers can lead to 
political accountability. They examine how voters can combine incentives produced by 
elections and the separation of powers to control moral hazard and reduce politicians' 
' Bardhan cites Hanson and Hartman's (1994) finding that few poor people move amongst US states in 
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rents under a variety of constitutional regimes (presidential, parliamentary, etc). Under 
appropriate checks and balances, they find that separation of powers helps voters elicit 
information about both politicians and the state of nature. These results are of interest 
not only here but for Part II as well, as the separation of powers is central to the 
operation of local government in Bolivia. 
3.2 The Model 
A country is made up of T districts, each with population ni where the subscript j 
denotes district. Individuals, subscripted i, have linear utility Ui = xi + Oib(gi) where xi is 
the amount of private good consumed by individual i, gi is the amount of public good 
available in district j, and 0i is individual i's preference for public good 	I use Orni to 
denote the local median preference for the public good in district j. Local welfare is 
defined as median utility, U inj = xmi + 0,0(0. The function of government is to provide 
public goods, which it finances with a local head tax. I allow central government to have 
a cost advantage in the provision of public goods, such that the head tax needed to 
finance a given level of provision under central government is agi/ni with 0<c1, 
whereas the tax under local government is gini. This cost advantage can derive from 
various sources, such as central government's superior technical knowledge or an 
organizational advantage which lowers the cost of complex public goods, or traditional 
economies of scale. 8 I also assume that local government ascertains 0 mi accurately, 
whereas central government ascertains 0 nisi with probability p and 0_,,i with probability 
(1-p). Probability varies as pe [0,1], and 0_,,i is defined as an unrestricted value of 0 
other than O r i. 
Under decentralization, local government's problem in district j is 
max [19 „,b(g) — 8±.1 
g 
( 1 ) 
where for simplicity I drop all subscripts j. Local government thus maximizes provision 
of the public good given median local preference, which it finances with a head tax. 
Taking first-order conditions and re-arranging yields 
bi(g)= 	1 
nOm 
(2) 
search of higher welfare benefits. 
Certain types of public health interventions, for example, require specialized technical knowledge 
which central government may be able to obtain more cheaply than local government. 
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The level of public good provided by local government is thus an implicit function of O m, 
the median preference for the public good, and of the population n. Citizens receive the 
level of public good that they prefer, which they pay for fully. 
Central government's problem is 
   
max 
gi -•-'gT 
Ij (p8„ti 	p)8_„,  p(g j )–I,a—g 
n • 
1 
(3) 
  
Solve for district j. Taking first-order conditions and re-arranging yields 
a  
11(g) - 	 (4) 
n(p 0 + (1– p)8_„,) 
The level of public good provided by central government is thus an implicit function not 
only of local median preference and population, but also of the probability that central 
government correctly assesses local preferences, the difference between "true" local 
preferences and those otherwise ascertained by central government, and central 
government's cost advantage. 
Hereafter the amounts of the public good provided in equilibrium by local and 
central governments, defined by equations (2) and (4) respectively, are denoted gi and gc . 
Utility is a strictly concave function of g, and hence b"(g)<0. Comparing the two 
equations, it is easy to see that, ceteris paribus, public goods provision under central 
government will be higher than under local government when the former has a cost 
advantage (c <1). Citizens will prefer central government which, for a given head tax 
levied, provides more of the public good than does local government. This is clear from 
figure 6(a), where central government's cost advantage changes the slope of the budget 
line, and allows the residents of j to move from a local-government equilibrium on U1 to 
the new tangency on U c where Uc>Ui. 
For the sake of simplicity, I assume from this point on that 0. m = 0 and analyze 
central government's assessment of local preferences via the pO m term. The central 
government equilibrium is now defined by b'(g c). oc/(np0m). Where p<1, central 
government underestimates local preferences, and ceteris paribus public goods provision 
will be lower than under local government. This is equivalent to comparing points 1 and 
2 in figure 6(b). Because there is no cost advantage, the budget line remains the same 
and citizens consume less g but more x. Choosing central government entails moving to 
a lower indifference curve Uc<U1, and citizens prefer local government provision. When 
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p=1 the center accurately assesses local preferences, provision is equal to that under 
local government (point 1 below), and citizens are indifferent between the two regimes. 
Figure 6: Utility Under Central v. Local Government 
U c 
cr 	 be 	gi 
By setting bi(gc) = IAD) we can find critical values for the indifference points at which 
the countervailing effects are equal. It is straightforward to see that if a= p, citizens will 
be indifferent between central and local government, as the center's inaccuracy in 
assessing local preferences is counterbalanced by its cost advantage, and provision of 
gc=gi. If cc>p, the cost advantage is dominated by the center's inaccuracy in measuring 
local preferences, and g c<gl. Citizens will prefer local government. If a<p, then the 
center's cost advantage outweighs its inability to perceive local preferences accurately, 
and gc>gi. Citizens prefer central government. These results are summarized in figure 7. 
Figure 7 
Indifference condition: 
11(g. (,)= b'(g 1) 	a 	1  
Assuming Condition Result 	Preference 
0_,,, 
a>p gc<gi Local 
a<p gc>gI Central 
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For simplicity, the analysis above depicts the function of the public sector as the 
provision of a single public good g, and examines the effects of competing political and 
institutional factors on that provision. In reality, of course, local and central 
governments provide many public and private goods and services, and perform a large 
variety of functions which this approach is too simple to capture. Cost advantage and 
assessment inaccuracies are likely to affect these different activities in different ways. 
Section four examines this question empirically by comparing central and local 
investment patterns across ten different sectors for Bolivia before and after 
decentralization. 
4. Empirical Tests: Decentralization and Investment 
4.1 Methodology 
My objective is to test whether decentralization made public investment more 
responsive to local needs in Bolivia. This can usefully be decomposed into two 
questions: (i) did the pattern of public sector investment change with decentralization? 
and if so, (ii) do indicators of need determine that change? It is possible that public 
investment did not change with decentralization. If so decentralization and 
centralization would be largely equivalent from an economic perspective, though one 
might be preferable to the other on political or administrative grounds. If 
decentralization did change investment patterns it becomes important to try to 
characterize this change in terms of welfare and distribution, and determine which social 
and institutional factors were most important in defining it. Ideally public goods would 
be measured in quality-adjusted units of output, separated by type. But such information 
is unavailable for Bolivia, and instead I measure investment inputs in the form of 
resources expended on public investment projects. This approach has the advantage of 
using natural, non-controversial units, and of facilitating comparisons across different 
sectors. I separate these flows into thirteen distinct sectors, of which I analyze ten (see 
figure 9). 9 
For each sector I estimate the model 
Gint 	+ Nem 1336t + Emt 	 (5 ) 
Multisectoral includes a sufficient diversity of projects as to be functionally meaningless as a 
category. And almost no local governments invest in Hydrocarbons or Mining, rendering comparisons 
across regimes impossible. 
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where an, and 8, are vectors of state and year dummy variables as per above, and a* m is 
the product of am and a decentralization dummy variable which takes the values 0 before 
1994 and 1 after (i.e. post-decentralization). 10 Investment patterns are thus decomposed 
into three terms: a state effect, am, which captures all of the characteristics of a state 
fixed in time, a year effect, ö t , which captures year shocks and time-specific 
characteristics, and a decentralization-interacted state effect, e rn, which captures state-
specific characteristics commencing in 1994 which were previously absent. As 
decentralized public goods provision began in 1994, this term will capture the effects of 
local government, local civic associations and other local institutions that sprang up with 
the reform, and social and political dynamics more generally that impact upon local 
government but lay dormant under central rule. The data cover the period 1987-1996. 
I then perform three tests: 
1. 131 =132 Means test. This is a simple t-test to determine whether the means of the 
am and e n, coefficients are significantly different for each sector. Significance 
indicates that decentralization changed national investment patterns through the 
effects and actions of local governments. 
9 . 131 m = 132m Individual tests. This F-test checks municipality by municipality whether -
the decentralization-interacted state coefficients are different from the simple state 
coefficients for investment in a given sector. A significant F-test constitutes 
evidence that decentralization caused a change in local investment patterns in a 
particular municipality. Significance in many municipalities constitutes stronger -
evidence that decentralization changed national investment patterns. 
3. Lastly, I place the differences in state dummy coefficients on the LHS and estimate 
the model 
P2m-131,= CS m + TiZm + Em 	 (6) 
for each of ten sectors, where S is a scalar or vector of the existing stock of public 
services (variously defined, as we will see below) at an initial period, and Z is a 
vector of institutional and civic variables, both indexed by municipality m. This 
approach isolates those changes in investment patterns resulting from a move to a 
decentralized regime and then examines its determinants. Notice that equation (6) is 
10 Thus Om takes the value 0 for all municipalities and all years before 1994, and is identical to am for 
all years from 1994 onwards. 
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a general-form and not structural model, and hence the results will not be sensitive to 
specific theoretical assumptions. 
The LHS variable should by construction be unrelated to all factors which remain 
constant between the two periods, and thus I omit socio-economic, regional and other 
variables which do not vary between the centralized and decentralized regimes. I 
assume that the variables in Z, as well as the stock of public services in the ten sectors of 
interest, S, are constant over the period in question." 
Literally hundreds of variables that might be included in the Z vector are 
available for Bolivia. To facilitate analysis, and in order to combine very specific Z-type 
variables into more meaningful and conceptually defensible indicators, I characterize 
them according to the groups in figure 8, and construct principal component variables 
(PCVs) for each. 
Figure 8: Interpretation of PCVs 
PCV Interpretation - Variable increases in... listed in order of 
PCV Group 	 No. importance, where applicable (see Annex 1 for details) 
Civil Institutions 1 
	
Strength of local civil institutions and organizations 
Private Sector 	 1 
	
Dynamism of the local private sector 
Training & Capacity-Building 	Intensity of the local capacity-building efforts undertaken 
by/for local government 
Information Technology 	 IT systems - hardware and software 
Project Planning 	 Informed project planning which follows consensual and 
open procedures 
This process is explained in detail in the following section (4.2). The PCVs and their 
constituent variables, as well as variables of need, are summarized in Appendix 1. 
Equation (6) can thus be written 
P2m-131m = CSni + TliZim + • • • +115Z5m + Ern , 	 (7) 
where subscripts 1 to 5 denote the groups above. 
In theoretical terms, the main coefficient of interest is C, which is interpreted as 
an indicator of the degree to which investment is based on need. I define "need" as the 
marginal utility arising from a particular type of public service, N = U'(g), where N is 
need and utility is defined as in the model in section 3.2. In the language of the model, 
let Om = U'(g). Hence need falls as the stock of g rises, and vice versa. I use two types of 
For most of the demographic and socio-economic variables in question, which tend to show change 
that is statistically significant only over longer periods of time, this is reasonable. It is less reasonable 
in the case of the S variable. Unfortunately the data leave no choice. 
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information as indicators of the stock of public services: (1) the penetration rates 12 of 
public services or benefits in the local population, r, or the population without access to 
the same, 1-r, 13 and (2) the initial per capita stock of infrastructure (at the outset of 
decentralization). Examples of these are: (1) the literacy and illiteracy rates, the share of 
population without water or sewerage; and (2) the number of sports facilities and 
markets per capita in 1994. Of these, type 1 variables can be considered truer indicators 
of need, as they better capture the criterion of public service use by the population and 
are likely to be better measures of the flow of benefits produced by public investments. 
Type 2 variables indicate existence more than exploitation by the local population, and 
hence should be less accurate indicators of need. I use type 2 variables when type 1 
variables are unavailable. It is also important to note that need here is a relative concept, 
rising and falling with U'(g). This is an important distinction, as the semantics of its 
common usage imply that need is an absolute, and even discrete, concept, existing in 
some places (at some times) but not in others. 
Following the argument in section 3.2, I expect C to be negative and significant 
when S 1  is measured by the penetration rate r, and positive and significant when S 1  is 
measured by (1-r). If S m is measured by r, a negative coefficient suggests that 
decentralized government invests more heavily in a type of public good where it is 
scarce, and hence presumably where it is more strongly preferred. Decentralization 
would thus lead to a more progressive investment pattern in terms of objective need than 
obtained under centralized government. A positive coefficient implies that decentralized 
government behaves regressively, accentuating the pre-existing differences in public 
goods endowments. I interpret this as evidence that the relationship posited in 3.2 is 
exactly backwards, and central government allocates public investment with more 
sensitivity to need than local government. A coefficient equal to zero suggests that local 
government does not take the existing stock of public goods into account at all in making 
its investment decisions, implying that the model is misguided and local preferences 
should not appear in the expression. 
The variables in Z are not included as mere controls, however. Their 
coefficients, rl , are of interest insofar as they help explain the institutional, civic and 
procedural determinants of decentralized investment decisions, and so constitute indirect 
12 Note that "rate" here denotes a stock and not flow concept. 
13 I use both for education, and obtain the expected variation in sign in our results (see below). 
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tests of the theoretical argument above. The case put forward by political scientists 14 for 
local government's superior assessment of local preferences and needs includes greater 
sensitivity to grass-roots demand, greater accessibility of local lobby groups to local 
government, and greater political accountability to the local populace. Some of the ways 
in which this can happen include the use of participative planning techniques, and the 
existence of private sector and civic organizations that are strong and dynamic. 
Remember that these factors were not relevant to central decision-making, which 
occurred in the center. Hence I interpret positive coefficients on these PCVs as weak 
evidence that local government assesses preferences more accurately than central 
government, implying that the value of p is less than 1 and the difference between real 
preferences and those perceived by the center (O rn-0„) is high. 
4.2 Empirical Approach and Data Reduction 
The surprisingly large amount of information available for Bolivia during the 
period 1987-1996 demands a strategy for choosing, from among 1200+ variables, those 
which are most appropriate and most closely related to the underlying concepts I wish to 
test. In particular a number of measures in which I am interested are present in my 
dataset as multiple, finely differentiated variables the interpretation of which —
collectively and across sectors — is problematic. I have, for example, sixteen variables of 
municipal capacity-building exercises by type, and thirteen variables measuring 
technical assistance drafting municipal development plans. The challenge is to reduce 
such groups to at most one indicator each without loss of information. 
I commence by narrowing down the dataset to a manageable size. My empirical 
strategy is iterative, and begins by finding the best idiosyncratic model of public 
investment for each of the ten sectors of interest. I fit the equation 
Gm = CS m + TIZ + Em , 	 (8) 
separately for central public investment (1991-3) and local public investment (1994-7) 
where Gm is aggregate investment per capita in the public good subscripted by 
municipality, S m is a scalar or vector of the existing stock of public goods of that type 
(variously defined) at an initial period, and Z is a vector of socio-economic, 
demographic, regional, political, institutional, administrative and procedural variables 
which might affect investment decisions. The use of the Z term follows the literature on 
the demand for public goods exemplified by Bergstrom & Goodman (1973) and 
14 See for example Wolman in Bennett (1990). 
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Rubinfeld, Shapiro and Roberts (1987) within the context of the available data. In 
particular, no income data is available at the municipal level in Bolivia, and so I 
substitute several alternative indicators of income and wealth, for example type of 
cooking fuel, and housing size, quality and related characteristics. But I expand the 
scope of the Z vector considerably compared to previous authors by including measures 
of the strength of local political forces as well as municipal institutional capacity. This 
innovation allows me to investigate the micropolitical basis of local government 
decision-making, explored in detail in Chapter 3. 
No constraints across sectors are allowed on the particular variables admissible 
in Z. I use the Huber/White estimator of variance to produce consistent standard errors 
in the presence of non-identically distributed residuals. This produces ten different 
models of public sector investment, one for each sector. Individually these models are 
quite satisfactory, with high R 2 and few variables insignificant. But because of large 
variation in the specification of the Z vector, comparison across sectors is problematic. 
Additionally, on a theoretical level these models would seem to assert that public 
investment in different sectors happens according to different processes, in which 
different variables intervene. This is evidently unsatisfying. 
In a second iteration I re-estimate equation (8) holding the Z vector constant 
across all sectors. But I take advantage of the previous stage by using only those 
variables found significant there; in this sense the previous stage constitutes a method for 
reducing the 1200+ indicators to a subset of 197. But a dimensionality problem persists 
even so. I then employ a method of forward and backward substitution and elimination 
in order to reduce this subset to 22 variables encompassing the thirteen categories of Z, 
in specifications of 23-30 variables overall. These models benefit from being readily 
comparable across sectors. The ratio of significant to insignificant variables drops 
sharply compared to the first stage, however, and R 2 values are somewhat lower. 
The insignificance of the variables chosen is not entirely separable from the issue 
of comparability, however. In these results none of the variables is significant in most of 
the sectors, and many are significant in only two or three. How does one interpret a 
given variable across sectors, knowing that an alternative one from the same group 
would produce a different pattern of significance and insignificance? For example, how 
do we interpret the insignificance of a given training & capacity building variable in 
most models when we know from stage one that there is at least one alternative such 
variable that is significant for each sector? We evidently cannot assert that capacity 
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building does not matter and must conclude that the comparability constraint forces us to 
omit information from our models that is important in explaining investment behavior. 
Indeed, given that there are 197 variables, many of them quite specific, which 
have explanatory power over the dependent variable, any subset of twenty, 30, or even 
100 will omit valuable information. I require a solution that allows me to retain the full 
breadth of information, and yet produce a specification which is both comparable and 
parsimonious. I turn to principal component analysis, a data reduction technique in 
which the objective is to find the unit-length combinations of explanatory variables with 
the highest variance. I follow Maddala (1977) in calculating variables z1 to zk where z is 
a linear combination of the x variables, 
z1 = aixi + a2x2 + 	+ aLxL 
z2 = bix + b2x2 + 	+ bLx L etc. 15 
ranked in order of variance, with highest first. Principal component analysis regresses y 
on z1, z2, zk, where k < L and z's are constructed so as to be orthogonal. So long as 
the z's chosen represent combinations of variables that have economic meaning and can 
be interpreted, this provides a method for estimating parsimonious models with limited 
loss of information. 
I calculate a set of principal component variables (PCVs) based on the raw 
variables retained in stage one. I discard all those with low eigenvalues, as per normal 
procedure, and then find the remaining subset which optimally estimate equation (8), 
where Z is a vector of PCVs. The eigenvectors associated with each of the PCVs used in 
this chapter are listed in Appendix 1, along with more detailed interpretations of each 
PCV. 
4.3 Results 
Figure 9 shows the results from the means test r31 = 132. Mean values are 
significantly different at the 0.1% level for education, water & sanitation, agriculture, 
transport, urban development and communication, and at the 1% level for industry & 
tourism and water management. In health, values are significantly different at only the 
13% level, and worse for energy. The evidence is that decentralization changed national 
investment patterns in the first eight sectors. Examination of the 132 values indicates that 
the effect of local government on average investment under decentralization was to 
increase investment in education, urban development, water management and perhaps 
15 For further treatment of this topic, see also Greene (1997), and Jackson (1991). 
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health, no change in energy, and decrease investment in agriculture, transport, 
communication, industry and tourism, and (puzzlingly given the increase in water 
management) water & sanitation. But figure 10 shows that the number of municipalities 
investing in these sectors increased for all except agriculture. This implies that the 
concentration of investment fell, as more municipalities invested in a large number of 
(often smaller) projects in nine sectors. 
Figure 9 
Test 1: Coefficients Equal? Test 131 43, = 0 
Sector Variable 
Test 	Test 
Mean Std Error t-statistic P Value 
   
Education 13 	1 
13 2 
0.00128 
0.01685 
0.00032 
0.00042 
-22.798 0.0000 
Water & Sanitation 13 	1 
fl , 
0.00374 
-0.01174 
0.00043 
0.00049 
17.343 0.0000 
Agriculture ii , 
13 2 
0.00867 
-0.00535 
0.00080 
0.00086 
8.667 0.0000 
Transport 13 	1 0.05464 0.00890 5.967 0.0000 
13 , -0.05152 0.00890 
Urban Development 13 	1 0.00307 0.00049 -5.324 0.0000 
13 2 0.00791 0.00053 
Communication 13 	1 0.00191 0.00032 4.011 0.0001 
13 2 -0.00055 0.00031 
Industry & Tourism 13 1 0.00101 0.00023 3.768 0.0002 
13 , -0.00071 0.00023 
Water Management id, 	1 0.00075 0.00018 -2.932 0.0034 
13 , 0.00182 0.00020 
Health (3 0.00258 0.00038 1.540 0.1238 
132 0.00141 0.00041 
Energy 13 -0.00489 0.00185 1.281 0.2004 
132 -0.00963 0.00186 
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Figure 10 
Number of Municipalities Receiving 
Investment, by Sector (in municipality-years) 
Sector Before After Change 
Urban Development 66 675 923% 
Education 75 685 813% 
Health 95 484 409% 
Water Management 46 175 280% 
Communications 38 97 155% 
Water & Sanitation 202 506 150% 
Energy 180 259 44% 
Industry & Tourism 44 60 36% 
Transport 357 444 24% 
Agriculture 343 309 -10% 
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Figure 11 shows the number of municipalities where we can reject the hypothesis 
p,m= 32m, that is, the number of municipalities where decentralization changed 
investment patterns significantly during the first three years. The test is significant in 
about three-quarters of municipalities for water & sanitation and education, and in one-
third of municipalities for urban development and water management, but in only one-
fifth of municipalities for agriculture and health and fewer in other sectors. This suggests 
that investment patterns changed significantly for water & sanitation, education, urban 
development and water management, did not change for industry & tourism, energy, 
communication and transport, with agriculture and health on the border between 
significantly different and not. Taking into account the results from test 1, I conclude 
that agriculture spending did change significantly between the two periods, while for 
health it may have but the evidence is inconclusive. Thus two sectors can be added to 
the two above for which decentralization did not significantly change investment 
patterns across Bolivia's 311 municipalities. From this point the analysis focuses on 
water & sanitation, education, urban development, water management and agriculture. 
35 
Does Decentralization Increase Government Responsiveness to Local Needs? 
Figure 11 
Test 2: Coefficients Equal? 
Test 13in,-132n, = 0 
Sector 
No. 
Significant Significant 
Water & Sanitation 224 76% 
Education 209 71% 
Urban Development 107 36% 
Water Management 105 36% 
Agriculture 65 22% 
Health 49 17% 
Transport 29 10% 
Communication 7 2% 
Energy 7 2% 
Industry & Tourism 7 2% 
These results can best be understood by considering the following: (i) One-half 
of all municipalities in Bolivia received no public investment at all during the three years 
before decentralization, and these are for the most part the poorest municipalities. As all 
municipalities have funds to invest post-decentralization, the most pronounced changes 
in investment patterns are accounted for by the poorest municipalities. And, (ii) given 
high levels of poverty and low levels of public investment before decentralization, poor 
municipalities have a need for investment in more than one sector. Thus, rather than 
spread resources around thinly, most reasonably choose to concentrate investment in a 
few, high-priority sectors during the initial years of decentralization. 
Hence the results are driven by investment by the poorest districts responding to 
their greatest needs. By revealed preference we can infer that local administrations in 
these areas prioritize basic social service projects above productive projects, and 
productive (i.e. income-enhancing) projects in turn above economic infrastructure. 
Hence they will tend to invest in education and water before agriculture, and agriculture 
before transport or communication. Because only a few years of post-decentralization 
data are available, the F-test is expected to fail in low-priority sectors, as poor 
municipalities received little or no investment under central government and continue to 
invest little under decentralization. In high-priority sectors, however, investment will 
leap upwards from a very low base if decentralization matters. This is indeed what 
happens. Decentralization leads to an increase in investment in water & sanitation and 
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education in three-quarters of all municipalities, and urban development and water 
management in one-third. There are moderate changes in investment patterns in 
agriculture and health, and very little change in transport, communication, energy and 
industry & tourism. In conclusion, decentralization did change the pattern of Bolivian 
public investment. and this difference was strongest in the social services and urban 
development. 
Test 3 investigates the determinants of the difference in dummy state variables, 
13, - 13 k , equivalent to the increase in investment due to decentralization. Results are 
examined sector-by-sector, beginning with education. 
Education 
Figure 12 
Test 3: R2m B 	r s + 	+ r lm = 	11-1m 	• • 
Independent Variable 
+ 	z 	F • 	• I5-5m + -n1 
I 	II 
Model* 
III IV V 
Private Sector PCV1 -0.000983 -0.00121 -0.00106 -0.0003 -0.00056 
(-2.466) (-3.004) (-2.689) (-1.004) (-1.619) 
Project Planning PCV1 -0.000538 -0.00049 -0.00055 -0.00037 -0.00052 
(-0.919) (-0.830) (-0.925) (-0.703) (-0.879) 
Civil Institutions PCV1 0.000973 0.00101 0.00103 
(1.752) (1.774) (1.839) 
Training & Capacity Building PCV1 -0.00063 
(-0.591) 
Information Technology PCV1 0.00118 
(1.010) 
Illiteracy Rate (Adult) 0.000173 0.00019 0.0002 
(2.906) (3.116) (1306) 
Illiteracy Rate (Over-6's) 0.00018 
(2.505) 
Literacy Rate -0.00011 
(-1.844) 
Local Education Authority 0.005603 0.00534 0.00543 0.0053 0.00479 
(1.421) (1.356) (1.378) (1.354) (1.379) 
_constant 0.0075759 0.02037 0.00806 0.00722 0.00704 
(1.814) (3.728) (1.816) (1.862) (1.731) 
R-square 0.0176 0.0136 0.0162 0.0155 0.0172 
Prob>F 0.001 0.0025 0.0016 0.0128 0.0104 
* OLS regressions reported with robust standard errors 
t-stats in parentheses; PCV1 = 1st pricipal component variable 
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Investment rises under decentralization where the illiteracy rate is higher, and 
investment is thus progressive in terms of need. This implies that local government is 
more sensitive to local need than central government. This finding is not sensitive to 
specification or to the measure of illiteracy used, as is evident in Figure 12 above, where 
the literacy rate is significant and negative. In terms of the model of section 3.2, the 
results imply that p<1, and hence that the center assesses local preferences less 
accurately than local government. Educational investment falls where the private sector 
is stronger, a finding which is again insensitive to specification. This is most likely 
because private firms lobby for resources to flow to other sectors where they stand to 
profit more. The results for urban development (below) support this interpretation. Civil 
Institutions, by contrast, lead to an increase in investment after decentralization, 
suggesting grass roots support for education (i.e. parents worried about their children). 
Participative planning methodologies have no effect on investment, nor do information 
technology or local training and capacity-building activities. 
Water & Sanitation 
Figure 13 
Test 3: B 	r s 	+ 	z 	+ r-2m- r-1m = 	+ .11-1m • 	••• 
Independent Variable 
+ 	z 	+ + -15-5m + -m 
Model* 
II 	III IV 
Private Sector PCV1 0.000123 -0.000856 -0.000712 
(0.130) (-1.265) (-1.058) 
Project Planning PCV1 -0.003165 -0.003322 -0.003517 
(-2.002) (-2.237) (-2.205) 
Civil Institutions PCV I -0.001227 
(-1.230) 
Training & Capacity Building PCV1 -0.001129 
(-1.161) 
Information Technology PCV1 -0.000196 
(-0.163) 
% Pop. w/out Sewerage 0.000194 0.000170 0.000180 
(1.881) (1.768) (1.756) 
% Pop. w/out Water 0.000157 
(1.791) 
constant -0.030616 -0.027167 -0.028461 -0.029259 
(-3.324) (-4.492) (-3.348) (-3.217) 
R-square 0.0323 0.0064 0.0320 0.0302 
Prob>F 0.0000 0.0743 0.0000 0.0000 
OLS regressions reported with robust standard errors 
t-stats in parentheses; PCV1 = 1st pricipal component variable 
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Investment rises under decentralization where more people have no sewerage. It 
also rises where the percent of the population without access to drinking water increases, 
though this finding is sensitive to specification and drops out when other variables are 
included in the model. Thus local governments invest more where need is greatest, and 
investment is progressive in terms of need. This implies that p<I in the model above. 
Participative planning methodologies are significant and negative, thus decreasing 
investment, and the private sector and civil institutions are both insignificant. This last 
result is surprising given the positive effect of civil institutions on investment in 
education. 
Water Management 
Figure 14 
Test 3: 	B 	rs 	+7 .11m 	••• 1 z 	+ Z 2 rn- .--m - ,55m + em - 
Model* 
Independent Variable I II III IV 
Private Sector PCV1 0.000171 0.000170 0.000056 0.000155 
(0.602) (0.609) (0.405) (0.758) 
Project Planning PCV1 -0.000550 -0.000540 -0.000533 -0.000525 
(-0.877) (-0.878) (-0.906) (-0.829) 
Civil Institutions PCV1 -0.000171 -0.000182 
(-0.655) (-0.655) 
Training & Capacity Building PCV1 -0.000024 
(-0.063) 
Information Technology PCV1 -0.000445 
(-1.326) 
% Pop. 1,v/out Water -0.000087 -0.000088 -0.000088 
(-2.363) (-2.339) (-2.412) 
% Pop. w/Water (Int. Plumbing) 0.000135 
(0.879) 
% Pop. w/Private Standpipe 0.000067 
(1.639) 
% Pop. w/Public Standpipe 0.000101 
(2.012) 
% Pop. vv/out Sewerage 0.000085 0.000110 0,000087 0.000077 
(2.217) (1.485) (2.249) (2.097) 
% Pop. w/"Other" Sewerage** 0.000113 0.000139 0.000112 0.000103 
(1.793) (2.481) (1.850) (1.725) 
_constant -0.001260 -0.012457 -0.001367 -0.000426 
(-0.393) (-1.441) (-0.404) (-0.136) 
R-square 0.0110 0.0114 0.0103 0.0116 
Prob>F 0.0832 0.1422 0.0824 0.0635 
* OLS regressions reported with robust standard errors 
t-stats in parentheses; PCV1 = 1st pricipal component variable 
** "Other" Sewerage refers to non-public-utility, non-septic-tank methods 
of sewerage disposal. 
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The water management sector is related to water & sanitation but is broader in 
scope, including reservoirs and wastewater treatment lagoons, levees, and storm 
drainage works. In general the degree of overlap between the two sectors is high, and 
similar indicators of need are used for both. Investment in water management is lowest 
where the share of population with no access to water is highest, rises as more people 
have access to public and private standpipes, and then falls again as internal plumbing 
becomes widespread. Investment is also highest where few people have access to 
sewerage, or access to rudimentary sewerage, and decreases as municipal sewerage 
systems become widespread. These results point to investment that is progressive in 
terms of need at intelinediate and high levels of provision, with a poverty trap amongst 
the most needy. Within this range, local government fails to respond to need and central 
government provision is superior. The model can explain this indirectly, if in these 
neediest districts the costs and complexity of making initial investments in water are so 
great (e.g. from developing water sources, laying water mains and building treatment 
plants) that local governments cannot undertake them alone, but once these initial 
investments are made the marginal costs of extending the system are manageable. In the 
language of the model, central government has a cost advantage over local government 
for initial investments, a<1. But at intermediate and higher levels of provision p<I and 
local government's needs-orientation dominates. Perhaps surprisingly, institutional and 
civic variable appear to have no effect on investment — only variables of need matter. 
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R-square 
Prob>F 
	
0.0198 	0.0209 	0.0201 
0.0768 	0.0818 	0.0798 
Independent Variable 
Model* 
I 	II 	III 
Private Sector PCV1 
Project Planning PCV1 
Civil Institutions PCV1 
Training & Capacity Building PCV1 
Information Technology PCV1 
Malnutrition Rate (Low), Males 
constant 
-0.000286 -0.000665 -0.000837 
(-0.156) 	(-0.466) 	(-0.657) 
-0.005871 -0.005644 -0.005932 
(-1.819) 	(-1.727) 	(-1.853) 
-0.000401 
(-0.226) 
-0.001492 
(-0.420) 
0.000885 
(0.303) 
0.000720 0.000680 0.000702 
(1.962) (1.987) (1.931) 
-0.032749 -0.031594 -0.032157 
(-2.936) 	(-2.981) 	(-2.918) 
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Agriculture 
Figure 15 
Test 3: 132m- 131m = 	+ 711Z1m + ••• + 15Z5m + Cm 
* OLS regressions reported with robust standard errors 
t-stats in parentheses; PCV1 = 1st pricipal component variable 
It is notable that even though agricultural investment decreased after 
decentralization - fewer municipalities invested here (see Figure 10) and the mean 
difference in state variables is negative and significant - investment nonetheless 
increases with the male malnutrition rate, a finding which is insensitive to specification. 
This implies that those municipalities that did invest in this sector after decentralization 
did so progressively according to need. Hence p<1 in the model above. Once again 
participative planning techniques decrease agricultural investment under 
decentralization, and the number of private sector enterprises and civil institutions has no 
effect. Investment is similarly unaffected by local training and capacity-building 
programs and installed IT capacity. 
41 
	0.0684 	0.0474 	0.0474 
0.0000 	0.0000 	0.0000 
R-square 
Prob>F 
Independent Variable 
Model* 
I 	II 	III 
Private Sector PCV1 
Project Planning PCV1 
Civil Institutions PCV1 
Training & Capacity Building PCV1 
Information Technology PCV I 
# Markets per capita (1994) 
# Sports Facilities per capita** 
(1994) 
_constant 
0.004749 0.004869 0.005125 
(4.486) 
	
(4.804) 
	
(4.704) 
-0.000801 0.000263 0.000175 
(-0.994) (0.219) (0.143) 
0.000439 
(0.750) 
-0.000540 
(-0.716) 
-0.000609 
(-0.285) 
0.136135 0.124015 0.108250 
(6.130) (3.048) (2.371) 
4.728497 4.758151 4.814974 
(2.815) (2.991) (3.013) 
0.006800 0.005830 0.005801 
(4.340) (3.244) (3.176) 
Does Decentralization Increase Government Responsiveness to Local Needs? 
Urban Development 
Figure 16 
B 	r Test 3: 	 s + z + + z 	F, 2m- ,lm = 	.1-1m • • • - ,5-5m -m 
* OLS regressions reported with robust standard errors 
t-stats in parentheses; PCV1 = 1st pricipal component variable 
** Defined as other than football fields, multi-use courts 
and coliseums. 
The initial (i.e. pre-decentralization) stock of infrastructure is used directly as the 
measure of need. Investment under decentralization increases as the initial number of 
markets per capita increases, and as the number of general sports facilities per capita 
increases as well. Investment is thus regressive in terms of need in this sector, as 
opposed to the others considered above, and this finding is not sensitive to specification. 
Thus it would seem to be central government that more accurately assesses local need in 
this sector, and local government that mis-estimates it. Investment increases with the 
number of private sector firms, which is as expected given that urban development 
projects often result in lucrative contacts for these firms. Investment is unaffected by 
participative planning techniques and civil institutions, implying that it is not a high 
priority at the grass-roots level. Neither training programs nor IT affects investment. 
The results show that the changes in investment patterns detected above in 
education, water, agriculture and urban development are strongly and positively related 
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to indicators of local need. Other plausible variables, including civil and social 
dynamism, the strength of institutions, and local government procedures, are not 
consistently significant. These results can be combined with the data of section 2.2 in 
order to distinguish between the cost advantage and needs-assessment effects posited in 
section three. Remember that in every sector except agriculture the number of 
municipalities investing increased, and the effect of local government on average 
investment was positive in the social sectors and urban development, and negative in 
economic infrastructure and agriculture. The average rise in investment (i.e. across all 
municipalities) in education, water management and urban development after 
decentralization can be interpreted as a product of the need-orientation of local 
government detected above, and evidence that the center cannot produce these services 
at lower cost than the periphery. The fall in average investment in agriculture, by both 
volume and number of municipalities, combined with the significance of need, is 
evidence that the center was over-investing in this sector, and that given the choice 
municipalities prefer to redirect resources elsewhere. The fall in average investment by 
value in water & sanitation, combined with an increase in the number of districts 
investing and the significance of need, implies that the central government concentrated 
investment in too few projects and districts; local government thus re-allocates resources 
in a larger number of smaller projects where need is greatest. And lastly, the systematic 
fall in investment by value throughout Bolivia in transport, communication and industry 
& tourism, combined with modest increases in numbers of municipalities investing and 
the irrelevance of need, implies weakly that the center may have had a cost advantage in 
these sectors, leading volumes to fall after decentralization. 
5. Conclusions 
The results show that decentralization significantly changed national public 
investment patterns in Bolivia. Investment changed unambiguously in education, water 
& sanitation, water management, agriculture and urban development after the 1994 
reform. And these shifts are strongly and positively related to real local needs. In 
education, water & sanitation, water management, and agriculture, post-decentralization 
investments are higher where illiteracy rates are higher, water and sewerage connection 
rates lower, and malnutrition a greater risk respectively. These changes were driven by 
the actions of Bolivia's 250 smallest, poorest municipalities investing newly devolved 
public funds in their highest-priority projects. Decentralization thus led to higher 
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investment in human capital and social services as the poorest regions of the country 
chose projects according to their greatest needs. In terms of the model of section 3.2, 
this implies that decentralized provision dominated central provision in these sectors 
through local government's superior sensitivity to local needs. In transport, 
communication and industry & tourism, on the other hand, central government may have 
had a positive cost advantage. 
In econometric terms, the most interesting feature of the results is that no terms 
other than need are consistently significant across the five principal sectors analyzed. 
Relationships of need are robust and insensitive to specification. By contrast social, 
institutional and procedural variables are infrequently significant across sectors, and 
seem to account for little total variation. Indeed, the only apparent effect of private 
sector firms is to transfer resources from education to urban development. Civil 
institutions are significant only for education, where they increase investment, and 
insignificant everywhere else. Training, capacity-building and IT are insignificant for all 
sectors. This implies that the differences in investment patterns chronicled above are not 
related to the number of private enterprises or civil institutions, or driven exogenously by 
training programs or information technology, but are instead determined by local needs. 
I conclude that the Bolivian experience, where decentralization led to an investment 
increase in municipalities with the worst demographic indicators and infrastructure 
endowments in the sectors examined, is exactly the opposite of what many academics 
and policy-makers predict, and what other researchers have found in the past. It is 
accordingly important to investigate the social and institutional mechanisms that cause 
these changes. I turn to these questions in the following chapters. 
By demonstration, this chapter seeks to make a case for conducting empirical 
research on decentralization and fiscal federalism in the manner employed here. Much 
of the empirical work on decentralization to date focuses on the share of national 
expenditures conducted by different levels of government, and ignores the many insights 
waiting to be uncovered by moving down to the level of the local political economy and 
conducting a careful comparison of spending and investment patterns with economic, 
institutional, social and demographic indicators. The data presented here is from one of 
the poorest countries in the Western hemisphere, and took years to collect, clean and 
organize. But as this chapter demonstrates, its quality is sufficient to permit significant 
and counter-intuitive results. Applying a similar methodology to more sophisticated 
countries in the region, not to mention Europe and North America, might prove very 
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fruitful. Lastly, the above analysis leaves open the question of how political power is 
distributed in a central government, the institutional mechanisms by which governments 
sense and take up local demand for public services, and the precise nature of the 
organizational or technical advantages or scale economies which might benefit one level 
of government over another. That is, p, O n, and a are all exogenous here. Research is 
needed to understand these processes and endogenize them in our models of public 
goods provision. 
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Two Extensions 
1. Introduction 
Chapter 2 showed that decentralization did indeed change Bolivian public 
investment patterns, and in a way which made them more attuned to local needs than 
centralized government had been. Most telling is the contrast between policy-making at 
the highest and lowest levels. Before decentralization national government concentrated 
investment in transport, hydrocarbons and energy in Bolivia's largest, wealthiest 
municipalities. After decentralization the country's smallest, poorest districts redirected 
investment toward social services and agriculture, allocating it much more evenly 
throughout the national territory. Even the most isolated municipalities benefited. These 
changes were sufficiently strong to cause dramatic shifts in national investment 
aggregates. 
How can we explain these differences? Why do central and local government 
make different decisions when faced with the same objective needs? Economic and 
political models of decentralization often rely on assumptions about the policy 
constraints faced by different levels of government, or their differing sensibility to local 
demands, that are largely ad hoc.' The model presented in the previous chapter is one 
example. If we are to understand decentralization and its impact on policy outcomes, we 
must go beyond this level of theorizing and comprehend the precise ways in which 
central and local government decision-making operate, and how they differ. We must 
model the institutional and political features that link policy priorities to need, or fail to, 
explaining thereby what "closeness" is and why it might matter. 
I examine these questions here through two extensions of the previous chapter: 
one empirical, the other theoretical. Section two employs econometric models of public 
investment that include a broader range of variables than those of Chapter 2 to examine 
the policy choices of central and local government in more detail. We are fortunate to 
A broad range of such approaches is discussed in Chapters 1, 2, 4 and 7. 
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have a rich seam of data on the political, social and civic, economic, institutional, and 
administrative characteristics of all Bolivian municipalities that begs to be exploited. By 
modeling policy decisions under each regime separately, I am able to probe deeper into 
the political economy mechanisms that govern outcomes in each. Ultimately the social 
processes in question are too complex and nuanced in nature, requiring qualitative 
characterization of actors and the relationships between them, to lend themselves 
naturally to quantitative estimation. This is thus an exploratory exercise, pushing at the 
limits of such techniques to see how much they can tell us, before moving on to the 
qualitative analyses of Part II. That interesting, even provocative insights do emerge is a 
testament to the quality and breadth of the data. But in the end the conceptual tools of 
Part II are required for a complete analysis of the local government process. 
Section three shifts the focus to central government. As Chapters 4 to 8 
comprise an extended empirical and theoretical investigation of the nature of local 
government, this is my last chance to explore how central government works. I do so 
with the tools of theory, seeking to explain the two stylized facts of decentralization in 
Bolivia: (1) a sharp fall in the geographic concentration of investment, and (2) a 
generalized change in the uses of investment away from infrastructure towards the social 
sectors. By showing that central investment was regressive economically and in terms of 
need systematically across Bolivia, while local investment was progressive on both 
counts, the empirical section confirms that these are not statistical artefacts but 
phenomena that require explanation. It is evident that the more even distribution of 
resources after 1994 is largely due to the per-capita criterion adopted by the 
decentralization reform. But strong evidence suggests that central government was 
essentially unconstrained before decentralization (see section 2.1 below). Hence the 
question must be turned upside down: Why did the center choose to invest nothing in 
one-half of all Bolivian municipalities? And why did it prefer such different sectors? 
I focus accordingly on structural attributes of central government in order to 
explain why its behavior differs from the periphery's. I move beyond a simple view of 
central and local government as mutually exclusive social planners with parametrically 
varying objective functions, to a bargaining framework that explicitly models 
interactions between the two and permits Pareto-improving cooperation. By locating the 
center in a particular district with its own constituency, preferences, and utility-
maximizing incentives, I can explain why decentralization triggers the substantial policy 
changes that we observe. Section five summarizes the findings of the chapter, as well as 
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the first part of the dissertation more generally, and provides suggestions for further 
research. 
2. Central v. Local Government Investment 
The object is to investigate the institutional, socio-political and administrative 
determinants of investment decisions by both central and local government. Specific 
questions include: Which local political forces are important in determining policy? 
How do voting and lobbying affect investment? How do the institutions of government 
shape policy choices? I wish to estimate the effects of these factors on public decisions 
under both central and local government, and compare them to those of need identified 
in Chapter 2. The nature of the data allows me to probe more deeply into the 
institutional and administrative characteristics of local government than I can for the 
center. Data on factors such as the planning procedures, training and capacity building, 
and information systems implemented by municipalities allows me to decompose their 
investment decisions to a surprising degree. For obvious reasons, central government 
data offers no cross-sectional variation of this nature, and hence less opportunity to pry 
open the black box of decision-making. The weight of analysis is accordingly biased in 
favor of the periphery. 
2.1 Empirical Approach 
The economic literature on local government includes a strong strain on the 
demand for local public goods and services. In a seminal contribution, Bergstrom and 
Goodman (1973) develop a method for estimating the demand functions of individuals 
for municipal public services. They find positive income elasticities and negative price 
elasticities for different types of municipal expenditures using a technique which takes 
explicit account of population heterogeneity. Rubinfeld, Shapiro and Roberts (1987) 
build on this to propose a maximum-likelihood estimation technique that incorporates 
the sorting of individuals among communities on the basis of quality and quantity of 
local goods provided. They find price and income elasticities considerably smaller than 
those of Bergstrom and Goodman and others. Pommerehne and Schneider (1978) allow 
for differences in democratic institutions, dividing their sample of Swiss districts into 
direct democracies, and representative democracies with and without referenda, and find 
that the median voter model works best for direct democracies. This literature 
establishes a method for estimating demand for local public services which I follow 
below. 
48 
How Do Central and Local Government Differ? Two Extensions 
Ideally public goods would he measured in quality-adjusted units of output, 
separated by type. But such information is unavailable for Bolivia, and instead I 
measure investment inputs in the form of resources expended on public investment 
projects. This approach has the advantage of using natural, non-controversial units, and 
of facilitating comparisons across different sectors. Following the example of Chapter 2, 
I separate these flows by sector. For each sector I estimate the model 
Gm = 	+ 	+ em , 	 (1) 
where Gm is aggregate investment per capita in the public good subscripted by 
municipality, S m is a scalar or vector of the existing stock of public goods of that type 
(variously defined) at an initial period, and Z is a vector of socio-economic, 
demographic, regional, political, institutional, administrative and procedural variables 
which might affect investment decisions. My use of the Z term follows Bergstrom and 
Goodman, and Rubinfeld, Shapiro and Roberts within the context of the available data. 
In particular, no income data is available at the municipal level in Bolivia, so I substitute 
several alternative indicators of income and wealth, including for example housing size, 
quality and related characteristics, and type of cooking fuel. But in comparison with 
previous authors I expand the scope of the Z vector to include measures of political 
regime type, municipal decision-making processes, and civic institutions and 
organizations, allowing me to investigate the micropolitical basis of local government 
decision-making. 
For reasons similar to those of Chapter 2, I adopt a simple cross-sectional 
approach where investment flows are summed over the years 1992-93 2 for central 
investment, and 1994-96 for local investment. I assume that the variables in S, the stock 
of public services, as well as those in Z, are constant over the five-year period in 
question. As in Chapter 2, I reduce the large number of potential Z variables to a 
manageable and conceptually coherent set through principal component analysis. This 
produces ten dimensions of Z containing thirteen principal component variables, which 
are summarized in figure 1 and explained in detail in Appendix 2. Equation (1) can thus 
be written as 
Gm = 	+ 	+ ..• + 1113Z13in Em 	 (2) 
where subscripts 1 to 13 denote the PCVs below. 
2 I reduce the sample to the period 1992-93 in order to be able to use census data as initial values of S,„ 
without incurring endogeneity. Extending the sample to 1991-93 does not change the results 
significantly. 
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- 	Figure 1: Interpretation of PCVs 
PCV Group 
PCV 
No. 
1 Demographic 1 
2 2 
3 Economic 1 
4 3 
5 Civil Institutions 1 
6 Private Sector 1 
7 Political Disaffection/Protest 1 
8 Training & Capacity-Building 1 
9 Information Technology 
10 Central Government Auditing 
1 
Interpretation - Variable increases in... listed in order of 
importance, where applicable (see Annex 1 for details) 
Protestants, atheists (i.e. non-Catholics) and rural dwellers 
Native-language speakers and rural dwellers 
Wealth and income 
Family size and poverty 
Strength of local civil institutions and organizations 
Dynamism of the local private sector 
Electoral abstention, null and anti-government votes 
Intensity of the local capacity-building efforts undertaken 
by/for local government 
IT systems - hardware and software 
Audits by, reports to, and information system shared with 
central government 
Robust administrative guidelines and operating 
procedures, and a strong executive 
Strong, activist municipal council and weak mayor 
Informed project planning which follows consensual and 
open procedures 
How Do Central and Local Government Differ? Two Extensions 
Following the notation of equation (2) above, I use coefficient to characterize 
central and local investment patterns according to need, where "need" is defined per 
Chapter 2 as the marginal utility arising from a particular type of public service, 
N=U'(g). Hence need falls as the stock of g rises, and vice versa. 3 
In theoretical terms, the main coefficients of interest are ri5-11 13 , corresponding to 
the social, political, institutional and procedural factors that underpin local governance. 
To a significant degree this vector of variables represents competing hypotheses about 
how government works, and thus we do not expect all to be significant for any given 
sector. Each sector also includes an interacted need-municipal training variable, to test 
the theory that even where training and capacity building have no independent effect on 
investment, they may affect investment indirectly via local government's ability to 
perceive need. 
Before moving to the results I briefly discuss two considerations which could 
affect the interpretation of the results in important ways. The first is the possibility that 
central government investment between 1992-3 was externally constrained, and thus its 
correlates reflect not central government preferences but rather the structure of these 
3 Per Chapter 2, I use two types of information as indicators of the stock of public services: (1) the 
penetration rates of public services or benefits in the local population, r, or the population without 
access to the same, 1-r, and (2) the initial per-capita stock of infrastructure (at the outset of 
decentralization). 
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constraints. The second is that municipal investment between 1994-6 was externally 
constrained, and thus these patterns similarly reveal little about local-government 
preferences and dynamics. If neither possibility holds, we may take investment 
decisions between 1992-3 and 1994-6 to reflect central and local priorities subject to 
budget constraints. Otherwise we must account for additional external constraints, and 
include them in our models. I take each consideration in turn. 
(i) Central Government Discretion: As Chapter 2 shows, any external constraints 
binding on central government before decentralization would be of a sort that forced it to 
skew investment dramatically towards a few, large municipalities and away from the 
smaller half, as well as favor transport and hydrocarbons over health, education and 
water & sanitation. In Bolivia's case such constraints would most likely come from the 
multilateral agencies and bilateral and other donors on which the country depends for 
scarce investment resources, and which impose numerous policy conditons as the price 
of aid. But careful consideration of Bolivia's international context during 1992-3 reveals 
no such pressures. Indeed, if anything international pressures would seem to have 
pointed in opposite directions from those Bolivia took. By 1992 Bolivia had ended its 
second structural adjustment program (ESAF) with the IMF, and begun its second 
Structural Adjustment Credit (SAC) with the World Bank. The conditions upon which 
these were based include a number of provisions designed to redirect public investment 
away from productive activities (mining and hydrocarbons especially) and toward the 
social sectors (i.e. education, health and water & sanitation). 4 Furthermore, a number of 
prominent projects undertaken by the Bolivian government at the time, including the 
Emergency Social Fund s , Social Investment Fund, Education Reform Project and the 
incipient Integrated Child Development Project 8 , co-financed in various combinations by 
the Word Bank, Inter-American Development Bank, USAID, WHO/PAHO, GTZ, KfW, 
the Dutch, Swiss, Swedish, Belgian and several other governments — that is to say, as far 
as Bolivia is concerned, the entire international community — sought explicitly to 
redistribute investment flows toward poorer, rural areas and away from Bolivia's cities. 
But according to the data in Chapter 2, on neither criterion did international pressures 
have any effect. The fact that investment outcomes were the exact opposite of those the 
World Bank Staff Appraisal Report, Second Structural Adjustment Credit, September, 1991. 
5 World Bank Staff Appraisal Report, Emergency Social Fund Project, 1987 
6 World Bank Staff Appraisal Report, Social Investment Fund Project, 1993 
World Bank Staff Appraisal Report, Education Reform Project, 1993 
8 World Bank Staff Appraisal Report, Integrated Child Development Project, 1994 
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international community supported forces us to conclude that central government in 
Bolivia faced no binding constraints on its investment decisions during this period. The 
implication for relevant donors' aid policy, of course, is that collectively at least their 
conditionality was entirely ineffectual. 
(ii) Constraints on Local Government: The question of external constraints on municipal 
governments between 1994-6 is only somewhat more subtle. Legal constraints certainly 
did exist — after the Popular Participation Law itself, central government passed 
Executive Decree 24182 which directed municipalities to dedicate at least 25% of their 
resources to productive investment, 30% to social investment, and no more than 15% to 
operating costs. The center sought to reward municipalities that did so through 
additional investment via the Social Investment Fund, Campesino Development Fund, 
National Environmental Fund, and the Regional Development Fund. Were this binding, 
changes in national investment patterns between the two periods would be the result of 
changed priorities in La Paz and not the action of local governments. But the evidence 
demonstrates the opposite — the center proved too institutionally weak to enforce this 
decree. No sanctions were taken against offending municipal governments, and the 
system of matching grants fell apart as the Funds (all of them executive agencies) 
ignored requirements and continued working with municipalities regardless of their 
compliance.`' An examination of the limit on operating costs reveals that 203 
municipalities exceeded 15% in 1994, 157 did so in 1995, and 147 more in 1996. t 
 Indeed, departmental capitals were amongst the biggest violators, and received 
correspondingly broad media coverage of their finances. Smaller municipalities took 
notice. Indeed, Chapter 5 illustrates the extraordinary extent of real discretion that 
municipalities enjoyed after 1994. As for central government, we must conclude that 
local governments faced no binding constraints on their investment decisions. 
2.2 Results 
I examine central and local investment in the five sectors analyzed in Chapter 2 
plus health, where results are strongest. We shall see that central government 
coefficients are generally larger by an order of magnitude or more than local government 
coefficients. This should be interpreted bearing in mind that even after decentralization 
the center manages over seven times the resources that local government manages, and 
9 Mauricio Lea Plaza, Director of Participative Planning, National Secretariat of Popular Participation, 
interview, La Paz, 29 September 1997. 
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that it concentrated investment in a relatively small number of municipalities. Larger 
coefficients should thus not be interpreted as greater sensitivity to the factors that interest 
us, but rather as by-products of budgetary scale and concentration. 10 
Health 
Figure 2 shows that of the eight indicators of need used in three models of central 
government investment, only one — the percentage of households using NGO or church-
run health facilities — is significant. Its positive sign indicates that investment increased 
where private (i.e. non-public") medical facilities already exist, which in Bolivia is 
where public facilities are also in abundance.'' This implies an increasing geographic 
concentration of infrastructure. The insignificance of the other seven indicators implies 
central government investment was insensitive to need, or at most weakly regressive. 
This effect is magnified for the case of civil institutions, which sprouted by the hundreds throughout 
Bolivia after 1994. 
The majority of private health facilities in Bolivia are NGO or church-operated. 
12 The Municipal Census (Secretaria Nacional de Inversion Pdblica y Financiamento Externo 1997) 
shows that private health facilities are mostly concentrated in municipalities that also benefit from 
public facilities of the same type. In the municipalities where all 46 private health posts are located, 
there are 436 public facilities. Of the 145 private centers nationwide, 107 are located in just two 
municipalities. Far from complementing the state health network and making up for its deficiencies, 
these facilities operate in parallel to the public system and compete with it for patients. 
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Figure 2 
Ind. Var 
Demographic & Regional 
Controls? 
Economic PCV 1 
Economic PCV3 
Political Protest Vote PCV I 
Civil Institutions PCV I 
Private Sector PCV I 
Training & Capacity Building 
PCV1 
Information Technology PCV 1 
Central Gov Auditing PCV I 
Municipal Administration PCV 1 
(Robust Guidelines) 
Municipal Administration PCV2 
(Strong Municipal Council) 
Project Planning PCV1 
Health Care, MM. Health % 
Health Care, Public Insurance % 
Health Care, None % 
Health Care, NGO & Church % 
Local Health Authority 
Needs-Training Interacted 1 
Needs-Training Interacted 2 
constant 
sigma 
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Model* 
Central Government Local Government 
YES YES YES YES YES YES 
0.11361 0.12081 0.13094 -0.0016 -0.0014 -0.0012 
(2.237) (2.420) (2.441) (-2.940) (-2.698) (-2.309) 
0.12182 0.12324 0.12294 0.0022 0.00224 0.00189 
(1.648) (1.628) (1.695) (2.020) (2.022) (1.793) 
-0.211 -0.2187 -0.2397 -0.0008 -0.0015 -0.0008 
(-1.455) (-1.508) (-1.620) (-0.801) (-1.390) (-0.798) 
0.12452 0.1203 0.1199 0.00161 0.00159 0.00152 
(2.401) (2.399) (2.336) (2.488) (2.401) (2.380) 
-0.0727 -0.0767 -0.0756 -0.0018 -0.0021 -0.0015 
(-1.866) (-1.912) (-1.868) (-2.022) (-2.363) (-1.807) 
0.06995 -0.1389 0.09059 0.00156 -0.0016 0.0016 
(0.733) (-0.917) (0.965) (1.041) (-1.008) (1.079) 
0.12397 0.12628 0.13478 0.00187 0.00172 0.00167 
(1.700) (1.750) (1.825) (2.135) (2.016) (1.961) 
-0.0353 -0.0315 -0.0369 -0.0012 -0.0014 -0.0012 
(-0.501) (-0.461) (-0.533) (-1.636) (-1.867) (-1.692) 
0.1012 0.10708 0.11265 -0.0006 -0.0007 -0.0006 
(1.350) (1.335) (1.486) (-0.648) (-0.686) (-0.636) 
0.0637 0.06782 0.04703 0.00167 0.00183 0.00141 
(0.866) (0.928) (0.633) (2.203) (2.188) (1.971) 
0.03738 0.03858 0.04565 0.00083 0.00082 0.00098 
(0.473) (0.490) (0.603) (1.083) (1.046) (1.258) 
-0.0019 -0.0004 0.00018 0.00014 
(-0.219) (-0.048) (2.513) (1.991) 
0.01408 0.01883 0.00045 0.00033 
(0.725) (1.051) (2.272) (1.807) 
0.01665 0.0184 0.01593 -0.0003 -0.0003 -0.0003 
(1.293) (1.558) (1.138) (-1.673) (-1.935) (-1.847) 
0.03638 -0.0003 
(1.860) (-1.549) 
0.01761 0.01808 0.01531 0.00038 0.00039 0.00041 
(1.273) (1.285) (1.068) (1.881) (1.850) (1.951) 
-0.373 -0.416 -0.0019 -0.0021 
(-0.975) (-1.083) (-0.527) (-0.557) 
-0.0045 -0.0055 -0.0001 -0.0001 
(-0.709) (-0.839) (-1.323) (-1.304) 
0.00433 5.8E-05 
(1.219) (1.067) 
-1.6044 -1.6839 -2.0193 -0.0008 0.00731 0.00132 
(-2.147) (-2.667) (-3.020) (-0.107) (1.312) (0.208) 
0.8949 0.88729 0.87899 0.01652 0.01674 0.01662 
(5.038) (5.016) (5.080) (4.482) (4.561) (4.512) 
x2 42.05 43.32 43.23 60.84 53.17 57.99 
Prob>x2 0.0041 0.0019 0.0019 0.0000 0.0001 0.0000 
N 265 265 265 259 259 259 
Tobit estimation with robust standard errors 
z-stats in parentheses; PCVn = nth pricipal component variable 
Civil institution PCVs are positive and significant in all three models, implying 
that strong civil institutions are associated with increasing investment in health. As this 
data pre-dates both central and local investment, the direction of causality must be from 
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civil society to investment outputs. This implies that civil institutions were able to 
successfully lobby central government to increase investment in health. The private 
sector variable is similarly significant in all three models, but negative. I interpre to 
mean that where the private sector is strong it successfully lobbied the center to reduce 
investment in health in favor of other sectors which interest it more, as we shall see 
below. The information technology PCV is also significant and positive in the three 
models, but because these IT investments only began with the decentralization program, 
I discount them as spurious correlations. Such results may imply that these variables 
proxy for deeper characteristics of municipalities before decentralization, but this 
possibility is not explored here. 
Investment under local government shows several important differences from 
that under central government. First, need variables are significant in all three models. 
Investment rises with indicators of need, although in the neediest municipalities there 
appears to be a poverty trap. Thus, investment increases with the malnourishment rate. 13 
 Investment is also higher where public facilities and those run by public insurers are 
used intensively. But investment is lower where the proportion of the population that 
receives no health care is high. I interpret this to mean that local government responds to 
demand for local health services, as well as to indicators of poor public health. But 
where very few health care services exist, people may be ignorant about their benefits 
and not demand health investment, leading local government to invest less. Second, and 
interestingly, investment is progressive in economic terms according to both PCVs in all 
three models; health investment increases as wealth and income fall, and as family size 
and poverty measures rise. This is the opposite of the usual, expected pattern, where 
investment is higher in wealthier municipalities. 
Civil institution and private sector PCVs are also significant in these models, 
with the same signs as for central government. This indicates that both civic groups and 
private sector firms are successful in lobbying local government to increase/decrease 
investment as they prefer. Municipalities which acquire IT systems invest more in 
health, perhaps because IT helps them to execute complex health projects, though as we 
shall see this result is not repeated in any other sector. Municipalities subjected to 
central audits and similar external pressures invest less in health, and municipalities 
where the local council is strong and active and the mayor relatively weak invest more. 
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Note that the interacted needs-training variables are insignificant in all three models, 
reinforcing the conclusion that training has no effect on investment. Curiously, the 
presence of a local health authority also has no effect on investment, either before and 
after decentralization. 
Water & Sanitation 
Figure 3 shows few determinants for central government investment in water & 
sanitation. Investment increased with the number and strength of civil institutions, 
indicating — as in health — their success in lobbying the center for resources. But no 
other variables in our four models are significant. In particular, central government does 
not seem to have responded to any of our five measures of local need. 
Decentralized investment in water is quite different. All indicators of need are 
significant. Investment rises as the share of population without access to sewerage rises, 
and falls with the square of this term. The trend holds across different measures of 
population without sewerage. This implies investment that increases in need up to a 
high level of deprivation,'` beyond which it falls again, signaling the existence of a 
poverty trap where existing levels of provision are extremely low. Investment also rises 
with the per capita number of public urinals, the lowest level of public sewerage 
available in poor communities. It is likely that the presence of urinals in such 
communities helps to build grass-roots support for further investment by showing people 
the benefits of sewerage. Investment decreases with the percentage of people who 
already have private sewerage, additional evidence that investment is concentrated 
where need is greatest. The models are robust to alternative specifications. 
Of the main variables of interest, both municipal administration and central 
auditing are consistently significant across our models. Investment rises where districts 
have a strong municipal council, whereas the PCV for robust municipal rules and 
procedures is not significant. Central auditing and budgeting systems that operate in the 
municipality are also associated with rising investment. None of the other institutional 
or procedural variables seems to affect local government investment, nor does the 
interacted needs-training term. 
13 Associated in Bolivia much more with nutritional balance than caloric intake, and hence susceptible 
to simple medical interventions. 
14 The implied inflection point is about 92% of the population without sewerage. 
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1.3E-05 
(0.308) 
-0.0417 0.02773 -0.0007 
(-1.843) (6.270) (-0.062) 
0.02775 0.02788 0.02799 
(11.48) (11.58) (11.77) 
-0.0004 
(-2.888) 
0.00028 
(2.045) 
4,69693 
(3.057) 
-2E-05 
(-0.458) 
-0.0447 
(-1.938) 
0.0277 
(11.18) 
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Figure 3 
Model* 
Independent Var  
Demographic & Regional 
Controls? 
Economic PCV1 
Economic PCV3 
Political Protest Vote PCV 1 
Civil Institutions PCV1 
Private Sector PCV 1 
Training & Capacity Building 
PCV I 
Information Technology PCV1 
Central Gov Auditing PCV1 
Municipal Administration PCVI 
(Robust Guidelines) 
Municipal Adminiso .anon PCV2 
(Strong Municipal Council) 
Project Planning PCV1 
% Pop. w/out Sewerage 1, 
Square of 
% Pop. w/Private Sewerage** 
% Pop. w/out Sewerage 2, 
Needs-training interacted 
constant 
sigma 
Central Government 
I 	II 	III 	IV 
YES 	YES 	YES 	YES 
0.00512 0.00281 0.00311 0.00524 
(0.780) (0.472) (0.504) (0.804) 
-0.0115 -0.0103 -0.0104 -0.0112 
(-0.944) (-0.913) (-0.844) (-0.898) 
-0.0131 -0.0139 -0.0135 -0.0131 
(-0.776) (-0.837) (-0.801) (-0.770) 
0.01931 0.01897 0.01911 0.01878 
(2.857) (2.830) (2.819) (2.797) 
0.00177 0.00132 0.00162 0.0018 
(0.213) (0.186) (0.241) (0.211) 
0.00993 0.00979 0.00979 0.01226 
(1.114) (1.094) (0.405) (0.503) 
-0.0142 -0.0151 -0.015 -0.0128 
(-1.393) (-1.449) (-1.430) (-1.263) 
0.01542 0.01606 0.01602 0.01484 
(1.353) (1.450) (1.451) (1.281) 
0.01125 0.01084 0.01087 0.01181 
(1.055) (1.023) (1.032) (1.092) 
-0.0114 -0.0112 -0.0111 -0.0108 
(-1.151) (-1.192) (-L147) (-1.082) 
0.00519 0.00553 0.00529 0.00481 
(0.629) (0.638) (0.624) (0.595) 
0.00141 0.00164 
(0.298) (0.338) 
-4E-06 -6E-06 
(-0.110) (-0.148) 
-4E-05 
(-0.022) 
0.00025 
(0.187) 
1.0385 
(0.045) 
1.3E-06 -3E-05 
(0.003) (-0.088) 
-0.3197 -0.2358 -0.2558 -0.3246 
(-1.758) (-3.338) (-2.432) (-1.783) 
0.16295 0.16327 0.16319 0.1628 
(4.612) (4.617) (4.585) (4.623) 
Local Government 
I 	II 	III 	IV 
YES 	YES 	YES 	YES 
0.00348 0.00292 0.00286 0.00371 
(3.313) (2.949) (2.843) (3.384) 
-0.0029 -0.0023 -0.0025 -0.003 
(-2.320) (-1.909) (-2.004) (-2.314) 
0.00133 0.00162 0.00142 0.00114 
(0.918) (1.117) (0.958) (0.761) 
-0.0002 -0.0003 -0.0002 410003 
(-0.233) (-0.265) (-0.216) (-0.292) 
-0.0019 -0.0032 -0.0025 -0.0021 
(-0.819) (-1.429) (-1.131) (-0.952) 
0.00109 0.00094 0.00016 0.00208 
(1.055) (0.909) (0.050) (0.709) 
-0.0004 -0.0006 -0.0006 -0.0001 
(-0.303) (-0.449) (-0.464) (-0.074) 
0.0039 0.00398 0.00419 0.00418 
(2.029) (2.165) (2.246) (2.125) 
-0.0022 -0.002 -0.0019 -0.0021 
(-1.432) (-1.345) (-1.290) (-1.353) 
0.00176 0.00207 0.0019 0.00201 
(1.549) (1.817) (1.662) (1.691) 
0.00116 0.00084 0.0011 0.00092 
(0.892) (0.650) (0.854) (0.687) 
0.00145 0.00153 
(2.408) (2.480) 
-8E-06 -8E-06 
(-1.850) (-1.920) 
x2 51.13 50.76 50.81 49.16 35.97 33.67 31.37 37.95 
Prob>x2 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0002 0.0046 0.0060 0.0180 0.0060 
N 276 276 276 268 269 269 269 261 
* Tobit estimation with robust standard errors 
z-stats in parentheses; PCVn = nth pricipal component variable 
** Includes septic tanks, outhouses, etc. 
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Economic PCV3 
Political Protest Vote PCV 1 
Civil InstitutionsPoV1 
Private Sector PCV 1 
Training &Capacity Building 
PCVI 
Information Technology PCV I 
Central GPV2"Auditing,PCV-1 
Municipal Administration PCV 1 
(Robust Guidelines) 
Municipal Administration P,CV2 
(SironeMuniciP#:Gauncil) 
Project Planning PCV I 
Illiteracy Rate (Adult) 
Illiteracy Rate (Over-6s) 
YES 	YES 
0.00462 
(1.489) 
-0.0007 
(-0.184) 
-0.0185 
(-2.198) 
0.00865 
(2.459) 
0.00024 
(0.144) 
-0.0004 
(-0.061) 
-0.0055 
(-1.220) 
0.01288 
(2.899) 
-0.0057 
(-1.205) 
0.00679 
(1.682) 
0.00243 
(0.568) 
0.0003 
(0.462) 
0.00415 
(1.360) 
-0.0002 
(-0.054) 
-0.0183 
(-2.198) 
0.00885 
(2.507) 
0.00033 
(0.204) 
0.00213 
(0.682) 
-0.0054 
(-1.203) 
0.01317 
(2.912) 
-0.0056 
(-1.190) 
0.00669 
(1.649) 
0.00241 
(0.568) 
1.8E-06 
(0.002) 
Needs Tiaining 	 racted 
Needs-Training Interacted 2 
constant . 
sigma 
Illiteracy Rate-(Over-15s) 
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Education 
Figure 4 
Model* 
Ind. Var 
Demographic & Regional 
Controls? 
Economic PCV 1 
Central Government 
I 	II 	III 
YES 
0.00484 
(1.522) 
-0.0007 
(-0.203) 
-0.0189 
(-2.231) 
0.00875 
(2.489) 
0.00033 
(0.206) 
0.00226 
(0325) 
-0.0055 
(-1.206) 
0.01235 
(2,720) 
-0.0059 
(-1.250) 
0.00719. 
(1.750) 
0.0022 
(0.518) 
Local Government 
IV I II III IV 
YES YES YES YES YES 
0.00471 -0.0017 -0.0016 -0.0017 -0.0013 
(1.415) (-1.695) (-1.652) (-1.718) (-1.420) 
-0.0015 0.00161 0.00172 0.00173 0.00174 
(-0.417) (0.997) (1.086) (1.105) (1.046) 
-0.0167 -0.0003 -0.0004 -0.0004 -0.0012 
(-2.171) (-0.142) (-0.176) (-0.193) (-0.566) 
0.00875 0.00338 0.0 .6347 0.00344 0.00307 
" (2.520) (1.986) (2.078) (2.033) (1.923) 
0.00116 -0.0054 -0.0055 -0.0054 -0.0065 
(0.786) (-2.012) (-2.037) (-1.995) (-1.883) 
0.00381 0.00161 0:00218 0.00221 0.00185 
(0.483) (0.533) (1.615) (1.639) (0.593) 
-0.0059 -0.0021 -0.002 -0.002 -0.0014 
(-1.263) (-1.312) (-1.268) (-1.311) (-0.896) 
0.01029 -0.0019 -0.002 -0.0021 -0.0023 
(2.345) (-0.967) (-1.056) (-1.076) (-1.084) 
-0.0067 0.00117 0.00127 0.00119 0.00161 
(-1.313) (0.819) (0.896) (0.838) (1.092) 
0.0064 -0.0008 -0.0008 -0.0008 -0.0004 
(1.711) (-0.532) (-0.539) (-0.510) (-0.308) 
0.00084 -0.0001 -0.0002 -0.0003 0.00021 
(0.181) (-0.095) (-0.153) (-0.184) (0.146) 
0.00058 
(1.958) 
0.00065 
(1.822) 
Educational Attainment, Low 
(0-3 years) 
Educational 'Attainment, 
University 
 
Local Education Authority 
0.00059 
(0.788) 
0.00125 
(1.552) 
0.00114 
(0.537) 
-0.027 -0.0265 -0.0268 
(-1.803) (-1.764) (-1.785) 
8.2E-05 
(0.409) 
-6E-05 
(-0.213) 
-0.086 -0.077 -0.0954 -0.1737 
(-2.452) (-2.268) (-2.483) (-2.437) 
0.05658 0.05672 0.05656 0.05782 
(4.674) (4.661) (4.716) (4.510) 
0.0089 0.0084 0.00867 
(1.810) (1.726) (1.777) 
1.7E-05 
(0.197) 
-4E-06 
(-0.038) 
0.02294 0;02377 0.02208 -0.0107 
(L978) '(2.665) . (1305) (-0.443) 
0.03645 0.03649 0.03647 0.03647 
(13.13) (13.08) (13.20) (13.09) 
0.00082 
(2.476) 
0.00252 
(1.093) 
X2 32.20 31.94 32.39 30.91 34.74 34.20 34.47 35.08 
Prob>y2  0.0208 0.0153 0.0134 0.0295 0.0102 0.0079 0.0073 0.0092 
N 276 276 276 275 269 269 269 269 
* Tobit estimation with robust stz ndard errors 
z-stats in parentheses; PCVn = nth pricipal component variable 
Central investment in education showed no discernible relation to need. I use a 
variety of indicators of literacy and educational attainment, but none is significant. 
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Interestingly, the presence of a local educational authority caused investment to fall 
under central government. This implies that the center went out of its way to deprive of 
resources those districts where sectoral authorities were in operation, a perverse result. 
As with health and water, investment increased with the strength of local civil 
institutions, implying that the grass roots were able to lobby the center successfully for-
investment in education. I discount the central auditing, municipal administration and 
protest vote coefficients as spurious correlations. Note that unlike health, the private 
sector PCV is not significant anywhere. 
Decentralized investment patterns, once again, are very different. Investment 
rises with indicators of need across all models, including various measures of illiteracy 
and educational attainment. The presence of local health authorities is also significant 
here, but now positive as we would expect. It is also notable that investment rises as 
wealth and income fall, making local education investment economically progressive. 
As in health, investment rises in all three sectors where civil institutions are stronger, and 
falls in measures of the private sector. This signals the existence of a healthy local 
political economy, where groups lobby for the sorts of investment that interest them 
most. 
Urban Development 
Very few municipalities received any investment in urban projects before 1994, 
with only 24 non-zero observations for central government investment. Hence I reduce 
the number of explanatory variables in each model by dividing the Z vector into two 
subvectors, Z' and Z2 , 15 and estimate 
G„i=CS ro +11'Z l m + Em 	and 	 (2') 
Gm = 	+ Ti 2Z2m Em 	 (2 —) 
separately using the same needs variables, as well as economic, demographic and 
regional controls in each model. 
I Where, using the notation of equation (2), Z I =Z I -Z7 and Z2=Z I -Z3 & Z8-Z11 . 
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Figure 5 
Model* 
Central Government 
Independent Var 	 I 	II 	III 	IV 
Local Government 
I 	II 
YES 	YES 	YES 	YES 
-0.0043 -0.0232 -0.0229 -0.0763 
(-0.099) (-0.361) (-0.536) (-1.262) 
-0.0954 0.11492 -0.1006 0.06418 
(-0.965) (0.879) (-1.117) (0.570) 
	
-0.4303 	-0.3555 
(-2.114) (-1.867) 
0.11442 	0.13407 
(1.839) (2.096) 
-0.0704 	-0.0325 
(-0.958) (-0.671) 
0.07368 	 0.0798 
(1.145) (1.201) 
0.0923 	0.13464 
(1.488) (2.050) 
0.15289 	0.19215 
(1.481) (1.450) 
-0.048 	-0.0737 
(-0.575) (-0.706) 
-0.2028 	-0.1886 
(-2.327) (-2.230) 
-0.0056 	0.03371 
(-0.059) (0.319) 
-1989.9 -1240.5 
(-0.841) (-0.327) 
-1620.1 -32251 
(-0.464) (-1.744) 
-376.88 -2326.5 
(-0.378) (-0.705) 
-41.835 -647.89 
(-1.033) (-1.119) 
-3.5377 	-19.14 
(-0.804) (-0.919) 
118.697 
(0.074) 
-1.6378 	-1.783 -1.7413 -1.7514 
(-3.341) (-2.704) (-3.102) (-2.571) 
0.72378 0.65308 0.75333 0.71266 
(4.185) (2.802) (4.170) (2.721) 
X
2 
Pro b>x2 
 N 
56.89 	54.63 	51.15 	43.76 
0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
273 	257 	269 	255 
92.31 	83.09 
0.0000 	0.0000 
245 	244 
Demographic & Regional 
Controls? 
Economic PCV1 
Economic PCV3 
Political Protest Vote PCV I 
Civil Institutions PCV I 
Private Sector PCV 1 
Training & Capacity Building 
PCV '1 
Information Technology PCV1 
Central:Gov Auditing PCV1 
Municipal Administration PCV 1 
(Robust Guidelines) 
Municipal Administration PCV2 
(Strong. Municipal Council) 
Project Planning PCV 1 
Sports Facilities per capita** 
(1994) 
Solid Waste Disposal sites 
(Landfills) per capita (1994) 
Museums per capita (1994) 
Markets per capita (1994) 
Commercial & Recreational 
Infra. (aggregate, per cap 1994) 
Needs-training interacted 
constant 
sigma 
YES 	YES 
0.003124 
(2.759) 
-0.00477 
(-2.777) 
-0.00542 
(-2.022) 
0.002936 
(1.000) 
0.013894 
(2.080) 
7.2E-05 
(-0.050) 
0.000428 
(0.294) 
0.001128 
(0.631) 
0.000886 
(0.527) 
0.000206 
(0.148) 
-0.00033 
(-0.239) 
9.555442 
(3.473) 
135.2504 
(2.002) 
40.59828 
(1.869) 
0.186157 
(2.517) 
17.92777 
(2.158) 
0.048671 
(9.671) 
0.034031 
(11.265) 
0.003575 
(3.061) 
-0.00449 
(-2.561) 
-0.00575 
(-2.319) 
0.002915 
(0.910) 
0.013566 
(2.011) 
0.000118 
(0.085) 
0.000988 
(0.704) 
0.000324 
(0.168) 
0.000806 
(0.494) 
0.000578 
(0.424) 
-0.00069 
(-0.504) 
0.19468 
(1.920) 
0.048174 
(8.904) 
0.033904 
(11.225) 
* Tobit estimation with robust standard errors 
z-stats in parentheses; PCVn = nth pricipal component variable 
** Defined as other than football fields, multi-use courts and coliseums 
Urban development is the only sector where central government seems to have 
invested progressively in terms of need. Of the five indicators of need employed, one -
solid waste disposal (i.e. landfills) - is significant in one of the models. Its negative sign 
implies that the center invested more where such facilities were more scarce, and hence 
where need was greater. But no other needs indicator is significant, and landfills is 
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insignificant in model 1. Evidence for progressivity is thus weak. Civil institutions 
seem to have increased central investment where they are abundant, but the private 
sector variable, surprisingly, is insignificant. 
Investment under decentralization shows a very different pattern. All five 
variables of need are significant and positive, implying that local government invests 
more where existing infrastructure is in abundance, and investment is regressive in terms 
of need. These results are supported by the economic variables, which are significant 
and strongly regressive; investment rises as wealth and income rise, and falls where 
poverty is greater. As we would expect, investment rises with the number and 
dynamism of private sector firms, which I ascribe to firms lobbying for the type of 
projects (i.e. contracts) from which they stand to gain. It is notable that the variable for 
political disaffection and protest is significant and negative. Given the pattern of local 
investment we observe, I interpret this as an indication that voters are successful in at 
least partially reducing resource flows to a sector in which investment is generally 
regressive and largely benefits firms. This describes a local political economy with a 
healthy dynamic in which different interests compete for resources, and — crucially —
voters and non-business interests can affect policy decisions. Given the number of 
municipalities that invest in this sector and the scale of resources involved, this is an 
important result. 
Of the remaining coefficients only the interacted need-training variable is 
significant. Like pure indicators of need above, it is also regressive. Although training 
seems to have no direct effect on investment, to the extent that it makes local 
government more aware of need it may make investment more regressive. 
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Water Management 
Figure 6 
Ind. Var I 
Central Government 
II 	III 	IV 
Model* 
V VI 
Local Government 
I 	II 	III 
Demographic & Regional YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Controls? 
Economic PCV 1 -0.0161 -0.0184 -0.0126 -0.0094 1.3E-06 -0.0069 0.0013 0.00114 0.00078 
(-1.366) (-1.226) (-0.992) (-0.622) (-0.618) (1.956) (1.405) (1.259) 
Economic PCV3 -0.0167 -0.0385 -0.0175 -0.0569 -0.0423 -0.0427 -0.0029 -0.003 -0.0019 
(-1.130) (-2.684) (-0.995) (-2.529) (-2.167) (-2.436) (-3.050) (-2.762) (-2.174) 
Political Protest Vote PCV 1 -0.0784 -0.1176 -0.0808 -0.0023 -0.0021 -0.0024 
(-1.752) (-2.161) (-1.822) (-1.855) (-1.675) (-1.887) 
Civil Institutions PCV1 -0.0094 -0.0199 -0.0087 0.0012 0.00088 0.00149 
(-0.913) (-1.238) (-0.661) (1.732) (1.352) (1.868) 
Private Sector PCV 1 0.00553 -0.0113 0.00671 0.0004 0.00538 -0.0002 
(0.867) (-0.251) (0.825) (0.517) (1.395) (-0.276) 
Training & Capacity Building -0.1254 -0.1075 0.00046 0.00237 0.00499 0.0004 
PCV1 (-1.962) (-1.381) (0.020) (0.964) (1.593) (0.505) 
Information Technology PCV 1 0.01334 0.01093 0.01512 -0.0004 -0.0007 -0.0006 
(0.769) (0.565) (0.772) (-0.448) (-0.799) (-0.640) 
Central Gov Auditing PCV I 0.00603 0.0116 8.9E-05 -0.0016 -0.0011 -0.0009 
(0.305) (0.510) (0.005) (-1.596) (-1.157) (-0.981) 
Municipal Administration PCV1 -0.0233 -0.0315 -0.0224 0.00079 0.00116 0.00106 
(Robust Guidelines) (-1.375) (-1.843) (-1.391) (0.911) (1.306) (1.264) 
Municipal Administration PCV2 0.04589 0.04313 0.03772 0.00072 0.00105 0.00105 
(Strong Municipal Council) (1.904) (1.725) (1.691) (0.853) (1.146) (1.244) 
Project Planning PCV 1 0.00562 -0.0028 -0.0045 -0.0003 -0,0007 -0.0008 
(0.260) (-0.132) (-0.219) (-0.387) (-0.718) (-0.790) 
Local Health Authority 0.63796 0.85599 0.65894 1.10805 0.68496 0.89958 0.00297 0.00503 0.0019 
(3.313) (2.776) (3.111) (2.916) (3.235) (2.863) (0.470) (0.707) (0.287) 
% Pop. w/out Sewerage 1 -0.0179 -0.0055 -0.0057 -0.0049 0.00178 0.00026 
(-2.739) (-0.828) (-1.492) (-1.281) (3.106) (1.753) 
% Pop. %v/out Sewerage 1, 
Square of 
0.0001 
(2.658) 
1.5E-05 
(0.243) 
-1E-05 
(-2.816) 
% Pop. w/out Sewerage 2 -0.0047 -0.0039 0.00023 
(-1.486) (-1.324) (2.045) 
% Pop. I,v/out Water 1 0.00316 0.01223 0.00188 
(0.645) (1.197) (4.215) 
% Pop. w/out Water 1, 
Square of 
-3E-05 
(-0.798) 
-9E-05 
(-1.085) 
-1E-05 
(-4.068) 
% Pop. w/out Water 2 0.001 0.00088 -0.0001 
(0.799) (0.773) (-1.468) 
% Pop. w/Water -0.0029 -0.0034 4.9E-07 
(Internal Plumbing) (-0.965) (-1.043) (0.003) 
% Pop. w/Private Standpipe 0.00026 -0.0005 0.00032 
(0.153) (-0.275) (1.639) 
% Pop. w/Public Standpipe -0.0148 -0.01 0.00042 
(-2.676) (-1.773) (2.114) 
Storm Drainage per capita -298.46 -297.96 -16.668 
(1994) (-1.049) (-0.563) (-0.857) 
Needs-Training Interacted 1 0.00182 -3E-05 
(1.834) (-0.849) 
Needs-Training. Interacted 2 0.00152 -6E-05 
(1.335) (- 1.440) 
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Ind. Var I 
Model* 
Central Government 
II 	III 	IV 	V 
Local Government 
VI 	I 	I 	II 	III 
constant -0.2879 -0.9658 -0.6264 -1.5882 -0.5857 -0.8976 -0.0669 -0.084 -0.0321 
(-1.633) (-2.189) (-2.743) (-2.674) (-3.408) (-3.194) (-2.832) (-3.680) (-2.234) 
sigma 0.16573 0.17072 0.17567 0.19856 0.16219 0.17232 0.0173 0.01738 0.01751 
(2.978) (2.809) (3.096) (3.015) (2.936) (2.762) (6.649) (6.793) (6.936) 
X2 30.85 29.83 25.51 21.32 32.36 27.53 79.86 84.40 72.99 
Prob>x2 0.0092 0.0125 0.0613 0.1664 0.0090 0.0247 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
N 300 282 294 275 300 282 269 263 269 
* Tobit estimation with robust standard errors 
z-stats in parentheses; PCVn = nth pricipal component variable 
The water management sector is related to water & sanitation, but is broader in 
scope. It includes such projects as reservoirs and wastewater treatment lagoons, which 
are components of municipal (potable) water systems, as well as levees and storm 
drainage works, which are not. In general the degree of overlap between the two sectors 
is high, and I use similar indicators of need for both. As for urban projects, central 
government invested in water management in very few municipalities prior to 1994, and 
so again I estimate equations (2') and (2"). 
The striking result in models I-VI is that those needs variables that are significant 
are negative, and hence regressive in terms of need. As more people had no water in 
their homes (i.e. rely on public standpipes) and as the proportion of people without 
sewerage grew, central government invested less in water. This trend is marked, with 
three indicators significant at the 1% level and one more at the 10% level. This finding 
is confirmed by the second economic indicator, which shows that investment fell as 
measures of poverty increased. Interestingly, the presence of a local health authority 
served to increase investment in all six models. The fact that this term is insignificant in 
the decentralization models implies that local health authority lines of communication 
and influence are sectoral more than geographic. That is, they were better able to lobby 
central government - presumably through their ministerial representatives in the capital 
- than their own, local representatives. The fact that local health authorities are 
generally composed of chief physicians and hospital managers who are often devolved 
ministerial staff, and hence "foreign" to the locality, may explain this pattern. Indicators 
of municipal government, training and capacity building, and the political protest vote 
are also significant, but I dismiss these as spurious correlations. 
Once again, the results for decentralized government are completely different. 
Local government invested greater sums in municipalities where people lacked running 
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water and sewerage. The models are robust to the several measures of water and 
sewerage provision used. A series of indicators in increasing quality of service (model 
III) reveals a progressive pattern of investment that increases where households receive 
water from public or private standpipes and then falls to zero where the proportion of 
households with internal plumbing is high. But significant squared terms of population 
without water and sewerage point to a poverty trap for the neediest localities. 16 I 
interpret these results to indicate a virtuous cycle where knowledge of the benefits of 
water and sanitation spreads through a population via a demonstration effect. But where 
existing infrastructure is below some critical threshold, voters remain ignorant and do 
not pressure their local government for investment. 
This interpretation is supported by the coefficients for civil institutions, which 
imply that strong local organizations succeed in pressing local government to invest 
more in water projects. As we found for urban projects, the indicator of electoral protest 
is negative and significant, implying that local governments without a strong electoral 
base are unable to undertake the expensive and complicated projects of the water sector. 
No other institutional or procedural variables are significant. 
Agriculture 
The models of central investment in agriculture are significant at the 10% and 
30% levels respectively, and hence I discount the second and interpret the results of the 
first with extra care. The evidence is that central government invested regressively in 
teems of need, with female malnutrition negative and just significant, and male 
malnutrition approaching significance. The data thus weakly suggests that central 
government invested less where levels of malnutrition were higher. On the other hand, 
civil institutions were able to increase investment where they are abundant and well 
organized. Unsurprisingly the indicator of the private sector, which excludes private 
farming of all types, is not significant, nor are economic variables. 
16 Implied inflection points are around 65% of the population without access to water and 80% without 
access to sewerage. 
64 
Figure 7 
Independent Var 
Demographic & Regional 
Controls? 
Economic PCV 1 
Economic PCV3 
Political Protest Vote PCV I 
Civil Institutions PCV1 
Private Sector PCV I 
Training & Capacity Building 
PCV1 
Information Technology PCVI 
Central Gov.  Auditing PCVI 
Municipal Administration PCV 1 
(Robust Guidelines) 
Municipal Administration PCV2 
(Strong Municipal Council) 
Project Planning PCV I 
Malnutrition Rate, Males 
Malnutrition Rate, Females 
Slaughterhouses per capita 
(1994) 
Municipal Nurseries per capita 
(i.e. Plants - 1994) 
Needs-training interacted 
constant 
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By contrast, local 
government invests more where 
more males are malnourished, I7 
 where there are fewer municipal 
slaughterhouses, and where 
municipal nurseries are scarce. 
Local investment is thus 
progressive in terms of need. 
These results are weakly 
supported by the first economic 
variable, which suggests in one of 
the two models that investment 
falls as wealth and income 
increase. Investment falls with 
measures of private sector activity 
in both models, which is not 
surprising as explained above, and 
points to a healthy local political 
economy where competing 
interests lobby for the types of 
investments they most prefer. 
2.3 Results - Summary 
Detailed econometric 
models of investment across ten 
sectors show how public 
investment decisions changed with 
Model* 
Central Gvt. 	Local Gvt. 
I II I II 
YES YES YES YES 
0.00983 0.00805 -0.0007 -0.0005 
(0.773) (0.611) (-1.690) (-0.919) 
-0:0048 -0.0112 0.00015 -0.0009 
(-0.190) (-0.457) (0.286) (-0.752) 
-0.0091 -0.0262 -0.0001 -0.0026 
(-0.270) (-0.847) (-0.156) (-1.139) 
0.02137 0.02504 0.00023 0.00043 
(1.703) (11942) (0.528) (0.818) 
0.00973 0.0072 -0.0012 -0.0016 
(0.922) (0.664) (-1.896) (-1.748) 
0.11584 0.02446 -0.0007 0.00076 
(2.238) (1.208) (-0.311) (1.093) 
-0.0243 -0.0304 0.00083 0.00081 
(-1.053) (-1.234) (1.219) (0.919) 
0.03112 0.03264 4.2E-06 0.0002 
(1.291) (1.313) (0.007) (0.247) 
-0.0029 -0.0003 0.00042 -0.0007 
(-0.160) (-0.017) (0.756) (-0.720) 
-0.0095 -0.0085 1E-05 -0.0006 
(-0.399) (-0.362) (0.021) (-0.693) 
0.01359 0.0104 0.00036 -4E-05 
(0.720) (0.504) (0.723) (-0.061) 
-0.0092 0.00034 
(-1.410) (1.963) 
-0.0084 -9E-05 
(-1.639) (-0.776) 
-60.953 -63,316 -1.4784 1/9 
(-1.120) (-1.055) (-2.047) (-2.014) 
-391.03 -25.21 
(-1.007) (-1.978) 
-0.0039 4.2E-05 
(-1.677) (0.407) 
0.05426 -0.3183 0.00129 0.00589 
(0.420) (-4.189) (0.313) (1.779) 
0.34342 0.36165 0.01203 0.01848 
(6.301) (6.520) (6.564) (4.911) 
X2 27.78 19.61 36.06 31.79 
Prob>x2 0.0878 0.2946 0.0104 0.0160 
N 263 274 257 267 
T bit 	 itl 	dd o 	esti rnati on w 	ro ust scan ar errors 
z-stats in parentheses 
PCVn = nth pricipal component variable 
decentralization, and provide insight into the 
social and institutional mechanisms by which these changes took place. Decentralization 
changed the policy regime from one where central government invested less where need 
was greater to one where local government invests more. Whereas the center invested 
regressively in terms of need in three of the six main sectors of interest: health, water 
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management and agriculture, local government invests progressively in terms of need in 
five of these six: health, water & sanitation, education, water management and 
agriculture. Indeed, local investment is regressive only for urban development. The fact 
that local investment was economically progressive in health, education and agriculture 
increases confidence in these findings. 
So far the results mirror those of Chapter 2, albeit in greater detail. But the 
models also allow us to probe much more deeply into the decision-making processes 
which led to this change, giving us insight into the political and institutional dynamics of 
local government and their effects on policy. Variables for civil institutions and the 
private sector are significant across a number of sectors and imply that each is successful 
in pressing local government to increase investment in those areas of greatest interest to 
it. Thus, local firms successfully lobby for lower investment in health, education and 
agriculture in districts with a vigorous private sector in order that more resources may be 
devoted to urban development, a sector which offers them many more lucrative contracts 
than training faliners or refurbishing schools. I8 And civil organizations, representing 
civil society via neighborhood organizations, rural syndicates and other grass roots 
groups, succeed in getting local government to increase investment in health, education 
and water, their areas of highest priority.' 9 The fact that the variable for political 
disaffection and protest enters negatively in our model of urban development, where 
investment is strongly regressive both economically and in terms of need, suggests a 
healthy picture of local democracy in which voters are able to influence local 
government through both their civil institutions and the electoral mechanism. Where 
local government works well, even the poorest citizens have voice and may participate in 
the policy debate, providing an effective counterweight to the power of private firms and 
government's own politico-bureaucratic interests. 
It is thus not surprising that local government is sensitive to local need. The 
competitive interplay of local political forces ensures that the local administration will be 
17 Interestingly, female malnourishment seems to have no significant effect. 
Is It may at first glance seem perverse that local business would be associated with decreasing levels of 
educational investment, implying a less skilled workforce. But the time inconsistency between local 
firms facing a high failure rate (in Bolivia as elsewhere), and social projects whose full benefits may 
lag by a generation or more, leads firms to prefer investment in urban development, where the benefits 
are large and immediate. Businessmen may rationally prefer useless urban projects that ensure them a 
few years', or even months', survival over projects with a much higher social return but where the 
contracts are less generous. 
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well informed about voters' preferences. And binding mechanisms exist to ensure 
accountability. Chapters 5 and 6 explore in great detail the question of how a consensus 
on local preferences is established and then represented before local authorities by 
interest groups and various mediating organizations. 
The type of municipal administration, though less important than the interplay of 
political forces, does seem to affect local investment in interesting ways. A strong, 
activist municipal council is associated with increasing investment in health and water, 
two sectors where investment is progressive in terms of need and which civil 
organizations favor. This combination of results suggests that a strong council serves the 
governance process by effectively transmitting demand from the grass-roots up to the 
level of decision-making, resulting in investment more closely aligned with people's 
preferences. This argues against the common claim that robust oversight mechanisms 
obstruct government action, whereas a strong executive promotes agile government. 
Indeed the first municipal administration PCV, representing a strong executive and clear 
operating procedures, is not significant in any of the main sectors of interest. I examine 
this issue more deeply in Part 
The results for IT, training and capacity building, project planning, and central 
government auditing are mostly insignificant, with the few coefficients that are 
significant and not self-contradictory scattered unsystematically amongst the various 
sectors. 20 This is interesting precisely because it is counter-intuitive — indeed, I expected 
the opposite. In the case of IT, it could be that the types of investments undertaken by 
the majority of Bolivian municipalities are insufficiently complex to take full advantage 
of the technology, and thus it will take some time for its full potential to be realized. 
Given high rates of obsolescence, the necessary implication is that a significant part of 
the investment undertaken in IT systems to date was premature, and much of it wasted. 
In the case of training and capacity-building, I have at my disposal 29 indicators of 
training programs undertaken and requested. If the models have failed to detect a 
significant effect in any sector, it is likely that there is none to be detected, at least with 
current data. The same is true for project planning techniques. 
19 This interpretation agrees with evidence presented in Part II, which cites extensive interviews with 
voters and the leaders of grass-roots organizations that reveal strong local preferences for investment in 
education, health, water and productive projects (usually agriculture). 
20  Project planning is not significant in any of the main sectors of interest, training approaches 
significance in one, IT achieves it only in health, and central auditing seems to increase investment in 
water but decrease it in health. 
67 
How Do Central and Local Government Differ? Two Extensions 
Lastly I return to my models of central government, where civil institutions 
increased investment in health, water, education, urban development and agriculture, and 
the private sector decreased investment in health. I interpret this as evidence that a 
political-economy dynamic was also at work there, with municipal forces competing for 
influence over central government resources. But the fact that central investment was 
regressive both economically and in terms of need, as well as concentrated in a minority 
of municipalities (as we saw in Chapter 2), indicates that the center was much less 
sensitive to local political forces and local priorities than decentralized government. 
Although a local political dynamic did operate under the former, and managed to 
influence policy, it did so with much lower efficacy and a correspondingly smaller effect 
on government outputs. But this begs the question of decentralization: If the center 
attempts to take account of local politics in its provision of public services but does so 
ineffectively, then why not decentralize? Why run a system where government's 
response to local priorities is muted by distance, incentives, and (geographically) 
extraneous political considerations? 
3. Theory: A Problem of Agency and Control Rights 
Section two leaves us with four facts about central government that require 
explanation. Not only was centralized investment (1) concentrated across space, 
ignoring one-half of Bolivia's districts, and (2) dominated by economic infrastructure 
projects while ignoring social and human capital investment; it was also (3) 
economically regressive and (4) regressive in terms of need. We saw evidence above 
that a form of political economy mechanism was at work under central government 
which somehow involved private and civic actors in the policy-making process. But this 
was evidently insufficient to link investment to the needs of the districts that received it, 
or distribute it more widely. Why is this when the opposite of each of the four facts is 
true for local government? What factors account for such behavior? The data can take 
us no further, and the question in any event does not appear susceptible to marginal 
analysis. I turn instead to structural factors, and to theory. 
Chapter 2 showed that a given district j will be better off under central 
government when the center's cost advantage dominates its inaccuracy in ascertaining 
local preferences, a<p. This assumes that resource allocation is essentially a function of 
external parameters, and the differences between central and local government do not 
have to do with the structure of government and the processes by which decisions are 
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taken. Given ct<p, welfare will be maximized under central government as it 
disinterestedly distributes a bigger pie amongst districts according to its objective 
function, without regard to external considerations. But the data in Chapter 2 implies 
that a more sophisticated approach is needed to explain the Bolivian experience. The 
fact that half of all Bolivian municipalities received no investment at all in the years 
before decentralization, even in sectors such as energy and transport where a priori we 
expect the center to have a cost advantage, suggests that policy is the product of a 
competition amongst interest groups and not just objective parameters, and that more 
complex institutional factors are at work than those proposed in Chapter 2. 
This model builds on the previous one, adding a mechanism of political 
bargaining that provides a more refined portrayal of the ways in which central and local 
governments interact and simplifies our results. It assumes the same political-
geographic context as Chapter 2, but diverges from it in the way it conceptualizes central 
government's problem. Unlike Chapter 2, central and local government are not mutually 
exclusive, but rather coexist, and the choice between centralization and decentralization 
concerns the way each interacts with the other. Specifically, under decentralization there 
is no cooperation between center and periphery, while under centralization mutually 
beneficial cooperation is possible but not assured. Municipalities' allocation of public 
goods under centralization is the result of bargaining in a national legislature in which a 
district's representatives negotiate with central government officials, representing all 
other districts, in a zero-sum game 2 ' centered on the public purse. This mimics real-
world political horse-trading, where central government politicians bargain with local 
leaders for political support in exchange for commitments of public expenditure, locally-
favorable policies, or other political rewards in the center's gift. 
3.1 The Model 
Following Chapter 2, a country is made up of T districts, each with population nj 
where subscript j denotes district. Local welfare is defined as median utility, U mi = xmj + 
0,„ib(gi), where 0 m j denotes local median preference for the public good g in district j, 
and x mi is the median consumption of private good x in district j. The function of 
government is to provide public goods, which it finances with a local head tax. Central 
government has a cost advantage in the provision of public goods, such that the head tax 
21 The allocation of resources within central government is zero-sum, while the shift from local to 
central government is not. 
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needed to finance a given level of provision under central government is agi/ni with 
whereas the tax under local government is gini. This cost advantage can derive 
from various sources, such as central government's superior technical knowledge, or an 
organizational advantage which lowers the cost of complex public goods, or traditional 
economies of scale. 22 Hence central government's unit price is lower than local 
government's for a given quality of output. Under central government each district has 
weight Xi in the national parliament where policy is made, 23 where Xi 0 and E2 =T. 24 
Local government ascertains O rni accurately, whereas central government ascertains O mi 
with probability p and 0..mi with probability (1-p). Probability varies as pe [0,1], and 0_,„i 
is defined as an unrestricted value of 0 other than e rni. 
Each district j has a local government which coexists with central government, 
itself located in a particular district c. Under decentralization all local public goods are 
produced by local government, and the central government dedicates itself to other 
pursuits. These other pursuits may be thought of as "national public goods", as in 
national defense, but they are extraneous to the model and not of concern here. Under 
decentralization, local government's problem in district j is 
max [0,,,b(g)— S-1 
where for simplicity I drop all subscripts j. Taking first-order conditions and re-
arranging yields 
b'(g) = 1 
The level of public good provided by local government is thus an implicit function of 0,,, 
the median preference for the public good, and of the population n. Citizens receive the 
level of public good that they prefer, which they pay for fully. 
Under centralization, government takes on a cooperative form where the job of 
local government is to relay information on local needs to the center, while central 
government, with its cost advantage, produces public goods cheaply. Central 
22 Certain types of public health interventions, for example, require specialized technical knowledge 
which central government may be able to obtain more cheaply than local government. 
- In this framework policy is understood to mean the level of public good provided. 
24 Thus if central government gives a particular district, such as the capital, a large weighting, average 
A.<1 for all the remaining districts in the country. 
g 
n „, 
(3) 
(4) 
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government then allocates public goods across districts. -,75  I assume that central 
government's cost advantage is an increasing function of the number of municipalities 
that cooperate with it, a=a(t), a'>0. This follows from the characterization of cost 
advantage a, which will tend to increase in t whether we think of it as an economy of 
scale, technical knowledge or organizational ability. 
Under centralization, districts' locally-elected representatives bargain in a 
national legislature over the allocation of public goods. Central government's problem is 
represented by the Nash Maximand 
Max(Vi — 	 (5) 
where Vi represents median utility in district j under central government's equilibrium 
allocation of g, and Vi represents the district's outside option. The negotiation takes 
place between a given district, j, and central government representing the rest of the 
country. 26 The outside option is simply district j's median utility under the decentralized 
equilibrium allocation of g, yi p , minus the cost of transition, 	from a centralized to a 
decentralized regime. V * is the sum of median utilities in the T-1 districts which 
comprise the rest of the country under centralization, and V represents the sum of T-1 
districts' outside options. X, is the sum of T-1 districts' political weights. That is to say, 
1 = 
(PB „U + (1— p)69_„d (g 1 )— a(t) g n 
V . =VP —k- —i 	JJ 
T-I 	 T-1 	 T-I 
V * = 	, 	V = /1* = 	/1. ; 	and so on. 
Transition cost k can be thought of as the cost incurred in returning to local 
production of public goods, including attracting outside technical experts, training local 
officials, setting up the infrastructure and organizations necessary to provide and 
administer local services, and the like. I assume k is observable by both center and 
periphery. Central government's problem can thus be interpreted as a negotiation over 
how to divide the productive surplus from moving from local production to lower-cost 
25 This model is generally similar to Ostrom, et. al.'s (1993) polycentric model of government, where 
different public functions are allocated across hierarchical levels of government. 
26 In practical terms, central and local government can be thought to negotiate over the head tax h j 
 which central government charges the residents of district j for the public goods it provides, where 
agitni gi/ni . The center keeps the difference (hi - agini) for itself. 
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central production of public goods. Note that the preference structure of Chapter 2 is 
retained, folded into a bargaining structure. 
Taking first-order conditions and re-arranging yields 
aV 
ap = 2* / —V j ) 
av*/ 	Ai (7 1 —v*) 
Equation (6) shows that district j and the rest of the country divide the surplus in 
proportion to their respective political weights and the marginal utility of the public good 
in each. Equation (7) states that the ratio of marginal utilities in district j and the rest of 
the country from increasing probability p is negative. Hence a unit increase in the 
probability that Omi is assessed correctly, which by definition must improve welfare in 
district j, must decrease welfare in the rest of the country — including district c where 
central government resides. We can interpret this as an implicit cost of coordination 
which the center must incur to liaise with district j and use information on j's preferences 
accurately. Doing so reduces the size of the surplus, providing the center with an 
incentive to mis-assess local preferences. Note that this is not an explicit assumption, 
but emerges from the structure of the model. Thus in the aggregate, taking account of 
multiple negotiations, the center will tend to provide a policy mix different to that 
preferred by the T districts. At this point the model can already explain the second 
general result of decentralization — the shift in the sectoral composition of investment. 
Figure 8 illustrates equilibrium allocations under both centralized and 
decentralized regimes. For convenience I assume X=T/2 and draw the welfare frontier 
as a straight line. 27 
27 If Xi is allowed to vary, then lines AT' and AF become curves. 
(7) 
ap 
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Figure 8: Centralized and Decentralized Equilibria (for Xi = T/2) 
A 
vi 
Under decentralization, the equilibrium solution for district j and the rest of the country 
is located at point D (ViD ,V*1)). The move from local to central provision generates a 
productive gain which shifts the welfare frontier (in terms of aggregate utility) out from 
A F to AF. Note that the size of the welfare gain (A F —>AF) increases with central 
government's cost advantage and decreases with the cost of coordination. Triangle BCD 
northeast of point D contains all combinations of Vi and V * that are Pareto-superior to 
(Vi D ,V 13). The two parties will negotiate over points in this triangle. Line segment BC 
represents feasible allocation sets that pareto-dominate all other sets in BCD, including 
the decentralized optimum D. BC thus describes all of the solutions that can occur in 
equilibrium. As the graph illustrates, the number of admissible solutions is infinite. This 
is a product of the unstructured form that negotiation has taken thus far. Adding a 
simple structure along the lines of a Nash bargaining game permits the reduction of an 
infinite set to an equilibrium that is unique. 
A Nash Bargaining Game 
Representing central government's problem as a Nash bargaining game permits 
the incorporation of a participation constraint for district j, which provides the key to 
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solving the model. The game is structured so that the negotiation over dividing up the 
centralization surplus involves central government offering district j enough incentive to 
cooperate. Three facets of the model are salient. First, the fact that central government 
is located in a given district c implies that its employees live in c and benefit from the 
public goods available there. Second, centralized production implies that the residents of 
c appropriate any part of the productive surplus not allocated to other districts in the 
country. Locating central government in a particular district thus ensures it is selfish. 
Third, the fact that cc.--cc(t) gives central government an incentive to induce as many 
districts as possible to cooperate. District j, meanwhile, seeks to improve upon its 
decentralized allocation Yip . This combination of incentives generates a game in which 
the center offers districts the minimum allocation necessary to ensure the cooperation of 
the largest number, thereby maximizing its own allocation of public goods. 
Bargaining takes the form of a repeated four-period, single-offer game. 
Negotiations between central government and all districts j occur simultaneously. In a 
negotiation with any given district j, central government represents all T-1 remaining 
districts. The four periods simulate a typical electoral cycle. Centralizing agreements 
take effect with a lag of one period. Defection from central to local government, 
however, can take place within a single period. 28 Districts know the number of periods 
between elections, and form their expectations about the next period's allocation based 
on current and past allocations. The structure of the game is as follows: 
28 Negotiation and coordination amongst numerous districts is assumed to take longer than a unilateral 
decision to return to local production of public goods. This has the effect of increasing district j's 
bargaining power compared to central government. 
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steps Origination 
0. The game originates. 
1. Central government invites all decentralized districts j to join the "club" of centralized 
provision of public goods, and offers to allocate g j . The offer will only take effect in the 
following period. 
2. Decentralized districts j accept or reject the offer. 
Periods 1 to 4 
3. Central government allocates g to all cooperating districts. Local 
government allocates g to all non-cooperating districts. All districts 
under both regimes observe their allocations and all V g 's are realized. 
4. Districts under central government choose to remain or defect to local 
government based on their centralized allocation of public good g. In 
districts under local government the decentralized equilibrium persists :2 
5. Steps (3) and (4) repeat during periods 2, 3, and 4. 
6. The game repeats from step (1). 
The first three periods consist of decisions over allocation and 
cooperation/defection, with central government making new offers at the end of period 
four. As the game is symmetric for all districts j, if one district chooses cooperation then 
all do, and if one district chooses decentralized provision then all do. The fact that 
central government makes the offer gives it a structural advantage which appears to be 
realistic and in keeping with stylized facts from around the world (see discussion below). 
But it is important to note that district j has a significant advantage too — its ability to 
break agreement unilaterally at any time. Between these two aspects of the model the 
latter would seem to be less realistic, making the model biased somewhat in favor of the 
periphery. 
With Credible Commitment 
I initially assume that central government can credibly commit to gj from the 
outset of the game. The solution to this problem is a standard result in game theory. 
Proposition 1: If ki = 0, Vi = ViD = Vj. The center appropriates the entire efficiency gain 
from centralization. 
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This is easily proven: District j has no incentive to accept a lower allocation than it 
receives under decentralization, and thus its payoff space has lower bound ViD . 29 Central 
government has no incentive to offer more than the V D+8 necessary to obtain j's 
agreement. Equilibrium thus occurs at point B in figure 8. 
Allowing kj to take on nonzero values increases central government's bargaining 
power at the expense of j. At cost ki l , the default allocation set Lyi,V*) shifts leftwards, 
suggesting an equilibrium at E. With high cost kj2, kj2 > kii, the implied equilibrium 
shifts back to A, with j's welfare close to the origin. But j will not accept offers at A and 
E, as both are below VP. Central government must offer a level of gj such that Vj 
in order to secure the agreement of j, and we return to point B on figure 8. 30 The result 
implies that district j can never improve on its decentralized optimum, Vj °, despite the 
center's cost advantage in service provision, credible commitment, and the possibility of 
accurate preference assessment by the center. Only district c can improve its welfare 
under central government. The presence of credible commitment, however, does keep 
j's welfare from falling below Vj D despite non-zero transition costs. 
With Limited Commitment 
Suspending the assumption of credible commitment changes the problem 
significantly. If commitment is completely absent and all parties know this ex ante, 
cooperation will be impossible as individual districts' expected allocation will be less 
under self-interested central government than under decentralization. Local government 
will prevail. Under different types of limited commitment, however, central government 
is possible. 
The concept of limited commitment is problematic, however, as different 
limitations may inherently conflict with the very concept of a commitment that is 
credible. Commitment with uncertainty, where the center commits to an agreed 
allocation of public goods which it can provide only with a given probability, is one such 
example.31 More generally, any form of limited commitment where the object of the 
commitment — in this case a level of gj — cannot be fully specified in advance should not 
29 For ease of expression, I refer hereafter to g and V interchangeably as the allocation received under 
central or local government, although in strict terms g refers to the allocation and V to the resulting 
welfare. 
30 Note that this may entail a lower level of g i than under decentralization, as the unit cost of g may now 
be lower. 
31 Following the earlier example, we can give this the form (Ttg i + (1-7c)g.;), where g.i is some level of g 
other than g; and IT is a probability, ICE [0,11. 
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be regarded as a commitment in the formal sense. I focus instead on commitment that is 
limited in time rather than in kind. For the sake of simplicity I examine commitment 
limited to one period in a multi-period game. Such commitment is both credible and 
specifiable, but limited in that parties may only make promises about outcomes one 
period in advance. This has practical relevance to the extent that it mimics negotiation in 
an uncertain political climate with shifting alliances. Other, more sophisticated forms of 
limiting commitment are possible, but for the sake of brevity I do not consider them 
here. 
Proposition 2: The equilibrium solution to the repeated Nash game with limited 
commitment is for central government to offer district j an allocation such that 
Vi = Vj + 15/6 1c1 in period one, V = ViD- 16 kJ in period two, Vi= 	la; in period three, 
and Vi= VI-19 in period four. 
The proof is as follows, and is illustrated in figure 9a below. The game occurs 
over four-period cycles where agreement is implemented in period one, and negotiations 
are conducted over the following cycle in period four. 32 Periods one to four thus 
represent the continuing sequence of plays where a stable equilibrium may be found. 
Analyze the sequence of plays in reverse, beginning with period four, for a repeated-
game equilibrium. Once central government is implemented, j will defect if Vj <Vj, as 
by defecting it can achieve V immediately and V°  thereafter. Hence central 
government will offer Vi= 	kj in period four. In period three, however, the center 
must offer Vi>Vj, as an allocation of Vj in period three implies the same in period four 
and j is better off defecting. Its decision to cooperate or defect can be characterized as 
2Vi=2Vip —kj, and the center must offer at least Vj = 	1/21ci for j to cooperate. The 
offers for periods two and one are derived by the same logic. 33 
Limiting commitment in this way thus alters the stream of allocations that district 
j obtains from central government from an even pattern to one where public goods are 
front-loaded in the first period and then decrease steadily through the cycle. Aggregate 
welfare over the cycle is equal to that under local government, as well as that under 
central government with credible commitment. But the temporal distribution changes 
significantly. The experience of Bolivian municipalities under centralization, most of 
which saw investment levels vary wildly from large sums down to nothing, supports this 
result. Once again, district j cannot improve on its decentralized optimum despite the 
32 I consider this feature realistic, but the results are not sensitive to it. 
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center's cost advantage and the ability to elicit accurate information on preferences, and 
only district c gains from centralization. But the presence of limited commitment once 
again keeps j's welfare from falling below 4Vi D over the cycle. Note that Vi rises with 
the cost of transition, leaving less for central government to appropriate for itself. Note 
also that the solution's parameters depend on the periodicity of the game, and that 
extending or compressing its temporal structure will increase or decrease equilibrium 
allocations accordingly. 
Figure 9 
(a) With Limited Commitment 
Allocation (in welfare terms) 
vi=viD+1 5/6k 	v J D_ vik 	 ViD — 
• 
0 	 1 
	 9 	 3 	 4 
Period 
(b) Without Commitment 
Allocation (in welfare terms) 
	
VS D 	 Vi D — I /3ki 	V;° — 1 /2ki 	Vi D — kj 
• 
1 
	 9 	 3 	 4 
Period 
When the Center Can Renege 
In many countries the question of central government submitting itself to an 
enforceable commitment, even a limited one, may be quite unrealistic. By definition, the 
transition from local to central government involves not just a change in fiscal regime 
but a fundamental change in the allocation of political power. Whereas before 
centralization the residents of j administered their own affairs, afterwards it is the central 
government that holds political power and administers resources on their behalf. They 
are the government, they make decisions, they uphold rules as they see fit. In countries 
where the legal and constitutional instruments for enforcing the center's commitment are 
not available to counterbalance the pure political power of the center, making an ex ante 
33 	• 	• This is easily derived by equating 4yi° to the stream of centralized allocations. 
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commitment on allocation bundles which central government is bound to honor may not 
be possible. Where checks and balances are weak, central government will have every 
incentive and complete liberty ex post to renege on its promise and increase its own 
allocation, and will face no sanction for doing so. 
Proposition 3: Where central government can renege on its commitment, district j's 
allocation over the four-period cycle will be such that 2Vj = 4Vj D —2 16219. Districts will 
be worse off under centralization than under decentralization. 
The proof is straightforward. Once district j has joined central government in such a 
setting, we can expect the allocation in period one to fall to Vi = 	- Valci, with 
allocations in periods two to four remaining the same as before (see figure 9b). Under 
the logic explained above, district j will have no incentive to defect from centralization 
in any given period, but the center can renege on any offers of front-loaded benefits. 
Hence in a context of a strong central government and weak countervailing powers 
brought about by a weak legal and institutional framework, self-interested central 
government will systematically under-invest in public goods in non-central districts by 
an amount that depends on transition cost k. 
But this outcome depends on the center essentially fooling district j, convincing 
it to join central government and incur potential cost k in the absence of guarantees that 
the agreed Vi will be provided. Why would localities agree to such a game? I note first 
that district j will not agree to such a game if accurately characterized ex ante. That it 
finds itself in such a situation is a product of the center changing the rules in mid-game, 
or its own ignorance or mistake. But whatever the cause, assume path dependency 
obtains and in a given period district j finds itself in the midst of an inherited, welfare-
inferior centralization scheme. The question then becomes: why does the equilibrium 
persist? With the payoff structure of figure 9b, j has no incentive in a given period to 
return to decentralization as its welfare will immediately fall in that period. Over several 
periods, of course, a short-term loss will lead to a long-term gain, and j should defect. 
But timing may be crucial. Elected officials in j — those responsible for the decision to 
defect — face a short time horizon given by the electoral cycle, and may have too high a 
discount rate to incur the cost of a transition which will mainly benefit future politicians. 
If their electoral cycle does not coincide with that of central government, they might 
prefer to wait for a general election in the hope of faring better under new leadership. Or 
they may take time to settle into office and comprehend their situation — and as the 
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payoff to defection declines over time, they may not be ready to make such a decision 
until it is no longer worthwhile. External factors may also intervene. Defection may be 
perceived as less prestigious than remaining in central government, and might leave 
elected officials open to charges of political weakness, poor negotiation skills, etc. 
Lastly, the center may offer local leaders opportunities for graft, future allocations of 
public goods, or other benefits if they cooperate. These possibilities are all beyond the 
confines of the model, and some violate its assumption of rationality. I will not pursue 
them further except to indicate that when surveying countries' fiscal arrangements, a 
number of complex factors may help explain the persistence of low centralized equilibria 
when districts would be better off decentralizing. 
The model shows that in a framework of legislative bargaining, where central 
government can provide public services more cheaply than local government and has 
access to accurate information on local preferences, districts on the periphery can never 
improve upon their decentralized allocations even when credible commitment is 
possible. And without commitment districts are worse off under centralization as the 
center hoards the resource pool. By modeling central government as an independent 
actor analytically distinct from local governments, with a privileged constituency and its 
own incentives and bureaucratic interests, the model can explain the two principal results 
of decentralization noted above: (1) central government invested very unequally across 
space and entirely ignored one-half of Bolivia's municipalities because it preferred to 
accumulate resources in the center and a few other districts with significant political 
weight; and (2) the sectoral composition of investment changed significantly because the 
center has different preferences from the periphery, and can increase its own welfare by 
failing to ascertain the sorts of investment that the periphery prefers. 
This second point comes out of the structure of the model, and can be interpreted 
as the straightforward result of differing preferences across space. If large construction 
companies and oil & gas firms are based in the capital, for example, the center will 
naturally prefer transport and energy projects to health and education, regardless of 
where the latter are physically located. Widespread economic and need regressiveness 
logically follow.34 The assertion that local government does invest according to local 
34 This is obviously a simplification of how central government works. A more nuanced view would 
begin recognizing that it is not the residents of the capital per se, but those interests able to organize 
and place representatives in the capital that benefit disproportionately. Chapter seven provides a more 
sophisticated model which incorporates this observation. 
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need rests on the results of the previous chapter. Part II of the dissertation turns to the 
how and why of that question in detail. 
The model's results hinge upon the question of credible commitment. Across 
countries, the mechanisms used and the degrees of commitment achieved appear to vary 
greatly. In countries without a strong and independent judiciary, where the constitution 
does not protect districts, and/or where institutions are too weak to oppose the political 
will of the executive, the model would predict resource accumulation in the capital, with 
considerably less accruing to the periphery. Nigeria, Mexico, Egypt, Thailand, and until 
recently Bolivia would seem to be a few examples. Elsewhere, however, the 
mechanisms of government seem designed to produce a different outcome. In Europe for 
example, regional aid and structural funds are explicitly designed to favor poorer 
countries and regions, which on the whole receive more EU funds than they pay in. 
Indeed, the fact that European integration is advancing slowly, within the framework of 
institutions where national interests are finely balanced and an elaborate set of side 
agreements and opt-outs exist, suggests that nations are aware of the danger of central 
confiscation and are keen to avert it. Similar claims can be made for the distribution of 
federal funds among US states and German kinder, where the rights and privileges of 
states and Linder are enshrined in law and safeguarded by the constitution. The fact that 
all three of these examples are federations of strong regions with comparatively weak 
centers, and the previous examples are the opposite, suggests that a robust legal and 
institutional framework can help to protect the power of the periphery against central 
encroachment. The unification of Germany and attendant relocation of the capital to 
Berlin could be seen in this context as a social experiment, a tug-of-war between an 
entrenched framework favoring the regions and a "new" capital in ascendancy which 
unites the economic, cultural and social elite of the nation. Lastly, a number of past and 
present wars may be understood in this light. The North and South American wars of 
independence, wars of decolonization, the US Civil War, and the ongoing wars of 
Yugoslav disintegration, may be viewed to varying degrees as violent attempts by 
regions to throw off the yoke of central governments that expropriate their resources. 
5. Conclusions 
This chapter differs from the standard literature on decentralization in two 
important respects: (i) the way in which it conceptualizes the role of central government, 
and (ii) its use of empirical models of investment to peer into the black box of local 
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government decision-making and unpack its institutional dynamic. I consider each in 
turn. 
The economic literature on decentralization typically treats central government 
either as an enlightened social planner (Oates, 1972), or as a neutral forum in which the 
representatives of different localities vote (Pande, 1999) or bargain (Besley and Coate, 
1999) over policy choices. This chapter treats central government as an independent 
political actor in its own right, analytically distinct from local governments, and with its 
own constituency, bureaucratic interests and policy goals. Such an approach is common 
in the political science and public choice literatures on bureaucratic (budgetary) 
maximization (see especially Niskanen (1971) and Tullock (1965)), but has been ignored 
in the literature on decentralization. By incorporating this idea into a framework in 
which the center bargains with the periphery over policy outcomes, I am able to show 
that districts can never be better off under central government than they are under local 
government. Among the model's conclusions, its prediction that investment flows will 
vary predictably with the electoral cycle mirrors the political business cycle literature 
(e.g. Alesina and Roubini (1992)), although derived from a different starting point. 
This permits me to contradict another of the standard tenets of the literature, 
which holds that rising inequality is one of the dangers of decentralization, as richer 
districts invest in more public goods and so increase their advantage over poorer 
districts. In this view, central government can ameliorate the problem through various 
systems of matching and bloc grants (see Rubinfeld (1987) for a good general 
exposition). But the data demonstrate exactly the opposite phenomenon in Bolivia—
central government increased already considerable disparities amongst municipalities by 
concentrating investment in the richest ones and those where need was lowest, and it is 
local government that has invested more equitably and worked to decrease such 
disparities. My model explains this apparent anomaly by locating central government in 
the richest and most developed municipality in the country and acknowledging that it has 
a vested interest in perpetuating this state of affairs. 
Another curious feature of the decentralization literature is that most of the 
theoretical effort goes into modeling central government through different techniques of 
preference aggregation and various decision-making mechanisms. But very little 
attention is given to how local government operates, with most papers assuming some 
variant of average local preference maximization. Although the model above is similar 
in this respect, the empirical work is not. Through six sectoral models of local 
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government investment I seek to shed light on the social forces that compete for power 
locally, the political dynamic to which this competition gives rise, and the characteristics 
of the institutions through which these forces shape policy-making at the local level. I 
seek to provide systematic and generalizable evidence of the micro-political foundations 
of local government decision-making. These themes are explored in much more detail 
in the chapters that follow. 
What conclusions can we draw from the results? Decentralization in Bolivia was 
largely a process in which the center empowered municipal governments, which it then 
could not control. Given the center's performance during the years leading up to 
decentralization, it is not surprising that the reform worked best in the smaller, poorer, 
more distant communities, as these are precisely those where the central state was most 
weakly represented, when it existed at all. As smaller districts are the ones which 
disproportionately drive the changes documented above, understanding local 
government dynamics there is equivalent to understanding why decentralization works. 
My results provide a good point of entry. Strong civil institutions cause municipalities to 
raise investment in the social sectors, whereas strong private sector firms decrease 
investment in the social sectors and increase it in urban development. Far from 
contradictory, this should be taken as a sign that the local political economy is 
developing along healthy lines in Bolivia's towns, with interests groups competing to 
obtain the outcomes each prefers. A local administrative regime characterized by a 
strong, activist municipal council working with a relatively weak mayor is also 
associated with more investment in social projects. And political disaffection and protest 
decreases investment in sectors where projects are very expensive and where investment 
tends to be regressive. These results paint a picture of a robust local political economy 
in which accountability operates through both the electoral mechanism and interest 
group lobbies. And the free interplay of these political forces in a context of strong local 
institutions, especially a representative council transmitting grass-roots demands, is at 
the heart of successful local government. 
It is instructive to contrast the importance of civil institutions and the private 
sector with the irrelevance of IT, training and capacity building, project planning, and 
central government auditing. The technocratic approach to institution building and good 
governance is often to deploy systems and procedural "software" in the place of building 
the institutions and the legal-political "hardware" necessary to the functioning of a 
democratic system. This tendency is at least partly due to the difficulty of the latter, and 
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the fact that the former fits well with many donors' project orientation. We see here 
direct evidence of the irrelevance of this approach, and of the importance of the interplay 
between civil and economic forces in the local political regime. This points to a way in 
which aid priorities can be reordered. Instead of spending on IT, training, and 
government processes more generally, resources could be invested in measures to secure 
the foundations of an open political system. This would include improving transparency 
and strengthening the legal and institutional framework to the point where it can 
successfully contain the societal pressures which clash therein, and is not torn apart by 
them. In the absence of such elements, installing information systems and training local 
officials is unlikely to succeed, and may actually hinder good governance by 
empowering self-interested agents in a dysfunctional system with inadequate barriers to 
rent-seeking. 
Such an interpretation is intuitively appealing, and coincides with much of the 
political science literature on the importance of an open, fair and competitive political 
system. It describes an institutional and legal arrangement, however, which is as 
available to large, rich districts as it is to those which are small and poor. In order to 
push our understanding of decentralization further, we must examine the advantages that 
smaller districts evidently have in its implementation. One likely advantage is 
transparency. The econometric results point to the role of accountability in policy-
making, and transparency is an important component of accountability. In large districts 
the mayor and councilmen are separated from voters by layers of bureaucracy and by the 
sheer size and complexity of the city over which they preside. Local politicians can 
counter the oversight mechanisms designed to keep watch over them with bureaucratic 
allies of their own. And they can take refuge in a range of municipal activities so great 
in number and variety that voters cannot reasonably hope to be informed about all of 
them. Citizens will thus rationally come to expect that public funds "disappear" in a 
work program which they neither understand nor expect to see the results of. In small, 
rural districts, by contrast, the mayor is never far from voters. Her neighbors greet her 
each morning as she crosses the square. They see her clothes and her manner; they 
observe her level of effort. They know if she has suddenly become rich. The scale of 
municipal operations is a much more human one, readily comprehensible by voters, 
greatly facilitating accountability. 
Similarly, and closely related, civil society is likely to be more homogeneous and 
coherent in small districts than in large ones. Partly this is due to issues of scale and 
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complexity noted above. And partly it is a result of the manner in which people 
associate in large urban areas versus small towns. In the former, social bonds often form 
more strongly around occupations, leisure activities, and other geographically non-
specific criteria. Accountants know their clients and they know other accountants, and 
their prosperity depends largely on both groups and not on where they live. In villages 
and rural areas, by contrast, the environment plays a much larger role in people's lives, 
and the axis around which social activity revolves is accordingly geographic. Neighbors 
make common cause because their fate is tied to the same factors, such as the weather or 
the change in a river's course. Where civil society is more unified and willing to work 
together to achieve consensual goals, accountability will tend to improve as local 
oversight becomes easier and its cost falls. This point is both subtle and complex, and I 
only mention it here; it is treated it much more extensively in Part H. 
All of this points to the fundamental difference between centralized and 
decentralized government — incentives. Whether ex ante, via the electoral process, or ex 
post, via the oversight and accountability mechanisms outlined above, decentralization 
fundamentally alters the incentives facing public servants, and thus their performance. 
Under centralization local investment is carried out by central agents whose interests are 
firmly aligned with those of their ministerial superiors and their constituency in the 
center, and not the beneficiaries of the investments for which they are responsible. 
Under decentralization, by contrast, the beneficiaries of public projects themselves hold 
the reigns of local power, and determine the future of those they depend on to serve their 
needs. The incentives of local politicians are thus clearly aligned with those of their 
voters, and the effect of this is strong enough to appear in national investment trends. 
Greater transparency and the lower cost of civic action explains why this phenomenon is 
stronger in smaller districts. In larger districts, issues of size, urban complexity, and the 
patterns of social relations may conspire to obstruct transparency, and hinder the 
accountability necessary for effective local government. 
There are other explanations for the discrepancy between the performance of 
small and large municipalities, of course. It is possible that the social structure of 
smaller, poorer districts is less hierarchical than that of larger districts, and thus less open 
to domination by a narrow elite. Alternatively, interests of groups on either side of 
social cleavages such as wealth and race might naturally be more closely aligned in 
smaller localities, due perhaps to a lower degree of social stratification or a narrower 
economic base than in large urban areas. The patterns of social relations and social 
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organization would thus affect governance not only through oversight mechanisms, as 
per above, but via the very preferences which different groups articulate. In either case, 
arriving at a consensus on how to invest public funds would be easier, and the consensus 
itself more robust, facilitating local government and contributing to its success. This 
issue is potentially a very large one, and one that crosses the boundaries of political 
economy into sociology. Unfortunately it is beyond the scope of this chapter. I raise it 
here as a provocative possibility, and topic for future research. 
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Introduction to Part II 
Part II of this dissertation follows the analysis of decentralization developed in 
Part I by seeking to unlock the black box of local government decision-making, first in 
two districts at the extremes of municipal performance, and then in a larger and more 
diverse group. In Chapter 2 I showed that decentralization changed public investment 
patterns significantly in terms of both the sectoral uses of funds and their spatial 
distribution, and that changes were driven by local needs. Moreover, these changes were 
a product of the decisions and priorities of Bolivia's newly-created (largely rural and 
poor) local governments, and did not merely coincide with decentralization. Chapter 3 
extended this work by exploring why local and central governments behave so 
differently. I first examined the institutional and socio-political determinants of central 
versus local government investment. I found that local decisions are largely determined 
by a competitive interest group dynamic which provides poorer citizens, as well as 
private sector firms and civic institutions, with political voice, and which ensures that 
accountability is binding for elected officials. The data highlights the importance of the 
legal-political structures of an open and transparent local political system, and 
institutions strong enough to contain the political pressures that inevitably arise. Central 
government, by contrast, invested where need was lowest, and concentrated resources in 
a minority of Bolivia's municipalities. This is consistent with a bargaining model of 
government that locates the center in a particular district, with its own constituency, 
preferences, and utility-maximizing incentives. 
This second part of the dissertation builds on these insights by exploring in great 
depth and detail how local government's decision-making process works, and why it 
produces the outcomes that it does. The theoretical methodology of the previous 
chapters treated local government as a unitary actor that seeks to maximize median 
social welfare. Although useful for exploring the incentives and informational 
constraints that local governments may face, this broad-brush approach misses important 
institutional and political features which, far from mere details, may determine the 
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quality of local government that a district receives. Similarly the empirical methodology 
used there, though benefiting from a powerful generality — the results it produces apply 
to the universe of Bolivian municipalities — can suggest only correlations between 
variables, not causality. And the measures used of such complex factors as municipal 
decision-making processes, institutional capacity, the strength of social organizations 
and ethnicity are necessarily imperfect approximations. If we wish to gain deeper 
insight into the nature of local government decision-making and establish causality 
amongst relevant factors, we must look further into the institutional and political 
processes that comprise it. 
Accordingly, Chapter 5 examines the processes, actors and institutions of local 
governance, the economic and political interests that compete for power locally, and the 
characteristics of civil society in one of the worst-run municipalities in Bolivia, Viacha. 
Chapter 6 does the same for one of the best, Charagua. I focus on the extremes in order 
to more easily identify the key factors that lead to good or bad government. The 
approach is very detailed, often allowing key protagonists to tell the story in their own 
words, in order to establish the fundamental facts and relationships that underlie 
government in each district. Chapter 7 abstracts away from the particulars of actors and 
institutions to offer a theoretical explanation of why each governments worked as it did, 
using the conceptual tools of political theory and the new institutional economics. A 
contrast of the respective logics inspires an analytical model of local government which 
can explain the experiences of Viacha and Charagua. This model is then made 
empirically tractable, and tested and refined in Chapter 8 through the analysis of 
government effectiveness in seven additional municipalities. Chapter 9 concludes. 
Chapter 1 noted the essentially ahistorical nature of Bolivia's decentralization 
reform. Similar questions of interest concern the politics of redistribution. 
Decentralization inevitably deprives some groups of resources and bestows them on 
others. Bolivia, as we saw in Part I, was no exception. What effects did redistribution 
have on Bolivia's (tenuous) national unity and integration? Why was reform not 
opposed more tenaciously by urban constituencies accustomed to the center's largesse 
who stood to lose most from it? Why did interest groups not distort it, seeking to control 
or curtail municipalities' actions? Such issues, and the basic question of how central 
government managed to pass and implement the LPP with few modifications, are both 
interesting and important, but ultimately tangential to my research agenda. The 
unchallenged fact is that by mid-1994 the center had deprived itself of resources in favor 
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of the periphery, where municipal authorities were largely free to pursue local priorities.' 
The local decisions that ensued can accordingly be analyzed as local phenomena, the 
product of local conditions, substantively independent of the politics of the center. 2 
The data used in Part II, and the empirical methods employed to obtain them, are 
quite different from those of Part I. I rely here on qualitative information gathered 
during six months of field work in Bolivia, in nine municipalities selected to control for 
size, region, economic base, rural vs. urban setting, and cultural and ethnic 
characteristics. In each of these I conducted extensive semi-structured and unstructured 
interviews of local government and community leaders, key informants, and citizens at 
the grass-roots level. I spoke to over 300 people in more than 200 interviews, following 
a systematic program in which I put standard questionnaires to 
• the mayor 
• other government leaders 
• government and opposition local councilmen 
• president of the oversight committee 
• heads of several grass-roots organizations 
• principal local health authorities 
• principal local education authorities 
• heads of major businesses and economic interests 
• union leaders 
• parish priest or other religious leader(s) 
• commander of the local military garrison 
• important local NGOs 
• chief municipal technical officer 
• chief municipal financial officer 
• leaders of grass-roots organizations 
• members of grass-roots organizations 
To this standard list were added informants of particular local import in each 
municipality. Interviews were carried out in the main city/town and throughout the rural 
catchment area in each district. I also collected each district's Annual Operating Plan 
(OAP) — its investment budget — and a detailed map of the communities that comprise it. 
In each district I was careful to visit a significant number of rural communities. The 
research was conducted in two rounds, March-May and September-November, 1997, on 
either side of a general (but not municipal) election. During the intervening period I 
analyzed initial results and designed the second round of interviews and questionnaires 
to pursue promising lines of inquiry and test early theories. The length of the above list 
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notwithstanding, the majority of the interviews by number (and duration) were with 
members and spokesmen of grass-roots organizations. 
Before attempting to analyze real municipalities in Bolivia, it is useful to quickly 
review the political science literature on local government. The intellectual case for 
decentralization originates in the most basic rationale for democratic government and the 
effective representation of citizens' interests. Political philosophers such as Rousseau 
(1978), Mill (1993), de Tocqueville (1969), Montesquieu (1989), and Madison, 
Hamilton and Jay (1961) distrusted autocratic central government and held that small, 
democratic units could, like ancient Athens, preserve the liberties of free men. In several 
of the Federalist Papers, Madison theorized about the prevention of tyranny via a balance 
of powers not only among the branches of central government, but between central and 
regional and local governments as well. 
The modern argument is well represented in Musgrave's (1959) familiar 
tripartite division of the functions of the public sector. Macroeconomic Stabilization, or 
the exercise of countercyclical policy, and Income Redistribution and Equality in the 
name of social justice are both primary responsibilities of central government; it has both 
policy tools and the scale appropriate to such functions, which local government largely 
lacks. The Provision of Public Goods and Services, on the other hand, provides the 
primary argument for the existence of local government. Many public services are of 
mainly local concern (e.g. fire protection, law enforcement, trash collection), but, as de 
Tocqueville noted, centralization tends to result in a uniformity of policy outputs which 
often ignores the diversity of local tastes and conditions. Placing control of such 
services in local hands can provide scope for setting levels and qualities of outputs 
according to the circumstances of individual jurisdictions. 
Wolman (1990) develops the theme further, arguing that decentralization can 
enhance efficiency, and hence social welfare. When tastes vary within the population, 
the divergence between individual preferences for public goods and those government 
supplies can be decreased when provision is by local governments operating in relatively 
homogeneous districts. This operates 
by placing government closer to the people, foster[ing] greater responsiveness of 
policy-makers to the will of the citizenry and, it is argued, result[ing] in a closer 
congruence between public preferences and public policy. This is not only because 
decision-makers in decentralized units are likely to be more knowledgeable about and 
attuned to the needs of their area than are centralized national-government decision- 
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makers, but also because decentralization permits these decision-makers to be held 
directly accountable to the local citizenry through local elections. 3 
This comprises the core of the political case for local government.` But how 
precisely can we account for the superior responsiveness of local government to local 
tastes and conditions? Beyond unspecified notions of proximity — to which a surprising 
number of authors appeal — this generally accepted idea is ultimately founded on the 
principle of accountability through the electoral system. But when we examine its 
micro-political foundations carefully, it is not clear how — or indeed if — it can function. 
As Verba, et. al. (1993) point out, elections are a poor mechanism for accountability 
because "the vote differs from many kinds of activity in being a rather blunt instrument 
for the communication of information about the needs and preferences of citizens." 5 
 Voting suffers from the well-known dimensionality problem,6 which makes it unsui ble 
for relaying complex information about citizen preferences to political leaders (this point 
is developed further in Chapter 7). The majority of political science's claims about the 
superior responsiveness of local government are thus only moderately more 
sophisticated than those of Tiebout, Oates and Chapters 2 and 3 above, which in essence 
assume such responsiveness but provide no convincing social mechanism to justify it. 
On the other hand, the results from Bolivia show that local government was indeed much 
more responsive to local conditions than central government had been. How did this 
come about? By what means did local society enforce its will on local government? 
Answering these questions is the subject of the rest of this dissertation. But before 
turning to it, we must first consider a seminal work which attacks the problem directly, 
and then develop some necessary conceptual tools. 
Undoubtedly the most important recent contribution to the field is Robert 
Putnam's Making Democracy Work: Civic Traditions in Modern Italy, which poses the 
question "What are the conditions for creating strong, responsive, effective 
representative institutions?"7 His setting is Italy after the creation of fifteen new regional 
governments in 1970. Despite essentially identical institutional structures and mandates, 
Putnam shows that institutional perfomiance and policy outputs vary strongly and 
4 Additional political arguments in favor of decentralization are largely systemic, concerned with such 
issues as the value of participation, national diversity, or subnational governments as an arena of policy 
experimentation, all of which are beyond the scope of this study. 
5 p.304. 
6 The vote is a unidimensional political instrument, and therefore cannot provide signals about voters' 
multi-dimensional preferences unless circumstances are highly, and conveniently, constrained. 
7 p.6. 
3 Wolman (1990), p.32. 
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systematically between northern and southern regions. He sets out to explain why 
governments in the North are so much more efficient, effective and responsive than their 
counterparts in the South. Quickly he establishes that this is not simply an issue of 
resources, as large transfers have flowed for decades from North to South in a bid to help 
the South catch up. Putnam carefully considers and discards a number of competing 
explanations, settling on the concept of social capital as the principal explanatory 
variable. His central idea concerns the differences between horizontal and vertical social 
linkages, the ability of each to foster trust and cooperation in society, and through these 
affect the performance of public institutions and ultimately a society's wealth and 
standard of living. This historical approach reaches back through the mists of time to the 
year 1100, locating the causes of contemporary patterns of social relations in the 
autocratic regimes of southern Italy, and the free city-states of the North. He 
summarizes his argument as follows: 
In all societies... dilemmas of collective action hamper attempts to cooperate for 
mutual benefit, whether in politics or economics. Third party enforcement is an 
inadequate solution to the problem. Voluntary cooperation (like rotating credit 
associations) depends on social capital. Norms of generalized reciprocity and 
networks of civic engagement encourage social trust and cooperation because they 
reduce incentives to defect, reduce uncertainty, and provide models for future 
cooperation. Trust itself is an emergent property of the social system, as much as a 
personal attribute. Individuals are able to be trusting (and not merely gullible) because 
of the social norms and networks within which their actions are embedded. 8 
Like conventional physical capital, social capital is cumulative and positively 
associated with outputs; unlike physical capital it tends to be self-reinforcing, 
strengthening with use and deteriorating with disuse. Putnam argues that the differing 
efficacies of governments in North and South respond to two distinct social equilibria: 
high and low social capital. Society can be held together by reciprocity, trust and 
cooperation, or force, dependence and exploitation. Once in either situation, rational 
individuals have strong incentives to act consistently with its rules. Equilibria thus 
persist for centuries. But they occur at very different levels of efficiency and 
institutional performance. This, ultimately, is why the Italian North is so much wealthier 
and better governed than the South. "History determines which of these two stable 
outcomes characterizes any given society." 9 
The chapters that follow lead me to agree with the first half of Putnam's thesis: 
the civic characteristics and cooperative potential of society are fundamental to 
8 p.177. 
9 p.179. 
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government performance. But the second half, that these characteristics are exogenously 
determined over long historical intervals, is contradicted by the Bolivian experience. 
The case of Charagua shows most clearly that social capital can evolve over relatively 
short periods with powerful consequences for the quality of governance a district can 
achieve. A millenium is not required; less than a generation can suffice. I then build on 
Putnam's work by providing an explicit model of local government that includes civic 
groups directly in the policy-making process, providing structure to the notion that social 
capital affects policy. My approach is consistent with Tarrow's (1996) critique, that 
Putnam looked into history with a model in mind that conceived of civic capacity as 
given and state structures as endogenous, when in fact patterns of state-building and state 
strategy shape civic capacity in important ways. 
The New Institutional Economics 
We turn for helpful theoretical tools to the new institutional economics, which 
according to Clague (1997a) 
represents a kind of "expanded economics". Like standard economics, it focuses on 
the choices people make in their lives. But it enriches the simple rational choice 
model by allowing for the pervasiveness of information problems and human 
limitations on processing information, the evolution of norms, and the willingness of 
people to form bonds of trust. The NIE seeks to explain not only individuals' choices 
with a given set of institutions but, more important, the way that individuals' beliefs 
and choices affect the evolution of the institutions themselves. 10 
I follow Clague (1997a) and Olson and Kahkonen (2000) in construing the NIE broadly 
to include the economics of transaction costs, institutional innovation and efficiency, 
property rights, collective action, and the evolution of cooperation and norms." Note 
that some of the foremost exponents of some of these subjects might well disagree with 
so broad a definition (see North (1990) and Williamson (1995a)). My purpose here is 
not to give a comprehensive account of the NE, but rather to highlight useful concepts 
in a framework which can be employed to analyze local government. 
According to Williamson (1995a), the NM insists on realistic, commonly 
verifiable instead of analytically convenient, behavioral assumptions: (i) opportunism, 
and (ii) bounded rationality. Opportunism does not assume that all people are always 
dishonest, but rather that "some individuals are opportunistic some of the time and that it 
I() p.16. 
H See Clague (1997), pp.17-23 for a discussion of these components. Good alternative definitions include 
Bardhan (2000), Moe (1995), Williamson (1995a), and Williamson (2000). 
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is costly to ascertain differential trustworthiness ex ante." 12 Opportunism thus prompts 
agents to seek credible commitments before executing transactions. The concept of 
bounded rationality was proposed by Simon (1957) as behavior that is "intendedly 
rational, but only limitedly so".' 3 It arises because people are limited in the information 
they possess and in the computational skills they bring to bear in making choices. "The 
capacity of the human mind for formulating and solving complex problems is very small 
compared with the size of the problems whose solution is required for objectively 
rational behavior in the real world." 14 Bounded rationality makes the mind itself a 
scarce resource. 
Closely related to bounded rationality is what North (1990) calls imperfect 
subjective mental models. This relates to the implicit behavioral assumption of the 
rational choice and neoclassical economics schools that 
actors possess cognitive systems that provide true models of the worlds about which 
they make choices or, at the very least, that the actors receive information that leads to 
convergence of divergent initial models. This is patently wrong for most of the 
interesting problems with which we are concerned. Individuals make choices based on 
subjectively derived models that diverge among individuals and the information the 
actors receive is so incomplete that in most cases these divergent subjective models 
show no tendency to converge. I5 
Imperfect mental models interact with and reinforce the bounded nature of human 
rationality to create significant obstacles to efficiency in transactions. 
Bounded rationality and imperfect mental models, combined with uncertainty, 
imply that "all complex contracts are unavoidably incomplete".' 6 Modern complex 
contracts are both multidimensional and extend over time. Agents' limited mental 
abilities imply that parties to a contract will be unable to specify all possible future 
contingencies. Parties will thus deliberately leave possible unknowns unspecified, 
rendering contracts incomplete. Instead they delegate the resolution of disputes which 
may arise to some third party, which accounts for the rise of certain institutions, to which 
we turn presently. 
A fifth idea central to the NM is costly transactions, pioneered among others by 
Coase (1937). North expands on this theme: 
The costliness of information is the key to the costs of transacting, which consists of 
the costs of measuring the valuable attributes of what is being exchanged and the costs 
12 p.190. 
13 Simon (1957) in Williamson (1995a), p.178. 
14 ibid., p.179. 
15 p.17. 
16 Williamson (1995a), p.179, original emphasis. 
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of protecting rights and policing and enforcing agreements. [.. .] Commodities, 
services, and the performance of agents have numerous attributes and their levels vary 
from one specimen or agent to another. 17 
Ascertaining the level of these attributes, protecting rights, and policing and enforcing 
agreements makes transactions costly. 
With these tools in hand, we can now turn to the structural characteristics of 
society. Consider first organizations and institutions. North defines organizations as 
"purposive entities designed by their creators to maximize... [some] objective defined 
by the opportunities afforded by the institutional structure of society." I8 They are groups 
of individuals united by a common purpose and shared objectives. Firms are specific 
cases of organizations, as are political parties, churches, clubs, and the houses of a 
congress. And so like films, their justification — and many of their structural 
characteristics — lie in the limits of human decision-making. Institutions, on the other 
hand, "are the humanly devised constraints that shape human interaction." 19 They 
compensate for human limitations in computing information by limiting actors' choice 
sets, thus providing structure for political, social and economic interaction. In doing so 
they reduce uncertainty in everyday life. The distinction between institutions and 
organizations is crucial, and analogous to that between rules and players in sport. 
Institutions are the written and unwritten rules of the game, while organizations are the 
teams who employ skills, strategy and coordination to win. "Institutions, together with 
the standard constraints of economic theory, determine the opportunities in a society. 
Organizations are created to take advantage of those opportunities, and, as the 
organizations evolve, they alter the institutions." 20 
The importance of institutions goes deep to the heart of socio-economic activity. 
Without institutional constraints, for example, complex exchange would likely cease 
because of uncertainty about whether self-interested parties would abide by their 
agreements. As Olson (2000a) points out, the failure of institutions can thus explain the 
historical persistence of underdevelopment in most of the world, locking societies into 
patterns of comparatively low-value, self-enforcing economic activity. Institutions are 
also central to property rights. "Property rights are the rights individuals appropriate 
over their own labor and the goods and services they possess. Appropriation is a 
17 North (1990), p.27-29. 
18 ibid., p.73. 
ID ibid., p.3. 
20 ibid., p.7. 
97 
Introduction to Part II 
function of legal rules, organizational forms, enforcement, and norms of behavior — that 
is, the institutional framework." 21 Without the existence of such institutions, property 
rights would not exist. 
The NIE conceives of organizational — and he e institutional — change as 
occurring through a quasi-evolutionary mechanism in which the environment selects 
fitter, but not necessarily the fittest, forms. The mechanism is transaction-cost 
economizing, as bounded rationality and imperfect mental models strictly prevent 
organizations from optimizing. Williamson (1995a) calls this weak-form selection. 
Alchian (1950, in Moe, (1984)) provides a stronger account of the idea, in which 
uncertainty negates the possibility of rationality and hence of profit maximization. 
Under these conditions, firms survive because they make a positive profit, regardless of 
how far from optimality they are. The economic environment de-selects loss-making 
firms, and over time innovation generates new forms for selection. But innovation will 
tend to serve groups with strong bargaining power at a given juncture, and not any social 
consensus on efficient forms. As environmental selection can only choose from amongst 
those organizational forms that are tried, surviving organizations are unlikely to be 
efficient, and the resulting population is unlikely to be optimal. 
The last concept central to the NIE is what Williamson (2000) calls 
remediableness. This corresponds to his concern with "making a place for and being 
respectful of politics."22 Remediableness pertains to the probability of changing an 
institution or policy given real constraints. Hence a policy that is inefficient when 
compared to a theoretical construct can be efficient in practice because economic or 
political conditions render it unremediable. Williamson suggests a two-stage test of 
remediableness. The first, economic question is: Can a superior form of organization 
that is feasible be described? The second, political question is: Does the proposed 
alternative have the necessary political support to be implemented? Employing this test 
will help to avoid lapses into ideal but operationally irrelevant reasoning patterns and 
policy advice. The principle of remediableness is very important and has significant 
implications for understanding economic development and reform. As Williamson 
points out, "many practices that are regarded as reprehensible when viewed through the 
21 ibid., p.33. 
22 p.105. See also Williamson (1995b). 
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lens of price theory/applied welfare economics actually serve efficiency purposes and/or 
are not remediable when examined through the lens of transaction cost economics." 23 
These, then, are the concepts that Part II of this dissertation will employ to 
analyze local government in nine Bolivian municipalities. Although the ideas remain 
latent in the next two chapters, we do well to keep them in mind as they comprise the 
intellectual tools with which the extremes of municipal performance are analyzed. The 
framework becomes explicit in Chapter 7, which describes an analytical model of local 
government that abstracts from previous evidence in terms of the ideas discussed above. 
The conceptualization of local government with which I approach the following two 
chapters, though very general, arises in part from the results of Chapter 3. It holds that 
local government occurs in an institutional context defined by (a) the legal framework of 
local government, and (b) norms and codes of behavior that govern political activity, 
which in turn give rise directly and indirectly to (c) governmental and political 
organizations (e.g. municipal council, local parties) which actually produce policy. 
Social and economic interests compete for influence over governmental and political 
organizations. The legal-institutional framework of local government may be strong 
enough to contain the pressures that these interests create or it may not be, in which case 
policy can become deformed, creating tensions in local society. 
Before commencing the analysis, it is useful to review quickly the institutional 
framework of local government in Bolivia. The Law of Popular Participation (LPP) 
stipulates that municipal councilmen be elected from party lists in single-constituency 
elections. The council then elects the mayor indirectly from amongst those of them who 
garnered the most votes. Bolivia's European-style, fragmented political culture, grafted 
onto an American-style presidential system, ensures that most municipal (and national) 
governments are coalitions. Hereafter, this chapter uses "mayor" to refer to the mayor 
and executive branch of local government, including all appointed administrative and 
technical officials — by far the largest and most important of the three. The third 
institution of local government is the oversight committee (OC), which is composed of 
the representatives of grass-root organizations within each municipality. A municipality 
will typically be divided into four or more regions, each of which nominates one 
member to the OC from amongst its local grass-roots leaders. OC members elect from 
amongst themselves a president, whose legal status is comparable to the mayor's. The 
23 p.118. 
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OC's power lies in its natural moral authority, as well as the ability to suspend 
disbursements from central to local government if it judges that funds are being misused. 
Oversight committees thus comprise a parallel, corporatist form of social representation 
similar to an upper house of parliament, enforcing accountability on the mayor and 
municipal counci1. 24 
Lastly, two purely stylistic notes. Throughout the second part of the dissertation 
I adhere to the NEE definitions of the terms "organization" and "institution" as given 
above, with the exception of references to (local) government institutions, where I revert 
to the everyday usage of an establishment devoted to the public cause such as the 
mayoralty, municipal council, and oversight committee. This is mainly to distinguish 
them from civic and other organizations, which arise spontaneously from society and are 
not formally part of the government structure. Secondly, when referring to village-level 
testimony I will often use the construction "Village X said" to mean "the leaders of 
Village X said" in order to avoid repetition. 
24 I am indebted to Dr. Teddy Brett for this apt analogy. 
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1. Introduction 
Wilting under the afternoon sun, Viacha squats on the altiplano like a dusty 
cholita at market, tired after a long day selling pantyhose and cigarettes smuggled across 
the border. Approaching along the old southern road from La Paz, you notice the outer 
edges of El Alto lapping like wavelets at Viacha, the two cities bridged by a progression 
of nameless eateries and roadside mechanics that never quite peter out. One may be 
forgiven for considering Viacha a medium-sized urban offshoot of the La Paz-El Alto 
conurbation. Urban viacheflos would take exception. They clearly think of their home 
as a city, and their surrounding countryside — when they think of it at all — as a catchment 
area of little importance. But to believe this is a mistake, as Viacha is in fact a large rural 
municipality with a medium-sized city in one corner. Of the seven districts that 
comprise it, four are rural. Of its 54,761 inhabitants, two-thirds are dispersed amongst 
300 rural communities that reach all the way to the border with Peru, with the remaining 
third living in the city. 1 
By Bolivian standards Viacha is a wealthy industrial town. It is home to the 
main cement plant of the Sociedad Boliviana de Cenzentos (SOBOCE), Bolivia's largest 
cement company, as well as a large bottling plant belonging to the Cerveceria Boliviana 
Nacional (CBN), Bolivia's largest brewery. Both companies contribute directly and 
significantly to Viacha's municipal coffers through property tax, business licenses, 
electricity bills, and — in the case of the CBN — generous in-kind lending of trucks and 
other heavy machinery, and large donations of beer, all placed at the mayor's disposal. 
Strung along the main road out of Viacha are numerous medium-sized and small textile, 
brick and tile, and other construction-related businesses, all of which contribute to local 
incomes and tax receipts. Municipal income includes receipts from property and vehicle 
taxes, licenses and place-rents for businesses and street commerce, planning and zoning 
approval fees, and a number of other items — more than most other cities in Bolivia. But 
Instituto Nacional de Estadistica. 1992. Censo Nacional de PoblaciOn y Vivenda. La Paz: INE. Viacha is 
the fourteenth most populous municipality in Bolivia 
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the city is curiously free of the signs of wealth, and hence of inequality, with 
neighborhoods ranging in appearance from poor peri-urban to middle class, but no 
higher. This is probably because the most successful Viachans take up residence in La 
Paz, underlining the city's status as a dormitory town. Viacha's index of Unsatisfied 
Basic Needs2 (0.852 on a scale where 0 is best and 1 worst) places it in the best-off 25% 
of Bolivian municipalities; its proximity to the cities of La Paz and El Alto ensures a 
higher level of economic activity than in other cities of comparable size. 
Yet by the middle of 1997 Viacha was a troubled town. After three consecutive 
electoral victories, the populist Union CIvica de Soliclariclad (UCS) party had lost its 
sheen in a hail of corruption accusations, and was increasingly seen as ineffective. Two 
million bolivianos of investment funds went unspent from the 1996 budget despite the 
mayor's pleas that he lacked the resources to satisfy communities' project requests. A 
rival oversight committee (0C2) was established demanding the mayor's resignation and 
disbandment of the official oversight committee (OC1 — sanctioned by the municipal 
government). With two competing OCs (and two sets of neighborhood councils), the 
participative planning process broke down as the city became polarized between groups 
supporting the mayor and those demanding his resignation. In the midst of this 
poisonous political and social climate, thieves broke into the municipal garage, killed the 
elderly guard and stole two vehicles. This gave rise to numerous accusations and 
counter-accusations. "There are cars parked on the street all over La Paz and El Alto," 
the president of OC1 said, explaining that one of the stolen vehicles had been located in 
El Alto. "If you want to steal a car, why would you come to Viacha and steal it from a 
guarded garage?" 3 In his opinion, the crime was the work of the opposition seeking to 
sully the mayor's reputation. Others saw the hand of the mayor himself, ordering a 
robbery to blame on the opposition in order to reap a vote of sympathy in the upcoming 
elections. In interviews in March of that year, however, municipal councilmen seemed 
not to appreciate the severity of their problems, telling me "not everything is going 
badly, nor is all well — we have our imperfections," 4 and then blaming the crisis on the 
opposition's "exaggerations". 
This is a Bolivian government index calculated from a variety of demographic and poverty indicators 
from the 1992 census. 
3 Remigio Quispe Mendoza, Walter Patzi Paty and Nemesio Mamani Fernandez, oversight committee (1) 
president, federation of neighborhood councils (1) president and federation officer respectively, interview, 
Viacha, 18 March 1997. 
4 Huber Quintela and Esteban Ticona, municipal councilmen (MNR & Condepa respectively), interview, 
Viacha, 18 March 1997. 
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The eruptions of Viachan politics occur within a broader tide of urban migration 
which flows around and through the city, giving Viacha its character. Perched on the 
edge of the La Paz-El Alto metropolis, Viacha is the first stop for many peasants fleeing 
the hardships of subsistence agriculture on the altiplano. Some move directly on to El 
Alto, but others stay and complete the transition to urban life in Viacha. They fill the 
streets with their Aymara dress, speech and rural customs, and are the objects of ridicule 
by city-folk who wear shoes and use electricity to cook.' Supporting themselves at first 
through menial labor or selling in the markets, and then through better-paid jobs in La 
Paz-El Alto to which they make the daily hour-long commute, they build the adobe 
neighborhoods of the city further and further outwards. They take little pride in the 
history of a city which has traditionally defined itself in opposition to the countryside; 
they stay, having found jobs in the metropolis, because the living is cheap. 6 The battle 
against prejudice to improve their livelihoods gives many Viachans a disconcerting 
blend of aggressive opportunism and rural tastes. "Viacheiios are the New Yorkers of 
the region — they have vices that others don't. There's too much alcohol about and 
everyone shows off their money drinking," 7 according to Carlos Nunez, financial 
director of SOBOCE. The city's northward expansion along the road to La Paz is in 
effect fusing it with El Alto 8 , leading to numerous problems of delimitation, land 
registration and taxation, which the two municipalities struggle to resolve. 
Dr Reynaldo Aguilar, district director of health, interview, Viacha, 10 October 1997. 
6 Luis Gonzalez, departmental director, Social Investment Fund, interview, Viacha, 17 March 1997. 
Interview, Viacha, 19 March 1997. 
8  El Alto, itself a former suburb of La Paz, is largely the result of rural-urban migration on a much larger 
scale. 
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Governing Coalition** UCS-MNR % of Population Speaks: 
General Spanish 	14% 
Total Pop. 54,761 % Vote 1995 48.4% Native Tongue 	19% 
Urban Pop. 19,036 Main Opposition Condepa Spanish & Native 	65% 
Urban Share 35% % Vote 1995 24.5% Literacy Rate 	77% 
Rural Communities 300 Electoral Absenteeism 39.4% No Ed. Attainment 	20% 
Indigenous Comms. 0 % Blank Votes 3.1% # Schools (Bldgs) 	163 
Unsatisfied Basic Needs 0.852 % Null Votes 4.4% Total Students 	18,860 
Urban UBN 0.598 Students/Teacher 	16.4 
Rural UBN 0.974 Municipal Employees TJses Formal Health 	43% 
1997 150 Care System 
Oversight Committee 1993 70 # Health Facilities 	18 
Total Members* 7 Increase 114% Malnutrition Rates: 
Village Members 5 per 1000 pop 2.7 Low 	19% 
President is from? Urban Top Salary+ Bs 1,560 Moderate 	6% 
Qualifs. Req'd? Yes (?) Severe 	1% 
VIACHA 	 Electoral Social Indicators 
Figure 2: Public Investment in Viacha 
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Figure 1 
sources: 1992 census, 1997 municipal census, National Electoral Court, Na tional Institute 
of Statistics, author's interviews 
* Refers to the officially recognized oversight committee (OCI) 
** In order of importance, 1995-99; the MNR continued to cooperate with tl ie UCS after 
the 1995 elections, although its support was no longer necessary 
+ Highest-paid non-elected official 
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2. Local Goverrunent Institutions 
2.1 The Mayor and the Local Executive Branch 
The mayor of Viacha in early 1997 was Edwin Callisaya, from the Aymara 
community of Tilata-Santa Trinidad in rural Viacha. Before entering politics Callisaya 
had taken courses in business administration at university, and then gone to work as a 
public sector employee in La Paz. He was first elected to local government as a 
councilman for the UCS in 1993, and became mayor shortly thereafter when the re-
elected mayor resigned to become a substitute MP for the UCS. He governed in 
coalition with the MNR through the 1995 election, which the UCS won easily with a 
large electoral surge attributed by many observers to the death of its leader, Max 
Fernandez, in a tragic airplane crash. 9 From 1995-99 the UCS governed Viacha alone. 10 
As a son of the poor countryside, Callisaya set out to ensure that resources 
reached rural villages. "He argues that the rural areas never received anything, and so he 
must invest there," said Oscar Magnani Meyta, the District Director of Education in 
Viacha. 11 Callisaya visited rural communities more often than the previous mayor and 
met with their inhabitants, the concerns and desires of whom he was well-placed to 
understand. He invited rural leaders to Viacha and hosted them at municipal events, 
including a prominent one where the yearly investment plan was agreed and co-signed 
by 56 local community leaders. 12 
Callisaya also expressed the desire to make Viacha a "model municipality", with 
a modern, rational administration that was transparent and a beacon to Viacha's less 
fortunate neighbors.'' To this end he sought to use resources from the World Bank, the 
Social Investment Fund (HS), and others — who he claimed recognized Viacha's natural 
importance — to increase both the size and quality of the municipal workforce. The 
municipal payroll rose accordingly from 70 to 150 during his mayoralty, and in the 
second year of his term he called a public competition to fill the posts of Chief Financial 
and Technical Officers. Seventy applicants with professional qualifications applied for 
9 Councilman Esteban Ticona and Lt.Col. Adolfo Davila Chacon, commander of the local military 
garrison, are two of the many people who recounted this commonly held view to me. In Davila's words, 
"The death of Max Fernandez was a big boon to the UCS. Condepa was stronger than the UCS in Viacha, 
but Max's death brought out the sympathy vote and the UCS won easily." (Interview, 19 March 1997) 
10 The structural reforms of 1993-94 extended the local electoral cycle from two to four years. 
II Interview, Viacha, 21 March 1997. 
12 Alejandro Yujra, Rony Morales and Hip:5lito Tovar, vice-president of the Federation of Neighborhood 
Councils (Juntas) of Viacha (2), secretary of the neighborhood council of San Jose, and member and 
spokesman for 0C2, interview, Viacha, 19 March 1997. 
I Interview, Viacha, 18 March 1997. 
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the two positions, marking the first important step in the technification of Viachan 
government. Despite this, Viacha's government still seemed lost on fairly basic issues. 
The newly-hired Chief Financial Officer admitted to me that "SOBOCE and the CBN 
are our great problems — we don't know what taxes we are allowed to charge them, nor 
for what amount. And it's worse if they obtain legal advice. We don't know which way 
north is." 14 
From the outside, Callisaya's administration was seen as somewhat successful in 
some quarters. In an interview after the 1997 elections, the District Director of 
Education (DDE) reported that the municipality complied with minimum legal 
requirements by providing funds for maintenance (e.g. desks, paper, classroom supplies) 
as well as investment (e.g. building classrooms, fixing buildings, equipping schools). 15 
 But even this praise was balanced by complaints that the municipal government refused 
to coordinate with the DDE, planning, designing and building educational infrastructure 
with no DDE input. Because the municipality has more resources than the DDE, 
communities solicit projects directly from them. The DDE is thus excluded at every 
stage of the project cycle, and as a result "municipal projects do not abide by the 
standards of the education sector," including especially those set out by the Education 
Reform Program that Bolivia is currently undertaking. 16, 17 This problem is compounded 
by the municipality's "constructionist" mentality, which prefers building infrastructure 
to running programs and providing services. "The municipality thinks the money should 
be used for urban development projects anyway," said the DDE, complaining that what 
educational investment it does carry out is almost entirely restricted to building and 
refurbishing simple schoolhouses dotted across the countryside. "And were it not for the 
PASE (a central government matching-grants schemes for school refurbishment) they 
would not do even that." 18 
Even this investment is unequally allocated across Viacha, with a small 
community like Titik'ana Takaka receiving three classrooms in addition to its existing 
three while many others receive nothing. The DDE estimated that some 40% of Viachan 
villages are forgotten by the municipal government. He attributed this to an ad-hoc 
14 Jorge Rada, chief financial officer, interview, Viacha, 15 October 1997. 
15 Maria Luisa Lucuy (who had recently assumed the position of DDE), interview, Viacha, 15 October 
1997. 
16 Magnani, op.cit. 
17 For example, the Education Reform Program calls for hexagonal primary school classrooms, but all of 
those built in Viacha in the previous few years were traditional "square boxes". 
18 Magnani, op.cit. 
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planning system which depends fundamentally on pressure politics and makes no effort 
to objectively assess local needs, or equitably allocate investment resources. Thus, in his 
words, "the communities which demand the most get the most," implying a bias in favor 
of villages that lie closer to the city, or those with the resources to fund travel and 
lodging for grass-roots leaders who lobby the mayor's office on the community's behalf. 
The mayor effectively agreed with this analysis, admitting that communities whose 
leaders were most "political" were most successful at getting their projects approved and 
obtaining municipal funds. 19 And the Chief Financial Officer conceded that he did not 
know how many projects the municipality had financed, nor how the Annual Operating 
Plan (AOP) had been drawn up, though he understood that the criteria used were not 
technical. 2° 
That the municipality ran such a "system" instead of making a serious attempt at 
investment programming was at least partly due to the poor quality of municipal 
personnel, "who are mostly UCS hacks instead of professionals." 21 "The cultural level 
of the local authorities isn't optimal," agrees Mr Naez of SOBOCE. "The first things 
the municipal government bought when Popular Participation funds arrived were cars, 
TVs, and so on," he added with disdain. 22 Even some municipal councilmen agreed 
with this view, arguing that the increase in the municipal payroll was "all numbers and 
no quality, or even with decreasing quality". 23 The head of Incerpaz, the largest of 
Viacha's brick and tile films, extended this judgment to the municipal council itself, 
asserting that "the main problem this municipality faces is a lack of qualifications and 
ability on the part of the municipal council and administration," and noting that qualified 
people tend to migrate to La Paz. "This municipality isn't sufficiently technical to 
devise a master plan of development for the 
municipality — something that the private sector in Viacha has directly requested." 24 
On the other side of Viacha, the DDE's colleague Dr Reynaldo Aguilar, District 
Director of Health (DDH), agreed with his diagnosis, while reporting a situation that was 
significantly worse. "The municipal government refuses to pay its share of the Maternal 
& Infant Health Insurance, as the law demands" 25 he said, explaining that the 
19 Callisaya, op.cit. 
21 Lucuy, op.cit. 
22 Nunez, op. cit. 
23  Quintela and Ticona, op.cit. 
24  Luis Paz, CEO Incerpaz, interview, Viacha, 15 October 1997. 
20 Rada, op.cit. 
25 Aguilar, op.cit. 
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municipality seized on incomplete documentation to declare the DDH's payment 
requests invalid and refuse disbursement. "In health the municipality is hypocritical, " 
he sighed. "They talk a lot but invest nothing." Like the DDE, Dr Aguilar was never 
invited to review Viacha's Annual Operating Plan despite requests for coordination. He 
detailed how the DDH lost the only hospital in the city and all of the equipment that they 
and others had bought for it, due to a mixture of incompetence, bad luck and sheer lack 
of interest on the part of the municipality. "The mayor is terribly bad," he concluded, a 
sentiment shared by Sub-Prefect Gladys Lozano, the local representative of the 
departmental government. 26 It is notable that the mayor managed to alienate the 
representatives of the ministries of Education and Health and the Prefect, arguably the 
three most important agents of central government in the city, during a relatively short 
period of time.27 In the case of Lozano the distrust became active and angry opposition. 
Among Viacha's private firms, the most important politically is the CBN bottling 
plant. The man who formed the CBN was an unschooled laborer, Max Fernandez, 
whose fabled ascent began at the wheel of a delivery truck and ended with him buying 
several breweries and dominating the industry. Turning his populist and paternalistic 
attentions to politics, he founded the UCS party and integrated it tightly into his beer 
empire, distributing pamphlets out of CBN delivery trucks and selling beer at political 
rallies. Thus, to interview a spokesman for the CBN is to speak to the largest employer 
in the region; but it is also to see the other face of the Fernandez family enterprise. The 
opinion of the mayor offered by Jose Luis Claros, production supervisor at the CBN 
bottling plant, is accordingly benign: "Our relations with the HAM are obviously good 
because we're from the same party," he said, explaining how the CBN provides the 
municipality with "trucks, machinery, beer — everything. And all free of charge. We 
give them beer in small quantities, say twenty cases at a time, for their meetings, events, 
celebrations. We support them too much," and his smile implied a professional 
impatience with this open drain on his accounts. 28 "All the same, the municipality 
doesn't prioritize us with any of its expenditures — it only takes." 
At SOBOCE, Claros' counterpart, Nithez, was less generous in his assessment, 
arguing that the municipality is largely dedicated to a symbolic equality, wasting its 
resources on cosmetic and essentially pointless investments like "government houses" 
26 Gladys Lozano, sub-prefect for Ingavi province (MNR), interview, Viacha, 17 March 1997. 
27 Bolivian prefects are appointed directly by the president. Sub-prefects are thus broadly viewed as 
representatives of the central government. 
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and plazas in rural areas that make locals feel they are not ignored, but do little to 
improve the quality of life in these villages — a point which the local priest echoes. 29 
 "There's no civil leader here who gives guidance on good, significant projects" that 
respond to local needs, he said." Luis Gonzalez of the FIS agreed, adding, "Many 
viacheiios want to rid themselves of Callisaya...but he's proven good at managing 
relations with the brewery, and manipulating [public opinion] through the parties and 
local festivals they sponsor." 31 
In addition to a showman the mayor was a shrewd tactician as well, conspiring to 
neutralize the opposition and short-circuit municipal accountability mechanisms. "The 
original oversight committee used to cut his financing and give him all sorts of trouble," 
according to Lt.Col. Davila, "but he wanted to be the 'little king' and considered them 
the enemy. When the OC was being renewed, he divided the nominating congress of 
grass-roots leaders — divided and conquered them." 32 With no effective oversight, 
Callisaya was able to do as he pleased and impose his will freely. In everything from the 
petty to the scandalous, the executive branch was not held to account. "He buys the 
peasants off with stupidities, and other times he sends them away, telling them 'Come 
back tomormw'." 33 The community leaders of Santa Ana de Machaqa, to name just one 
example, provided details: 
The mayor comes along brightly to ask us what projects we want, but then does 
nothing about it.... The municipality isn't like the Plan Internacional [an NGO active 
in the area], which does come through for us. [...] We spend money making trips to 
Viacha to make formal requests for projects but nothing comes of it. 34 
The municipality did build a schoolhouse and public urinals in Santa Ana, but 
local residents were not consulted about the project design and were not told the value of 
the counterpart contribution that they were expected to make. The community's request 
to change the urinals to an additional classroom was rejected. Then they were 
overcharged for their lime supplies, and discovered that the wood the municipality had 
provided was rotten. 35 But the mayor's high-handed rule proved even worse in 
Sombrapata. According to Sub-Prefect Lozano, this community was excluded entirely 
28 Interview, Viacha, 21 March 1997. 
29 
 Fr Justin() Limachi, parish priest, interview, Viacha, 16 October 1997. 
30 Nu'nez, op.cit. 
31 Gonzalez, op.cit. 
32 Davi la,  op.cit. 
33 ibid. 
34 Jose Quezo Cusi, community leader, Lorenzo Julian, teacher and electoral notary, and Olga Cusi de 
Julian, Plan Internacional liaison, interview, Santa Ana de Machaqa, 23 March 1997. 
35 ibid. 
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from the municipal participative planning exercise because of the UCS' low vote tally.' 
Project quality suffered as well. "The sewerage extension was badly done with pipes 
that were too small," explained Davila. "They exploded and inundated the city with 
waste. [...] Even today water and sewerage service does not extend beyond four blocks 
from the main square," leaving his military base unattended. 37 The mayor himself 
admits that municipal performance has been "bad" in health, garbage collection, 
sewerage, roads and irrigation.38 
The picture that emerges is of a municipal executive which makes some effort to i 
spread resources throughout the municipality, but which lacks the personnel, technical 
criteria, quality control, beneficiary participation, budgetary controls and ultimately the 
leadership to articulate a clear investment strategy and use resources effectively. With a 
municipal staff awash in people but lacking skills, and an institutional structure 
undermined and incapable of carrying out oversight, the mayor's impulses to 
modernization and equality were drowned in a sea of mismanagement and 
demagoguery. Political imperatives were allowed to override all others, and the 	1 
municipality ignored community needs and the requirements of the education and health i 
networks in a crude attempt to maximize votes. 
Such a situation would seem destined to lead to corruption, and in Viacha it did. J  
Paz asserts that municipal employees stole municipal property as a matter of course. 39 
 According to Lozano, the mayor authorized the purchase of cement at twice the market 
price in a transparent kick-back scheme. 4° According to Davila the mayor bought a large 
piece of land alongside the main road to La Paz in a clear conflict of interest. 
SOBOCE's Niltiez places corruption in the larger context of the municipality's overall 
performance. 
The municipality plans roads and related works badly. First they tear up the roads to 
lay down sewerage, and then a few months later they tear them up again for water 
works. Our cement trucks take the blame for poor state of roads, but it's also the 
municipality's fault with their poor-quality repairs. We have serious suspicions of 
corruption in all of this. It seems to be all about payments to certain firms for 
construction and equipment rental. Imagine — they're paying more for pavement here 
than in La Paz! 4 ' 
36 Lozano, op.cit. 
37 Davila, op.cit. 
38  Callisaya, op.cit. 
39 Paz, op.cit. 
40 Lozano, op.cit. 
41 Naiez, op.cit. 
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Even councilman Ticona stated simply, "Edwin Callisaya is corrupt," referring to the 
regular over-pricing of projects during his tenure. "One cemetery was budgeted at 
Bs.50,000 but then built for only Bs.28,000. But the municipality poured Bs.50,000 or 
more into it anyway. Callisaya and his officers conspired to do this." 42 But the most 
impressive evidence of the effects of the mayor's near-impunity concerns the checks and 
computer records of community counterpart contributions for the sewerage projects 
mentioned above. 
The account, earmarked for the purchase and laying of pipes, reached Bs.6 million, but 
nothing happened. When the neighborhood committees began asking what was going 
on, the computer was stolen along with the checks. Shortly afterwards, the checks 
reappeared, having been cashed in Argentina. 43 
Both Davila and Lozano claimed that the mayor and Edgar Robles, then-president of the 
municipal council, were involved, and Lozano went so far as to accuse the two of going 
on a vacation-cum-spending spree in Argentina with the sewerage funds. 
It is not surprising, then, that by the end of his tenure Callisaya was deeply 
unpopular. The national auditing agency informed the municipality that it had found 
evidence of administrative charges against him." Newspaper articles appeared 
documenting allegations of corruption, and the rival OC2 called repeatedly and loudly 
for his resignation. "The mayor acts in a `verticalist' way like a dictator," the president of 
OC2 declaimed. "He is a peasant who wouldn't know how to speak to a donkey." 45 
 "The CBN gives the city equipment, money and beer. But they don't give them brains, 
or at least not the mayor," added Davila. 46 As viacheflos seemed to awaken out of their 
torpor and political tensions mounted, the impression dawned in Viacha that the 
municipality was actually worse off than before the Law of Popular Participation. Local 
government was now larger, inefficient, and more corrupt. Voters were demoralized by 
the municipality's ineffectiveness in the countryside, and scandalized by its corruption in 
the city. 
2.2 Municipal Council 
The UCS' electoral surge of 15% in Viacha's 1995 municipal election had the 
net effect of wresting one council seat away from Condepa. Hence the balance of 
councilmen in early 1997 was UCS four, Condepa two, and MNR one. Although the 
42 Esteban Ticona, municipal councilman, interview, Viacha, 9 October 1997. 
43 Davila, op.cit. 
44 Rada, op.cit. 
45 Hip()lito Tovar, 0C2 president, interview, Viacha 19 March 1997. 
46 Davila, op.cit. 
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UCS now held a majority of seats on its own, in practice the MNR continued to 
cooperate with it, mirroring the parties' coalition at the national level. The president of 
the municipal council was Edgar Robles, a former schoolteacher from Sucre and Potosi 
whose family lived in La Paz. Despite having no family or community ties to Viacha, he 
had been elected to public office three times there — as mayor in 1991 and again in 1993 
(succeeded by Callisaya when Robles became a substitute MP in La Paz), and as a 
councilman in 1995. Robles' fellow party-members on the council were farmers and 
local leaders from the Aymara communities of the Machagas region towards Peru. 
Unskilled in the practice of urban politics, both they and the city seemed slightly stunned 
by their presence in city hall as late as 1997. The two Condepa councilmen were both 
city viacheiios and foliner employees of public enterprises, one of them in La Paz, who 
entered politics by becoming party activists. And the lone MNR representative, also 
from Viacha, was the recently-elected head of his party comando and a public employee 
who worked for the central government in La Paz. 
When asked about Popular Participation, councilmen universally opined that it 
was a very good law and beneficial to their constituency. But they also seemed 
somewhat intimidated by the process, and worried about the expectations it was 
generating in rural communities. 47 Unfortunately their worries did not necessarily spur 
them to action. They admitted to ignorance about the 1994 Municipal Development 
Plan, which maps local needs and preferences for public investment throughout 
Viacha," implying that they were not using it as part of the budgeting and investment 
planning process in the municipality. And while noting that Viacha's needs in health 
and waste disposal were considerable, they acknowledged that the municipality's 
performance in these areas so far was poor, and that in electricity, roads, irrigation and 
water little or nothing had been achieved. 49 
This peculiar combination of concern with inaction may be partly explained by 
the municipal council's view of its role in local government, which is that of a tail 
wagged by the executive (i.e. mayoral) dog. "We have one secretary and one adviser," 
the councilmen complained, "how are we supposed to cope? They [the executive] have 
47 Quintela and Ticona, op.cit. 
48 PDMs were developed through an elaborate series of participative planning seminars held in each of 
about 100 Bolivian municipalities in 1994. Delegates were invited from a broad spectrum of society to 
workshops where needs were identified and projects ranked based on individual communities' priorities. 
PDMs were meant to be multi-year plans, and the basis for drawing up Annual Operating Plans. 
49 Quintela and Ticona, op.cit. 
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140 people there."5° When asked about the organization of the local administration, 
salary levels, and hiring criteria, they responded that they had made same queries 
formally to the mayor, but had received no response. "We do not have access to that 
infoilliation," they pleaded.'' They went on to float a proposal for more training of 
municipal staff, and more resources generally to improve the municipal administration. 
They seemed not to appreciate the irony that it is the municipal council that approves the 
focal budget, and it is thus within their power to increase funding for any item that they 
choose. 
Regarding its external role in the municipality, the council claimed to set policy 
and priorities according to their voters' wishes. But on this point they were directly 
contradicted by the voters themselves. Community leaders in Santa Ana de Machaqa 
testified that "councilmen obey their parties — they're elected as representatives of the 
local people here, but then they go to Viacha and get absorbed by the political parties 
there and forget their home." 52 In Titik'ana Takaka, the leaders said that "councilmen 
respond mainly to the parties and the municipal government's own interests, not ours." 53 
 Judgments were virtually identical in the communities of District Five, District Six, 
Chama, and the city of Viacha. 54 Even the mayor testified that councilmen ignore their 
voters, explaining "there is a party discipline that has to be obeyed." 55 As if to underline 
the point, Quintela and Ticona admitted to knowing nothing about how a large and 
controversial project to re-build a school in Viacha was designed and tendered. "The 
Social Investment Fund did it all — we weren't involved." 56 
Not surprisingly given this panorama, outsider's views of the municipal council 
were unflattering. "The one who thinks on the municipal council is Edgar Robles," said 
Lt.Col. Davila. "The mayor is also clever. The rest are a brotherhood of imbeciles." 
Luis Paz agreed, calling the member of the council "ignorant and imperceptive". 57 
 Some, including the Sub-Prefect and the local leader of Condepa, singled out the UCS 
50  ibid. 
51 ibid. 
52 Quezo, Julian and Cusi, op.cit. 
53  Genaro Mamani Chiri, Gumercindo Vito Guarachi, Saturnino Tola Mamani, and Doroteo Callisaya 
Mamani, community leader, district official, representative to the Federation of Ayllus and Indigenous 
Communities of Ingavi Province (FACOPI), and community official respectively, interview, Titik'ana 
Takaka, 20 March 1997. 
54 Geronimo Colque, community deputy leader (District Six), Severo Guarachi, community leader 
(Chama), Simon Canavi, community leader (Viacha), and Alicia Rodriguez, women's leader (District 
Five), interviews, Viacha, 17 March 1997. 
55 Callisaya, 
56 Quintela and Ticona, op.cit 
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rural councilmen for scorn as unsophisticated and easily manipulable. "They're ignorant 
peasants — they don't know where they're standing," elaborated the latter. 58 I had the 
good fortune to travel with two of these UCS rural councilmen for a long day across the 
Viachan hinterland to the border with Peru and back. Both men were very kind and 
helpful, and kept high spirits throughout a tiring ride in a crowded jeep. But neither 
showed much interest in the opinions and priorities of the communities which we visited, 
all of which lay in their constituencies. I spent hours that day speaking to local leaders 
about their concerns and needs for municipal investment, but the two men were largely 
absent. Unfortunately, the criticism went deeper still. Ms Lozano also accused some 
councilmen of corruption and political treachery. "The Condepistas used to complain 
and give the mayor trouble. But then the UCS found them jobs and now they're 
silent."59 The District Director of Health asserted that the problem was more widespread 
— "The [entire] municipal council has been bought off — bought off by the UCS." 69 
All of the evidence points to a municipal council in Viacha which failed to 
operate as an independent deliberative and policy-setting body, and thus as a 
counterweight to the significant power of the mayor and local executive branch. Council 
members were of poor quality, untrained in the legal and procedural details of the post to 
which they had been elected and uninterested in learning the same. This was 
compounded by their perception of themselves as the residual in the local political 
equation, systematically uninformed about municipal business and powerless to affect 
the mayor's decisions; powerless, in fact, to learn what these decisions were until well 
after they had been taken. This is difficult to understand given the broad authority 
granted to the council by Bolivia's constitutional and legal framework, as well as the 
system of countervailing approvals and oversight specified in the Law of Popular 
Participation. Indeed, Bolivian mayors emanate from municipal councils through 
indirect elections, and council members then have the prerogative to oust the mayor after 
his first, trial year via a "constructive vote of censure". 61 This option was exercised in 
over 100 municipalities in 1995-96 by councils that refused to tolerate the mayors they 
had elected. But in Viacha, councilmen sat idly by, complaining occasionally, while 
their municipality sank into a pit of waste and corruption. 
58 Tomas Palacios Rodriguez, Condepa local leader, interview, Viacha, 15 October 1997. 
59 Lozano, op.cit. 
60 Aguilar, op.cit. 
61 	• 	• This is only one, albeit the most radical, of the municipal council's countervailing powers. 
57 Paz, op.cit. 
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The question we must ask is why Viachan councilmen behaved in this way, 
when the formal legal and institutional context within which they operated was identical 
to that in scores and scores of other municipalities where the governing dynamic was 
altogether different. A key piece of evidence is that the man chosen to be president of 
the municipal council was Edgar 
Robles, previous mayor and close 
associate of Callisaya who handed 
power over to him when the party 
elevated him to Congress. Combine 
him with three rural representatives 
who, though initially popular, were 
thoroughly unprepared and 
uninterested in exercising their 
responsibilities, and we have a council majority which serves as the right arm of the 
mayor, rubber-stamping his decisions and helping to obscure his dishonesty. Such a 
majority is completely unsuited for municipal oversight and control, and most unlikely 
to engage in it. Eventually opposition councilmen did cause trouble for the mayor, 
attempting to scrutinize his accounts and call him to order. When this happened, the 
opposition was simply bought off by the UCS wielding the huge economic power of the 
Cerveceria Boliviana Nacional. 
The trail leads directly to the door of the CBN/UCS, which would appear to have 
constructed a strategy of neutralizing the municipal council by choosing candidates, 
structuring authority within the council, and buying off the opposition so as to ensure the 
council's docility. Under this theory, rural UCS candidates were picked with the twin 
aims of maximizing the rural vote and minimizing their functional independence once 
elected, and not because of any personal qualities they might bring to the office. The 
ultimate institutional effect was to short-circuit the governance process and free the 
mayor's hand in his conduct of official business, allowing him to do whatever he chose. 
The evidence suggests that he seized the opportunity. The larger question of how the 
CBN was able to achieve this and why must await completion of our survey. 
2.3 Oversight Committee(s) 
Viacha is divided into five rural and two urban districts. Within each of these, 
communities are represented by mailkus, ayllus, peasants' unions, neighborhood 
Box 1: The Cure 
Esteban Ticona wheezes and sneezes his 
way through our second interview. His nose is 
bright red and his gaze floats towards me through 
a sea of misery. As we finish, his secretary arrives 
with a dark potion she has just bought in the 
market outside. Elated, Ticona leaps into the 
Council chamber and drops his pants. She jabs 
him with a huge syringe and decants the murky 
liquid into his bottom. "Guaranteed to cure a sore 
throat," she says, gleaming. Ticona emerges 
shortly, smiling, wincing, and clutching his rear. 
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councils, or any other natural form which civil society chooses to express itself. The 
organizations within each district elect a junta, which represents communities' interests 
at the district level. The president of each junta is a member of the municipal oversight 
committee, which elects its own president from amongst its seven members. 
Of the nine municipalities studied here, Viacha is distinguished by having two 
oversight committees. But far from leading to a greater level of scrutiny, this situation 
undermined the oversight that municipal business received. As reported above, Mayor 
Callisaya was the enemy of the OC he inherited, which opposed his policies and caused 
fiscal flows from central government to Viacha to be suspended. 62 At a congress called 
by the Federation of Juntas to renew the OC, and attended by grass-roots organizations 
from throughout the municipality, the mayor saw his chance. Accounts of the precise 
events at this conference differ in the details, but agree on the following facts. The 
congress elected Hipolito Tovar and Teddy Montalvo, both known to be opponents of 
the mayor, as representatives to the OC for the two urban districts. As Tovar was also 
chairing the assembly, a dispute broke out during his confirmation over conflict of 
interest and his eligibility to stand. The assembly divided on this point and the situation 
became quite tense. Then the congress was invaded by "UCS activists, many of them 
employees of the municipalities, who had been drinking and were drunk. They caused 
disturbances and broke up the congress. They also used ladies from ADRA [a food-for-
work scheme active in the area] armed with clubs," who threatened the delegates and 
barred their exit from the meeting hall. 63 The congress recessed early before exhausting 
its agenda. 
One month later, the part of the congress supporting Tovar and Montalvo 
reconvened and finalized its nominations. Its action was recognized by the Federation of 
Juntas of La Paz, which validated the election of the two men. But during the interim, 
another "assembly of the people" was called, in which Remigio Quispe and Walter Patzi 
were named representatives to the OC and the Viachan Federation of Juntas respectively. 
The OC farmed by the five previously elected rural representatives — about whom there 
was no controversy — and the two new urban ones duly elected Remigio Quispe as their 
president; a meeting of the juntas did likewise to Walter Patzi. The municipality 
recognized this result and installed both Quispe and Patzi in offices in city hall. Tovar 
and Montalvo were thereby excluded from the acting OC. During my time in Viacha 
62  Davila, op. cit. 
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Teddy Montalvo had faded into the background, and Hip()lito Tovar had assumed the 
role of spokesman for the rival oversight committee and for community organizations 
opposed to the mayor's rule. 
Remigio Quispe, representative for the first (urban) district and an ex-
cooperative miner from the southern mining region of Bolivia recently arrived in Viacha, 
reported that the previous OC had done "nothing during the past two years — there's no 
documentation, nothing. Now we're going to comply with the law and scrutinize the 
municipality."64 But there was little sign of this in his actions at the time. When asked 
about specific investment projects that Viacha was undertaking in the city, Quispe 
admitted ignorance. He knew none of the financial details of a large school project a few 
blocks from his office, and surmised that they must have been worked out in private 
between municipal technicians and those of the FIS. He knew nothing of the projects 
completed before his tenure. Amongst more general issues, he did not know how many 
people worked in the municipality nor what their salary levels were; he did not know 
what IT and accounting systems had been implemented in the municipality since 1994; 
and he didn't know the voting details of the last election. He nonetheless claimed that 
Viacha had done comparatively well after decentralization, and called it a "model 
municipality". He attributed this in part to a mayor who responded more to the people 
than his party. "Here in Viacha things aren't so polarized," he added, numb to the public 
mood. He conceded that the OC did not receive requests for projects directly from 
communities, as in other municipalities, and that politics played a role in the allocation 
of funds, with UCS representatives leveraging resources out of the municipality more 
successfully than others. And yet his opinion of local government's performance in 
Viacha was higher than that of the mayor and municipal council, with higher 
performance ratings across five sectors. 65 
Not surprisingly, Hipolito Tovar and his associates from the (opposition) district 
junta disagreed with this assessment of municipal success. Tovar, a retired railway 
mechanic and long-time resident of Viacha, was categorical — and even emotional — in 
denouncing the mayor as a corrupt demagogue, and his administration as little short of a 
disaster for the city. His associates, Alejandro Yujra66 and Rony Morales, 67 vice- 
63 Max Mercado, president of the Viachan Federation of Juntas, interview, 11 October 1997. 
64 Remigio Quispe, president, oversight committee, interview, Viacha, 18 March 1997. 
65 Of five sectors rated from "very good" to "very bad", Quispe rated only one sector "bad". Both the 
mayor and the municipal council rated two sectors as "bad". 
66 A mathematics schoolteacher and resident of Viacha. 
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president of the opposition Viachan Federation of Juntas and secretary of the San Jose 
neighborhood council respectively, agreed with the substance of his position, though at 
times taking exception to his florid language. Accusing the municipality of consulting 
no one in the planning of its investment, the three qualified all of the municipality's 
projects as "very bad" and accused it of ignoring garbage disposal and irrigation entirely. 
"The municipality has drawn up several Annual Operating Plans in any given year — 
they keep changing their mind," Morales said, explaining how the mayor manipulates 
the planning process to obfuscate municipal goals and the uses of funds, so subverting 
effective oversight. In this confusion, "the municipal architect set up his own 
construction firm and built the [Evaristo Valle] school" with 100% cost over-runs. He 
was also the construction supervisor for the project, incurring an obvious conflict of 
interest. 68 
As one might expect, these three men who sought to oversee and control local 
expenditures found themselves frozen out of all municipal business, with no access to 
records, investment plans, local resolutions, or any of the other information they 
requested. They nevertheless toured me around a number of recent or ongoing 
investment projects in Viacha to substantiate their many claims. At the Evaristo Valle 
school they pointed out obvious cases of poor construction, including a new wall that 
was cracked, sinking foundations and a sunken roof, among others. The Ballivian 
school showed similar problems, with cracked walls and a new section built with bricks 
standing instead of lying flat. 69 Montes Avenue near the central square was in a terrible 
state, with large sunken sections where the ground had subsided and new holes opening 
at one end despite being repaired five times. The "Toboggan", a long, high slide located 
in a children's playground which seems to have particularly captured the mayor's 
attention, had fallen apart after only a few months, with a large central section missing. 
The M. Pinilla Avenue was literally an unusable ruin despite three re-constructions, 
occasioned in part by the exploding sewerage project described above. But of these and 
other projects we saw in various states of decomposition, nothing compares to the Park 
of the Americas. This was a large, overgrown area cordoned off by a low wire fence, 
with a high rubbish dump in the middle and a sewage-contaminated lake79 off to one 
67 An engineering student and also resident of Viacha. 
68 Yujra, Morales and Tovar, op.cit. 
69 Building in this manner saves on bricks but results in a weaker structure. 
70 According to Morales and Tovar. 
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side. According to Morales, Viacha had invested Bs.200,000 in this park the previous 
year. 71 
Outside of the city no one I spoke to knew of the existence of rival OCs. 
Because there had been no controversy surrounding the nomination of rural OC 
members, rural leaders referred to OC1 as "the" OC. Disappointment with its 
performance was widespread. Local leaders from Santa Ana de Machaqa accused the 
OC of doing no work with them and ignoring them completely. 72 Leaders from 
Titik'ana Takaka asserted that the OC did not work well, but that they knew few details 
and were seeking information in order to sanction or overturn it. Even in the city, people 
as prominent as the CEO of Incerpaz knew nothing of the Viachan OC nor if it 
operated, 73 indicating that he had never come across it in his dealings with the 
municipality. 
All of the evidence points to an official OC1 which was beholden to the mayor, 
completely uninformed and operationally inert, not only failing to provide any sort of 
counterbalance to his power but actively endorsing his demagogic manipulations. Thus 
we have the approval of the 1997 Annual Operating Plan, in which the mayor 
summoned community leaders to a "planning seminar" in the city. Having paid and fed 
them, he invited them all to endorse a plan which his technicians had drawn up earlier. 
"The communities didn't propose a single project in that plan. Each of the 56 leaders 
who signed was given a can of beer," said Tovar. "And Remigio Quispe approved it all" 
in the name of the OC. That night they celebrated at the health post with a big party. 
Things got out of control and the guard was killed and the two vehicles stolen. 74 Quispe 
and the mayor both publicly blamed the opposition. So extreme was the situation that 
even councilman Ticona admitted that the OC did not function in Viacha, and that 
Quispe received a municipal salary in direct violation of the law. 75 
The opposition 0C2, in the meantime, was considerably more active, better 
informed, and intent on providing active oversight of municipal policies. But having 
been effectively sidelined by the mayor, it was excluded from local governance and 
unrecognized by the state, and thus powerless to oppose his actions. When 
representatives of 0C2 and the opposition Viachan Federation of Juntas approached the 
71 Rony Morales and Hipolito Tovar, secretary of the neighborhood council of San Jose, and member and 
spokesman for 0C2 respectively, interview and site visits, Viacha, 21 March 1997. 
72 Quezo, Julian and Cusi, op.cit. 
73 Paz, oe.cit. 
74 Yujra, Morales and Tovar, op. cit. 
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departmental secretary of popular participation to request that municipal funds be frozen 
due to corruption, he ignored their pleas. Already liberated by his party from the 
political oversight of a functioning municipal council, the mayor was also able to block 
social oversight of his activities by dividing civil society against itself, neutralizing its 
mechanism for accountability, and hiring his own. And the ensuing circus of accusation 
and counter-accusation between OC1 and 0C2 served, if anything, to divert popular 
attention and shield him further from public scrutiny. The result was the squandering of 
capital and opportunity described above. 
2.4 National and Departmental Government 
Departmental governments are not elected in Bolivia — rather the president 
directly names prefects, who in turn name their sub-prefects and other departmental 
officials. Thus departmental and national government are regarded here as a continuum, 
as they are by most Bolivians. The highest departmental representative in Viacha is the 
Sub-Prefect, an honor accorded the city on account of its status as the first municipality 
of the Ingavi province. 76 The holder of this post in 1997 was Gladys Lozano, a local 
resident and former nurse who holds a university degree — probably the only person 
active in local politics at the time so qualified. With almost no budget nor staff and few 
operational responsibilities, she threw herself wholeheartedly into the political battle 
against the mayor, whom she despised. She clearly regarded her job as primarily, or 
even exclusively, political, and in a day-long journey through the countryside did not 
hesitate to point out the many party slogans that she had proudly painted herself on 
hillsides, boulders and cliffs. But her power was limited to exhortation and public 
complaint. She had neither the resources nor the authority to challenge the mayor. 
Despite an avowed and burning desire to oust him, she was able to do little more than 
conspire with the local opposition and urge them on. 
The two other important central government authorities in Viacha are the district 
directors of education and of health, already encountered above. Each reports to his 
respective departmental secretary, who in turn report to sectoral ministries in La Paz. As 
we saw above, neither the DDE not the DDH, despite strong criticisms of the mayor's 
policies, was able to affect local policy in significant ways. In both education and health, 
75 	• Ticona, op.cit. 
76 Municipalities are ranked administratively within each province, 2 Yd , etc. The 1 st municipality in 
each province is the capital, and residents thereof seem to take pride in this fact. 
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the municipality ignored or actively flouted sectoral policies without fear of reprisal from 
local authorities or their superiors in La Paz. 
The mayor and municipal councilmen confirmed their own supremacy locally. 
"The prefecture doesn't get in the way of the municipal council," reported Ticona, 
adding that "the change of government has had no effect on Viacha so far — the National 
Fund for Regional Development [an executive agency] treats us the same as before," 77 
 two sentiments with which Quintela agreed.78 The mayor confirmed on several 
occasions that central and departmental government officials cooperated with the 
municipality, or at least kept out of their way, and that he was fully satisfied with his 
relationship with the authorities in La Paz. 79 Local leaders from the communities of 
Villa Santiago de Chacoma, Rosapata, Nazacara, and the city of Viacha confirmed 
independently that little or nothing had changed when the national government changed 
hands in 1997, and that central government thus appeared to have little leverage over 
local policies. Both OCs supported this view. Perhaps the main reason for this was 
provided by Quintela, who pointed out that "the mayor's and municipal council's 
authority emanate from popular elections, whereas the prefect is designated. Hence in 
any conflict between the two the municipal authorities must prevail" because of their 
democratic legitimacy. 8° 
The evidence from Viacha thus supports the argument made in Chapter 3 that 
central government regulations on local government behavior did not constitute a 
binding constraint on the latter. This was not, it is important to note, for lack of wanting 
or even trying. The DDE and DDH were strongly opposed to different aspects of 
municipal policy in their respective sectors, and the sub-prefect on several occasions 
declared her heartfelt intent to topple the mayor. But central government authorities in 
Viacha proved too weak institutionally, and too lacking in resources and democratic 
legitimacy, to mount a serious challenge to the ruling administration. Once the mayor 
had cleared local obstacles along the path to his own impunity, he was able to travel it in 
comfort, secure in the knowledge that his authority would not be contradicted by the 
government in La Paz. 
77 Ticona, op.cit. 
78 Huber Quintela (a), municipal councilman (MNR), interview, Viacha, 10 October 1997. 
Callisaya, op.cit. 
8° Huber Quintela (b), municipal councilman (MNR), interview, Viacha, 16 October 1997. 
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3. Local Civil Society 
3.1 Private Sector 
Of the large private firms in Viacha, the most typical of local industry is 
hiclustrias de Ceramica Paz, or Incerpaz. The most successful of the tile and brick firms 
that line the highway between Viacha and El Alto, Incerpaz has factories in several 
departments and sales throughout the country. Its CEO in 1997 was Luis Paz, an 
engineer by training and descendant of the company's founder. He boasted of excellent, 
though limited, relations with the municipality. Despite the firm's size, Incerpaz paid 
only some US$200081 per year in property tax to Viacha, and the remainder of his tax 
bill to the city of La Paz, where the company is legally registered. Paz asserted that that 
sum would rise to $13,000 to $15,000 per year if he were to change Incerpaz's legal 
domicile to Viacha. Sitting in his factory office from which he runs the firm, he 
professed a willingness to do this. He cited the case of Warnes, a similar satellite city 
just outside Bolivia's second city of Santa Cruz, which tempted companies to relocate 
there with a five-year tax holiday. "If the municipality offered to improve the main road, 
street lighting, and other local installations, this property would rise in value and I could 
borrow more," he explained. "Then it would be worthwhile for me, to register in Viacha. 
But they don't propose anything," he added with exasperation. 82 
Incerpaz had essentially no other dealings with the municipality, with neither 
approaching the other, and Paz was content to watch municipal affairs from the 
sidelines. He reported that "the principal mechanism of power" in Viacha was money, 
and that the CBN bought power through its financial support of municipal activities. 
"They support all folkloric activity here," he said, in order to support the mayor and 
simultaneously increase beer sales. In his opinion, corruption was rampant in Viacha. 
"But the money from the CBN washes away corruption, and the people vote for them 
anyway "s3 
Paz explained the high degree of social conflict in Viacha as an endemic problem 
based on viacheflo culture and even geography. 
The altiplano is very poor, with only one crop per year. In Cochabamba and Santa 
Cruz nature is abundant and no one lacks food. But not here — on the altiplano they're 
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on a knife's edge of hunger and poverty. Here when they find a vein of gold they 
never ever let go because it's the only one they'll ever get. This is typical of the 
altiplano. In the valleys and tropics people are more generous. Here people work 
longer hours and are more productive but still they have less. We have factories in La 
Paz, Oruro, Cochabamba, and Santa Cruz. Our best personnel are here — much harder 
working. In Santa Cruz they won't work more than eight hours. Here they put in 
fourteen hours and charge overtime down to the penny. And they know — Bs.125.25, 
and they charge you the 25 cents. In Santa Cruz they don't worry about pennies. 84 
According to this interpretation, the deprivation of the Viachan region leads 
people to fight over resources in a way that is more desperate and raw than elsewhere. 
And the presence of a few large sources of patronage leads society to polarize around 
competing political-industrial poles of influence. In Paz's view, traditional forms of 
community government, where elected leaders are expected to serve as advocates for 
local interests before municipal and regional government, only exacerbate this. "The 
moment someone declares himself a social representative, he starts demanding donations 
and favors" to pay for his activities. Thus people fight over these positions and create 
even more social divisions at the grass-roots level. Community representatives from the 
villages of District Five, District Six and Chama as well as from the city agreed with Paz 
about the presence of industrial patronage, and were not afraid to name the interests 
involved. "Beer and cement call the shots in Viacha." 85 
With its huge factory on the dusty outer edge of the city, SOBOCE's physical 
presence in Viacha is certainly large. The plant generated $30 million/year in sales and 
$2,340,000/year in VAT, which was paid in La Paz where the fiiiir was legally based. 
Owned by the prominent politician and ex-Minister of Planning from the Movimiento de 
la Izquierda Revolucionaria (MR), Samuel Doria Medina, the company had in recent 
years given up its previously activist stance in local politics. "We don't want to be too 
involved in local politics," Ntifiez said. "We have no intention of installing a MR 
mayor."86 The company provided regular support for the municipality's sporting and 
cultural events, but otherwise kept its distance from local politics. This stemmed at least 
in part from the political beating SOBOCE had suffered four years earlier. Nt.Thez 
explained that a decade before the plant had been highly inefficient, operating at a 
fraction of its capacity. Then a new management team took over and increased output 
considerably, with a resulting increase in pollution. The local population protested 
vociferously, spurred on by environmental groups from La Paz. After at first holding 
84 ibid.  
85 Colque, op.cit.; Guarachi, op.cit.; Canavi, op.cit.; and Rodriguez, op.cit. 
86 Nunez, op.cit. 
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firm, SOBOCE eventually capitulated and installed filters when it was made clear that 
the plant was losing potential revenue up the chimney. The fight was intense according 
to those who opposed the firm. "I'm the one who pushed and pushed for them to get 
filters," said Robles, who was mayor at the time. "So they tried to oust me." 87 In 1993 
SOBOCE invested $3 million in electric filters which dramatically reduced pollution, 
and thereafter maintained a low public profile in Viacha. 
This did not imply, however, that the plant's managers approved of their 
municipal administration. Claros and Ntlfiez reported that local government had not 
involved SOBOCE in its participative planning exercises, nor informed it of its 
municipal development plan. The mayor and municipal council had repeatedly 
condemned SOBOCE for tearing up local roads with its large cement trucks. Yet when 
the firm offered to build a ring road specially for the factory, the proposal became 
bogged down in the municipal council and no decision was ever taken. But it was 
SOBOCE's electricity payments that seemed to gall the two men most. "We pay the 
municipality $15,000 per month for our electricity supply," Nalez said, explaining that 
this was set by official municipal resolution and not metered in any way. "It must be 
enough to light up the whole town." The plant's management had in fact offered to light 
the entire municipality free of charge, but local government rejected the offer. So where 
did the money go? "It goes directly into the municipal coffers." 88 It was thus not 
surprising that local officials were completely unprepared for the plant's planned growth. 
"We are going to invest $45 million in this place, expanding the factory and machinery 
to make Viacha definitively the national center of cement production," Ntlriez explained. 
The plant's local taxes and user fees would double, but so would the strain it imposed on 
local services. "Even so the municipal government ignores this — they have no position 
at all regarding this." 
With regard to broader issues of local society, l\hatiez seemed to agree with Paz, 
complaining that relations with local organizations and institutions were not very 
productive. "The altiplano mentality is too closed, too difficult," he said. Like Incerpaz, 
SOBOCE also had a plant in Santa Cruz, where Nithez found the atmosphere completely 
different. "There it's easy to reach agreement — agree compromises that make the city 
grow." If SOBOCE's relations with the municipality were problematic, that was not the 
case for the Cen)eceria Boliviana Nacional. Both Nariez and Claros pointed to the 
87 Robles, op.cit. 
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dominant role of the bottling plant in Viachan local affairs. "[The plant's director] 
Blanco owns this town," testified the former, adding that relations between the two 
companies had been difficult in the past but were now quite friendly. In Nunez's view 
the CBN did not recognize a distinction between business and politics. These opinions 
were not exceptional, and were widely shared amongst observers of Viachan affairs. 
"Blanco runs the show here," declared Davila. "He lifts an eyebrow and heads roll. He 
plays politics from the CBN."89 Luis Paz and the 0C2 agreed, with the former calling 
Blanco "the eminence grise behind the curtain"." 
After determined lobbying, I met Blanco in his office at the CBN bottling plant; 
despite high expectations, he did not disappoint. At well over six feet Juan Carlos 
Blanco is a bear of a man, with larger-than-life expressions and a booming voice that 
spews a stream of obscenities. When I met him he was director of the bottling plant, 
leader of the local UCS and a prominent figure in the national party, director of 
Integration Radio and host of his own radio show, and a director of the National Fund 
for Regional Development. He told me he worked very hard, and made $8000/month. 91 
 He defended himself against the accusations noted above. "The councilmen say 'Juan 
Carlos Blanco said so' to shield themselves, but I don't know what's happening!" he 
insisted, with an enormous smile. "It's true that I have influence, but I don't use it." 92 
 When the interview turned to Viacha's many problems, especially accusations of official 
corruption, his tone changed. "There are 50 or 60 people here who bitch about the party 
and the municipality in order to be bought off," he explained. "We bought off Rafael 
Rodriguez by hiring him, and he shut up." Still, local complaints about the UCS 
administration had only grown, and this annoyed him. 
"My problem is that I have to manage rural councilmen," he explained, referring 
to three of the four UCS representatives. 
The pie is too small and the necessities are very large. And the people think it's all a 
rush of money.... The town wants all of the money for itself, and then Jesus de 
Machaqa93 brings 1000 peasants marching on Viacha demanding money and projects. 
But I'm lacking projects! 
he bellowed in frustration. The Popular Participation Law had raised local expectations 
significantly, and the municipality had proven unequal to the task. "The municipality's 
88 Nunez, op. cit 
89 Davila, op.cit. "But SOBOCE doesn't get involved," he added, "they're too pragmatic." 
90 Paz, op.cit. 
91 An enormous sum in Bolivia. 
92 Juan Carlos Blanco, CBN bottling plant director, interview, Viacha, 16 October 1997. 
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employees are bad — they can't distinguish between good and bad materials." As a result 
his party's popularity had decreased dramatically. "I lost the elections horribly here," he 
moaned, referring to the recent national poll. "The UCS used to own this town because 
of the money Max94 spent. But 
the opposition was very agile 
here. Now they're making me 
throw out this corrupt guy," he 
said, referring to the recently 
resigned Callisaya. And with 
that Blanco admitted that 
Viacha's problems went deeper 
than implementational weakness. 
"There is corruption in my 
municipality. Everything 
involves a percentage, 
everything is cooked." Local 
government was corrupt from 
the mayor down, and municipal 
employees had grown used to abusing their positions for personal gain. The graft and 
venality extended into civil society as well. "The peasant congresses run on money. He 
who pays out the most money reaps the most representatives." Blanco explained that the 
CBN had sent beer and cash to the previous congress and won significant support 
amongst rural leaders. 
The irony, in Blanco's view, was that decentralization had made his job not 
easier but more difficult. "Before Popular Participation the municipalities were nothing. 
Max gave Viacha everything," he said nostalgically. The party's authority was 
unquestioned. But the devolution of large sums of money to local governments had 
raised local expectations and increased opportunities for graft, both problematic issues 
for someone in Blanco's position. Worse still, the price of the electorate's gratitude had 
risen significantly. The projects with which the UCS was previously able to win over 
the city were now lost in a sea of public investment. Unable to buy the UCS' electoral 
share with his traditional ease, Blanco turned to more explicitly political action, 
93 An important rural community. 
Box 2: Who's the boss? 
"They say I'm the boss in Viacha?" Blanco 
mocks my question and his roar echoes round the 
large office. "Call him," he barks at an aide. "Call 
him! I want him now!" A few minutes later 
Callisaya wanders meekly into the meeting. Dressed 
in blue jeans and tired cowboy boots, this CBN 
worker is a shadow of the proud, besuited mayor I'd 
met that autumn. "Sit down," Blanco commands. 
Callisaya gazes around in confusion. "There, next to 
him." And he takes the empty seat at my side. 
Blanco is leaning back in his office chair now, almost 
horizontal. The altiplano sun blazes in through the 
large window behind him, enveloping him in tones of 
gold. "They've told him that I'm the boss in Viacha. 
What do you think? Am I the boss?" Callisaya's 
eyes are wide open, a slight tremor in one hand. He 
is nervous and deeply confused. "No," he says, 
swallowing. He looks first at me and then at Blanco. 
"No, he isn't the boss." 
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sponsoring cultural and sporting events and providing beer for public occasions of all 
varieties. This strategy gradually lost effectiveness, however, as Viachans — newly 
empowered — grew dissatisfied with the politics of gesture. And UCS/CBN largesse 
became tainted by association with the officials who dispensed it, and entwined in the 
public's mind with the scandal of public drunkenness and violence that led to murder at 
the municipal garage. 
3.2 Political Parties and Elections 
The advent of decentralization in Bolivia brought a new political dynamic to 
Viacha, as elections which had previously been fought only in the city now extended 
through a large rural area. Seeing their opportunity, rural leaders from the Machaqa 
region took the initiative in the run-up to these elections and chose two respected local 
men with a history of service to their communities as their candidates to the municipal 
council. As the LPP recognizes only candidates from legally registered parties, rural 
leaders needed to come to agreement with the political establishment in order to include 
their candidates on the ballot, and decided that the UCS offered them the best chance. 
The mayor, who co-managed the campaign with Blanco, agreed to include the names on 
the UCS electoral list in exchange for the massive UCS vote that the Machaqa leaders 
promised in their region. In doing so he opened his party to the countryside for the first 
time. He also effectively co-opted forms of social organization and representation which 
were deeply rooted in the community structure of the Machaqa region, with all of their 
attendant legitimacy and capacity to mobilize public opinion. But then the mayor 
betrayed them. During the campaign he attempted to renege on his promise by changing 
the list to favor his own political allies, causing great consternation amongst 
machaquefios. In the end the original names were included, but lower down the list than 
had been promised. The UCS vote was sufficient to elect both to the council anyway, 95 
 but the goodwill Callisaya had begun to build with rural voters was tainted by his 
scheming and the cavalier way he treated their representatives. 
Such a lack of political commitment on the part of the UCS should not be 
surprising. The previous section documents that where the Viachan UCS was 
concerned, the party was the business and the business was the party. The two concepts 
were intimately conflated in their means and their ends. The party availed itself of the 
94 Max Fernandez, founder of both the UCS and CBN. See above. 
95 Esteban Ticona Alejo and Xavier Alb6, Jesus de Machaqa: La Marka Rebelde 3, La Lucha Por el Poder 
Conzunal, C1PCA/CEDOIN, La Paz:1997, pp. 295-6. 
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brewery's delivery trucks, sales agents and retailers to disseminate political literature and 
mobilize supporters. And political campaigns served as traveling beer rallies and brand-
building exercises, the ubiquitous logo emblazoned behind every podium, campaign 
workers clad in blue CBN uniforms, and the famous froth gracing the lips of candidates 
as they communed with their voters. A number of times, as the sun set behind the 
mountains, I found uniformed workers from the brewery enthusiastically unloading UCS 
materials from their delivery trucks, working to capture the vote and earning valuable 
overtime. With impeccable entrepreneurial logic, the twin imperatives "drink Pacefia" 
and "vote UCS" were seductively paired in a seamless operation which never really shut 
down, a sort of permanent campaign enjoining consumers to enjoy life but also do their 
civic duty. Once the UCS was firmly in control of the city hall, the concept of boundary-
less enterprise was extended to include municipal business as well. "The UCS 
inaugurates projects, donates materials and gives away beer as if it all came from the 
party, and not from the municipality's popular participation funds," Sub-Prefect Lozano 
complained. 
In the heated political atmosphere of Viacha, only the fellow-populists of 
Condepa were able to challenge the UCS' dominance. The party was founded by a 
charismatic radio and television host who specialized in airing the grievances of La Paz's 
recent indigenous and mestizo migrants from the countryside. Condepa was adept at 
manipulating the symbols of race and oppression into an emotionally charged discourse 
of liberation which at times strayed towards vengeance. Without the economic power of 
the largest private business in Bolivia behind it, Condepa relied on its media outlets to 
generate a politics of identity that mobilized voters and nourished its constituency. Its 
position was illustrated by councilman Ticona's response when questioned about the 
support he received from the national party. "The party's support depends on me getting 
the condepistas jobs.96 But I can't because we're a minority in Viacha, and so the 
support of the national party has ebbed away." 97 With few links to the local business 
community, the party was dependent upon placing its activists in municipal jobs in order 
to sustain itself. The leader of the local party was an ex-railway worker named Tomas 
Palacios. He claimed that the party's electoral lists were set by an assembly of all local 
Condepa members from short lists drawn up by the party leadership. "But in effect 
urban members decide because rural members don't want to come to Viacha to 
96 i.e. Jobs for the boys. 
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participate."98 The pragmatic Ticona, himself a product of this selection system, 
contradicted him. 
Candidate lists are mostly set in La Paz by party or departmental leaders. Local people 
don't participate. This is true of all the parties except for the UCS, which is run out of 
the bottling plant. When someone ambitious isn't popular locally, he goes to La Paz to 
lobby [the party leadership], and often the order comes down to name him candidate. 99 
The third most important party in Viacha was the MNR, architect of the 1952-53 
"nationalist revolution" in which the traditional criollom° land-owning and mining upper 
class was overthrown in favor of an ascendant, educated middle class which nationalized 
the mines and redistributed land to dispossessed peasant farmers. Although the MNR 
was traditionally strong amongst rural voters, during the previous decade it had lost 
supporters throughout the altiplano to the potent appeal of Condepa and the UCS; 
between the 1993 and 1995 elections its vote tally had fallen by half. The local MNR 
leader in 1997 was councilman Quintela, who worked as a public employee in La Paz. 
He had been elected leader during the internal democratization of the party which had 
occurred a short time previously. "The MNR is the most democratic party in Bolivia," 
he averred. In electoral terms, this amounted to a strategy for winning over the educated 
professional and middle classes more concerned about good governance than 
government patronage — a group largely absent in Viacha. But this democratization, he 
then added "only goes so far. For the uninominal [a local congressional seat] the local 
party preferred one person, but the big men in La Paz preferred another, and the other 
was chosen. The MNR has party discipline, and I lost." 0'  Unlike the UCS, the MNR 
had few business links locally and resorted to selling seals and letters of approval to 
people looking for jobs in local, regional or national government in order to finance 
itself. The MNR in Viacha was clearly a party in decline, unused to being marginalized 
and unsure how to stem the rapid erosion in its base of support. 
The last party of any importance in Viacha, more by association than its electoral 
weight, was the MIR. Despite its association with SOBOCE and its owner, the 
prominent politician and vice-presidential candidate Samuel Doria Medina, the MIR's 
fortunes were at a low ebb in 1997. Its vote had fallen by more than one-half in the last 
election, an abrupt recent change in party leadership had left much confusion locally, and 
97 	• Ticona, op.cit. 
98 Palacios, op.cit. 
99 Ticona, op.cit. 
loo Literally "Creole", meaning locally-born descendants of European immigrants. 101 Quintela (b), op.cit. 
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some prominent observers doubted whether the Viachan MIR even continued to exist. 
Quintela, for one, could not name its leader. He was Antonio Soto, an unemployed 
former railway worker elected in April of that year. Soto explained that Doria Medina 
has thrown out the former leadership due to personal dislike, following a struggle for 
power amongst them. In previous years, he said, party leaders had nominated electoral 
lists amongst themselves and their wives, and had manipulated party assemblies to 
maintain themselves in power. Now all this had changed. "Now we're ordered by 
Jaime Paz or Oscar Eid [the MIR's national leaders] to keep the current leadership or 
reorganize it. And I'm happy to let Jaime Paz decide these things. "102 The national 
party required nothing of him, and Soto — who had only joined the MIR a few months 
earlier after many invisible years in the MNR — remained obediently quiet. 
The deeper dynamic in Viachan politics was a long-term shift away from the , 
1 
traditional parties arrayed left to right along a fairly typical policy spectrum, in favor of 
the politics of identity, race and redress in the form of two new, populist and highly / 
personalized parties: Condepa and the UCS. These two competed for the support of a 
common electoral group with two distinct ele___ 	___ments: (1) a large and growing 
constituency of rural migrants to peri-urban areas — largely uneducated people uprooted 
from their tight communities who were thrust into the confusion and anonymity of a 
precarious existence in the La Paz-El Alto-Viacha conurbation, and (2) the relatives they 
left behind in rural villages who were as a result increasingly connected to the urban 
economy. Popular opinion held that truckers and other transport workers were in the 
camp of the UCS, while small merchants voted Condepa. The larger truth was that 
amongst urbanizing indigenous and mestizo groups political identity was weak, and the 
fortunes of the two parties competing for their votes ebbed and flowed unpredictably. 
Condepa's Palacios admitted as much when he ascribed his party's victory in the 
previous election to having captured all of its target voter groups, "peasants, factory 
workers, small businessmen, and railroad workers". I03 In recent years each party had 
seen its vote surge in waves of sympathy following the untimely deaths of their 
respective leaders; the UCS' vote surged in Viacha by two-fifths in 1995, only to be 
reversed in favor of Condepa in 1997. With similar populist and charismatic appeals 
aimed at voters immersed in a rapidly growing and changing local economy, neither 
party could count on a stable electoral base. 
102 Antonio Soto, MIR local leader, interview, Viacha, 10 October 1997. 
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To voters outside the city of Viacha, however, politics looked very different. 
Spokesmen from Villa Santiago de Chacoma, Rosapata and Nazacara reported that no 
local people had been put forward as candidates in the previous elections. All were 
"foreigners" to them, cityfolk they suspected. With no knowledge of how candidate lists 
were set, all three communities viewed political parties as "vehicles of business and rich 
people's interests." 104 And the elections they competed in were a dirty affair. 
Representatives of Chama, District Five and District Six complained that fraud, though 
less common than before, continued to mar elections. The ultimate result of such 
behavior was both widespread throughout the municipality and unsurprising. "People 
are voting less and losing interest in elections," said Santa Ana de Machaqa, "as they 
lose faith in politicians." 05 
3.3 Community and Grass-Roots Organizations 
With a huge area that extends from the urban factories of Viacha-El Alto to the 
cold, empty highlands adjoining Peru, Viacha has an economically and socially diverse 
population which embraces a wide variety of cultural and organizational patterns. It is 
possible to array Viacha's communities along a scale of increasing "urbanness" where 
rural communities which have retained their traditional Ayllu and Mallku authorities 
define the rural extreme, and Viachans who live in the city but work in La Paz occupy 
the urban extreme. On this scale, rural communities that organize themselves as peasant 
unions, and rural-dwelling day migrants who find work in the informal economy of the 
city, would lie somewhere in between as in figure 3 below. 
Figure 3: Rural-Urban Communities in Viacha 
Ayllus & 
Mallkus 
Peasant 
Union 
Peri-Urban 
Migrants 
Dormitory 
Viachans 
This schematization along a continuum should not obscure the fact that the major 
103 Palacios, op.cit. 
104 	• Villa Santiago de Chacoma, Rosapata and Ntizacara, interviews, 11, 14 and 14 October 1997. 
105  Cusi, Julia'n and Cusi, op.cit. 
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divides in Viachan society are first between city and countryside, and second, within 
rural Viacha, between the Machaqas region and the remainder. These differences are a 
product of communities' economic activity, environment, history, and to a lesser extent 
language and culture. They resulted in the adoption of organizational forms for 
neighborhood and community self-governance that differed widely by area. Not 
surprisingly, the demand for public services also varied significantly over such a diverse 
region, as did political views and affiliations. 
The superiority that Viacha's city-folk felt towards their rural neighbors, with 
whom they had never felt any affinity and who had only very recently been made part of 
their district, is documented above. The insulting views that many in the city had of their 
mayor and councilmen are only the most blatant examples of the low regard in which 
viachefios held villagers and rural migrants generally. The resulting tensions in social 
relations, and unwillingness or inability of urban whites to cooperate with peri-urban 
migrants and rural villagers, were evident in everyday city life and became a barrier to 
the smooth operation of the institutions of government. When 0C2 denounced 
corruption on the part of the mayor, for example, they were widely and instinctively 
dismissed as the rantings of racially prejudiced cityfolk; not even the documentation they 
produced to substantiate their claims was enough to convince many. The contempt with 
which insular urbanites viewed the villages and their problems was tempered only by 
their determination to ignore them altogether in favor of the city. 
Rural Viacha contained its own fault-lines as well. As a number of community 
spokesmen pointed out to me, all of Viacha is Aymara, but the rural area is divided into 
two sectors, the Machagas and the rest. The Machaqas, a large area in the western part 
of the district around Jesds de Machaqa and San Andres de Machaqa, is a distinct region 
with a strong identity and long history of rural uprisings against both the Spanish 
colonialists and the criollo republic that followed. The machaquefios supported 
numerous uprisings against successive regimes throughout the 18 th , 19th and 208' 
centuries, culminating in the fatal rebellion of 1921 in which a new Republican 
government — which had acceded to power pledging to defend indigenous communities 
— instead turned on them and slaughtered them in the massacre of Jesds de Machaqa in 
March of that year. 106 Whereas in the rest of rural Viacha communities are organized 
around the general secretariats of the peasants' union movement, modernizing and 
106 	• Ticona and Albo, op.cit. 
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"rational" forms of social organization which spread throughout Bolivia after the 
revolution of 1952-3 and were meant to break the social relations of the past, in the 
Machaqas the traditional ayllus and mallkus predominate. The former think of 
themselves as one of the progressive forces which ended the oppression of the 
indigenous majority by a small, white elite fifty years earlier; the latter base their 
legitimacy in ethnic pride and traditions which predate the arrival of the Spanish in 
South America. Aymara is by far the prevalent language in the Machaqas, whereas 
elsewhere a mixture of Spanish and Aymara is spoken. And the ferocity remains. "The 
Machaqas are rebellious and conflict-prone," one observer told me. "They still have 
`whipping-justice' there." 107 
Community life in the city was organized around neighborhood councils. These 
organizations were riven by the conflicts that divided and paralyzed the oversight 
committees, as described above. Hence Viacha had two rival sets of neighborhood 
councils, and rival representatives to the federation of neighborhood councils at the 
departmental leve1. 108 While these conflicts were partly due to hostilities particular to 
Viacha's urban population, they were also due in part to the ethnic cleavages that divided 
the city. As a result, when the mayor appointed a migrant from Potosi to head his own 
OC, the peri-urban population of Viacha did not voice disapproval. And the "authentic" 
viacheiios determined to oust both mayor and 0C1 visibly failed to carry this large and 
growing population. Despite their relative wealth, high living standards, and the 
facilities of living in a city, the residents of Viacha were unable to form community 
organizations that adequately represented their interests before local government. 
The reality in rural areas, by contrast, was very different. The leaders of the 
communities of Chama, District Five and District Six reported successful participative 
planning exercises, where the community met to discuss and prioritize their requests for 
public investments. The three representatives appeared to take their jobs very seriously, 
and were familiar with the financial and technical details of projects being carried out in 
their communities. They had convened popular assemblies to approve project designs, 
and had participated in the various legal steps involved in launching the projects. 1°9 
 Santa Ana de Machaqa, among many other communities, boasted a democratically 
elected work committee to manage projects and mobilize community contributions. In 
107 Armando GoclInez, anthropologist, numerous conversations, La Paz, February - May and September -
November 1997. 
108 	• Quispe, Patzi and Mamani, op.cit.; Tovar, Yujra 	 cit. and Morales, op.  
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this village projects were chosen via communal assembly, which prioritized them 
democratically and informed city hall. 11° And the practice of community contributions 
to projects worked well throughout rural Viacha. "There's a big difference between how 
projects are implemented in the city and how it's done in the countryside," said Titik'ana 
Takaka. "In the city people don't lift a finger for their projects, whereas in the country 
we build everything ourselves" with materials purchased by the municipality." The 
leaders of Nazacara were also concerned with the needs of their people, and in particular 
with those who migrated to Viacha and El Alto in search of work. "In the city people 
suffer," they told me. "What people want is a job here.... This region has great 
potential." 112 They proposed that the university establish an institute locally to bring 
them new crops and improved agricultural techniques. And rural communities were able 
to cooperate amongst themselves to at least some extent, something impossible in the 
city. Titik'ana Takaka explained that the jurisdiction of Jesus de Machaqa owned a 
truck which communities within the jurisdiction shared to transport materials and people. 
It was not clear whether cooperation extended to non-machaquenos , however. Despite 
poor language skills in some areas, and low levels of human capital in others, rural 
communities in Viacha shared a social legitimacy and capacity to mobilize that were 
utterly lacking in the city. 
But strong village structures were insufficient to make government work 
effectively where government had little interest in villages. Even where communities 
were well organized and levels of participation and cooperation were high, the requests 
that communities made to local government were ignored, and local needs were not 
taken into account in municipal policy decisions. Hence in Villa Santiago de Chacoma, 
where leaders gathered the entire community to discuss its needs in a meeting open to 
all, and decisions were taken by acclamation, requests for local investment were rejected 
by the municipality without explanation. " 3   Santa Ana de Machaqa's petition for a 
schoolhouse was rejected in favor of public urinals made of surplus materials from an 
urban construction site. 114 And in Titik'ana Takaka, the municipality decided to build 
109 Colque, op.cit.; Guarachi, op.cit.; and Rodriguez, op.cit. 
110 Francisco Juliano Paz, Santa Ana de Machaqa community officer, interview, Viacha, 18 March 1997. 
Mamani, Vito, Tola and Callisaya, op.cit. 
112 Juan Laurel Hinojosa, Dona Francisca Plata de Maldonado, Julio Choque Huanca and Jaime GOrnez, 
community coordinator, community leader, education officer and school director, interview, Nazacara, 14 
October 1997. 
113 Eulogio Choque and Valentin Atahuichi Callisaya, cantonal officer and community construction officer, 
interview, Villa Santiago de Chacoma, 11 October 1997. 
114 Cusi, Julian and Cusi, op.cit. 
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schoolhouses with a large community contribution without consulting the community, 
and despite the fact that three good schoolhouses were already in operation there. us 
 Even when government did fund projects that satisfied locals, villagers had to negotiate a 
labyrinth of corruption involving extra-official payments to municipal engineers, 
architects, workmen and drivers in order to persuade them to take measurements, 
provide technical drawings, and deliver materials.' 16  Not surprisingly, public opinion 
was unenthusiastic about decentralization throughout the Viachan countryside. Districts 
Five, Six and Chama said the LPP had improved things "to a tiny degree" only, and 
complained that too many popular participation resources remained in Viacha. I17 
 Titik'ana Takaka broadly agreed. In the view of Nazacara, "Popular Participation has 
mainly benefited the wealthy — doctors, lawyers, not people like us," 118 while Santa Ana 
accused municipal employees of being the principal beneficiaries of the LPP. I19 
The many failings of Viachan local government also had two unintended and 
interesting social consequences. The first was a vocal demand among the communities 
of Jesds de Machaqa for training their grass-roots leaders in the processes and norms of 
modern government: budgeting, the legal and regulatory framework, etc. They also 
requested that local government post municipal officials in their jurisdiction, "in order to 
be closer to the people". 12° Far from disillusioned with decentralization, the residents of 
Jesus de Machaqa reacted to its shortcomings by demanding that it be deepened. This 
culminatedin a movement within the jurisdiction to secede from Viacha and form the 
fifth municipality of Ingavi Province. Given the history and strong local identity of 
Jesds de Machaqa, this was in retrospect a natural response to the indifference of 
government in Viacha. 
The second consequence of decentralization was much less predictable, and 
involved the autonomous reorganization of society at the village level. Titik'ana Takaka 
was a case in point. The community had been part of an ayllu which was divided into 
three affiliates of the peasants' union by the syndicalist movement of the 1950s. But 
these sub-centrales began re-grouping with decentralization, and by 1997 were returning 
to their traditional forms of authority and representation. The residents of Titik'ana 
Takaka hoped to increase their political weight by banding together with nearby 
115 Mamani, Vito, Tola and Callisaya, op.cit. 
116 Laurel, Plata, Choque and Gomez, op.cit. 
117 Colque, op.cit.; Guarachi, op.cit.; and Rodriguez, op.cit. 
118 Laurel, Plata, Choque and G6mez, op.cit. 
119 Cusi, Julian and Cusi, op.cit. 
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communities, and so improve their ability to capture resources and tend to local needs. I21 
 In doing so they rejected the social forms of the 20`h centuryin favor of those of five 
centuries earlier. 
Another, deeper motive was that decentralization changed the logic of social 
organization in Bolivia. A lasting legacy of the revolution was that between 1952-1994 
the means for sharing out public resources were national negotiations, strikes and 
lobbying conducted in La Paz between representatives of government, business and 
labor, each organized in its own "peak association". 122 Economic identity was thus 
much more important to rural dwellers than where they lived. After 1994, by contrast, 
bargaining over resources was largely conducted at the municipal level amongst 
community representatives. Whether citizens fished, farmed or drove a truck no longer 
mattered. Where they lived, and how well the leaders they elected negotiated the 
division of resources across municipal space, became paramount. The effects of this 
change reached deep down into village life, and made the way in which communities 
were organized much more important. 
3.4 Other Local Actors — The Military and the Church 
In the past the armed forces and the Catholic Church had figured large in 
Viachan life, but their shared history of association with an oppressive white minority 
under both colony and republic conspired to make them insignificant forces in the local 
democratic context of 1997. Of the two, the military's role in oppression was by far the 
more direct. For centuries the army was the state's instrument of domination for the 
benefit of a landowning and mining criollo elite. The government in the capital 
legislated, regulated and taxed the countryside so as to push Aymara communities off 
their traditional territories, allowing latifundistas to purchase the land at convenient 
prices. It also enforced the mit'a, a distortion of the ancient practice of communal labor 
by which young men were extracted from peasant communities throughout the altiplano 
and forced to work in the silver and tin mines of Potos1. 123 When the peasants revolted, 
the army was sent to put them down, which they did with a ferocity made easy by 
superior armor. These events were seared into the memory of the campesinos, and 
120 Mamani, Vito, Tola and Callisaya, op.cit. 
121 ibid. 
122 The peasants' union was, along with miners and public employees, an important component of the 
Confederation of Bolivian Labor, the leadership of which for many years wielded great power in the 
capital. 
123 See Dunkerley (1984), Klein (1993), AIM, et.al. (1990), Ticona and Albo (1997), among others. 
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became important touchstones in their ethnic history and identity. Even today the 
residents of Jesids de Machaqa take pride in their rebellious past and continue to 
celebrate their doomed uprising which led to the 1921 massacre. 
By 1997 the military found itself in quite a different position in Viacha. The 
revolution of 1952-3 had largely ended the systematic military repression of the 
peasantry, and the restoration of an open, democratic regime in the 1980s had returned 
them to their garrisons. Years of curtailed military spending had reduced the army unit 
based in Viacha to a distressed state, with outdated equipment and insufficient resources 
for training. Its commander was Lt.Col. Adolfo Davila, a native of Viacha, who led the 
2000 soldiers of the army's 1 st Division GADA 231 unit, based only a few blocks from 
the city's central square. A confident, well-spoken man, he was a keen observer of local 
affairs and well-versed in the workings of local government. Unusually for Bolivia, he 
and the mayor had found no way in which to cooperate, and if his relations with local 
government were cordial they were also largely empty. The commander complained 
about the government's inefficiency and described the schemes by which senior officials 
misappropriated public funds, but in the end his power to affect local events was very 
smal l " 
The Viachan Catholic Church stands silently at one corner of the central plaza, 
itself the very symbol of a "civilized" urban society which defined itself in opposition to 
the indigenous countryside. 125 On both sides of the ethnic divide the church was 
traditionally and strongly associated with the dominant white and mestizo classes. 
Throughout the colony and the republic local authorities allied themselves repeatedly 
with the church, and used this alliance to amass rural landholdings for the church and 
themselves. 126 The church was thus regarded by campesinos as a foreign institution, and 
in the uprising of Tupaq Katari in 1781 rebels killed the local priest. Despite this, the 
evangelical efforts of the church over 500 years were not in vain, and the church was 
also an integral part of daily rural life, with "the sacred role to bless, celebrate baptisms, 
festivals, and many other rites that, from as early as the 18 th century, were already part of 
Aymara daily life.„127  Aymara and Quechua speakers throughout the altiplano 
internalized many of the doctrines and symbols of Catholicism in a sui generis religious 
form which intertwined them with elements from traditional indigenous spiritual 
124 Davila, op.cit. 
125 Ticona and Alba, op.cit., pp.29-43. 
126 
/ p.40. 
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beliefs. 128 Thus, for example, the Virgin Mary was viewed by many as a manifestation 
of the Pachamania, 129 and the lightning which made stones sacred and revealed the 
identity of yatiris13° was thought to come from the apostle Santiago.''' 
Beginning in the late 1960s, the Aymara Church movement sought a more 
explicit reconciliation with its indigenous flock, introducing the Aymara language and 
music into liturgical celebrations. The parish priest of JestIs de Machaqa was one of the 
founders and principle exponents of this movement. This represented a significant 
change from the historical pattern of relations between the church and the rural masses, 
and an important attempt at outreach. Unlike comparable developments elsewhere in 
Bolivia, it was more a religious than a social or political movement. It was, indeed, a 
product of the withdrawal of the church from political life to concentrate on the spiritual 
and evangelical. Fr. Justino Limachi, the Viachan parish priest, confirmed that the 
Church had little interaction with Viacha's government. "We don't work with the 
municipality. There was talk of church involvement early on, but people go into local 
government to steal, so the church didn't participate." 132 In his view municipal events 
were driven by politics, and this was an area that the church no longer engaged. 
4. Summary: How Government Works in Viacha 
The evidence strongly indicates that local government in Viacha was of very 
poor quality. The institutions of government varied between merely ineffective and fully 
corrupt, and the interplay amongst them produced service and policy outputs which were 
insensitive to local needs and unsatisfying to local voters. There is substantial evidence 
that Mayor Callisaya was inadequate as a manager: he expanded his payroll by over 
100% without significantly increasing the administrative ability or technical skills of the 
local executive branch; and he squandered huge sums of money on pet urban 
development projects, like a municipal coliseum, the toboggan, and municipal sewerage, 
which suffered significant cost overruns and were badly conceived and badly executed. 
These white elephants stood unfinished or broken, in ugly testimony to his 
administration's penchant for gesture over judgment. Unfortunately, the charges against 
127 ibid., p.137. Author's translation. 
128 ibid., pp. 137-139. 
129 The mother earth "goddess". 
130 Andean holy men or "priests". 
131 Xavier Alb& Armando Godinez, Kitula Libermann and Francisco Pifarrd, Para Comprender Las 
Culturas Rurales en Bolivia, MEC/CLPCA/UNICEF, La Paz:1990, pp.125-135. 
132 Limachi, 
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Callisaya did not end there. Numerous sources, including public officials, municipal 
councilmen, and even the mayor's political boss at the CBN, testified to Callisaya's 
corruption, and a national audit of municipal accounts charged him with malfeasance. 
And the example the mayor set spread throughout his administration, until it foimed a 
chain of corruption in which everyone from municipal truck drivers to experienced 
technicians demanded paybacks before they would unload supplies, draw up technical 
studies, and otherwise provide the services funded by city hall. 
Across the hall from the mayor's office, the municipal council were a good-
natured and ineffective bunch. The councilmen themselves readily admitted that they 
had little knowledge of the workings of their municipality, and displayed no interest in 
informing themselves. Regardless of party, councilmen were oblivious to the powers 
and privileges inherent in their post as municipal legislators, and were content to react to 
the requests they received from time to time from the mayor's office, or occasionally 
from a community organization. Authoritative observers in Viacha called the municipal 
council "ignorant and imperceptive", unsophisticated and easily manipulable. One could 
only expect uninformed councilmen who showed so little initiative to be uncritical 
agents of the parties that got them elected. Respondents from both the city and 
countryside testified that the council was indeed insensitive to local needs, unresponsive 
to community requests and beholden to their parties. And increasingly their loyalties 
belonged to just one party. When opposition representatives began to question 
municipal policy, the CBN/UCS hired them and members of their family, and the 
councilmen were thereafter quiet. The Viachan municipal council was thus the residual 
in the local political equation, unable to act as an independent deliberative and policy-
setting body. It offered no institutional or political counterweight to the power of the 
mayor, and effectively short-circuited the first layer of checks and balances designed to 
protect local government against executive abuses of power. 
The next layer of checks and balances was based on the oversight committee, 
and its interactions with the mayor and municipal council. But in Viacha this tier was 
broken, and Viacha suffered from two OCs. 0C1, the "official" OC recognized by both 
city hall and national government, was completely uninformed and operationally inert. 
Its president was unaware of the financial details of the projects initiated during his 
tenure, and professed no knowledge of such basic information as how many people the 
municipality employed, what their salary levels were, and whether or not any 
information or accounting systems had been implemented recently. An ex-miner 
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recently arrived in Viacha, he did not even know the results of the previous elections. 
Rural community leaders testified that ()CI was ignorant of their needs and ignored their 
requests, and prominent urban observers did not even know of its existence. 
Uninterested in municipal affairs and insensitive to public opinion, he not only failed to 
counterbalance the mayor's power, but actively endorsed his demagogic manipulations, 
including notably the beer-soaked planning exercise that led to theft and manslaughter. 
In this way he earned the illegal salary that the mayor paid him. The opposition OC, by 
contrast, was considerably more active, intent on providing local oversight. And despite 
the mayor's attempts to sideline them, they were surprisingly well-informed, brandishing 
the municipal budget and readily quoting project details. Unrecognized by the national 
and local state, however, and thus excluded from the processes of local government, 
0C2 was ultimately powerless to intervene in the formulation of municipal policy. 
The institutional mechanism for the production of local government in Viacha 
was thus doubly short-circuited. Having freed himself from political oversight, the 
mayor was able to block social oversight of his activities by dividing civil society against 
itself, neutralizing its mechanism for accountability, and hiring his own. The stress 
placed on Callisaya's role is intentional. These events were neither coincidental nor 
casual but rather engineered deliberately by a canny political strategist in order to free 
his hand. The corruption of the entire municipal apparatus subsequently, and naturally, 
ensued. And the policies and investments that local government carried out in Viacha 
were grossly inefficient, largely ineffective, and more importantly bore little relation to 
public need. 
This story begs the deeper question of how such a situation came about. What 
incentives were there for such behavior? What social and economic factors sustained a 
municipal government which should have collapsed under the weight of its own 
ineptitude and corruption? The dominant actors in Viachan society were potent 
industrial-political groups which had stormed into the vacuum left by the withdrawal of 
the church and military from public life. The most powerful of these were the CBN-
UCS and SOBOCE-MIR complexes. In order to understand their role it is important to 
consider first how Viacha fit into the larger context of Bolivian national politics. 
Viacha's proximity and ease of travel to La Paz, and the increasing migration of the 
owners of its factories and businesses to that city, made its politics the by-product of the 
political strategies and dynamics of the capital. Viachan local parties were mere 
franchises of their national organizations. They were not mechanisms for aggregating 
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individual preferences and transmitting them to the institutions of local government, nor 
did they champion local causes. They were, rather, the tools by which the consequences 
of national struggles for power and influence were played out locally. Local party 
leaderships were made and unmade on the whim of national and departmental leaders 
based on loyalty, electoral success, and subservience. The MLR, for example, was not 
permitted to hold a meeting without explicit approval from La Paz. The only exception 
was the UCS, which was run out of the CBN bottling plant. 
National party bosses expected their local operatives to conduct electoral 
campaigns while doing nothing to constrain the party's strategies in La Paz. They were 
uninterested in the problems of government in Viacha, and provided local leaders with 
minimal resources with which to do their jobs. Of the two imperatives, the latter was by 
far the more important — silent electoral ineptitude was preferable to winning elections 
and causing a stir. The leaders of the MIR, for example, essentially closed down the 
local party after losing a heated political battle against a UCS mayor, among others, over 
the cement factory's pollution. The battle had been politically costly for a leftist party 
with environmentalist pretensions, and the owner of SOBOCE wanted no surprises to 
upset his vice-presidential ambitions. 133 The retirement from politics of the only force 
capable of acting as a counterweight to the CBN-UCS freed it to pursue its interests 
without external constraint. In Viacha the party's interests were identical to those of 
Juan Carlos Blanco, its paramount leader. His goal was to improve his standing within 
the party by delivering large majorities in Viacha, 134 and he exploited the considerable 
resources of the bottling plant, as well as the municipality, to win over voters. And in 
the CBN Blanco had a business, with its large labor force, its wide distribution network, 
and the enticement of beer, that was particularly suited to proselytism. With such a 
narrow objective and a time horizon never more than an election away, the UCS proved 
as uninterested in Viacha's collective welfare as it was in its long-range development 
needs. That local government proved a disaster is thus not surprising. 
By 1997 Viachan civil society seemed absent from the government process, 
cowed by the tight grip of party, government and brewery on local affairs. Callisaya had 
skillfully manipulated the hostilities between city and countryside and set them fighting 
against each other, and there was, it seemed, no remedy to UCS misrule. Then, to the 
surprise of many, the grass roots flexed their muscle and proved that they were not 
133 Samuel Doria Medina was the MIR's vice-presidential candidate in the 1997 general election. 
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powerless after all. Rural communities might be too distant and poor to confront their 
government, but urban society was not. Following a series of town meetings that aired 
their grievances, the people of Viacha rose up against their mayor on the 22 nd of March 
and marched on city hall demanding his resignation. I35 A crowd of several hundred 
people136 paraded through town and then massed in the central square opposite 
Callisaya's office loudly and angrily demanding his departure. A few days later he 
announced that he was stepping down to run for a congressional seat. And then, in the 
June general election, Viacha recorded a huge swing from the UCS to Condepa. It 
added insult to injury and, coming after an expensive and frenetic electoral season, was a 
slap in the face to a party which had, literally, given away so much. The experience 
suggested that in the new context of local government in Bolivia no local government, 
no matter how rich or powerful the interests that supported it, could govern against its 
people for long. The UCS had taken voters for fools, and the voters had had their 
revenge. 
134 Blanco, op.cit. 
135 Presencia. "Los vecinos viachefios marchan hoy para que se vaya su Alcalde". 22 March 1997. 
136 Estimates of crowd size vary from 150-200 according to UCS spokesmen, to 500 according to 0C2. 
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1. Introduction 
The road to Charagua is an orange ribbon of earth that carries travelers away 
from the exuberance of Santa Cruz's tropical flowers and swaying palms, deep into the 
Chaco. The bouncing and banging of your jeep along the dusty road is interrupted by 
slippery silences as you slide softly into mud. The sun's relentless glare melts the lush 
green surrounding the city into the scrubgrass and low twisted bushes of the arid plain. 
The journey takes five hours in the dry season, and becomes impossible during the rains. 
Located in the southeastern corner of the country, Charagua is the second 
municipal district of the Cordillera province and shares a long border with Paraguay. It 
was overrun by the Paraguayan at 	my during the Chaco War of 1932-35, and the memory 
of violence lives on in the stories of village elders and the statues in the central square. It 
boasts the biggest municipal area in Bolivia — its 60,000 km 2 make it larger than 
Holland, Costa Rica or Denmark, and about twice the size of Belgium. Only 13% of its 
18,769 inhabitants live in the town of Charagua, with the rest scattered across 80 
indigenous and rural communities, a handful of newer Mennonite communities, and the 
smaller town of Charagua Station. The economy is accordingly rural, with agriculture, 
cattle-ranching, education in the form of a teacher-training college, and commerce the 
main sources of income. Of these only cattle-ranching achieves a respectable scale, with 
a few families raising thousands of heads of cattle on tens of thousands of hectares. By 
contrast Charagua's agricultural sector is planted firmly in antiquity, with Guarani 
peasants farming communal lands without the benefit of the plow, let alone tractors or 
irrigation, relying on their traditional stick method to break the earth. 
The population of Charagua is overwhelmingly Guarani, with Ava-Guaranies in 
the northern foothills and Tupi-Guaranfes in the South, especially the Izozo region. 
Although official business is conducted mostly in Spanish, the principal language of the 
region is Guarani. Quechua, a distant third, is heard primarily in the urban market, 
where recent migrants from the altiplano ply their trades, and in the few rural 
communities where they have settled. The town of Charagua lacks industry and has 
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little commercial activity. Its importance comes rather from the fact that it is the seat of 
power of the landowning cattle families who traditionally dominated the region and its 
inhabitants. Charaguan townsfolk think of themselves as either white or mestizo, in 
strict opposition to the Guarani hinterlands, a division which is clear in the minds of 
townspeople and Guaranies alike. 
Despite the huge landholdings of some Charaguans, the town itself retains a 
curiously classless, colorless air, its low one and two-story buildings fronted by shaded 
porches often in need of a coat of paint. There are no conspicuous displays of wealth, 
and no abject poverty is visible. This is probably due to the fact that its richest 
inhabitants maintain only secondary homes in town, and spend most of their time and 
attention on their farms, where their estancias are. But it is also indicative of the crisis 
affecting the rural economy, with low commodity and land prices and an exodus of the 
ranchers' most talented children to the city. This crisis, which has been going on for 
over a decade, is likely to deepen in coming years, and we return to it below. Despite its 
unprepossessing appearance, however, the town benefits from a significantly higher 
level of public service provision than do its surrounding communities. Charagua town's 
index of Unsatisfied Basic Needs is 0.453, tenth best for Bolivia as a whole and very 
similar to the scores of Bolivia's three main cities. By contrast, the value for rural areas 
is 0.926, ranking Charagua 100 th amongst Bolivia's 311 municipalities. 
A principal problem of landowning wealth is illiquidity, and this is to a great 
extent Charagua's problem too. With few businesses in the entire district, the 
opportunities for charging license fees are very limited. And the small quantities of land 
that change hands in any given year make reaching realistic property tax assessments 
difficult. Up until 1997 this was compounded by cattle ranchers' practice of paying 
property taxes via their regional association, headquartered in Santa Cruz. Hence all 
such revenues accrued to the departmental government, with none returned to the areas 
where it was generated. As a result, Charagua's own resources amounted to only 
Bs.49,000 in 1996, out of a budget of Bs.2,328,060, or a tiny 2% of the total. And given 
the subsistence economy of Guarani agriculture, essentially all of these revenues came 
from the town. "The Guaranies don't pay taxes," the mayor declared with a twinkle in 
his eye, "they just procreate." I 
Luis Saucedo Tapia, mayor of Charagua, interview, Santa Cruz, 31 March, 1997. 
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Despite this lack of resources, by the middle of 1997 Charagua had acquired a 
reputation within the department of Santa Cruz, and increasingly nationally, of being 
well run by a competent and enthusiastic mayor. The mayor came out top in a ranking 
of all of the mayors in the department. "He is a very good administrator," said the 
departmental head of the Social Investment Fund, "and a very active person. [...] He has 
a very good image — even people from rival parties recognize this." 2 Decentralization 
had increased municipal resources by some 6500% year-on-year, and yet the funds 
appeared to be well-spent. Local government had resisted the temptation to inflate and 
had managed to keep operating costs to just 4% of total budget. A series of municipal 
audits carried out by the national government on medium-sized municipalities supported 
this view, finding no deficiencies in Charagua's operational programming, 
administrative organization, budgeting, personnel administration, administration of 
goods and services, treasury management, accounting, and internal auditing and control. 3 
The foundation of good local government in Charagua was a strong social 
consensus which upheld a political coalition between the center-left Movimiento Bolivia 
Libre (MBL) party and the center-right Accion Democratica Nacionalista (ADN) party. 
This consensus consisted of two closely-related components: (i) a political covenant 
between the MBL and the Guarani People's Association (APG), whereby the former 
allowed the latter to choose candidates for its local electoral list in exchange for Guarani 
votes in municipal elections; and (ii) the animosity felt by rural inhabitants of Charagua 
towards the MNR party and its previous mayor, who was widely accused by Guaranies 
of racism and brutality towards rural villagers.` To this second point was added a more 
general, if less acute, rejection of the local MNR by townspeople who associated it with 
an increasingly unpopular national government. The nature of this social and political 
consensus is central to understanding the success of local government in Charagua, and 
we examine its components in detail below. Its immediate results were to allow the 
MBL, which had never done well in Charagua, to win almost as many votes as the first-
place MNR, and then to propel the ADN and MBL into coalition government behind an 
MBL mayor, thus excluding the MNR from power. In a municipality where Guaranies 
2 Dr. Fernando Murioz Franco, interview, Santa Cruz, 31 March, 1997. 
3 Secretarla Nacional de Participacion Popular. 1997. Matriz Resumen de las Auditorfas SAYCO 
Practicadas en Gobiernos Municipales Categorla "C" ( Pob. Mayor a 15,000 y Menor a 50,000 flab.): 
hzfonne SCAE/IEA. 
4 Eulogio Nrifiez, CIPCA director (NGO) and municipal adviser, interview, Charagua, 2 April 1997. 
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did not vote and the MNR traditionally beat the ADN into second place in town, this was 
a shocking turn of events for many. 
The ADN-MBL coalition proved surprisingly robust in practice, and provided 
the mayor with a strong political base for his administration. By his own account this 
was very fortuitous. "Never before have so many distant communities received so 
much" in public services and investment, he said, explaining a planning and budgeting 
system built around the principle that each community in the district must receive an 
equitable share' of the municipal budget over a multi-year cycle. 6 But the effort needed 
to run a planning system in which communities discuss their needs and prioritized their 
own projects, in a municipality as big as Charagua, was immense. "It took two months 
just to meet all 67 indigenous communities and agree their needs," he explained. "The 
workload is very heavy for many municipalities that weren't used to so much 
responsibility. [...] Every year we have to re-structure ourselves better." It is doubtful 
that the municipality would have achieved the results it did without the unwavering 
support that the municipal council provided the mayor. 
Box 1: The Slavery of Captive Communities 
Councilman Solano explained that some of the migrants to Charagua were from Ivo, 
Boyuibe and Huacareta. "They come without land or money, and the locals here tend to the needs 
of brother Guaranies." The source of these desperate arrivals are the "captive communities" deep 
in the Chaco, where modem slavery flourishes. The CIPCA's Ndfiez explained how it works. 
There are towns 
where the rich families run everything and occupy all the important posts. [. ..] They have 
between 10 and 30 Guarani families living on large properties where they are kept as slaves on 
the land and aren't paid for their work. [...] The patron keeps them in debt. They can't leave 
before paying or they're put in jail. 
The debt is passed down from father to son, and Guarani families are allowed neither education 
nor contact with the outside world. "These families have radio communications amongst 
themselves," Niffiez continued. "They set up roadblocks and radio warnings to each other when 
an outsider appears. Then they send the Guaranies up into the hills with the cattle, and the 
outsiders are told no one lives there." The patrones even had the gall to register themselves as a 
rural community so they would not have to pay taxes. "Now these rich families have formed a 
GRO and are able to demand public money for wells, roads, etc. on their private property. And 
they put Guarani families on their lists of GRO members." CIPCA has purchased the freedom of 
some captive Guaranies at a price of around Bs.1000 each. The APG has proposed the wholesale 
liberation of these slaves, but successive governments have been afraid to, tackle the'issue. 
The deeper background to Charagua's municipal dynamics is a Guarani cultural 
renaissance which began in the early 1980s and gathered pace in the 1990s. The 
5 i.e. Based on population. 
6 Saucedo (a), op.cit. 
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Guaranies, who as a people had managed to survive Spanish colonialism successfully for 
over three centuries, succumbed throughout the 19 th century to the criollo republic's 
potent mix of Christian conversion, government territorial annexations, and cattle 
ranchers' land purchases and confiscations, all backed by repression of the Bolivian 
army. 7  With their spears and arrows the Guaranies were no match for the firearms of the 
state, and at Kurujuky in 1892 an indigenous uprising led to a massacre which almost 
destroyed the Guarani culture. 8 Coming as it did after a long string of setbacks, the 
massacre of Kurujuky cast the Guaranies onto the margins of society, where they 
survived as the perpetually indebted slaves of large landowners or as subsistence farmers 
in isolated rural communities. The Guaranies spent the better part of a hundred years in 
material and spiritual deprivation, a proud and bellicose people beaten into docility, lost 
in a sort of collective amnesia triggered by their defeat. 9 
After the chaos of successive coups d'etat and hyperinflation, the 1980s 
witnessed a re-birth of Guarani consciousness and Guarani pride, as is discussed in detail 
below. The Asainblea del Pueblo Guarani (APG) was formed in 1986-7 to coordinate 
Guarani affairs, foment cooperation amongst communities, and articulate Guarani 
interests. The moment was evidently ripe for such an organization, and the APG 
flourished and very quickly established a central role throughout the Guarani world from 
the most mundane community tasks to the international arena via its representation of 
Guaranies across Bolivia and Paraguay. Thus when the MBL sought to mount an 
electoral coup in Charagua by capturing the hitherto ignored Guarani vote, it found in the 
APG an interlocutor which not only spoke with authority but possessed the legitimacy 
and organization to mobilize a highly dispersed population. When the Guaranies voted 
for the MBL, they also voted for the Guarani candidates that the APG had chosen. The 
party's vote increased by over 360% in the 1995 local election. 1° Rural voters and 
community leaders that I spoke to reported satisfaction with their electoral success and 
the subsequent government's performance. With the presence of Guaranies on the 
municipal council for the first time, they felt not only that their voices were heard but 
7 Xavier Alba, Los Guarani-Chiriguano: La Comunidad de Hoy, CIPCA:La Paz, 1990, pp.19-22. Alb() is 
acknowledged to be one of the premier authorities on Guarani culture in Bolivia. 
8 Fr. Gabriel Sequier (Tianou Pirou), parish priest, interview, Izozo, 3 April 1997. Sequier is another 
Spanish priest who has dedicated his life to understanding and working with the Guarani people. 
 Javier Medina (Ed.), Arakuarenda: Un Centro Intercultural de Capacitation Para el Desarrollo 
Guarani, Arakuarenda/FIS:La Paz, 1994, pp.19-30. 
I° Corte Nacional Electoral (Direction de Informatica), Estadistica de Votacion Absoluta, Elecciones 
Municipales de 1993 y 1995. [Database] 
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Governing Coalition' MBL-ADN % of Population Speaks: 
General Spanish 	34% 
Total Pop. 18,769 % Vote 1995 44.0% Native Tongue 	14% 
Urban Pop. 2,486 Main Opposition MNR Spanish & Native 	46% 
Urban Share 13% % Vote 1995 37.6% Literacy Rate 	80% 
Rural Communities 37 Electoral Absenteeism 39.5% No Ed. Attainment 	17% 
Indigenous Comms. 51 % Blank Votes 2.1% # Schools (Bldgs) 	46 
Unsatisfied Basic Needs 0.873 % Null Votes 1.4% Total Students 	4,316 
Urban UBN 0.453 Students/Teacher 	17.5 
Rural UBN 0.926 Municipal Employees Uses Formal Health 	87% 
1997 9 Care System 
Oversight Committee 1993 4 # Health Facilities 	18 
Total Members 8 Increase 125% Malnutrition Rates: 
Village Members 7 per 1000 pop 0.5 Low 24% 
President is from? Rural Top Salary" Bs 1,700 Moderate 	9% 
Qualifs. Req'd? Yes (?) Severe 	2% 
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that they had assumed control of the municipality. "Councilmen are sent to represent us. 
They pay attention to us and not to the parties — they do what we want." 11 Quietly, 
tenuously, but with evident pride, the Guaranies were emerging from obscurity to take 
their rightful place at the center of Charagua's political life. 
Figure 1 
sources: 1992 census, 1997 municipal census, National Electoral Court, National Institute 
of Statistics, author's interviews 
* In order of importance, 1995-99 
"`* Highest-paid non-elected official 
I I Pablo Diego Vaca and David Segundo, community leader and adviser, interview, Yapiroa, 3 April 1997. 
Local leaders held similar views in rural communities throughout Charagua, including Kapiwasuti, 
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2. Local Government Institutions 
2.1 The Mayor and the Local Executive Branch 
Prof. Luis Saucedo Tapia is a retired schoolteacher originally from Villamontes, 
on the southeastern edge of the Chaco in Tarija. He has lived in Charagua since 1967, 
working for most of that time in the town's large educational establishment. A 
sympathizer of the center-left MBL party and its brand of politics emphasizing human 
rights, rural development, and periodic anti-corruption drives, he became mayor when 
the APG nominated him to the top position of the MBL's electoral list. "The Guaranies 
borrowed a karai 12 as candidate for mayor" in order not to scare Charaguan 
townspeople, explained the president of the oversight committee. All of the other names 
on the list were Guarani, and the APG made an implicit bargain with the town to control 
Charagua through one of them in exchange for the support, or at least restrained 
hostility, of the white elite. 13 Saucedo agreed with this, explaining that "the town 
demanded that the ADN give me their vote in the municipal council. Now they've 
turned against me because they say I give all the money to indigenous people." 14 But the 
countryside continued to support him, he added. 
Saucedo was relaxed and patient during various lengthy interviews that spanned 
several months. With a thorough grasp of the administration over which he presided, he 
easily rattled off population and investment figures, project names and budgets, and 
much other municipal information in detail without reference to notes. "Our plan is to 
attend to the basic needs of all of the communities first," he explained, "and then to 
invest in productive projects that raise future income.' ,I5 To this effect the 
municipality's 1997 budget prioritized the following areas, in order of importance: (i) 
Education — fourteen schools throughout the district; (ii) Health — the Mother and Child 
Health Insurance scheme and an anti-chagas program; (iii) Water & Sanitation — a 
number of new wells in rural areas; and (iv) several tourism projects and heavy road 
maintenance. Saucedo noted that Charagua was investing some 50% of its municipal 
budget in human development, compared to the 30% that central government guidelines 
recommend. He reported municipal investments in all eight of the sectors about which 
Taputami, Acae and El Espino, among others. 
12 Guarani for white man. 
13 Florencio Antuni Sdnchez, oversight committee president, interview, Charagua, 1 April 1997. 
14 Luis Saucedo Tapia, mayor, interview, Charagua, 1 April 1997. 
15 ibid. 
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he was questioned, and judged the results obtained so far as good in six of these and bad 
in two. 
Saucedo was most emphatic about the distribution of resources in his 
municipality. "This has undeniably improved since the Popular Participation Law —
there's no comparison." He described a planning system which breaks the municipality 
into four zones and allocates resources to each strictly by population. Thus Charagua 
Norte received Bs.500,000, Charagua Sur Bs.350,000, the Izozo Bs.650,000, and the 
town and surrounding Guarani and Mennonite communities received Bs.900,000. He 
then recited the population of each region to prove his point. Within these limits, 
specific projects and policy interventions are decided by local meetings in each 
community. These agree on local priorities and send a list of each community's 
preferences to the oversight committee and the mayor. The mayor and OC pre-select 
which of these projects they will undertake. The municipality then hosts general 
meetings in each of the four zones to discuss projects requested, make the final selection, 
and establish an investment plan for each. From these meetings the municipal Annual 
Operating Plan emerges. This AOP cannot be modified by the municipal council or 
mayor alone, and requires a written resolution from community leaders or the OC before 
changes can be considered: 6 
Other local authorities confirmed Saucedo's outline of the planning system, and 
all stressed the high degree of grass-roots participation which made it successful. "Each 
zone demands a share of the budget proportional to its population," the mayor explained. 
But it did not end there. "Even after the AOP is finished, some groups want to benefit 
always. They send written requests for more projects and stage demonstrations" to voice 
their demands. These are analyzed by the mayor, municipal council and OC; they may 
lead to reformulations of the entire AOP. Grass-roots leaders are also instrumental in 
setting the level and type of community contribution that financing agencies like the FIS, 
the World Bank, and others demand, according to the president of the OC. And once the 
project is going, "they press for the FIS, the municipality and the contractor to deliver on 
their obligations as well."" 
MNR councilman Julian Segundo Chipipi described an atmosphere of 
cooperation and accommodation in zonal meetings. "The money of communities that 
16 Crispin Solano Menacho, municipal councilman (MBL) and ex-oversight committee president, 
interview, Charagua, 28 October 1997. 
17 Antuni (a), op.cit. 
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have already satisfied their needs goes to other communities. They understand this and 
are in agreement." I8 "Peasants today aren't like they used to be," added the (ADN) 
president of the municipal council. "Now they're learned, able, awake and agile," and 
can easily handle complex negotiations amongst distant communities. I9 Despite the 
mayor's protests that this planning system was still new, its results — the municipality's 
AOP — satisfied all of the rural communities that I interviewed in Charagua. Only civic 
leaders from the town itself complained that the 1997 AOP represented the 
municipality's wishes and not communities' greatest needs.2° But this was probably due 
to resentment of the shift in resources and priorities away from the town that Popular 
Participation had brought about. "It's the Guaranies who are most successful in 
extracting resources from the municipality," admitted Saucedo. 
The mayor was obviously pleased with his success in Charagua, declaring 
merrily, "this system of programming funds is good! It's right to do things this way." 21 
 But he also worried that managing the process was stretching his municipal government 
to the breaking point. Even though it had increased in size from four to nine employees, 
the administration was still too understaffed to provide effective local government to an 
area twice the size of Belgium. The mayor had three executive, four operational and two 
support staff working for him, plus a few occasional employees hired for specific 
projects. The highest qualification required — for the executives — was a high school 
diploma, and salary levels were too low to attract technically trained staff from the city. 
And to make matters worse, they were building institutional capacity on a non-existent 
base. "Before Popular Participation," said Saucedo, "there were no educational 
requirements for hiring people. Any cripple who limped past was given a job." The 
mayor earned a derisory Bs.250/month, and the others less. With no salary, no staff and 
no budget to work with, those who served in Charagua's government were motivated by 
a sense of civic duty, not by hopes of what they might achieve. 
After decentralization, various central agencies attempted to strengthen the 
municipality by installing the SICOPRE and SICOM information systems and training 
staff in their use. But the mayor did not hold out much hope for these. "In the end no 
one understood the SICOPRE," he admitted. "And they're implementing SICOM now," 
18  Julian Segundo Chipipi, municipal councilman (MNR), interview, Charagua, 2 April 1997. 
19 Abelardo Vargas Portales, municipal council president (ADN), interview, Charagua, 1 April 1997. 
20 Walter Garcia Juarez and Jorge Cortez Romero, community association president and community 
member, interview, Charagua, 3 April 1997. 
21 Saucedo (b), op.cit. 
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he added, shrugging. Instead Saucedo opted to hire an NGO called CIPCA (Center for 
the Investigation and Promotion of the Peasantry) for institutional development and 
technical advice. CIPCA is a left-of-center group formed by politically active university 
graduates who had settled in Charagua some years earlier, established their NGO, and 
took over the ailing branch of the MBL. 22 CIPCA signed a covenant with the mayor to 
provide technical support for the formulation of the AOP, advice on relations with rural 
communities, and help with administrative development. In practice CIPCA quickly 
became involved in most aspects of daily business, helping the government to design 
and find financing for projects, formulate its five-year Municipal Development Plan, and 
assist in relations with the various national development funds (e.g. FIS). Some local 
observers, such as the parish priest Fr. Luis Roma, lauded CIPCA's role, saying "The 
good shape the municipality is in is due to CIPCA. The mayor blindly does what 
CIPCA tells him to do." But others, especially in town, complained that CIPCA's 
influence was too strong, and that it had become a parallel government. The president of 
the OC, the man perhaps in the best position to know, countered this, explaining that 
CIPCA supported the local planning procedure only, and was not involved in the 
decision-making stage. 23 
But not even Charagua's careful planning system, nor the widespread goodwill 
that it engendered among civic and political leaders, could guarantee success. In order to 
multiply his investment budget, the mayor had obtained co-financing for school 
construction projects from the FIS. But a number of these suffered delays in late 1996, 
and by mid-1997 construction had stopped at ten of them as the FIS sued the contractor 
for damages. The mayor, municipal councilmen, and many of the community leaders 
interviewed attributed these suspensions primarily to the particularly heavy rains that had 
affected the region that year, washing out roads and paralyzing even the trains. The 
mayor also cited the contractor's weak cashflow, which made it unable to operate ten 
construction sites simultaneously and led it to demand larger community contributions 
than had been initially agreed. In both cases the mayor lay blame squarely at the FIS' 
door. He argued that the FIS worked backwards — using the dry season to complete 
project paperwork and initiating construction at the onset of the rains; and he complained 
that the FIS should never have awarded ten projects to a single film in the first place, 
23 Antuni (a), op.cit. 
22 Nunez, op. cit. 
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especially one only recently formed and with little experience building schools to FIS 
specifications. 24 
Saucedo was quick to point out that the rest of his investment program had gone 
well and was largely completed. But these schools represented one-half of Charagua's 
yearly investment budget, and their interruption froze Saucedo's budget and crippled his 
government. Large swathes of rural Charagua had agreed to expect nothing more from 
local government than a school. The projects' suspension broke local government's 
credibility in the areas affected, and undermined its claim to be focusing resources on 
rural problems more generally. Although local authorities such as the District Director 
of Education and the president of the OC defended the municipality and accused the FIS 
and the contractor of poor planning, 25 their view was not shared by all of the grass-roots 
leaders I spoke to. At the community level people seemed disillusioned by the turn of 
events, and unsure whom to blame for services they'd been promised that were not being 
delivered. As time passed and no solution was found the public began to lose patience 
with the mayor and his municipal council, and in some quarters opinion turned hostile. 
The fact that the Charaguan government retained significant credibility amongst 
most of its voters despite these setbacks, and that many civic leaders seemed prepared to 
suspend judgment for a time, is probably due to the stark contrast between the MBL 
administration and the MNR regime which preceded it. According to Mr 1\illtiez of 
CIPCA, "The previous government was absolutely urban — rural communities weren't 
represented.... It's AOPs were drawn up for it by the Office of Municipal Strengthening 
in the Prefecture in Santa Cruz. The communities complained that their needs weren't in 
it."26 Saucedo paints a much more dire picture of the state of affairs. 
The previous government was taking Charagua to the brink of disaster. The FIS could 
find nothing in Charagua to finance in 1994 and 1995. Finally the municipality began 
sending money directly to the communities because projects would not materialize. 
Some spent well, others badly.... This distorted the local idea of what revenue-sharing 
means. '-' 
But more important perhaps were the purely political elements of government. 
"Rolando Gutierrez [the previous 1VINR mayor] had serious problems with the 
Guaranies. He had been a policeman here. He was one of those who went to Guarani 
24 Saucedo (a), op.cit. 
Antuni (a), op.cit.; Oscar Hugo Aramayo Caballero, district director of education, interview, Charagua, 4 
April 1997. 
26 Ndriez, op.cit. 
27 Saucedo (b), op.cit. 
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villages to demand labor, and if they didn't comply he beat them and put them in jail. "28 
It is thus not surprising that Guaranies voted overwhelmingly against the MNR, and 
were happy to see the party vacate power. I attempted to interview Mr Gutierrez about 
these allegations but he refused to speak. 
In the rural communities where most Charaguans live people displayed a lively 
pragmatism, judging the mayor and his administration on their performance and little 
else. When asked about the legal provision which allowed the municipal council to 
overturn the mayor after his first year in office, the common view was that this was 
positive and should be freely used if the mayor did not satisfy expectations. According 
to the leadership of La Brecha, "This measure is necessary. Municipal projects must 
benefit everyone. The municipality either works or it doesn't work." 29 Respondents in 
the community of Yapiroa made the point that "We know how much we're due from the 
Law of Popular Participation — it's according to our population. If this isn't disbursed, 
then we must get rid of the mayor." 3° Civic leaders in Kapiwasuti, TaputamI and Acae 
echoed these sentiments, stressing that the decisive criterion for such decisions must be 
municipal performance at the community level, and official responsiveness to 
community needs. 
And the general view from the communities was that municipal performance had 
been at least satisfactory, and for the most part good. Representatives from Kapiwasuti 
reported projects in four of the eight sectors queried, and judged all of them good. 
"Popular Participation has increased the distribution of money in this municipality.... 
And the municipality is investing well. They're not wasting money. These aren't bad 
investments."31 Leaders from Taputami held a similar view, reporting investments in 
two sectors, both good. The villages of Yapiroa, Acae and El Espino all suffered from 
the school suspension debacle, and did not hesitate to express their disappointment. But 
despite this, all reported satisfaction with a local government that listened to their needs 
and at least attempted to respond to them. The response of El Espino's leader was 
typical, reporting projects in four sectors: three good and one mediocre. But despite the 
" Nunez, op. cit. 
29 Francisco Chavez Flores, Delcio Moreno Candia, Mario Arreaga, Andres Chavez Flores, Vicente 
Moreno, and Licelio Cuellar Martinez, community leader, aid to the capitania, hospital administrator, 
nursing assistant, school association president and Alto Izozo district deputy, interview, La Brecha, 3 April 
1997. 
30 Vaca and Segundo, op.cit. 
31 Demetrio Caurey and Florencio Altamirano, president of the community irrigation committee and 
infrastructure officer, interview, Kapiwasuti, 2 April 1997. 
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travails of the school, he praised the municipality for responding to a genuine need. "We 
chose the school in a community meeting," he explained, "according to greatest need. 
Because there are many students here, and the nearest schools are far away." 32 
But perhaps the most surprising response came from the community of La 
Brecha. As of mid-1997, this community, the traditional capital of the Izozo region, had 
received nothing from its municipal government. And yet local spokesmen lauded the 
law and their local government for the schools it had built and the road it had improved 
elsewhere in the Izozo. Referring to one school in particular, they said "all of the Izozo 
benefits because that school is a nucleus. 33 And the road runs the full length of the 
Izozo. [.. 1 These projects are necessities that emerge from the community itself, which 
has prioritized their greatest needs. They're discussed and analyzed in a community 
meeting."34 They went on to describe how the needs of the entire Izozo were discussed 
in a meeting of the region's civic leaders. Largely because of this consensual process, 
the projects that were approved were seen as belonging to the entire region. The local 
concept of "community" had expanded to include villages hours away by jeep. "Things 
that were never seen before have been seen now," they enthused. The strong Guarani 
identity, and the social bonds that link Izozefio communities, allowed even a village that 
had seen no municipal investment to appreciate local government's work elsewhere. 
By contrast, this attitude was missing amongst the Charaguan townspeople. Of 
the five sectors in which they had received municipal investment, they judged one good, 
three mediocre, and one bad. Local leaders approved grudgingly of the main public 
investments there, a new motor for the electricity generator and the renovation of the 
town square, but complained that other urban priorities were being ignored in favor of 
investment in rural areas. "Sewerage, domestic gas, street paving, storm drainage, waste 
recovery and treatment — they're all expensive projects and there's not enough money," 
they groused.35 The fact that their existing public services were far superior to those of 
any rural community in Charagua did not prevent them from resenting the investments 
the latter received. And when queried about neighborhood construction officers and the 
arrangements they'd made for the plaza's upkeep, they admitted that there was no civic 
oversight of project finances, quality, etc., and that maintenance of the plaza would be 
the exclusive responsibility of the municipal government. Unlike in the rural 
32 Pablo Carrillo and Marcial Arumbari, community leader and officer, interview, El Espino, 4 April 1997. 
33 • Le. A "magnet" school accepting students from a large rural area. 
34 Chavez, Moreno, Arreaga, Chavez, Moreno, and Cuellar, op.cit. 
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communities, townspeople clearly felt that the municipality belonged to them, its 
resources theirs to exploit to their own ends. They did not conceive of local government 
as something external with which they had to reach accommodation. 
Grass-roots perceptions of larger questions of the effectiveness and equity of 
municipal government seemed to proceed directly from communities' appraisals of its 
performance at home. In most communities people noted that decentralization had 
brought about improvements in the effectiveness of government that ranged froin 
modest to large. Community leaders in Copere Brecha, Yapiroa, Acae, Kapiwasuti, El 
Espino and La Brecha all reported that municipal government had improved 
significantly with the Popular Participation program. The commentary from El Espino 
was typical: 
Things are much better with Popular Participation, because now we know how much 
money arrives each year. Before they said 'There are royalties' but there was no way 
to find out [how much] and we never received anything. Now the mayor is closer [to 
us]." 
"Before the money was all for the people in the local administration itself — not even for 
the town," added Israel Romero Macuendi and Florencio Altamirano of Acae. "Now we 
have people who know the laws [and can prevent this]. The communities choose the 
most important projects." 37 Interestingly, the leaders of El Espino and La Brecha 
attributed this wholesale change to the presence of three Guaranies on the municipal 
council. "They control things here. Hence things aren't done so badly." 38 Other 
communities attributed increased municipal effectiveness to procedural changes that 
improved responsiveness to local needs. "The municipal government improved a lot 
after Popular Participation — now the municipality comes here to meet with the people 
and budget resources with them." 39 Spokesmen for other communities agreed, citing 
direct contact with and listening to voters as crucial attributes of an ideal mayor. 
Of the eleven communities I visited in Charagua, most were fairly or very 
satisfied with the quality of their local government generally. Only one — Rancho Nuevo 
— complained government was unsatisfactory, saying, "The municipality spends its 
35 Garcia and Cortez, op.cit. 
36 Carrillo and Arumbari, op.cit. 
37 Israel Romero Macuendi and Florencio Altamirano, community leader and community member, 
interview, Acae, 2 April 1997. 
38 Carrillo and Arumbari, op.cit. 
39 Vaca and Segundo, op.cit. 
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money elsewhere — not here. What it promises remains on paper only." 4° Two 
communities, Charagua town and Isiporenda, reported little change in the quality of 
government since decentralization. Two communities, Taputami and La Brecha, were 
fairly satisfied with the quality of government. And the remaining six communities were 
very happy with municipal government, reporting significant changes since 1994. 
Remarks in El Espino were typical: "There are paralyzed schools here — but this is not 
the fault of municipal government.... Most people are quite satisfied with the 
municipality because they see the works that are being carried out." 41 It is interesting to 
note that this summary reflects the deterioration in local perceptions between the first 
and second halves of 1997, due mostly to the paralyzed FIS schools. Chavez and the 
others in La Brecha, where satisfaction had dropped from high to moderate, summed up 
the feelings of many when he said "Up to a year ago things really looked good. But now 
we see things differently because the money never arrives. The AOP — which itself is 
good — isn't being executed." 42 
From the outside, the mayor and the local executive branch were regarded quite 
positively by prominent local observers. Civic and private sector leaders alike praised 
the mayor for his honesty, and his hard working and transparent administration. Juan 
Carlos Gutierrez, president of the local branch of the Cattle Ranchers Association of the 
Cordillera province, professed satisfaction with the municipality. "Local government 
works well as far as we're concerned. We call the municipality and they respond. The 
municipal council and the mayor work well together." 43 Given the very large share of 
the local wealth that cattlemen represented, this was an important vote of confidence. 
The District Director of Education was even more enthusiastic: 
We receive everything that local government can give us. [...J In 1995 we got almost 
nothing from them. In 1996 we got Bs.4 million and this year Bs.3 million more.... 
This mayor is good because he invests in human capital, including teacher training. 
He has a great will to do good. 44 
Fr. Gabriel Sequier, who has worked for decades with poor Guarani communities in the 
region, put it more bluntly still. "The municipality is working here like never before. It 
deserves our applause.... The Law of Popular Participation is a blessing from God." 45 
4° Luis Garcia and Hipolito Sirari Ena, community founder/adviser to the capitania, and community leader, 
interview, Rancho Nuevo, 28 October 1997. 
41 Carrillo and Arunbari, op.cit. 
42 Chavez, Moreno, Arreaga, Chavez, Moreno, and Cuellar, op.cit. 
43 Juan Carlos Gutierrez, interview, Charagua, 1 April, 1997. 
44 Aramayo, op.cit. 
45 Sequier, op.cit. 
157 
Charagua 
The other institutions of local government concurred. Florencio Antuni, the 
president of the oversight committee, was enthusiastic about the quality of the local 
executive. "Almost everything is being done now. Before 1994 nothing was being done 
— the municipality had no money. Now, with a little money from the LPP law, they can 
go in search of co-financing from external sources. They can consult communities and 
do what the local people want." 46 In a relatively short period of time the mayor and his 
staff had proceeded from an initial shock of managing unprecedented resources to the 
strategic ability to leverage them in order to obtain central government and external 
financing which multiplied the local budget. But Antuni's praise did not end there. 
"The opinions and necessities of the grass-roots are being taken into account here. And 
for the Guarani people this is very important," a point with which the Izozefio 
councilman Julian Segundo Chipipi agreed. 47 Both men joined municipal council 
President Vargas in declaring that the distribution of resources had improved notoriously 
under the present government, using words that echoed the most enthusiastic community 
leaders cited above. Regarding specific investment projects, Segundo judged them good 
in three sectors and mediocre in two, Antuni good in five sectors and Vargas very good 
in five sectors. But Vargas pointed out that institutional weakness was still a significant 
problem. "A team of advisers financed externally should come for at least a year and 
provide technical and legal advice.... And the municipality needs to pay better salaries 
to attract better people — especially technicians and functionaries. They need money ... 
to hire financial and administrative officers to run the local administration."48 He 
recommended a sort of apolitical municipal civil service which would maintain local 
service standards through local and national changes of government. 
The mayor himself was sanguine, and even modest, about his role in the 
transformation that his municipality had undergone over the previous three years. "In 
the beginning no one understood what Popular Participation was — including the 
municipality. Now we're beginning to reap the fruits of the LPP." 49 But he did not 
underestimate its importance. He thought decentralization had visibly and "undeniably" 
improved municipal government in Charagua. "We see better civil works; the 
necessities of the people are being attended to." Of the 88 communities in the district, 
over 50 had received new investment since 1994, and the rest had benefited in other 
46 Antuni (a), op.cit. 
47 Julian Segundo Chipipi, municipal councilman (MNR), interview, Charagua, 2 April 1997. 
48 A. Vargas, op.cit. 
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ways, via building repairs, road improvements and the cleaning of public areas. But 
more important than the projects were the changes to the process of governance itself: 
Now the people that run the show are the common, rural people. Classist principles 
are being abolished here. Marginalized people are entering the political realm. Before 
the cattlemen ruled here. Now it's the indigenous villages and marginalized people 
who reap most of the benefits of Popular Participation.' ° 
This shift in power relations had permitted a change in the relationship between 
government and its citizen-beneficiaries. No longer were rural communities cast in the 
role of supplicants, making formal requests to local representatives of a state which 
might never deign to answer, for public services which in the best circumstances would 
be bestowed deus ex cathedra upon a grateful populace. Responsive local government 
responded to the people by working with them. "The municipality has to help people 
with the greatest needs. But we must not be paternalistic. We give but we make 
demands as well — that those who benefit work, produce, etc. There must be 
counterparts. Nothing should be given freely."51 And the concept of counterparts was 
much broader than community contributions in building materials and projects costs. "If 
we build them a school then they must educate themselves."52 But the mayor kept the 
process in perspective, his gaze clearly fixed on his ultimate goal. Charagua had for 
decades suffered high levels of poverty and deprivation, with a highly dispersed rural 
population mired in a trap of ignorance, endemic diseases such as Chagas and 
tuberculosis, and the low productivity of a subsistence economy. His goal was to 
increase the human capital of his poorest voters and then invest in public infrastructure to 
increase their incomes. "All of these productive projects serve to keep the Guaranies 
from having to beg," he explained. After much municipal investment, for example, 
"Charagua Norte is now producing large quantities of corn." Change was possible, he 
believed. "It all depends on how you invest the money." 
2.2 Municipal Council 
Voting patterns in the town of Charagua remained largely stable in the 1995 
municipal elections, with the MNR and the ADN vying for first place amongst urban 
preferences. But the inclusion of a large rural area into the Charaguan district space 
changed municipal voting patterns significantly, increasing the total vote by 140%. The 
MBL captured more than half of these new voters, with an especially dramatic surge in 
49 Saucedo (a), op.cit. 
s° ibid. 
51 ibid. 
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the Guarani communities of Charagua Norte and Charagua Sur. This was the motor 
which propelled that party from under 10% to over a third of the vote district-wide and a 
close 2nd place behind the MNR, increasing its representation on the municipal council 
from none to two. Also notable was the MNR's success in capturing votes in the Alto 
and Bajo Izozo regions, which partly compensated for its slump in town on the heels of a 
highly unpopular outgoing mayor and a less unpopular national government. Concerned 
that the MBL-APG electoral pact would cost it votes in rural Charagua, the MNR had 
reached a similar agreement with the Capitaida del Alto y Bajo Izozo (Cabi), the 
traditional Guarani authority for the Izozo region,'' which allowed Cabi to name the 
second candidate on the MNR's electoral list in exchange for official Cabi support. All 
of this left the local legislature with two MNR and two MBL councilmen, and one from 
the ADN. The latter three easily reached agreement whereby the ADN councilman 
supported the MBL candidate for mayor in exchange for the presidency of the municipal 
council and the job of Chief Municipal Officer for his son. According to one local 
observer, "Vargas behaved well — he was offered money, a farm, and more if he gave his 
vote to the MNR for mayor. But he said 'If I vote for the MNR the town will kill 
,,,54 me. 
Abelardo Vargas Portales, the president of the municipal council, was born and 
raised in Charagua town. Ex-princi le o - the rural teacher training school, he has the 
gray hairs and serious air of a man who thinks before speaking. Vargas praised the civic 
attitude and will to work of his fellow councilmen. "Councilmen don't wear their 
party's colors," he said. "They don't speak of politics. They all want the development 
of the community." 55 Councilman Abilio Vaca agreed and developed the point further. 
We don't have sectarian politics here. We work together for the municipality. We 
take advantage of the parties to move the wheels of government in Santa Cruz if things 
get stuck there. But there's no party politics here. It's all work, progress, and 
solutions to problems. [...] Parties don't get involved in local affairs. I'm here for the 
APG, not the MBL. 
Vargas extended his praise to the opposition MNR councilmen as well. "There's 
no real opposition on the council — the MNR doesn't actively oppose us. Outside they 
do campaign against other parties, but in the council they work [with us]." This last 
52 lb id. 
53 Cabi forms part of the APG, though with somewhat older traditions than most of the rest of the APG, as 
is explained in greater detail below. 
54 Fr. Luis Roma, parish priest, interview, Charagua, 29 October 1997. 
55 Abelardo Vargas Portales and Abilio Vaca, municipal council president and councilman (ADN and 
MBL) respectively, interview, Charagua, 28 October 1997. 
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point was quite easy to corroborate. Councilman Julian Segundo Chipipi freely admitted 
"I was named to this post by the Cabi. I'm not here representing any party." 56 And 
Rolando Gutierrez, the ex-mayor much hated in his own town, had virtually disappeared 
from sight and ceased to play an active role in local politics. 
Segundo, a Guarani farmer and civil registrar from the town of Yapiroa, had 
never been active in politics until the 1995 election. He explained the dynamic within 
the municipal council. "The three Guarani councilors respond more to their grass roots 
[than their respective parties]. They are the ones who demand that the municipality 
perform."57 Behind the closed doors of the council these three cooperated, oblivious to 
their party and government-opposition divides, to promote service provision and 
investment in Guarani villages. Councilman Crispin Solano, from the Guarani village of 
Masaki, concurred, citing his own political freedom from the MBL and the absence of 
national party-politics in Charagua. "The municipality seeks instead to work with the 
APG," eschewing political intrigue in favor of community development. 58 
The oft-heard phrase "responding to the grass roots" appeared to be more than a 
slogan in Charagua. Segundo and Vargas set out what this signified. "The peasants are 
very direct. If they send me a note [containing their demands] and I don't comply they'll 
kick me out of my job," said the former. 59 But most grass-roots demands were 
channeled through the Cabi/APG, which played an important role coordinating requests 
and following them up. 
There is a good understanding on the part of the Capitania. They come to see how the 
projects are going. They send requests [for modifications or new projects] to the 
municipal council. The council investigates the possibility of approving. [And at the 
end,] I write a letter of information directly to the capitan. 6° 
Segundo testified that the council listened to such requests carefully and took them 
seriously. Vargas agreed, noting that whether civic pressures took the form of official 
letters or demonstrations, the council always viewed them as legitimate expressions of 
the popular will. The APG (including the Cabi) also coordinated community requests 
and pressure of national institutions, including the FIS. 
The councilmen's accounts of their own work were corroborated by community 
leaders throughout Charagua. Of the eleven communities questioned, only three 
Lr- 
56 Segundo, op.cit. 
57 ibid. 
58 
59 
60 ib /d. 
Solano, op.cit. 
Segundo, op.cit. 
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reported that the council did not respond to their needs. The other eight expressed 
satisfaction with a local legislature which in their opinion listened to and worked for 
them. Spokesmen for Kapiwasuti said simply, "councilors respond to the people who 
voted for them," 61 and those from Yapiroa, "councilmen are sent to represent us. They 
pay attention to us and not to the parties. They do what we want."62 El Espino attributed 
this to the way in which candidates for the council were selected, indicating that 
information on the electoral deals that had been struck — and the resulting political 
dynamic — had penetrated to the village level in Charagua. Community leaders were 
well aware of where they stood vis-a-vis local government, and were eager to exploit 
their advantage. "Politicians have opened their eyes and seen that they have to work," 
noted La Brecha. "Their behavior has improved." 63 And in Isiporenda, "The municipal 
council's job is to approve everything that is formally requested by the communities. 
The capitates direct only just requests to the council." 64 
Only Isiporenda, Rancho Nuevo and Charagua town expressed dissatisfaction 
with the council. "Currently councilmen obey the commands of an NGO and not their 
parties nor the people," Garcia and Cortez from Charagua explained, referring to 
CIPCA. They qualified the work of the municipal council as no better than mediocre 
"on account of the inexperience of the three Guarani representatives, not because of bad 
will or negligence. „65 Even enthusiastic communities admitted that the councilmen 
required assistance. "The council needs to be well advised because the Guaranies aren't 
well educated and need advice in order not to go backwards," 66 said El Espino. 
Charagua town recommended training in planning, legal matters and parliamentary 
procedure in order to foster a non-political atmosphere in the council. Other 
communities agreed. 
Outside government, local authorities also rated the municipal council highly. 
Gutierrez of the cattle ranchers declared that the council worked well and that he was 
pleased with it. "One of the councilors is an ex-leader of the cattle ranchers. He clarifies 
things for us when necessary,” thus facilitating trust and a smooth flow of information. 67 
oi Caurey and Altamirano, op.cit. 
62 Vaca and Segundo, op.cit. 
63 Chavez, Moreno, Arreaga, Chavez, Moreno, and Cuellar, op.cit. 
64 	• Hilda Ibanez vda. de Castro and Vidal Duran Sala, community leader and adviser, interview, Isiporenda, 
29 October 1997. 
65 Garcia and Cortez, op.cit. 
66 Carrillo and Arumbari, op.cit. 
67 J.C. Gutierrez, op.cit. 
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Some esteemed the municipal council more highly than the mayor. "The council is 
better than the mayor — it is more equitable because of the Guaranies and the presence of 
Vargas, who is an honest and dependable man," said the parish priest of Charagua. 68 
 The mayor and the president of the oversight committee agreed that the presence of the 
Guarani councilors was the key to the council's effectiveness. Saucedo echoed the 
councilors' thoughts about the absence of party politics in the council, explaining that the 
councilmen had made a joint commitment to resign if they campaigned actively in 
national elections. "Councilmen respond to the interests of the region. It's the ethnic 
factors that unite them in this way. There are no political fanaticisms, no frontal fights. 
This is a stable municipality despite the diversity of its composition." 69 
The dynamic described by prominent local observers, community leaders and 
councilmen alike was of a well-organized civil society expressed through representative 
and legitimate institutions working closely with the municipal council to detect and 
prioritize local needs throughout a large municipal area. This close cooperation, once 
established, allowed a process of feedback to develop in which municipal plans could be 
constantly reviewed and altered to respond better to changing community conditions. 
The policy outputs of this system, in the form of municipal investments, commanded the 
respect and enthusiasm of voters even in far-flung communities as citizens felt that their 
concerns were being addressed. And where projects were delayed or suspended, the 
grass-roots pressure on the municipal council was intense. The obvious question which 
presents itself is whether it was necessary for an APG-like institution to virtually take 
over local government in order for these favorable dynamics to emerge. We return to 
this issue in detail below. 
2.3 Oversight Committee 
Charagua's oversight committee was the preserve of the Guaranies, with seven 
of its eight members from rural villages and only one karai, the secretary — an 
orthodontist from the town. The president of the OC was Florencio Antuni Sanchez, a 
peasant fanner from Acae and member of the MBL. Although he has only a fourth-
grade education, Antuni is an impressive man — rapid, with intelligent eyes and a 
speaking style which is direct and succinct. I met him the day after he stepped down as 
president of the APG. He sat sideways in his chair, tilting against the wall and swinging 
69 Saucedo (b), op.cit. 
68 Roma, op.cit. 
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his legs, and the confidence born of experience was evident in his relaxed and cheerful 
air. Unlike other municipalities in Bolivia, where OC presidents often had little relevant 
experience, Antuni entered the job with an extensive preparation in leadership, 
administration, and politics. 
Is the oversight committee active here? "Oh yes — I'm very good," Antuni said 
smiling, and then more seriously, "Up to now there hasn't been even one letter of 
complaint against me. Never — because we work well there aren't any conflicts." 70 He 
went on to describe how the OC met regularly with the full municipal council to discuss 
and solve problems that cropped up throughout the municipality. But he also stressed 
that there was much room for improvement in the OC's operation. 
The oversight committee has no money, no means for moving about the municipality, 
etc. Oversight committees should be supported. Most members are peasants who are 
forced to return to their homes because there's no money for the OC to carry out its 
activities. 
He explained that the work of the OC requires it to travel throughout the municipality in 
order to plan investments, review ongoing projects, and respond to local concerns. In a 
municipality the size of Charagua, this implies significant expense just to reach far-flung 
communities. But the OC had no budget, its representatives received no salaries, and 
there was no vehicle at its disposal. The mayor lent the OC his official car on occasion, 
but it was old and unreliable, constantly in use, and lacked the four-wheel drive 
necessary to travel around the district during the rainy season. Antuni stressed that the 
provision of operating funds for the OC was a key way in which to improve the quality 
of local government in Bolivia. His plea found an echo at the grass-roots level. "The 
president of the OC is a hidden mayor. He's given a bigger responsibility than that of 
the mayor, but he doesn't have Bs.1 to do it with," said Charagua town. "What is he 
supposed to eat? He has to leave his work in order to do that job."7I Interestingly the 
central government also agreed, and in mid-1997 decreed that 1% of all devolved funds 
should be earmarked for the operating costs of oversight committees. 72 
The division of the responsibilities of local governance between mayor, 
municipal council and oversight committee seemed very clear to Antuni, as was the 
power that lay in his hands. "If there's corruption... then we must get rid of the mayor. 
[.. .] In the house of the people you cannot take possession of what isn't yours." 73 He 
70 Antuni (a), op.cit. 
71 Omar Quiroga Antelo, neighborhood council president, interview, Charagua, 30 October 1997. 
72  This measure took effect after the research for the present study was completed. 
73 Antuni (a), op.cit. 
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was not shy about the possibility of confronting the mayor in a direct battle for local 
power, if necessary, and confident that he would prevail. This was based on the strength 
of his mandate, which in turn depended upon the high degree of legitimacy and 
representation of the APG system which selected him. In any local fight for resources or 
power Antuni could rely on an organization that reached down into the smallest 
community, for support that in principle was comprehensive, unambiguous and 
untainted by the horse-trading and compromises of party politics (see below). Antuni 
stressed this last point. "Politics screws everything up. The MNR pushed and pressed 
town hall about the [restoration of the] plaza. They held loud street demonstrations 
about it demanding action." But nothing came of it. Local people showed little interest, 
spurning public meetings called by the party, and the MNR's claims to voice local anger 
were shown to be nothing more than politiqueria. 74 In Antuni's opinion, the apolitical 
nature of the OC system of representation was one of the keys to its success, at least in 
Charagua. 
At the grass-roots level Charaguans testified to the importance of the work of the 
oversight committee for effective local government, and vouched for the quality of the 
previous OC leadership, but were divided in their judgment of the current OC. Taputami 
and Isiporenda were most positive. "The OC does work here — it does oversee municipal 
funds. Requests from the community to change projects are taken up by the OC and 
reviewed with the mayor. Then they meet with the municipal council to make a 
decision."75 Other communities, while lauding the work of the previous OC, noted that 
the current leadership had not yet made its weight felt. "The OC has stumbled this year 
— it doesn't report on municipal expenditures like an OC should," complained the leaders 
of Antuni's village of Acae. 76 El Espino concurred but refused to condemn the OC, 
noting that "the current OC is still new — only two months old," and it was still too early 
to judge.77 Kapiwasuti, Yapiroa and Charagua Station agreed that the current OC had 
not yet reached the standard set by the previous one. But the leaders of El Espino put 
this issue in perspective. "Before 1995 there was no OC — and the municipality paid no 
attention to us then." Even if the current OC was not yet fully satisfactory, its very 
existence gave rural communities additional weight in the competition for public 
resources. 
75 Josue Aiduare and Florencio Aiduare, community leaders, interview, Taputami, 2 April 1997. 
74  "Playing politics" in Spanish. 
76 Romero and Altamirano, op.cit. 
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At the other end of the spectrum, Charagua town and La Brecha agreed that the 
previous OC had been effective but condemned the inaction of the current one. "It does 
not work," said Charagua. 78 La Brecha saw evidence of a sinister dynamic behind the 
OC's declining effectiveness. Alleging that the OC president was a member of the 
ADN, and its vice-president a member of the MBL, they accused the OC of conspiring 
with the mayor and municipal council to ignore community requests and cover up local 
complaints. Instead of representing rural communities during the last round of 
participative planning to draw up the AOP, "the OC became a supporting agency for the 
mayor's office.... The parties have become so powerful that they have been able to co-
opt civil society," they explained. "The APG is being undermined here by 
politicization."79 Such a development would be serious, with the potential to undermine 
accountability in local government. But this accusation was not voiced by any other 
respondents that I interviewed in Charagua. And indeed, with Guaranies appointed by 
the APG and Cabi in majority on the municipal counci1, 8° it is difficult to conceive of 
political parties conspiring to co-opt the OC in order to have it collaborate with 
municipal government against the interests of Guarani villages. In Charagua, the co-
opting would seem to have worked in the opposite direction. 
Other local authorities had a favorable opinion of Antuni and the work of his OC. 
Mayor Saucedo weighed in without reservation: 
The OC is working well, without problems. It's structuring itself better in order to 
meet more often. And its members are receiving training.... They have many 
criticisms [of investment projects] and demand modifications. But they don't have the 
money to comply with their obligations — especially to mobilize themselves.... The 
bureaucracy thinks they're peons whose time is free. 81 
Gutierrez affii 	wed that the cattle ranchers worked well with the OC, a sentiment which 
Antuni reciprocated. Councilman Vargas described the OC as an effective body. 
"They're Guarani —" he explained meaningfully, "they're vigilant and they watch over 
things.„ s2  He noted that the OC had not fought with the municipal council yet, and 
ascribed this to the presence on the council of three Guaranies, whose strong cultural 
tendency was to reach consensus at any cost in order to avoid open conflict (see below). 
Saucedo was eager to promote the institutions he judged necessary for good government, 
79 Francisco Chavez, Alberto Rodriguez and Ignacio Alvarez, community leader, adviser to the capitania 
grande, and community member, interview, La Brecha, 28 October 1997. 
80 And Guaranies who were so openly disdainful of their party affiliations. 
77 Carrillo and Arumbari, op.cit. 
78 Garcia and Cortez, op.cit. 
81 Saucedo (b), 
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but unsure how to approach the problem of the OC. "If you don't give them money 
they're against you," he pointed out, "but if you do they're beholden to you." 83 
Other observers mentioned the deterioration in OC performance noted above. 
"The OC is not so active lately," said councilman Segundo. "Their presence hasn't been 
in evidence." 84 Chief Municipal Officer Vargas agreed with this assessment, and noted a 
quiet shift in the institutional dynamic of the town. "The Guaranies are in the majority 
here, and named a Guarani directorate of the OC. But they're uneducated peasants and 
hence timid and unchallenging before the municipal government." 85 Concerned that 
their interests were being ignored by the OC, and seeking a voice of their own with 
which to address the municipality, the nine neighborhood councils of Charagua and 
Charagua Station joined to form the Community Association. This was a new 
institutional interlocutor with no standing in law, but one which nonetheless proved 
adept at representing urban Charagua's concerns. "The Community Association is more 
active in meeting with the mayor and asking what's going on," said the Chief Officer. 
"The OC has allowed its functions to be usurped by the Community Association. [...] 
The town is dominating the participatory element of the Law of Popular Participation." 
This Association thus afforded Charaguans a tool with which to redress the rural bias 
that they felt themselves subjected to. It is interesting to note that the system of local 
government established by Bolivian decentralization was sufficiently flexible to allow 
for the emergence of new institutional forms to fill the vacuums of representation and 
voice that might occur from time to time. 
Interestingly, the role of the oversight committee in the institutional dynamic of 
Charagua's local government can be summarized by two semi-contradictory facts. The 
first is that in the OC, as opposed to the municipal council, Guarani leaders did not feel 
the need to disguise their preponderance behind a white figurehead in order to comfort 
the urban elite. They regarded the OC, built on a foundation of grass-roots 
organizations, as their natural habitat and simply took it over. They felt no need to 
compromise on its administration or the form that social representation took. This was 
not true of the mayoralty nor the municipal council, with their urban seats, political 
parties, and electoral campaigns, which were claimed by the town and seemed alien to 
many Guaranies. This view was repeatedly confirmed to me by rural leaders, 
82 A. Vargas, op.cit. 
83 Saucedo (b), op.cit. 
84 Segundo, op.cit. 
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independent urban observers and other local authorities, who acknowledged the OC as 
"theirs" and saw the three indigenous councilors as a natural bridge between "them" and 
the council. It was also confirmed by the complete absence of Mennonite participation 
in OC activities, elections, etc, and by the urban neighborhoods' decision to break away 
from the OC and form a separate body. Indeed, the identification of the OC with 
Guarani interests explains why non-Guarani spokesmen in Charagua had so little to say 
about it, and sought separate, parallel channels of influence over local policy-making. 
The second, more striking, fact is that the need for an OC dominated by rural 
Guarani-dwellers was low in a municipality like Charagua. The presence of three 
Guaranies amongst the five councilmen, and a mayor selected by the Guarani People's 
Association, ensured that the interests of the indigenous rural majority would be well 
represented in local government even without the participation of the OC. In an 
institutional framework built around checks and balances, 86 the role of the OC was 
essentially oppositional, based on the power to hobble municipal finances if the OC 
disagreed with local government decisions. As a representational vehicle it was 
structurally different from the mayor and municipal council, and intended to give voice 
to groups under-represented therein. But there was little scope for such opposition in a 
municipality in which the OC and municipal council were both rooted in the social 
network of the APG. This eliminated many of the key functions of the OC, rendering it 
in these respects redundant. The conspiracy theory voiced above by residents of La 
Brecha is probably due to this phenomenon, and not to any political party's success in 
manipulating the organs of local government. In this respect the efficacy of the OC in 
Charagua, while interesting in the abstract, was at best a second-order concern. 
2.4 National and Departmental Government 
Unlike Viacha, Charagua's status as the second municipality in the Cordillera 
province did not merit a sub-prefect, nor other direct representative of the departmental 
govemment. 87 The highest central government representatives resident in town were the 
district directors of education and health. Satisfied with local government's focus on 
investment in primary health and education, both authorities professed good relations 
with the municipality individually and throughout their respective sectors. "The 
86 James Madison, Alexander Hamilton and John Jay, The Federalist Papers, NY: New American Library, 
1961. See especially no.10. 
85 Roberto Vargas, chief financial officer, interview, Charagua, 30 October 1997. 
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municipality...supports us paying salaries, supplying personnel, and helping with the 
costs of the hospital," said Dr. Wilfredo Anzoategui Vaca. 88 No conflicts between local 
and departmental or national government were evident in either sector. Local 
community leaders supported this view and went further. When questioned about the 
change in national (and departmental) governments after the 1997 election, spokesmen 
from throughout the district replied that there had been no effect on the day-to-day 
operations of local government. "We have seen no difference since the change of 
government," affirmed La Brecha, reflecting the near-universal view that the national 
politics simply did not matter for local affairs. Of the eleven communities visited, only 
Rancho Nuevo dissented, saying "It's politics as usual — we'd like to change to an ADN 
mayor so things work better than with the MBL one we have now."89 But his omission 
of any specific failures of coordination implied that this was a general impression based 
on expectations or even political bias, and not a complaint founded in experience. 90 
Amongst local government authorities — those in the best position to know — the 
view that little had changed prevailed. Councilmen Vaca, Vargas and Solano all 
asserted that "things are the same after the change of government. Popular Participation 
is working the same."91 It is telling that these three represented both the incoming 
(nationally) ADN and outgoing MBL parties. Vaca and Vargas went further, accusing 
the prefecture of ignoring Charagua, a charge echoed by Edgar Gutierrez, leader of the 
local ADN, who testified that his local work was quite unsupported by the ADN prefect 
in Santa Cruz. 92 The mayor provided a more nuanced view of the state of affairs, 
explaining 
There have been few concrete changes, but relations with the prefecture have 
improved [since the change of government]. Before the MNR waged war on us 
because of our alliance with the ADN. 93 But the new ADN prefect has pledged not to 
treat us as opposition despite being MBL. 94 
87 Departmental prefects, named directly by the president, are essentially central government authorities 
(see above). 
88 Dr. Wilfredo Anzokitegui Vaca, hospital director, interview, Charagua, 30 October 1997. 
89 Garcia and Sirari, op.cit. 
90 The speaker admitted to campaigning in the past for the ADN and being a banzerista (a supporter of the 
ADN then-president). 
91 Vargas and Vaca, op. cit. 
92 Edgar Gutierrez Hurtado (a), ADN chief, interview, Charagua, 28 October 1997. 
93 Bolivian politics traditionally divides into two groups centered on the MNR on one hand, and the ADN 
on the other. The two parties can fairly be said to despise each other. 
94 Luis Saucedo Tapia (c), mayor, interview, Charagua, 27 October 1997. 
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"The ADNistas made a lot of noise after the national election and turned up wanting to 
govern," added Antuni. "But they were told that for that they have to win local 
elections, and from then on they were quiet." 95 
These political (non-)dynamics took place in a deeper context of the relative 
power and legitimacy of local and regional governments respectively. And on this point 
Charaguan opinion was unanimous. "Municipal government is autonomous and free of 
the prefecture," explained Solano. "The prefecture is not a departmental government 
because it's not elected, unlike local government." 96 Vaca and Vargas agreed. "The 
municipality is autonomous — no outside authority can impose itself on it. It's never 
happened."97 Opinion in the villages was both informed and in agreement. "The 
municipality is stronger," was the response of Isiporenda, typical of the eleven 
communities, "it's based on elections."98 
3. Local Civil Society 
3.1 Private Sector 
With nothing else to sustain the local economy but teacher-training schools and 
small-scale commerce, cattle-ranching and the private sector are synonymous in 
Charagua. The Cattle Ranchers Association of the Cordillera province (AGACOR) 
represents the ranchers of Charagua and neighboring districts. AGACOR has 200-250 
members, each with an average of 2500 hectares; collectively AGACOR claims some 
50,000 head of cattle, and controls over a half-million hectares of land. In addition to a 
voice for ranchers' interests locally and regionally, AGACOR is a self-help group 
dedicated to providing ganaderos with technical assistance and disseminating best 
practice amongst them. One of its most important programs in 1997 was a campaign to 
eradicate hoof-and-mouth disease. Juan Carlos Gutierrez, president of the local branch, 
assured me that the Cordillera would be the first region in Bolivia to accomplish this, 
and to this end AGACOR was working with local ranchers whether they were members 
of the organization or not. He went on to explain that the region's cattle were grass-fed 
and hormone-free. "Our meat is ecological," he said, with evident pride. 99 But there 
were also dark clouds on the ranchers' horizon, as Pedro Ribera of AGACOR's 
95 Florencio Antuni Sanchez, oversight committee president, interview, Charagua, 30 October 1997. 
96 Solano, op.cit. 
97 Vargas and Vaca, op.cit. 
98 Ibanez and Duran, op.cit. 
99 J.C. Gutierrez, op.cit. 
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directorate explained. "With MERCOSUR the meat market will open up, and we will 
face competition from better quality and cheaper meat. And we face high interest rates 
and a high cost of transport here." 10° Business was set to become considerably more 
difficult for the cattlemen. 
Although it was generally agreed that the cattle ranchers were predominantly 
ADNistas, they were known for supporting all of the main political parties, donating 
cows during electoral campaigns for candidates to serve up at political bar-b-que rallies. 
"Even the MBL gets cattlemen's support for their churrascos," said Antuni. 1°1 In the 
same catholic spirit, Gutierrez declared his support for distributing municipal resources 
evenly throughout the district. "All of Charagua benefits from rural schools and roads —
the town should not get everything." But he hinted that the authorities were not taking 
advantage of their resources as they could. "They need to learn how to leverage their 
funds, to turn twenty into 100. We need strategic associates for community 
development." 102 
Under Gutierrez's leadership, AGACOR sought to be one such partner, 
contracting to drill wells in rural areas for the municipality for significantly less than 
commercial drillers charged. "In 1996 we hired a private company to drill and lay pipes 
for us," the mayor reported, "for about Bs.100,000 [per well]. This year the cattle 
ranchers are doing the same for Bs.35,000 each." I°3 "We've had success recently 
drilling wells at 60-120 meters in a region where the experts said there was no water 
above 300 meters," Gutierrez smiled, explaining that they developed this expertise 
providing technical aid for AGACOR members. "This 'Dry Chaco' is a myth." 104, 105 
But Gutierrez's vocation stretched beyond the mayor's finances. "One way we help 
indigenous people is by drilling wells for them. I told the mayor to ask for anything and 
we'll give it to them." Gutieri -ez's offer was certainly generous. But it also denoted the 
"gift" logic of public action that the ganaderos espoused, which was born in and 
reinforced the traditional relationship of dependency between ranchers and Guaranies. 
130 Prof. Pedro Fidel Ribera Caballero, member of the directorate of AGACOR, interview, Charagua, 30 
October 1997. 
101 Antuni (b), op.cit. 
102 J.C. Gutierrez, op.cit. 
103 Saucedo (b), op.cit. 
104 J.C. Gutierrez, op.cit. 
105 The region denoted as the "Dry Chaco" is accepted widely throughout Bolivia. 
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Commenting on their continuing political power, Ribera hinted that this relationship was 
not yet dead. "We have ways of making ourselves felt," he assured me. 106 
One of the instruments of AGACOR's local power was its control of the flow of 
tax revenues. Ranchers traditionally paid their taxes to AGACOR, which in turn 
transferred them to the Eastern Agricultural Congress (CAO), the peak association for 
Santa Cruz's farmers and ranchers. The CAO was headquartered in the city of Santa 
Cruz, and all revenues it collected were paid to the departmental government there. But 
the agricultural reform law which followed Popular Participation obliged ranchers to pay 
tax locally instead. Though still unimplemented in mid-1997, the effect of this measure 
would be to increase local tax revenues significantly at the expense of the prefecture. 
Gutierrez made the case that AGACOR should be named payments agency, collecting 
taxes on behalf of the municipality. In addition to showing his willingness to work with 
the municipality, his offer reflected ranchers' desire to remain in control of their affairs 
in a changing institutional and legal environment. This was especially true on an issue 
widely viewed as the thin edge of a wedge which might ultimately deprive them of their 
land holdings, and hence their base of power. 
If the ganaderos' future allowed for some uncertainty, their past was 
unambiguous. Community leaders, municipal authorities and local observers voiced a 
consensus notable for its unanimity on the dominance of the ranchers in the past. 
"Landowners used to run the show. They imposed their will. One of them arrived with 
two revolvers and he was the boss," explained La Brecha. 1°7 Councilman Segundo 
described a power that was both economic and political. 
Before the cattlemen and whites ran the show. They had the right to make Guarani 
men and women work without pay, and they didn't allow them to go to school to get 
educated. [...] Before the karais beat peasants [who voted the wrong way]. Even 
today old people refuse to vote because they think this will happen again. 108 
The white elite in town used legal requirements on voter registration and identity 
papers to their advantage, keeping Guaranies away from the ballot box and out of public 
office. But they were not alone in this project. "Ranchers ran to the army to fix their 
problems with their employees and servants," said Niliiez. 1°9 The district director of 
education agreed, arguing that under the Banzer dictatorship, "ranchers and the army 
106 Ribera, op.cit. 
107 Chavez, Rodriguez and Alvarez, op.cit. 
1°8 Segundo, op.cit. 
109 Nunez , op.cit. 
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divided up [public] lands between them according to their taste and pleasure." 11° And 
they availed themselves of the local institutions as well. "Local power was in the hands 
of three or four families that occupied all of the 'spaces of power' locally — the electricity 
and water cooperatives, the television station, and AGACOR.' ,111 Through their control 
of resources, political power and local institutions, the landowning elite acquired a 
stature that tended to legitimize and perpetuate their position. I12 "The people saw them 
as [natural] leaders t00." 113 
But the twin forces of economics and the socio-political emergence of the 
Guaranies from what Albo describes as a sort of spiritual exile 114 conspired to change 
the Charaguan panorama. Roma explained that the ranchers continued to exercise 
power, 
but much less aggressively than before. It's less visible here than in the Beni, for 
example. This is because the profitability of their farms is much lower. Farming is 
only feasible on a large scale now. So the sons of the ganaderos go to the city [instead 
of staying on the farm].... The triangle of power — jobs, power, money — has been 
broken. 115 
The ranchers' decline is mirrored in that of their traditional political vehicle as 
well. "The MNR used to dominate also, but as it has lost power so has that old class." 116 
 Though Roma argues that these changes began well before the LPP, the law contributed 
to them and earned the landowners' enmity. Respondents from the villages agreed that 
the ranchers' dominance was over. "Here anyone who wants to order others around is 
chased out," announced La Brecha triumphantly, "Huasca!" 117 But respondents differed 
on the origins of their decline. Many, such as Kapiwasuti and La Brecha, dated it to the 
Chaco war, which opened the door of a closed society and its ways to a huge influx of 
people from distant parts of Bolivia. Others, such as El Espino, thought the change 
happened later. "Very recently this has finished — because of people in the communities 
organizing themselves. Now the people don't go out to the ranches to work 
anymore." 118 But there was widespread agreement that both the landowning elite no 
110 Aramayo, op.cit. 
NiThez, op.cit. 
112 Alb& op.cit., pp.19-31 and 332-338. See also Kevin Healey, Caciques y Patrones: Una Experiencia de 
Desarrollo Rural en el Sud de Bolivia, Cochabamba:CERES, 1982, and Francisco Pifarre, Los Guarani-
Chiriguano: Historia de un Pueblo, La Paz:CIPCA, 1989. 
113 Nunez, op.cit. 
114 Albo, op. cit. 
115 Roma, op.cit. 
116 ibid. 
117 Chavez, Rodriguez and Alvarez, op.cit. 
118 Paul Carrillo, Ricardo Melgar and Marcia! Arumbari, community leader, community member, and 
community officer, interview, El Espino, 31 October 1997. 
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longer held the town in its grip, and the interests of the Guaranies were now effectively 
safeguarded by the APG and its representatives in local government. The Law of 
Popular Participation had contributed to and accelerated this dynamic, but the 
fundamental change in the power structure was underway from well before 1994. 
Antuni summed things up with three illustrative facts. 
(i) It would be difficult for someone to force you to chop wood for him these days. 
Before you had to chop five meters of wood in exchange for a piece of bread and an 
ounce of coca leaf. [...] (ii) People no-one thought would ever enter town hall now sit 
on the municipal council. [...] (iii) Cuellar, Gutierrez, Pantoja and Garcia [the most 
prominent cattlemen] no longer rule the roost. Now they're my friends — or at least I 
don't have problems with them. 119 
The new Charagua incorporated all of its inhabitants, rich and poor, into its 
political life, and the various actors treated each other with civility and even respect. The 
private sector appeared eager to work with local government on projects for the common 
good, and publicly elected and accountable officials, not ranchers, were the final arbiters 
of local policy and the use of resources. The list of practices and abuses that were 
commonly accepted before and had now disappeared was a long one, but perhaps the 
most telling change in Charagua was in the general climate of relations between 
townspeople and villagers. This change was both difficult to characterize and obvious 
and pervasive even to the unaccustomed eye. "The ganaderos lead on initiatives 
because they have money — for any initiative the town knocks on their door. But they 
don't impose themselves on Charagua," assured Lt.Col. Villaroel, commander of the 
local garrison. "Town hall runs things now." 120 And Gutierrez added, 
We've had a few problems with the APG over land rights. When the land reform law 
came into force there was confusion on both sides. But problems were resolved 
through talk, through negotiation.... Keeping the peace here is priceless. I21 
"Here there are many ganaderos who are Guaranies or mixed," he continued, explaining 
that AGACOR and the APG had good reason to get along well. And for good measure, 
"It's as if everyone was a millionaire here — you can drink a beer and a humble person 
sits down next to you and speaks to you, just like that." 
3.2 Political Parties and Elections 
The political topography of Charagua before decentralization was relatively well-
defined, according to local political leaders. The MNR was "the party of the old guard — 
119 Antuni (b), op.cit. 
120 Lt.Col. Fair Eduardo Villaroel, army garrison commander, interview, Charagua, 2 April 1997. 
121 J.C. Gutierrez, op.cit. 
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old professors, old cattlemen. Some Guaranies are grateful for 1952 122 and still vote 
MNR in the communities." 123 The party was highly centralized, with local candidates 
named directly by departmental leaders in Santa Cruz. Cattle ranchers dominated the 
ADN, electing local leaders from amongst their senior figures. Some rural communities 
were allowed to name candidates directly (a dedo) onto the lower parts of the list. 124 
 The MBL, the insurgent which upset the ruling duopoly, was a traditional also-ran in 
Charagua, depending for its support on the goodwill generated by rural NGOs associated 
with it. It was able to advance beyond the third rank of local politics when a new 
generation of MBL leaders arrived from Santa Cruz to displace an entrenched and 
ineffective cupola. 125 They revitalized the party by holding meetings with 
representatives of Guarani areas, and inviting them to name from amongst themselves 
the top candidates to the MBL electoral list (see above). 126 Thus a movement that began 
in dialogue ended taking over local government. The other national and regional parties, 
including Condepa, MIR and the UCS, commanded little support locally, and were not 
serious contenders for power. 
Although the MNR consistently won three of five seats on the local council, it 
traditionally eschewed internal elections, leaving little room for local activists or the 
development of local leadership. The head of the local branch of the MNR in mid-1997 
was Nelson Eguez Gutierrez, a native of the town who was unemployed at the time. 
Santa Cruz always wants to order us around. I proposed that the local commando 
designate candidates directly, but Santa Cruz named the ex-mayor [Rolando Gutierrez] 
instead. I tried to get rid of him but couldn't — that's why we lost so many votes.... 
People don't like the MNR candidate.' 27 
Cattle ranchers and businessmen were also kept at arm's length. Some donated money 
or lent vehicles for campaigns, but there was no consultation with private interests for 
the selection of MNR candidates. Eguez blamed this political arrogance for the party's 
disastrous performance throughout the province in the last elections. What the party lost 
in this way it then tried to recoup through bribery, offering the ADN an alleged $30,000 
for supporting the MNR candidate in the municipal council. But the local ADN leader 
122 The 1952-53 revolution and subsequent agrarian reform. 
Quiroga, op.cit. 
124 ibid. 
125 NIThez, op.cit. 
126 Quiroga, op.cit. 
127 Nelson Eguez Gutierrez, local leader of the MNR comando, interview, Charagua, 30 October 1997. 
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had received an order to support any party other than the MNR, and the ADN's vote 
went to Saucedo. I28 
Unlike MNR comandos in the altiplano and valleys, where the powerful legacy 
of the agrarian reform filled party rosters with indigenous and mestizo names, Guarani 
communities played almost no part in party affairs before 1995. In that year's local 
campaign, the MNR realized that the MBL was on the verge of capturing a large share of 
the Guarani vote and negotiated a defensive agreement with the Cabi, which resulted in 
the election of Julian Segundo to the municipal council (see above). The residents of La 
Brecha and Isiporenda confirmed that this strategy was at least partly successful. "There 
was a general assembly to select candidates for the MNR and MBL, to see who best 
represents the peasants.... The MNR and MBL had peasant candidates — not the 
others.... Peasants voted for them to vote for their own people. " 129 The MNR's lack of 
a strong rural base can be explained by the failure of land reform to make significant 
inroads in the Cordillera province (see box 3). "Agrarian reform changed things very 
much in the altiplano and Cochabamba. But here the big landowners appropriated the 
revolution of 1952 by becoming MNRistas. And in that way they were able to protect 
themselves" and their estancias from the state confiscations promulgated throughout 
most of the rest of the country. 130 Thus, while the party's political history bequeathed it 
a large peasant following in the rest of the country, the elite's appropriation of the 
revolution in the Chaco made the MNR into a different sort of vehicle there. 
Edgar Gutierrez, the local ADN chief in mid-1997, is a jovial man with a large 
walrus moustache known as "Chipi". A native charaguetio and restaurant-hotel owner, 
he had worked in the regional development corporation in Santa Cruz for fourteen years 
until the MNR returned to power in 1993 and threw him out. "The ADN is organized in 
all 67 communities in Charagua. We have a political committee in each ranch," 13I he 
explained, revealing his party's lack of organization in Guarani communities, and its 
status as the preserve of the land-owning elite. As elections draw near, "the 
departmental order comes to draw up electoral lists. Two or three candidates present 
128 E. Gutierrez, op.cit. 
129 — Ibanez and Duran, op.cit. 
130 Nunez, op.cit. Cecilia Buhlens explains in A rakuarencla (Medina (ed.). 1994) that the social structure of 
the Guarani people was decimated by the 1950s. In the altiplano and valleys regions of Bolivia the Aymara 
and Quechua peoples were able to present landowners with a united front in the form of peasant unions and 
traditional community organizations, and so demand land during the revolution of 1952-53. But in the 
Cordillera landowners were able to exploit land reform to actually extend their holdings and capture 
Guarani communities. 
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themselves and party members vote.... About twenty people go to meetings to elect 
candidates," he explained, describing the cozy atmosphere in the local party. "There's 
not much rivalry within the ADN — not much competition." 
But Gutierrez also complained of a complete lack of support at the departmental 
level. "Santa Cruz sent no money [for internal elections]. I had to finance it all myself." 
And as if to rub in his lack of resources, "then our second candidate switched to the 
MNR for $300 plus a job at ENFE [the national railroad corporation]." The regional 
party's neglect of its Charaguan branch stretched well beyond the setting of electoral 
lists. "There's little contact between them and us. We have to go to Santa Cruz to 
inform ourselves of what's going on." The problem continued even into elections. 
"They sent us $600 for national elections. But you need at least $3000 for good results." 
Other parties sent considerably more. Gutierrez was very disappointed that the Santa 
Cruz leadership did not get involved with the local party or the municipality, and did not 
manage to pay him a "decent" salary for his efforts. "Now I'll be corregidor132 and will 
earn Bs.1300/month. I have a daughter studying in Santa Cruz and another who leaves 
next year," he said plaintively, explaining why he could not afford to retain his political 
independence. 
It was perhaps Gutierrez's disappointment that led him to a surprising 
conclusion. "The MNR knows how to govern. We do not. Look now! Nothing's 
happening," he said, referring to the newly elected ADN president. "The government 
hasn't changed anyone yet in the local institutions. I've traveled to Santa Cruz to speak 
to the prefect and leave lists [of names] with him, but all the same people are still 
working in health, education, etc." So the smiling "Chipi" revealed his conception of 
politics as a naked game of power and patronage, where political tribes compete to gain 
control of government in order to share out its resources amongst themselves. And his 
tribe was a white tribe, and the game was tinged with racism. He freely referred to his 
party's electorate as "we the white people". 133 And he complained that 
CIPCA teaches the peasants not to deal with whites — to fight the whites. There's 
going to be a conflict here. Money comes to the MBL from outside. No one controls 
this. The priests are also MBL to the death. The professors are almost all MBL. 
That's why we must change the people in local institutions! 
132 Literally chief magistrate, usually a departmental official. The corregidor in Charagua is a municipal 
employee. 
133 "Nosotros los blancos." 
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In this sense councilman Vargas, perhaps because he is a fo 	mer professor, represented a 
different wing of the local party — one which conceived of the municipal interest more 
broadly and was willing to work alongside Guarani leaders. But the danger remained 
that the party's core constituency would eventually depart from his path. 
The leader of the Charaguan MBL, and the man who oversaw the opening of its 
electoral lists to the APG, was Eulogio Naiez of CIPCA, a young man who dressed 
casually and carried the air of an intellectual in the wilderness. He described the ease 
with which he was able to negotiate the MBL's accord with the APG, and how it caused 
a chain reaction in the local political establishment. "The Min opened its list 
completely to the Guaranies, and other parties that had closed their lists grew afraid and 
included Guaranies in theirs — the MNR in the second slot and the ADN at number 
five." I34 The entry of Guaranies onto the municipal council provoked another 
negotiation, however, this time with the elite in town. "Crispin Solano was the first 
president of the municipal council. But the cattle ranchers couldn't accept that a former 
servant of theirs now led the meetings." So Vargas took over the presidency and Solano 
became vice-president of the council. The cattlemen's distrust was in part prompted by 
the Guarani representatives themselves, who behaved in council as an ethnic group and 
not as members of political parties. "They don't pay the 10% to their parties," explained 
Nthiez. "And they speak in Guarani so the others [on the council] can't understand." As 
cattle ranchers had always molded local policy to their liking, and continued to lead the 
two principle parties in town, this flouting of political convention by Guarani 
councilmen threatened them with a loss of control over local affairs. Crispin Solano 
cheerily confirmed their fears. "I came in via an electoral accord with the APG. I report 
to the APG," he declared, and not to any party. I35 
Despite not being Guarani himself, Saucedo echoed these sentiments at the 
mayoral level. "We don't pay any attention to the parties," he said. "I support the MBL 
through my way of being mayor." I36 But unlike how other parties might have reacted, 
the MBL provided Charagua with its full support, providing volunteers to convoke 
meetings and mobilize people for planning exercises. Otherwise, "I have my hands free 
to run the municipality as I want. It's always the people first — the party doesn't 
interfere." The explanation for this attitude lay largely in the MBL's symbiotic 
134 Nunez, op.cit 
135 Solano, op.cit. 
136 Saucedo (a), op.cit. 
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relationship with rural NGOs, many of which were active in the region. The party had 
split away from the larger Movement of the Revolutionary Left during the 1980s, and 
had taken with it its left-leaning anthropologists, agronomists, and rural development 
practitioners. After years of working with MBL-affiliated NGOs, communities 
throughout Bolivia's foothills and eastern regions had come to trust the party and 
identify with its values, and provided it with a natural constituency. For its part, taking 
over local government was for the MBL a natural scaling-up of the rural development 
activities carried out by its affiliated NGOs. As the NGOs were an important component 
not only of the party's ideology but also of its electoral success, it was happy to give its 
elected officials a relatively free reign to invest municipal resources in community 
development. The experience of CIPCA, whose officers also led the local MBL, 
provides a good illustration of this dynamic. Having negotiated with communities that 
knew them well to elect their candidate mayor, CIPCA then provided technical 
assistance to the mayor's office, focusing on a planning and investment strategy that was 
fiiinly focused on rural areas. 
Charaguans were also happy with the more general changes that had occurred 
recently in their local political system. Respondents from Taputami, Yapiroa, El Espino, 
Acae, La Brecha, and Charagua town agreed that the most recent elections had been 
clean — a welcome change from how things used to be. "Before they hit the peasants and 
obliged them to vote for the party of the rich man by removing all of the ballots naming 
the parties favored by the poor. Then they showed the cainpesinos the door. That no 
longer happens." 137 And where the voting was fair, "results from here never made it to 
the capital. Ballots were thrown away and replaced with others." 138 "But now they can't 
do that," explained El Espino. "The votes are counted here and the radio and press are 
present, observing." 139 Recent electoral reforms allowing more voting stations to be 
located in rural areas also pleased Charaguans, and had increased turnout. "Now we 
vote here," said Acae with satisfaction. "Before we had to go to Charagua 8km 
away." 14° Related reforms aimed at providing rural citizens with the identity papers had 
also helped. Since women formed the majority of undocumented Bolivians, this had had 
a disproportionate effect on women's voting, as had rural literacy campaigns, where 
much the same was true. The aggregate effect on voter turnout was dramatic in some 
137 Romero and Altamirano, op.cit. 
138 Garcia and Cortez, op.cit. 
139 Carrillo and Arumbari, op.cit. 
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areas, increasing from one-quarter of eligible voters in La Brecha to about three-quarters 
in the previous election. 141 Overall these changes generated a virtuous circle in which 
voting became feasible or significantly easier for rural Charaguans, who then took an 
increased interest in local politics. Local politicians accordingly took an increased 
interest in them, and for the first time municipal policy and life in the villages began to 
interact. 
But the deep-seated suspicion that rural dwellers harbored for things political did 
not disappear. "Here in the community there are no politicians," said El Espino, and the 
sentiment was echoed in La Brecha. "Where there are politicians people fight a lot." 142 
 Mennonite communities continued to shun politics in all its forms. Even the residents of 
Charagua Station argued for "a pure representation of the people. Parties get in the way. 
We should get rid of the parties and allow communities to nominate councilmen directly. 
This would better represent the interests of the people." 143 Such an attitude was 
surprising in a community that regarded itself as an urban satellite of Charagua town, 
where the parties were embraced as their own. 
3.3 Community and Grass-Roots Organizations 
The maximum expression of Guarani social organization in Charagua, and 
indeed throughout the Chaco, is the APG, which acts as the voice of Guarani interests. 
But to understand how it works and the legitimacy it has locally, it is important to 
consider its roots in the organization of rural communities. Guarani communities benefit 
from a traditional system of self-government. Leadership is rotational, and indigenous 
communities change their leaders every year. Communities nominate individuals, 
according to ability and interest, as community officers responsible for priority tasks. 
"Of 100 [villagers], there's always one who loves a particular type of work," explained 
Antuni. "So the community names an education officer, for example. He has the keys 
to the schoolhouse and decides how it's to be used and keeps it in good repair. He lends 
it out for meetings." 144 Each community has its own statutes setting out the 
responsibilities of community officials, how they are selected, and how it is governed. 
"They operate via assemblies," explained Mut-1oz of the FIS, "everything is consensual. 
140 Romero and Altamirano, op.cit. 
141 Chavez, Moreno, AiTeaga, Chavez, Moreno, and Cuellar, op.cit. 
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There's no majority voting, nothing like that. They spend days and days talking in order 
to reach a decision. But once they do agree, that decision is very strong — no one can 
later say 'I did not want it so.'" I45 ' 146 
Until the 1980s, Guarani communities labored in isolation and with an acute lack 
of resources. But beginning in 1983, a diagnosis of Guarani poverty and exclusion 
carried out by the Santa Cruz Regional Development Corporation, ClPCA and others 
resulted in the adoption by Guarani leaders of PISET as the guiding principle for their 
local development efforts. 147 The concept of PISET, the Spanish acronym for 
production, infrastructure, health, education, and land/territory, comprises a system of 
work that defines how the community should progress. "They have a directorate at the 
regional level that directs PISET efforts. They work PISET at each level from the 
community up to the department and beyond." 148 Sequier placed great emphasis on the 
emergence of this consensus. "PISET marks the opening of a new historical process 
here...a re-birth of Guarani culture" after the Battle of Kurujuky. 149 
The Guaranies' success in 
integrating local PISET efforts 
into a regional development 
strategy inspired the creation of 
the APG in 1986-87. From its 
very inception, the APG built its 
organization on the pre-existing 
social structure of Guarani 
communities; it benefited from 
the deeply ingrained legitimacy of 
autochthonous village institutions 
founded in consensual decision-
making. According to both 
Mufioz and Antuni, the APG was 
energetic and achieved a great 
deal in its first years of existence. 
145 Munoz, op.cit. 
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Box 2: Building Consensus in Guarani 
I arrive on a golden late afternoon to speak to 
the leaders of Taputami. We shake hands and retire 
to a badly-kept classroom to conduct the interview. 
Numerous onlookers and passers-by squeeze into the 
little room with us, sitting in desks meant for 8-year-
olds and crouching on the floor. I count 13 inside, 
and perhaps 10 more peering in at both windows and 
the door. They are badly dressed and look poor. 
Their curiosity blocks the light and I find it difficult 
to see what I am writing. Later night falls and 
someone brings a flashlight. I continue to scribble in 
its pallid beam, and they sit still in the darkness. 
Many of my questions trigger long discussions in 
Guarani. The strange, lyrical tones linger in the 
night air, and when they have finally reached 
agreement one or two explain the answer to me in 
Spanish, which they all seem to speak. 
The scene is similar in La Brecha. 
Deliberations are invariably followed by a broad 
smile as the one sitting nearest turns to me and 
begins "Well, I think...". The rest listen to the 
collective verdict with approving nods — the Guarani 
system of consensus. 
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"In less than two years the Guaranies produced 500 high school graduates," Antuni cites 
an example. "We'd thought that would take us until the year 2000." 150 And by serving 
as a credible voice for Guarani interests, it was for the first time able to mobilize external 
resources, including notably those of the FIS, in favor of Guarani needs. New schools 
and health posts appeared in the Charaguan countryside alongside irrigation and other 
productive projects. The APG's initial attainments combined with the weakening of 
landowners and modest economic growth during this period to produce gradual but 
steady improvements in the lives of Guarani peasants. Whereas before most Guarani 
men had been forced to leave their homes for the sugar cane harvest, for example, now 
few did. "Before Guaranies were employed as servants. Now there are very few 
Guarani domestic employees. The rich bring them from elsewhere." 151 The APG's 
structure, which reached deep down into the smallest Guarani communities and was 
based upon spontaneous forms of self-government, was largely responsible for what it 
achieved. "The Guaranies' incredible unity is the source of their success," the FIS' 
Mutioz declared. 152 
Both the degree of social organization and its effects were on display in villages 
throughout Charagua. Unlike Viacha, communities here were well informed about the 
costs, schedules, and counterpart contributions of projects being implemented locally. In 
Kapiwasuti, for example, the entire community discussed and agreed plans for an 
irrigation project for local farmers, and then approved the design that CIPCA had drawn 
up 153 And villagers were able to overcome the free rider problem by mobilizing 
themselves to provide services for the common good. Thus Acae boasted three 
production teams called "work communities" 154 which planned, organized and worked 
communal lands for the benefit of al1. 155 And this was not limited to more prosperous 
areas. Even the poorest communities such as El Espina. and Taputami, where 
respondents wore no shirts and scarcity was evident, had village presidents, work 
communities and PISET officers. These institutions permitted villages to coordinate 
relatively large and complex projects, and so attain a considerable degree of self-
reliance. Thus Taputami was able to design and build a 100 meter bridge over a local 
stream entirely on its own. The strength of indigenous institutions was demonstrated in 
150 Antuni (a), op.cit. 
151 ibid. 
152 MUF10Z, op.cit. 
153 Caurey and Altamirano, op.cit. 
154 Cointazidades de trabajo in Spanish. 
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Kapiwasuti shortly after decentralization, when villagers set about organizing a "grass-
roots organization" as the law stipulated. But Kapiwasuti already had a community 
president, and he retained the people's support. "The GRO 156 shriveled and the 
community president took over as de facto GRO," the villagers said, explaining how 
they preferred their own institutional forms to the foreign ones of the Bolivian state. 157 
The organizational capacity of Guarani communities was largely based on 
feelings of solidarity amongst villagers. And these feelings extended far and wide 
through the ethnically homogeneous Guarani countryside. Thus many villages reported 
working with neighboring villages on joint projects. "The people from neighboring 
communities are the same as us — they have the same customs," reported Isiporenda. 158 
 Copere Brecha agreed, adding that they participated in meetings of the huge upper and 
lower Izozo to coordinate activities and plan joint projects. 159 Yapiroa went further, 
affirming its willingness to forgo further municipal investments for the benefit of other 
communities. "There's a lack of money in the municipality, and other communities have 
needs too." 160 This solidarity persisted despite the historical and cultural differences 
between the Ava-Guaranies of the northern Charaguan Serf-culla Aguarague and the 
Tupi-Guaranies of the Izozo farther south. 
To the outsider these differences are difficult to perceive. The Guaranies 
themselves refer to each other as cousins very similar in appearance, discernible only by 
the "echo" in their speech. 161 A more telling distinction lies in the organization of their 
communities. Tupi-Guaranies retain the traditional capitanlas of their forebears, while 
Ava-Guaranies' local authorities are called local mayors, corregidores, etc. Village 
capitanfas are subordinate to the authority of the Capitanla del Alto y Bajo Izozo (Cabi) 
— headed by the Capitcin Grande — while local Ava-Guarani authorities are integrated 
directly into the APG. The Cabi is also formally part of the APG, but maintains its 
distance and prefers to think of itself as a separate entity. The differences between the 
two surpass the semantic and the s ymbolic. "The Cabi has an autocratic structure, while 
155 Romero and Altamirano, op.cit. 
136 Grass-roots organization. 
137 Caurey and Altamirano, op.cit. This, of course, was the original intent of the law. 
158 Ibanez and Duran, op.cit. 
139 Leoncio Pabaroa and Javier Yupico, interim community leader and ex-leader, interview, Copere Brecha, 
29 October 1997. 
160 Vaca and Segundo, op.cit. 
161 Tupi-Guarani more closely resembles the Guarani spoken in Paraguay. 
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the APG is more democratic," the mayor explained to me. "With the capitates, all that 
they get 162 is for themselves and the people go hungry." 163 Antuni was more explicit. 
Boni [the Capitcin Grande] takes the men out to work in the sugar harvest in Santa 
Cruz. He charges Bs.10/head, supposedly for the benefit of the capitania. But it's all 
for him. You'd think they'd have at least one building after thirty years of this. [.. 
And the Capitan Grande has a woman in each community. 164 
Avas saw themselves as more modern while Tupis thought themselves more 
authentically Guarani. But the solidarity amongst them overcame this divide. Village 
spokesmen throughout the countryside reported good relations and numerous joint 
projects with nearby rural communities. Tupi and Ava families alike identified with the 
larger Guarani cause. 165 There was neither visible resentment nor a struggle for 
resources between the two groups. But even amongst rural peoples, solidarity ended at 
the racial barrier. "We have good relations with other communities," said La Brecha, 
"but few relations with the Mennonites." 166 All of the villages I spoke to with 
Mennonite neighbors agreed. Some complained about the Mennonites' farming 
methods, and others seemed worried that they were buying up land. But none reported 
more than minimal, strictly commercial relations with them. 
Civic activity in town, on the other hand, took on a very different character. 
Communities were organized into neighborhood councils and focused their attention on 
infrastructure and urban development — much narrower concerns than in rural 
communities, where authorities' concerns extended to residents' livelihoods and cultural 
identity. They operated not as community governments but as interest-group lobbies 
competing for municipal funds. Indeed, according to the MNR's Eguez, neighborhood 
councils did not exist before 1994. "All of them were formed specially for the LPP." 167 
 The councils' formation of the Community Association (described above) as a means of 
increasing their political weight and wresting the initiative from the Guarani-dominated 
OC is a telling sign of their underlying concerns. They were not motivated by social 
solidarity, but rather by the refinement of political antagonism as a tool for controlling 
the public purse. It is ironic that the town, in creating new representative institutions, 
was following the example of the Guaranies in form even as it betrayed it in substance. 
The responses of both neighborhood councils and rural communities to general questions 
162 Saucedo here referred to both locally and externally raised resources. 
163 Sauced() (c), op.cit. 
164 Antuni (b), op.cit. 
165 Isiporenda, La Brecha, Yapiroa and Copere Brecha, among others, testified to this effect. 
166 ChEivez, Rodriguez and Alvarez, op.cit. 
184 
Charagua 
of governance support this view. To the question of how to improve local government, 
townspeople proposed granting official functions to the civic committee — a sort of local 
chamber of commerce — as well as urban social and educational organizations. "The OC 
is being politicized..., and we must involve other organizations in local administration. 
[...] White people are better at leading ... because we can't be influenced as readily," 
they affirmed. I68 Their intent was essentially to exclude the OC, and hence the peasant 
majority, from government. 
In answer to the same question, by contrast, spokesmen for El Espino innocently 
proposed organizing the APG in the town itself. "It still doesn't work there — they need 
officers in charge of education, infrastructure, etc." 169 Though naïve, this idea was based 
on a concept of community organization that springs from the grass roots upwards, and 
which is deeply rooted in the Guarani mentality. 170 Respondents throughout the 
Charaguan countryside invoked it responding to a variety of questions about governance 
and identity. When asked what caused a community organization to be bad, for 
example, Copere Brecha replied "A grass-roots organization is always good. It is able to 
work for the community." 171 They did not admit the possibility of a bad GRO. For 
them a GRO is the institutional expression of the community and all of its inhabitants. A 
GRO could not be bad any more than a community could be bad, though it might prove 
more or less effective over time. This essentialist view of community organization as an 
expression of the collective will contrasted sharply with the townspeople's view of 
GROs as interest group lobbies immersed in pork-barrel politics. This idea was in turn 
founded in a deeper, Hegelian notion of historical progression. 172 "We always wanted 
education," pleaded Yapiroa. "We want to advance as a people. The older generations 
eliminated slavery. Now we want to continue to move forward." I73 
3.4 Other Local Actors — The Military and the Church 
The last two actors of any significance on the Charaguan political scene are the 
military and the church. The local army garrison traces its history to the soldiers who 
bravely fought back the invading forces during the Chaco War and re-took Charagua 
from the Paraguayans. But the years of small military budgets left their installations in 
167 Eguez, op.cit. 
168 Garcia and Cortez, op.cit. 
169 Carrillo and Arumbari, op.cit. 
17° Alba, op.cit. 
171 Pabaroa and Yupico, op.cit. 
172 Hegel, GWF, Philosophy of Right, trans. SW Dyde, Amherst, N.Y.:Prometheus Books, 1996. 
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poor condition, with no funds for equipment and inadequate resources for training. The 
garrison commander, Lt.Col. Fair Villaroel, boasted of good relations with the municipal 
government, with numerous projects on which the two had cooperated. For example, the 
garrison provided a large part of the labor for the plaza renovation and park projects. 
"They provide the cement and we provide the rest," Villaroel said. I74 The army had also 
helped to clean the cemetery and the streets of the town, and had provided manpower for 
several health campaigns. 
Villaroel had in effect taken advantage of an ambitious municipal government to 
substitute the combat training he could not afford with civic exercises, the running costs 
of which the municipality paid. This work broke the tedium of barracks life, and 
afforded his officers the chance to develop their organizational skills and instill 
discipline in the rank and file. The commander's only complaint was of too few such 
opportunities. "We'd like to do more," he declared, "but the mayor is a little 
disorganized." The garrison's civic spirit also extended into the Guarani hinterland. 
"We have very good relations with the Guaranies and the APG," said Villaroel, 
explaining that he sent a doctor and dentist to the Guaranies' medical center regularly, 
and that "any community that requests help gets it". Mindful of the army's historical 
role in the repression of the Guarani people, Villaroel sent officers to village festivals 
and ceremonies, and tried to ensure that his soldiers would not disrupt Guarani life. 
Local observers were not in disagreement with the picture Villaroel presented, observing 
that after many years the army had returned to the barracks and now played a benign role 
in the affairs of the municipality. I75 
The leader of the Catholic Church in Charagua in mid-1997 was Fr. Luis Roma, 
a Spanish priest who had worked for 40 years in Bolivia, three of them in Charagua. In 
addition to overseeing the parish, Roma was responsible for the school run by Fe y 
Alegrla, a Catholic NGO dedicated to education. Roma professed good relations with 
the municipal government, the army, rural villages and the townspeople, an impression 
that was shared by each of these in turn. But the Church's role had not always been 
impartial, nor benign. "Before 1955 local power was held by the landowners and the 
Church, plus the politicians in power at the time," explained AGACOR's Ribera, himself 
173 Vaca and Segundo, op.cit. 
174 Villaroel, op.cit. 
175 Nunez and Aramayo, among others, concurred on this point. 
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a landowner. "But after the revolution the Church changed and took up popular causes 
and began working with marginal populations." 76 
The Church had previously formed part of the criollo establishment, sanctioning 
the violence of the state against the non-Christian Guarani people. But then it changed, 
and its new attitude was exemplified by such men as Albo, Sequier and Roma — foreign-
born, activist priests who had crossed the globe to work with the rural poor and the 
dispossessed. They employed a new, highly involved form of outreach which addressed 
not just the spiritual needs of Guaranies, but their physical and cultural concerns as well. 
Their instruments were traditional church-centered community activities, parish 
programs in the villages, and a range of church-supported NGOs dedicated to education, 
health and rural development. Fe y Alegria and CIPCA were two prominent examples; a 
third was Teko-Guarani, led by Jesuits and dedicated to bilingual education for 
Guaranies as a form of cultural assertion. No longer seated at the right hand of temporal 
authorities in town, the Church's profile was much reduced, its power greatly diffused 
compared to a half-century earlier. But it remained an important and influential actor in 
Charaguan daily life. 
4. Summary: How Government Works in Charagua 
The evidence points overwhelmingly to the conclusion that local government in 
Charagua was of high quality. Through dozens of hours of interviews with authorities 
and citizens from all walks of Charaguan life not a single accusation of official 
corruption surfaced. This is surprising given the state of public disaffection with elected 
authorities in Bolivia, as well as Charagua's inexperience managing large financial 
flows. Respondents from communities scattered throughout the municipal area reported 
satisfaction with their local government, and felt that their concerns were being 
addressed by municipal policy. The mayor, working in concert with the oversight 
committee, had implemented an investment planning system which the authorities and 
grass-roots alike agreed was transparent, equitable, and highly participative. The 
projects which resulted from this process pleased citizens both because they responded 
to real needs, and because of the importance given to local opinions in their conception 
and design. Informed observers with a variety of political and organizational affiliations 
agreed that municipal authorities were well-meaning and effective, and that the quality 
of the investments and services they provided was correspondingly high. 
176 Ribera, op.cit. 
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Good government resulted from the interplay of the institutions of local 
government — the mayor, municipal council and oversight committee — operating in a 
political context dominated by the principle actors in Charaguan society — cattle-ranchers 
and the APG. The mayor's office, the executive branch of local government, was 
institutionally weak in Charagua, suffering, as Saucedo admitted, from poor human 
resources and relatively low administrative capacity. This was largely compensated by 
the virtues of the mayor himself, who was widely admired as energetic, honest, and 
ambitious for his municipality. The strength of his electoral mandate was an additional 
advantage. Hand-picked by the APG leadership, Saucedo was the white face of Guarani 
political power in Charagua. His nomination by an organization which embraced the 
majority of the population and reached deep down into its community structure 
conferred upon his office immense legitimacy. At the lowest, grass-roots level, the 
people trusted their mayor. This proved instrumental in eliciting the ideas and 
preferences for municipal investment of communities more used to the violence of the 
state; their subsequent cooperation during project implementation was similarly 
forthcoming. And so the mayor was able to integrate the demand from dozens of rural 
communities into an investment strategy that reflected their needs: human development, 
productive projects, and road maintenance. And he was also able to make demands of 
them — to donate labor and materials, but more importantly to exploit public investment 
to their benefit. If a school would be built, they had to get educated. The fact that the 
municipality now spoke with the voice of the poor illustrates the degree to which power 
had shifted in Charagua. Town hall was no longer the domain of the ganaderos. 
Like the mayor, the council worked closely with community leaders and listened 
carefully to grass-roots demand. Like the mayor, councilmen were held in high esteem 
in their constituencies as hard-working, honest and able. Villagers judged them 
effective, and were pleased with the outcome of their work. But in institutional terms the 
municipal council was perhaps more remarkable than the mayor, as the APG's influence 
crossed party boundaries and overcame well-established political and ideological 
rivalries. The two MBL and one MNR Guarani councilmen essentially ignored their 
parties once elected, admitting enthusiastically that they reported to their superiors in the 
APG and to no one else. They formed a majority on the council of five and worked, 
along with the ADN representative, to advance the interests of their rural communities. 
The presence of the Guaranies, and they way in which they operated, was clearly the key 
to the municipal council's effectiveness. Once again, the foundation of its electoral 
188 
Charagua 
mandate in the APG, and the legitimacy that this bestowed upon its efforts, allowed it to 
work closely with village authorities to detect and prioritize needs throughout a large 
municipal area. This led to a process of feedback in which municipal plans were 
constantly reviewed and revised to better respond to changing community conditions. 
If the Guaranies controlled the municipal council, they completely dominated the 
oversight committee. With seven Guaranies out of eight members, the OC was 
essentially an arm of the APG cast in the guise of a municipal institution. Its authorities 
were APG authorities, and its president, Florencio Antuni, spent the first part of his term 
as president of the APG as well. Whereas the mayor and municipal council represented 
the APG's positions in local government, the oversight committee essentially was the 
APG. Whereas Guarani interests were able to transcend party politics in the municipal 
council, the OC was overtly apolitical. The grass-roots perceived the OC as they did the 
APG — representative, honest and as practically an extension of their own will. Antuni 
could exploit the APG 's organization directly to ascertain village opinion, and to 
mobilize Guaranies from the grass-roots upwards. This placed him in a strong position 
vis-a-vis the mayor and municipal council, and he knew it. 
But ironically, the electoral underpinnings of power in Charagua were such that 
the OC did not find it necessary to assert itself. Bolivian local government is designed 
around checks and balances, where the different institutions of government represent 
competing interests. The role of the OC is as a veto-wielding upper house of parliament 
where rural populations are over-represented; it is able to paralyze municipal business if 
government proves corrupt or insensitive to its constituents' needs. But in a 
municipality where both municipal council and mayor sprang out of the APG, the 
interests of the rural majority were already well represented. There was little role left for 
an OC which also spoke for the countryside. Its mere existence probably gave rural 
communities greater weight in the competition for public resources. But its efficacy was 
ultimately of second-order importance to the question of government effectiveness. 
With their complementary roles in policy planning and execution, it was the mayor and 
municipal council that jointly determined local government's success in Charagua. Of 
these the mayor, the protagonist who helped to plan investment and then carried it out, 
was probably more important. To the extent that the council provided oversight for a 
mayor already watched over by the APG, it was somewhat redundant. But the common 
political roots of the two institutions render such distinctions both difficult and ultimately 
futile. The strength of the mayor was based on the social consensus represented by the 
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governing majority in the municipal council. Both institutions were ultimately founded 
in the social network of the APG. 
The Guarani assault on local politics began only in 1995. Their history over the 
previous hundred years was a long, sad tale of official oppression and abandonment. 
What changed? What underlying economic and social conditions allowed the Guarani 
people to successfully occupy the central spaces of local power? The story most 
obviously begins with the foundation of the APG, discussed in detail above. Built on the 
pre-existing social structure of Guarani communities, the APG quickly gained a 
legitimacy and organizational strength which belied its youth. The consensual basis of 
its decision-making, along with the natural level of solidarity amongst Guaranies, greatly 
facilitated the APG's ability to coordinate their aspirations and actions over a sparsely 
inhabited area larger than some European countries. 
But this is clearly insufficient as an explanation of political change. The urban 
elite in Charagua town had dominated local life for decades, through wars and 
revolution, and the rise of a network of rural communities did not represent a serious 
challenge to their supremacy. In previous times AGACOR might have squashed the 
APG, or easily excluded it from power. That it made no such attempts in 1995 is 
indicative of the depths that the cattle economy, and cattlemen's morale, had plumbed. 
Once the rulers of the southern plains, with vast landholdings and herds that numbered in 
the tens of -thousands, Charagua's ganaderos were by 1995 the dispirited victims of 
years of agricultural crisis that had slashed food prices, incomes, property prices, and 
borrowing ability. As economic power passed from the countryside to the cities, the 
children of the ranchers left the farm in search of education and careers in the city. The 
ancient certainty of rich farms and perpetual prosperity passed from father to son was 
broken; no longer would land be the sustenance of generations of rancher families 
stretching into the indefinite future. For many, farming would become a hobby. As the 
value drained from the land, the ganaderos found that they had much less invested in 
their farms, and thus much less interest in controlling local politics. And thus when a 
conciliatory APG emerged to claim the municipality for itself, they found that they had 
no strong reason to oppose it. 
AGACOR retained its importance as an institution, with control over a large 
budget and good technical and human resources. But as a political protagonist and 
defender of interests it was lost in the new Bolivia. One sensed that even the ranchers 
regarded themselves as a dying breed. Whereas AGACOR's will once echoed in the 
190 
Charagita 
town hall, it now found no place for itself in the new institutional context. One 
interpretation of the townspeople's formation of the Community Association is as an 
attempt to find an organizational form that might fit into the new scheme. But even this 
was not so much a strategy as a response to the APG's success, a sign of their 
ambivalence, and a groping attempt to regroup. In an era when history and ideology had 
stripped the ranchers of their traditional allies, the armed forces and the church, and they 
found themselves lost in a sea of change, the APO was able to stroll into town and 
simply assume power. 
191 
Theorizing Local Government 
7 
Theorizing Local Government 
1. Introduction 
Chapters 5 and 6 examined in great detail how local government functions in two 
very different municipalities. We focused on extremes of municipal performance in 
order to highlight how different institutional characteristics and political dynamics affect 
the quality of government. The districts operated in a common constitutional and legal 
framework, under the same institutions of the central state. And yet in Viacha 
government was deplorable during the period in question, with an ineffective council, a 
corrupt mayor, and competing oversight committees, while in Charagua an energetic and 
competent mayor, hard-working council and strong oversight committee governed well. 
How can we explain these differences? The previous two chapters employed a close 
analysis of the dominant social forces in each municipality to argue that the quality of 
their government institutions, and hence of the policy outputs they provide, is a product 
of deeper economic and political factors that characterize each district. This chapter 
probes further by focusing on emergence — the political mechanism by which the 
institutions of local government are engendered, and how competition amongst social 
interests to control them limits or enhances their capabilities. 
In order to comprehend decentralization we must understand how local 
government works. We must be able to explain why some municipalities are good and 
others terrible. But the economic and political theories explored thus far are of limited 
help. They largely assume that local government will be more sensitive to local needs, 
and fail to ground this in convincing micro-political foundations. As a result, these 
theories cannot adequately explain why some local governments are more responsive or 
effective than others. Empirical analyses based on such ideas are often left clutching at 
the straws of staff quality, resources available, and other idiosyncratic explanations (see 
Chapter 1). This chapter approaches the problem in reverse. It first contrasts the 
empirical attributes and experiences of our two extreme cases of municipal performance 
as a means of generalizing about the deeper social and institutional dynamics that 
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underpin local government. From these observations it induces an analytical model of 
government that accounts for both responsiveness and accountability through simple 
electoral and social behavior. These insights will in turn serve to explain the results of 
Chapters 2 and 3 — why decentralized government is systematically more responsive to 
local needs than centralized government. 
The rest of this chapter is organized as follows. Section two contrasts the social 
and institutional characteristics of Viacha and Charagua under three headings — the local 
economy, local politics, and civil society — in a search for underlying patterns that 
explain municipal performance. Section three reviews existing models of public choice 
focusing on the difficulties they have in explaining responsiveness and accountability, 
especially as manifested (or not) in Charagua and Viacha. Section four proposes a 
simple two-stage model which does this. Section five operationalizes the model in 
preparation for testing it in the following chapter using qualitative evidence from seven 
additional municipalities. Section six concludes. 
2. Society and Governance 
2.1 The Local Economy 
The economic differences between Viacha and Charagua are huge. The former 
district is dominated by an industrial city, home to two of Bolivia's largest businesses 
and with a well developed and vibrant private sector. The latter is a rural district 
dominated by cattle ranching and subsistence farming, centered on a town of 2500 
inhabitants with little commerce and no industry. With respect to local government, the 
fundamental difference between the two is in the economic interest that dominates each 
and its role in the local political system. The vast majority of Charagua's wealth is held 
by the large landowning cattle-ranchers who traditionally ran the region. But by 1997, 
after years of economic hardship, the ganaderos were dispirited, increasingly 
impoverished, and felt that the tide of history had turned against them. Their power was 
at a nadir and both they and the Guaranies knew it. Viacha, by contrast, had in the CBN 
a firm which was in clear economic and political ascendancy, which dominated the 
city's political life like few others in Bolivia. 
Even though the brewery's assets and income were a considerably smaller share 
of the local economy than those of the cattle-ranchers in Charagua, its single-minded 
exploitation of its human and financial resources, combined with skillful political tactics, 
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allowed it a degree of influence over local politics and government far in excess of what 
Charagua's ranchers managed. Unlike the CBN, the latter were not, after all, a firm, but 
rather a collection of independent businessmen who did not face identical business 
conditions, and accordingly did not act politically or commercially with a single will. 
Although most AGACOR members sympathized with either the ADN or MNR, at least 
a few could be found in all of Charagua's political parties. In addition, ranchers were 
willing to support parties' electoral campaigns regardless of their personal sympathies, in 
order to remain on good terms with all of the principal parties. In business also, 
AGACOR helped Guarani farming communities to drill rural wells and gave non-
members technical and veterinary assistance. In Viacha, by contrast, the CBN behaved 
with fiercely partisan aggression, and went to great lengths to undermine or discredit 
opposition political parties, including bribing their councilmen and — in the case of the 
MIR — mounting a campaign against the SOBOCE factory. The bottling plant made no 
pretense of working evenhandedly with rival political or business groups. All of its 
public actions formed part of a simple strategy designed to capture votes and promote 
the UCS-CBN brand. 
The withdrawal of SOBOCE from local politics left the CBN in a dominant 
position, as the near-monopsonistic provider of political funds to the local party system. 
The brewery was only too happy to exploit this role to hobble the opposition in the 
interests of the political dominance of the UCS. Thus what was in political terms an 
economic monoculture became, at least for a time, a political monopoly as well, as the 
CBN-UCS stifled competition and steadily raised the price of opposition and dissent. 
Charagua's ranchers behaved in a very different way, eschewing monolithic political 
action in favor of a gentler and more diverse approach better suited to a pluralistic group 
of businessmen. By supporting a variety of parties, they contributed to opening the 
political regime in Charagua and encouraging competition amongst parties. And when 
their rivals won power, far from attempting to undermine them the ranchers of 
AGACOR found an accommodation and were able to work with the new municipal 
authorities. 
This analysis suggests a political analogue of the neoclassical argument in favor 
of the efficient allocation of resources via open and competitive markets. Parties —
especially those in opposition — are not self-financing entities, and require resources in 
order to mount campaigns and generally carry out party functions. Where a 
municipality's economic landscape is dominated by an economic hegemon, that 
194 
Theorizing Local Government 
hegemon will tend to reduce political competition by financing a favored party, and may 
well abuse its position in other ways in order to hinder its political rivals. Thus 
monopsony in the provision of political funds will tend to lead to monopoly in the party 
system. Such a reduction in political competition will reduce the level of oversight that 
local government institutions are subjected to as a by-product of political competition, 
and may well leave sectors of the population unrepresented and effectively 
disenfranchised. An open and competitive local economy, by contrast, promotes 
competition in politics, leading to an increased diversity of ideas and policy proposals 
that compete for public favor, as well as improved public accountability for government 
officials. Where an economic hegemon and a dominant political party actively collude, 
the effects can be multiplicative — together they can distort the local party system, 
capture the institutions of government, and deform the governance process to their own 
ends, as happened in Viacha in the mid-1990s. Charagua was also run on such a basis 
for much of the twentieth century, with comparably deleterious effects on local policy-
making, until long-term economic changes paired with political reforms to end the 
cattlemen's dominance. 
2.2 Local Politics 
The analysis of local politics can be usefully divided into systemic issues and the 
party system per se. The former refer to the ground rules of electoral competition, and 
its fairness and openness to both parties and voters, while the latter refers to the nature of 
local party organizations and how they compete. The systemic reforms noted in 
Charagua correspond to nationwide changes which affected municipalities throughout 
Bolivia. These included reforms to electoral laws to increase transparency in the vote 
count, ensure voting secrecy, provide for independent oversight of the voting process, 
and increase the number of polling stations in rural areas. But they also included non-
electoral reforms, such as a new, efficient citizen registration process (which in turn 
permitted voter registration), and the extension of rural literacy programs (especially 
amongst women). Their collective effects were a broad increase in voter registration and 
improved voter participation. But the secret to the success of these reforms lay in large 
part with the design of the decentralization program itself. The LPP brought rural areas 
into the municipal system, and then devolved significant authority and political 
responsibility to them. Whereas before rural dwellers voted, if at all, for cantonal 
officials who had neither resources nor political power, now fully-fledged municipal 
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governments with real resources and legislative authority were at stake. The prospect of 
gaining control over these drove political parties into the countryside in search of rural 
votes. The prospect of benefiting from them pushed villagers and farmers into municipal 
politics and into the voting booth. In this way the concerns and opinions of the rural 
50% of Bolivians were brought into the political mainstream as electoral politics 
penetrated deeper and deeper into the hinterland. 
Charagua provides a case study of this process. Registered voters increased by 
72% between the 1993 and 1995 elections, the great majority of whom participated, with 
an increase in suffrage of 139% and absenteeism falling by one-third.' The reforms 
which opened politics to a new electorate simultaneously established the conditions for 
fair and open competition. The old methods of bribery and intimidation no longer 
worked in Charagua; thelVINTR's attempt to bribe Councilman Vargas failed because, 
given electoral transparency, the transaction would have been apparent and would have 
exposed Vargas to the voters' wrath. 2 And so the Guarani majority was able to overturn 
the cozy duopoly which had run the town for so long. In this political aperture, the 
parties that underwent comparable openings benefited most, and those which attempted 
to carry on as before suffered. Thus the MBL, previously irrelevant in Charagua, struck 
a deal with the APG and captured the majority of new votes, while the MNR lost its 
local pre-eminence and was thrown out of government. But the MBL was more than 
tactically clever — it had deep roots in rural life through its affiliated NGOs, which had 
earned the trust of Guaranies after years of patient work. The presence of such a party 
not only facilitated the alliance between the APG and the political establishment, but was 
instrumental in raising the quality of government after the election. NGOs like CIPCA 
and Teko-Guarani specialized in planning and carrying out rural projects. The skills 
they had developed, and their relationships with rural communities, were instrumental to 
the transformation of Charagua into an effective municipality that served its rural 
majority. 
Decentralization, by contrast, contributed to a very different process in Viacha. 
Although voter registration did increase, Viacha's gain of 22% was an order of 
magnitude lower than Charagua's, while absenteeism remained roughly static. 3 This 
reflected the fact that Viacha's politics remained a closed affair, inured to the concerns 
I Corte Nacional Electoral, op.cit. 
2 Vargas, op.cit. See Chapter 6, section 2.2. 
3 Corte Nacional Electoral, op.cit. 
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and priorities of the rural majority. This, in turn, was largely due to Viacha's status as a 
comparatively small city dominated politically by the imperatives and dynamics of the 
La Paz-El Alto conurbation. Viacha was sufficiently close to the capital, and transport 
links sufficiently good, that national political leaders could intervene in local affairs at 
relatively low cost. Because it offered a fairly easy way to score political points without 
the public scrutiny that they were subjected to at home, party leaders essentially ran their 
Viachan affiliates from La Paz. They allowed their subordinates in Viacha very little 
room for initiative, reducing them to spokesmen and messengers. And with cavalier 
disregard for the popular will, their directives were based on strategies that responded to 
events in the capital or nationwide, and not on the needs and circumstances of Viacha. 
In this way, more powerful actors invaded the local political stage, trampling on local 
concerns in the thrust and parry of a drama that was as threatening as it was foreign. 
A particularly lamentable consequence of this intervention was that the legal-
electoral reforms detailed above were insufficient to counter the CBN-UCS' capture of 
local government. The party exploited the resources of the CBN to suborn and 
intimidate the opposition until it achieved near-monopolistic power in the local political 
context. With its hand thus freed, it indulged in the corruption and misrule documented 
above. Under normal conditions, political competition and openness could be expected 
to catalyze a cleansing of the political system. But a substantive political choice is 
required for this mechanism to operate. And in Viacha the choices on offer were wan 
simulacra of political options, marionettes whose strings jerked across the horizon. The 
fact that the Viachan party system was dominated from beyond implied that local party 
leaders did not innovate in search of new voters. They did not have the operational 
independence to strike a deal along the lines of the MBL's in Charagua, and any such 
agreement that might occur was likely to be rejected by a national leadership more 
concerned with avoiding embarrassment than policy experimentation. The generally 
poor quality of Viachan political leaders — another by-product of political dependence —
made the leadership even less likely to tolerate local originality. Thus, while 
decentralization created many opportunities to make political gains and win votes in 
Viacha by reaching out to newly incorporated communities and addressing their 
concerns, the local establishment's efforts were limited to mundane extensions of 
campaign rallies and sloganeering to the countryside. Voters offered a false choice 
between options devoid of local content eschewed politics altogether and dropped out of 
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the system. And so Callisaya was able to perpetuate his misrule until popular revulsion 
spilled into the streets and forced him from power. 
This suggests that effective local governance requires a vigorous local politics in 
which competition spurs political entrepreneurship and policy innovation as parties vie 
to win new voters. The analysis above indicates two conditions necessary for such a 
local politics to obtain: (i) an open and transparent electoral system, which both 
promotes and is (indirectly) sustained by (ii) a competitive party regime. These combine 
naturally to produce a third, endogenous requirement of good local politics, especially 
important for the case of Viacha: a substantive focus on local issues and local people. 
Systemic electoral reforms which increase the transparency and ease of voting serve to 
increase participation by making voting both feasible and fair. Voters who are able to 
reach a polling center and cast a vote will be more likely to do so the less likely it is that 
results will be misrepresented or distorted by local interests. Reforms which promote all 
of these things encourage citizens to express their political preferences freely, both inside 
and outside the voting booth. This in turn raises the electoral return to parties which 
actively canvass local opinions and propose policies that respond to changing voter 
needs. Policy innovation of this sort can be termed political entrepreneurship. 
But a competitive party system must be in place if the full beneficial effects of 
systemic opening are to occur. Political entrepreneurship which attempts to offer 
dissatisfied voters a political alternative will be thwarted by a party regime which is 
monopolized by one actor. Viacha provides a compelling example of how competition 
in a political environment which is formally open can be subverted through the 
	C C >j1Jh.. 
systematic use of bribery and intimidation by a dominant faction to undermine 
substantive opposition. In a way which is, again, closely analogous to the working of 
competitive markets, a competitive political environment will encourage policy 
entrepreneurs to innovate in the hopes of capturing electoral share from their rivals. 
Party systems characterized by multiple participants and free entry, featuring political 
agents who succeed or fail based on their ability to attract votes, will tend to serve the 
welfare of their constituents better than those dominated by a single actor, and hence a 
narrower range of policy options. And a competitive local economy, as discussed above, 
will tend to promote a competitive political system. 
If the first two conditions refer to complementary aspects of competition in the 
local political economy, the third consideration can be characterized as a deepening of 
the logic of decentralization from the administrative to the political realm. This is the 
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seemingly obvious point that a district's local political dynamic must be driven by local 
concerns and local incentives if it is to benefit local inhabitants. A policy discourse 
which is carried out in terms natural to a different city or larger political unit will result 
in a political debate essentially foreign to the priorities of local people. When carried out 
on a small scale, this will work to the detriment of offending parties, as the MNR 
discovered when it attempted to micromanage its Charaguan affiliate from Santa Cruz 
after decentralization. But where such behavior is widespread in a municipality's 
political establishment the damage can be considerably larger. As Viacha vividly 
illustrates, the beneficial effects of systemic opening can be undermined as local politics 
becomes a sterile and corrupting battle-by-proxy. In such circumstances, the process 
described above by which competitive politics leads to effective and responsive local 
government will be short-circuited, as politicians ignore the voters and voters lose faith 
in their leaders. Moreover, such a predicament may constitute a stable equilibrium, as 
parties oblivious to local discontent fail to capitalize on the electoral opportunity it 
represents. The question is why parties would err in such an obvious way in the first 
place. A compelling answer lies in their own organizations and internal power 
structures. Political parties are by nature national organizations, and the devolution of 
authority required for municipal politics to take on its own, self-sustaining dynamic 
requires an internal decentralization which many party leaders will resist as an 
unacceptable erosion of their power. But this is, of course, precisely the point, and 
confirms a much larger truth about decentralization: in order to work it requires people 
who hold resources and power to let go, and they will always have strong reasons not to. 
. A final consideration is the common counterclaim that the fundamental variable 
explaining government performance is the quality of local political leadership. This line 
of reasoning focuses primarily on the character of the individuals concerned. Hence, the 
principal difference between Viacha and Charagua is that the former suffered a corrupt 
mayor whereas the latter benefited from an honest and able one. A simple exchange of 
mayors (and other institutions of government) between the two would thus have restored 
probity to Viachan public life and plunged Charagua into the abyss. This study rejects 
such a position as simplistic and short-sighted, and prefers to treat political leadership as 
an endogenous variable determined by the economic, political and social processes 
analyzed above. In this view, politicians can be regarded as mobile agents who are 
exogenously determined as "good" or "bad". The question then becomes, what are the 
characteristics of municipalities where bad politicians gain control of public institutions? 
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and where and why do good politicians prevail? In addition to being more interesting, 
this question permits a deeper, multidimensional analysis of local government which 
exploits the empirical insights developed in the preceding chapters. Building on the 
previous analysis, the answer can be stated simply: corrupt political agents will have far 
more opportunities to enrich themselves in municipalities where government oversight 
and accountability are crippled by economic monopoly, distorted political competition or 
deep-set social antagonisms (see below). In districts where competition and 
transparency naturally lead politicians to concentrate on satisfying voters' needs, bad 
political agents will dedicate themselves to other pursuits or leave. We return to this 
point below. 
2.3 Civil Society 
The conspicuous economic and political differences between Viacha and 
Charagua are matched by the disparate characteristics of local society in each. In 
Charagua the Guarani majority formed a territorially vast network of rural villages with 
similar social characteristics and similar self-governing community structures. These 
villages had autonomously organized themselves in the 1980s into the APG, an 
independent civil institution which acted as ethnic advocate and regional self-
government. The APG's roots in the spontaneous village traditions of the Guaranies 
gave it both tremendous legitimacy and a high capacity for mobilizing the opinions and 
efforts of its constituents, qualities which were to prove invaluable after decentralization. 
Townspeople formed the other important local group, with their own organizational 
structures based on neighborhood councils. They were less uniform socially than the 
Guaranies, and less united in their goals and policy preferences. But they proved 
pragmatic in the end, willing to work with the new majority when the Guaranies took 
over local government. 
Viachan civil society, by contrast, is a heterogeneous mix, including two groups 
with strong and divergent identities and a long history of mutual antagonism marked by 
episodic outbreaks of civil violence. The city of Viacha is dominated by an urban elite 
which defines itself in opposition to the indigenous countryside, and which suddenly 
found itself miscegenated with a large rural hinterland which greatly outnumbered it. 
Like Charagua, urban organization is centered on neighborhood councils, which are 
quick to confirm their legitimacy in national federations headquartered in La Paz. Rural 
Viacha is itself divided between the Machaqas in the west and the remainder, closer to 
-74 
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the city. The former is a distinct region where the Aymara language predominates and 
communities are organized into traditional, pre-Columbian Ayllus and Mallkus. The 
latter see themselves as more modern, speak a mixture of Spanish and Aymara, and base 
their social organization on the peasant union's general secretariats. Of these three, the 
Machaqas region — the furthest from the city — is the most homogeneous and boasts the 
most robust social organization. The other two regions are strongly affected by the 
status of Viacha as an urban transition zone, an important threshold in the slow 
urbanization process that characterized Bolivia during the latter half of the twentieth 
century. The difficult journey from rural campesino on the altiplano to urban vecino in 
La Paz-El Alto can take several generations, and for many thousands their path takes 
them through Viacha. The two worlds collide in the city's markets and peri-urban areas, 
and in adjacent rural communities, and the resulting frictions lead inevitably to social 
tensions. 
That these differences proved crucial to the quality of governance achieved in the 
two municipalities should not be surprising. Even without a theory of how society 
relates to government, the Law of Popular Participation marked the formal incorporation 
of civil society into the governance process as a governing institution, via the oversight 
committee. The OC is charged with overseeing all municipal activities on behalf of 
grass-roots organizations, and can effectively paralyze the administration if it objects. 
But the law did not specify the norms or procedures by which the social groups which 
give rise to the OC should operate, prefen -ing to trust in their autonomous dynamics. 
The innate characteristics and internal workings of civil society are thus vital to the 
quality of government that municipalities can achieve, as both Viacha and Charagua 
illustrate. 
In order for civil society to provide useful oversight and a feedback mechanism 
for the governing process, it must be able to accomplish a limited but important set of 
tasks. First, it must be able to identify a specific failing of local policy at the community 
level. It must then formulate a coherent demand or complaint and transmit it upwards 
through, typically,4 two or three of its own hierarchical levels. Finally, local civic 
leaders must be able to take up this complaint and communicate it convincingly to the 
mayor or municipal council. Such abilities are not culturally or organizationally specific, 
and thus a wide variety of societies are likely to have them. But they will all share four 
Typically for Bolivia. 
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general traits that facilitate these tasks. The first is simply the ability to communicate, 
often across large areas and diverse ethnic groups — a significant challenge in many areas 
of Bolivia. The second is norms of trust and responsibility, both within communities and 
across them (including leaders in the seat of government), as well as across time. Where 
community leaders do not comply with their duties of leadership and advocacy, 
government will not reap the information it needs to right policy mistakes. Communities 
must then trust leaders farther up the hierarchy to accurately represent their interests 
before government, and leaders must trust that their information is correct. And civic 
leaders at the municipal level must then actively pursue communities' demands if 
government is to be held socially accountable for its policies at the community level. 
The third trait is a minimum level of human capital amongst civic leaders such 
that those at the municipal level are able to interact productively with local government. 
This involves both cooperating with elected officials to advance policy goals, and 
opposing their decisions in such a way as to modify their actions. The last trait, and 
often the most difficult in Bolivia, is a minimum level of resources required to carry out 
these activities. Even if civic officials are unpaid, there remain unavoidable and non-
trivial transaction costs associated with their activities. Communities in Bolivia have for 
the most part long-standing traditions of reciprocal generosity which cover the 
transactions costs of community self-government. 5 But the extension of these social 
institutions to the municipal level has in many places strained such finances beyond the 
breaking-point, making it impossible for OC presidents in districts as diverse as Viacha, 
Porongo, Baures and Atocha to operate effectively. ° 
. In these terms it is easy to see why civil society was a significant benefit to local 
government in Charagua, and a significant liability in Viacha. Charagua benefited from 
a highly structured and coherent civil organization dating from before decentralization, 
in which communication was fluid and norms of trust and responsibility were strong. 
Through it, civic and municipal authorities found it easy to stay in touch with local 
demand at the village level, as well as mobilize support for collective efforts. By 
promoting local authorities up through its hierarchy, the APG developed its own leaders 
internally; and the covenants it signed with NGOs provided it with the modest resources 
necessary to conduct its activities. In Viacha, however, civil society was functionally 
See Alba (1990), Chapters 3 and 8, and Alba, et.al. (1990), Part I, Chapters 2 and 3, and Part III, Chapter 
4. 
Chapter 8 provides details for Porongo, Baures and Atocha. 
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broken. Its constituent parts did not trust each other, and in many cases could not even 
speak to each other. Government travesties in the countryside went unreported in the 
city, where civil authorities of all extractions ignored village requests. Civic leaders with 
proven effectiveness at the village level were overwhelmed by the pressures and scale of 
municipal government. With no budget of their own and depending on official 
generosity for their sustenance in the city, they were easily neutralized as independent 
actors by government authorities. In Charagua, a civil society which functioned 
organically essentially took over local government and made it work. In Viacha society 
was a bubbling cauldron of resentment and discontent, composed of people so mutually 
suspicious of each other as to make social oversight virtually impossible. Callisaya's 
installation of his own OC only added insult to a deep injury. Viachan society's inability 
to resist such a ludicrous ploy confirms that its internal divisions left it unable to act in 
even its most basic defense. 
It is instructive to remember that Charagua, while in some ways more 
homogeneous than Viacha, is itself a heterogeneous society, with its minority criollo, 
Mennonite, Quechua and Aymara populations. Even with a well-functioning APG, it 
would have been feasible for Guarani politicians to assume authority and ignore or 
exploit rival ethnic groups. That they did not must in part be due to enlightened 
leadership. But it is also due to the value of fairness in such a district. The fact that 
Guaranies -are not only the largest population group but form a majority of the population 
implies that the question of how to allocate public investment is essentially a problem of 
how to share out municipal resources amongst themselves. An arbitrary investment 
scheme such as Viacha's that produced unequal distributions would lead to strife 
amongst the Guaranies, an outcome which Guarani government would seek to avoid. 
Allocations that were fair amongst Guarani communities but systematically lower for 
minority groups might be feasible, if administratively problematic, but would come up 
against a different barrier. Most of the wealth in Charagua is held by the criollo 
townspeople. Policies which discriminated systematically against them would alienate 
them from local government, thus depriving the latter of the technical expertise and 
financial resources they controlled. In addition, the moral case made by Guaranies for 
decades was for an end to discrimination and fair treatment at the hands of the Bolivian 
state. The fact that they identified themselves for years with a given moral position 
(fairness) gave them a strong incentive once in power to defend it. And, coincidentally, 
the party which carried the APG to power — the MEL — preached fairness and 
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transparency during the years that it was effectively shut out of power. Taken together, 
these considerations provided Guarani-dominated government with strong incentives to 
fairness in government, and to the transparency with which that fairness might be 
announced to the electorate. 
In Olson's terms, there existed in Charagua an "encompassing interest" — i.e. one 
whose incentives were consistent with the growth of the collectivity. 7 Viacha, on the 
other hand, had no encompassing interest, only narrow interests which sought to exploit 
power for the short-term gain of narrowly-defined groups. This explains why the role of 
history varies so much between the two districts. For centuries both had suffered from 
state oppression, extremes of inequality, and periodic outbursts of civil violence. But 
Charagua's history was if anything more repressive and more cruel than Viacha's, 
leaving a potentially deeper reservoir of resentment. And yet it is in Charagua that the 
victims of oppression were able to overcome their past sufficiently to reach an 
accommodation with the urban elite, whereas in Viacha lingering social tensions 
contributed to government breakdown. In Charagua the group that stood to benefit most 
from government formed the majority, and therefore had an encompassing interest in its 
success. In Viacha, groups that lacked such interest fought for and abused municipal 
power to the point of disaster. 
An alternative, and tempting, view is to infer from a comparison of the two 
municipalities' demographics that social homogeneity is an important determinant of the 
quality of local government. Casual empiricism suggests that homogeneity is positively 
associated with communication, trust and social responsibility in a society. Sameness 
may. also make it easier for civil institutions to elicit contributions for projects of 
collective benefit, although its effect on the formation of human capital is difficult to 
predict a priori. But the immigrant nations of North America and Australia provide a 
clear counterexample of the possibility of organizing heterogeneous civil societies that 
function cohesively. They also suggest that the more subtle, multi-dimensional concept 
of encompassing interest provides a fuller explanation than simple homogeneity of why 
some societies are more cohesive and equitable than others. The topic is addressed in 
more detail in the chapter that follows. But for now this study asserts that while 
homogeneity may be helpful through its association with social characteristics that lead 
to good government, it is not itself a causal factor. 
7 Olson (2000), Chapter 1. 
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3. Information and Accountability 
The political and economic interactions between diverse actors in society were 
evidently important to the quality of government in Viacha and Charagua. But how can 
we think about them more systematically? In order to understand events in the two 
districts we must be able to distinguish cause from effect and describe a structure within 
which protagonists in each district operated. If we are to use these experiences to inform 
a more general theory of local government, we need a model. 
The political economy and public choice literature has no shortage of these, 
including models of voting, lobbying, bureaucratic decision-making, and much more. 
This section reviews those most relevant to determine how useful they are in explaining 
the divergent quality of government in our two districts. The previous analysis showed 
the importance of three factors to effective local government: (i) a competitive local 
economy, (ii) openness and competition in local politics, and (iii) well-functioning civic 
organizations that represent society's grass-roots. These factors contributed to 
responsive local government in Charagua by conveying information on local needs and 
preferences to government officials through the APG's extensive rural network, and 
enforcing accountability on them via electoral competition and the oversight committee. 
In Viacha, by contrast, their absence led to crippled mechanisms of accountability and 
breakdown in the channels by which information on local needs might be 
communicated; the result was a deep insensitivity of elected officials to voters' needs. 
Indeed, the effects of economics, politics and society on local government can, at the 
limit, be reduced to information and accountability. I define these terms as follows: 
i. Information. A mechanism exists by which citizens' policy preferences are 
revealed to government officials. This typically occurs either through the 
selection of politicians with majority-preferred platforms, or the communication of 
the majority's preferences to elected officials. 
ii. Accountability. A mechanism exists by which elected officials are held 
responsible to voters for acting upon this information. By placing power over 
officials in the hands of voters, the former are given incentives to act in the 
interests of the latter. 
The following uses these concepts as a lens through which to review the 
literature, focusing specifically on how information can be used to make government 
accountable to voters. I examine how existing models provide for each, and discuss 
whether the mechanisms involved are consistent with the major features of the previous 
two chapters. 
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3.1 The Literature 
Tiebout (1956) offers no such mechanism. His is a world in which district 
governments offer different public good-tax bundles, and individuals allocate themselves 
costlessly across districts according to their preferences for the same. A competitive 
equilibrium in locational decisions ensues. Local government is not responsive to 
"voters", rather voters are responsive to local governments. Voting-with-your-feet 
models generally share this characteristic, making them inappropriate for the analysis of 
information and accountability as described above. 8 
The more general question is how the demand for public services is joined with 
supply. Tiebout-type models posit individual mobility as the mechanism, whereas other 
authors (see below) rely on voting. Which is more useful? Consider the reasonably 
common occurrence where more than half a district's population opposes its local 
government. Does the majority vote to change the government, or does it move to 
another district? It seems self-evident that the costs of the latter are significantly larger 
than those of the former — at either the individual or aggregate level — and hence that 
moving is an unrealistic remedy for poor government. Seen in this light, the many 
empirical studies of voting with your feet l° would seem to estimate marginal Tiebout-
type effects operating in larger decision frames. That is, within a broader decision to 
move, a household's decision of where to move to is likely to be affected by the quality 
of public services, level of local taxes, etc. But the basic decision whether to move — a 
costly and highly disruptive event' I — is likely to be based on a larger set of 
considerations. I argue that citizens dissatisfied with local government will turn first to 
voting and other political instruments to effect change, and only much later to moving 
from the district. Accordingly, our primary focus should be on the local political system. 
Subsequent models of decentralization, such as Besley and Coate (1999) and 
Bardhan and Mookherjee (1998 and 1999) among others, place voting in a more central 
role. To varying degrees they rely upon Downs' (1957) median voter result to 
select/inform politicians with regard to voter preferences, and hold them accountable for 
the policies they subsequently implement. These models have the virtue of realism, 
s Rubinfeld (1987) has observed that Tiebout's model, used for decades to analyze decentralization, is not 
actually a model of decentralization. 
Unless specified, public "policy" and "services" are used broadly interchangeably here. 
to See Cebula (1979), and Cebula and Kafoglis (1986) for reviews of this literature. 
Psychological studies consistenty rank moving house amongst the most stressful of life events, alongside 
death in the family and divorce. 
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invoking a dynamic which would seem to predominate in decentralized, democratic 
countries. 
But voting carries with it problems of its own as a mechanism for both 
accountability and preference revelation. Most obviously, it offers only weak constraints 
on the actions of elected officials between elections, via calculations of the effects of 
policy decisions on officials' future chances of re-election. In a context of preference 
aggregation this implies that accountability may well not operate over issues that are 
small, or affect isolated populations within an electoral district. Additionally, voting a 
government out of power may be too blunt an instrument for effective accountability 
where complex or nuanced policy questions are concerned. 
More subtly if government exists primarily to provide public goods, then at least 
some component of voter satisfaction with their provision must relate to the "publicness" 
of these goods. Relevant characteristics of public education and health, for example, 
may well include not only their quality and cost, but their extension and accessibility 
throughout the population. In other words, voters may endogenize the private utility of 
other individuals from public services. But the simple median-voter model presumes 
rational individual voters who lack obvious horizontal connections for the transmission 
of such information. Such a criticism is at best implicit, as there is nothing in these 
models to prevent such horizontal linkages from occurring. But if they are indeed 
important to voter's appreciation of public goods, and hence to electoral outcomes, they 
should be made explicit in our models of local government. 
But the fundamental objection to voting is the well-known difficulty of finding 
an equilibrium. The possibility that voting in a multi-dimensional space will lead to 
cycling was recognized over two hundred years ago by Condorcet (1785). If a voting 
equilibrium cannot be shown to occur, then elections are an indeterminate method of 
social choice. For our purposes the problem can be divided in two: 
(a) Existence — the existence of a stable equilibrium in multi-dimensional space; and 
(b) Instrument — voting as a means for bringing about such an equilibrium. 
We take each in turn. 
Black (1948), building on Hotelling (1929), showed that the majority voting rule 
can bring about equilibrium in single-dimensional space given single-peaked 
preferences. But both uni-dimensionality and "single-peakedness" are implausible if 
votes are to transmit information. Local government provides services in many different 
areas, each of which constitutes a policy — and hence informational — dimension. Indeed 
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even individual policy initiatives can be multi-dimensional when voters care about more 
than one aspect (e.g. the cost, quality and location of a school). To assume that elections 
operate in just one dimension is thus highly restrictive. And given multi-dimensional 
concerns, single-peaked preferences on individual votes are improbable. Davis, 
DeGroot and Hinich (1972) provided a way forward by showing that under majority 
rule, equilibrium can obtain in multi-dimensional space as well, but at the cost of four 
restrictive assumptions about preferences: (i) reflexivity, (ii) completeness, (iii) 
transitivity and (iv) the extremal restriction. Taken together, these restrictions specify 
the foim that individuals' preferences must take when they are non-identical. This, as 
Kramer (1973) illustrates, is highly unlikely to arise naturally. I2 
If the existence of an equilibrium is problematic, the literature on voting does not 
offer an obvious solution. Approaches to voting can be broadly divided into 
deterministic and probabilistic models. Where voting is deterministic, difficulties 
concerning the existence of majority-rule equilibria map directly into electoral results, as 
the problem of finding a multi-dimensional candidate or platform that defeats all others 
is equivalent to finding an issue in multi-dimensional space that is majority-preferred. 
Researchers have found one way around this through the claim that all (multi-
dimensional) political issues can be collapsed into a single left-right dimension. 13 
 Piketty and Spector (1995) generalize this claim by modeling a process in which rational 
communication causes beliefs to converge toward a one-dimensional axis. A number of 
empirical studies that test the median-voter hypothesis claim support for this position. 14 
 If true, the instrumentality of voting and debate would serve to transform multi-
dimensional preferences into a theoretically tractable uni-dimensional decision space, 
thereby solving the existence problem. But voting of such a nature would not satisfy the 
condition of information, and by extension accountability, set out above. Complex 
information on the nature and intensity of voters' preferences for different types of 
government services, and accompanying taxation, would be collapsed — and thereby lost 
— into a single left-right instrument of (dis-) approval. If individuals' preferences are to 
be revealed across a range of policy issues, the exercise must be resolved in multi-
dimensional space. 
12 In simulation exercises "when no special restrictions are placed on the types of preference orderings 
individuals may have, the probability of a cycle is high, and approaches one as the number of alternatives 
increases." — Mueller (1989), p.81. Mueller recommends Niemi (1969) and Riker and Ordeshook (1973) 
for reviews of this literature. 
13 See, for example, Poole and Romer (1985). 
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A more sophisticated solution to the problem of existence comes through 
probabilistic voting, which assumes that voters vote for a candidate according to a 
probabilistic function of the candidate's position. I5 By smoothing out the discontinuity 
inherent in a deterministic voting function, this approach cuts through the thicket of 
cycling results to permit voting equilibria in multi-dimensional space. But it does so at 
the significant cost of introducing uncertainty on the part of voters regarding candidates' 
positions, or of candidates regarding voters' preferences, or both. If candidates and 
voters cannot know where each other stand, the informational content of elections will 
be weak. In a way comparable to the dimensionality collapse described above, the 
probabilistic approach neutralizes the ability of the vote to convey information. 
More recent work has departed from the strictures of the median-voter approach 
in a number of interesting ways. Besley and Coate (1995) model a political process 
featuring citizen-candidates and no restrictions on the number or type of policy issues to 
be decided. Individuals vote over the preferences and competence of candidates, about 
which they have complete information, and candidates who win implement their 
preferred policies. Policy outcomes are efficient. Their model solves the problem of 
existence without directly addressing that of information. In a multi-dimensional policy 
world, elected officials have no way to distinguish which of their own policy preferences 
are majority-preferred and which are not. As a result, they simply act on their own 
priorities, making them a sort of elected dictator. Such an approach resembles politics in 
Viacha, not Charagua, and is unlikely to capture the key differences between the two. 
Piketty (1995) explores the extent to which voting can be used to communicate 
preferences through a model in which individuals are intermediate between strategic and 
sincere voters. He finds that two-round electoral systems permit more efficient 
communication than one-round systems. While this model is more nuanced than many 
previous attempts, the mechanism is too simple to permit the transmission of detailed 
information on multi-dimensional policy preferences, and hence does not satisfy the 
initial criteria set out above. 
This leaves us with a significant dilemma: models of voting in a multi-
dimensional world cannot be solved while maintaining the integrity of information on 
voters' complex preferences over fundamental issues of public policy. And if elections 
cannot transmit infoiination, how does effective accountability come about? Officials 
14 Inman (1979) surveys this literature. Mueller (1989) disputes the strength of these results. 
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may be ejected from office, but what lessons will their successors learn about which 
policies the majority prefers? 
The "rational ignorance" strand of the literature provides bleak answers to these 
questions. It builds on Downs' idea that individuals have a negligible probability of 
affecting electoral outcomes, and hence rational voters will not expend time or energy 
informing themselves about candidates. The voter is carried to the polls by social 
conditioning, but lacks the information required to make a discriminating choice. Such 
rational ignorance about candidates and issues drains the vote of meaningful 
information, and with it the power of elections to enforce accountability. Quite apart 
from the technical characteristics of the instrument, people are unwilling to use it. 
Brennan and Buchanan (1984) take this further, describing voting as an expressive act, 
like cheering at a stadium. The inconsequential nature of a single vote frees the 
individual to allow "non-substantive" factors to sway his decision — slogans, 
advertisements, peers. The likelihood that such random factors determine electoral 
outcomes implies that the vote is empty. 
While it is important to recognize the limited ability of our theory to explain 
policy outcomes, we must guard against being overly critical. Many of its shortcomings 
are due to features which are realistic. Most real-world elections evidently do occur in 
one-dimensional space, for example. Despite complex policy preferences we cast a 
simple vote in favor of a single candidate or party. Hence it is not necessarily our 
models of voting that are limited, but rather our real voting systems. Or, more 
interestingly, the way we model government. It is possible to go beyond simple electoral 
mechanisms to consider a comprehensive government regime that captures the complex 
reality of political competition in multi-issue, multiple-priority space. 
Consider the evidence from Charagua and Viacha. The Charaguan municipality 
had considerable infoimation on local needs available to it, but this did not come through 
the vote. Rather it came through civil society — specifically through the explicit 
incorporation of civic organizations into the municipal planning process, directly and via 
the OC. In Viacha this channel was blocked, the OC disabled and civic organizations 
weak, and government remained largely uninformed about what its voters wanted. But 
in both elections were held regularly according to the minimum standards specified by 
law. Information did not obtain in the way voting models define, and these models 
15 Mueller (1989) reviews and summarizes this literature. 
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cannot explain how it was in fact revealed (in Charagua). So too with accountability. In 
Charagua accountability was enforced through the combination of a well-functioning 
electoral system featuring substantive competition, and active civic organizations which 
mediated policy-relevant information between communities and town hall. This 
provided voters with the necessary inputs to judge the performance of their local 
government, as well as the means to enforce their will. Accountability was binding, and 
local officials responsive. In Viacha by contrast, town hall and the hegemonic political 
party joined forces to undermine civic organizations and corrupt the electoral mechanism 
through endless shenanigans and political machinations. Accountability was crippled 
and con-uption and mismanagement flourished. 
The insertion of civil society into the local government process was thus key to 
information and accountability in both districts. Charagua provides clear examples of 
this. There some villages were happy with a school the municipality built, while others 
delighted in the repairs their road received. Still other villages were satisfied despite 
obtaining no investment from their local government. But how did local government 
know where to site specific projects? How did it avoid giving a hospital to the village 
that preferred a school? And how did it know which communities it could leave 
unattended? The leaders of these villages were in no doubt that the information was not 
electoral, but came, rather, through their direct participation in the governing process. 
They informed officials about local needs and explained to communities receiving 
nothing that their turn would come. The public choice models reviewed above 
contemplate no civic mechanism, and hence provide little insight into why government 
in these two districts was so very different. Hence we need a new model. 
What follows is an attempt to provide one derived inductively from the results of 
Chapters 5 and 6. It adheres to the maxim that in order to analyze local government 
decision-making we must first describe how local government works. Our departure is 
the simple observation that the voting models discussed above do not represent the 
familiar local government systems common in most Western democracies. In addition 
to voters, politicians and elections, we observe civic groups, producer and consumer 
lobbies, newspapers and diverse media, and other actors who lobby, advocate, oversee 
and otherwise participate in the policy-making process, with important effects on policy 
outputs. Our task is to incorporate such actors into the local government system, and 
describe their channels of influence over policy-making. 
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4. A Two-Stage Model of Local Government 
This section describes a two-stage model of local government which incorporates 
realistic features of observable local political systems, and handles multi-dimensional 
policy space through a simple, sequential structure. I follow Williamson's (1995b) 
injunction regarding commonly verifiable assumptions and the primacy of discrete 
structural over marginal effects; the framework incorporates important features of local 
government identified in the field. The model is described, but not formalized here. 
Assume a two-stage local government game. In the first stage, politicians 
compete in elections for control rights over public institutions, public resources and the 
right to make local policy. The second stage consists of a number of single issue sub-
games in which civic and private actors lobby elected officials for policies that favor 
them. There are as many sub-games as there are distinct policy questions. The overall 
model is simple, analytically tractable, and incorporates realistic elements of electoral 
and lobbying behavior. It handles multi-dimensional policy space in a straightforward 
way through an institutional structure which separates the allocation of power to political 
agents from substantive policy decisions. In so doing, it provides a natural way to 
incorporate non-voting actors (e.g. civic groups, firms) into the policy-making process. 
In the first stage, control over the institutions of government is allocated to a 
particular set of individuals via elections, which serve an establishing/legitimizing 
function. These elections occur in a single dimension, which I identify not as "left/right" 
but rather "trust" or "confidence". The resolution of complex concerns about candidate 
ability and priorities into a single dimension of trust is an idiosyncratic, unobservable, 
voter-specific process. Since the results of such calculations are externalized through the 
vote, the underlying process need not be modeled explicitly.' 6 Moreover, the structure 
of the model implies that individual policy outcomes are not determined by prior 
electoral equilibria; that is, we may take the identity of elected officials as given. The 
winners of elections enter into implicit contracts with voters, which can be renewed or 
terminated at the following election. These contracts are necessarily incomplete on 
account of the intrinsically unforeseeable, and hence unspecifiable, nature of political 
contingency, and on account of voters' bounded rationality. Voters can no more know 
candidates' future policy actions than they can predict future policy surprises; indeed, 
they cannot even appreciate the full (i.e. general equilibrium) consequences of 
16  In this respect my framework follows the spirit, if not the form, of Besley and Coate (1995). 
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candidates' stated platforms due to their humanly limited computational skills. The 
indeterminacy of voting in multi-dimensional space is thus rendered irrelevant. 
Given the incompleteness of political contracts, candidates' platforms do not represent 
legislative agendas, and voters do not seek to anticipate candidates' policy decisions 
once elected.' ? Platforms are instead instruments that signal candidates' political values, 
broad policy priorities, and ability to govern. Voters vote for the candidate they trust 
most, not least to cope with unforeseen future problems. They vote over single-
dimensional personalities (i.e. "trust"), and not multi-dimensional issues. The vote 
allocates power, it does not bear information. This interpretation reconciles appealing 
features of both the rational ignorance and median voter approaches. Like the former, 
voters do not expend energy learning about candidates' policy proposals. But this is 
because of bounded rationality and incomplete political contracts, and not because voters 
do not seek to influence political outcomes. Indeed, like the latter approach they seek to 
determine elections that take place in a single dimension — candidate "trustworthiness". 
Such factors, which the rational ignorance view considers "non-substantive" personality 
issues, are in fact the only thing that matter. 
In the second stage political competition is in some sense replayed, but with 
different rules and different players in discrete settings which treat the various 
dimensions of local policy one-by-one. Here the local government process devolves into 
issue-specific sub-games in which the institutions of local government (e.g. mayor, local 
council) are lobbied by private sector and civic organizations (e.g. firms, producer 
lobbies, traditional tribal structures, neighborhood associations, issue-specific interest 
groups, NGOs) over specific policy decisions. The precise characteristics of these sub-
games — and the equilibria that may result — depend upon the characteristics of the 
question at hand; this allows us to deal with such factors as history, ideology, and the 
organizational structure of local society. But all share a simple over-arching structure. 
Each stage two decision process can be described as a simple n-player game, where 
players include interested civic and private organizations who compete to lobby a local 
government decision-maker. The object of each sub-game is a decision regarding a 
particular policy question (e.g. build a school, issue a bond). Hence each sub-game 
occurs in uni-dimensional policy space. Through their lobbying, players reveal the 
payoffs they will provide the decision-maker if the policy is implemented in teims of 
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cash and expected votes at the next election. Cash payoffs must be non-negative, 
whereas vote payoffs can take positive as well as negative values. Players' ability to 
provide cash and votes will vary. Once all vote-cash pairs have been revealed, the 
government official's decision consists of a simple constrained maximization in which 
she maximizes her payoff subject to sufficient votes to be re-elected in the following 
period. 18 
Stage two is thus where preference revelation occurs. Sub-games are preference-
revelation incentive compatible as the events that trigger them — whether planned to a 
regular schedule (e.g. the public budgeting process, the public works program) or not 
(e.g. an external shock) — naturally call forth the lobbying efforts, testimony, demands, 
and expressions of interest of diverse parties. Voters and organizations that are 
indifferent remain on the sidelines. All of this information enters the political arena, and 
based on it a decision is taken. This part of the model relies on the pressure group 
politics literature of scholars such as Bentley (1967), Finer (1997) and Truman (1951), 
which claims that "real" democratic decision-making is a function of the interaction of 
such groups with government officials. 
If stage two is where specific policy outcomes are determined, the quality of 
elected officials is set in stage one. The trust over which individuals vote will be based 
on their impressions of candidate ability. Where candidates have experience in 
government, their records will tend to weigh heavily in this calculation. 19 In an open, 
competitive political system where information flows freely, corrupt agents will be 
associated with low trust and will have difficulty being re-elected. Crooked candidates 
will have to deform the political system to win elections consistently. The fairness and 
transparency of the electoral mechanism is thus essential to the proper operation of the 
local government model. This is consistent with the discussion of good and bad political 
agents in section 2.2 above, and is supported by the experiences of Viacha and 
Charagua. 
A key assumption of the model is that preference revelation involves the 
mediation of intervening organizations. Voters do not reveal their preferences 
This is similar to Austen-Smith and Banks (1989), who find no necessary structural relationship between 
post-electoral policy outcomes and candidates' announced electoral platforms. 
18 A stochastic term can be added to a policy outcome function, or equivalently to a voter turnout function, 
to prevent politicians being able to ensure re-election through the policies they enact. 
19 This constitutes a feedback mechanism from stage two outcomes to stage one elections. 
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individually, as per median-voter models. 2° Rather an initial round of preference 
aggregation is carried out by the spontaneously occurring organizations of civil society 
and the private sector. Thus an intermediate stage ensues in which partially aggregated 
preferences are revealed for public consideration in advance of the policy making stage. 
These actors then represent group-collective preferences to policy makers in the second 
stage of the governing process. Hence much will depend on the quality of these 
organizations and the rules and norms that govern their interaction. Questions of interest 
include: Is the sub-game dynamically transparent? Is it open to participation by all? Do 
organizations, and the interplay amongst them, elicit a broadly representative range of 
opinion from interested parties such that no players are privileged/dominant? Where 
these questions can be answered affirmatively, the resulting equilibria should entail 
political accountability in the strict sense that policies implemented are majority-
preferred. 
Another approach to these questions is to ask how the civic organizations that 
represent the poor or marginalized interact with other actors in the sub-game context. 
Private sector firms and associations will tend to have relatively strong cash 
endowments, and relatively weak vote endowments with which to engage in sub-game 
strategies. By contrast the civic organizations of the poor will tend to be relatively well-
endowed in votes and badly endowed in cash. Middle class civic organizations will lie 
between these extremes. Because cash is easier and cheaper to administer and offers 
policy-makers the prospect of immediate gratification, the poor enter a sub-game 
dynamic at a disadvantage. But in a developing country such as Bolivia where the poor 
are in majority, their countervailing electoral advantage may compensate. Much 
depends on the skills such groups display in eliciting members' needs and opinions. 
Much also depends on their ability to mobilize the vote. Both sets of activities rely on 
civic groups' ability to communicate information credibly: upwards in the case of 
preference revelation — from individuals to elected officials; and downwards in order to 
mobilize the vote — informing citizens about candidate quality and policy commitments 
in a way which coordinates voting behavior and achieves favorable electoral outcomes. 
Section 2.3 above discusses the characteristics of civic organizations that are 
politically effective. Where these traits obtain amongst the poor, their civic 
organizations can comprise a resilient social network capable of mobilizing the 
20 Indeed, the only way voters can know what aggregate preferences are in these models is by observing 
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information, social support and votes necessary to counterbalance the advantages natural 
to other interest groups. Such organizations are well-armed to compete effectively for 
power and resources in the political arena. But policy outcomes depend on the 
characteristics of the political system as well. Section 2.2 discusses the traits of the 
vigorous, competitive political system associated with good government. Such a system 
will spur the political entrepreneurship and policy innovation necessary for political 
exclusion to be arbitraged away, leading — as in Charagua — to a broadly representative 
local politics. Distortions can come from civic or economic actors, in both stages one 
and two. In Viacha, for example, the brewery damaged the integrity of electoral politics 
by actively undermining opposition parties through bribery and intimidation; they used 
similar tactics to cow civic organizations and rival private groups, and quell grass-roots 
dissent. In both stages of the game, the CBN-UCS managed to effectively clear the field 
of other players, leaving it a free hand to do as it pleased. From these experiences arise 
the observations in section 2.1 about the importance of openness and competition in the 
local economy. 
In addition to incomplete contracts and bounded rationality, the model presented 
here, relies on the ideas of costly transactions and hierarchy from the new institutional 
economics. Why do individuals organize into civic groups in the first place? Because of 
the transaction costs of attempting to sway policy in stage-two sub-games. Collective 
action through civic hierarchies — whether preference revelation or vote mobilization — is 
more effective21 and cheaper than attempting to coordinate individual actions through 
the market. Another implicit NIE concept is weak-folin selection. Civic and private 
organizational forms that are less successful in stage two should be de-selected over time 
in an open, competitive governance system, as losers mimic winners and organizations 
experiment with structure. Indeed, one of the most important consequences of Viacha's 
closed politics was the crippling of this mechanism. Weak civic organizations were 
sustained and even propagated by a governance regime that was impaired so as to 
prevent effective political competition in the second stage. In Charagua, by contrast, the 
mechanism's effectiveness was evident in the institutional changes it wreaked, as the 
MBL and1VINR vied to attract votes by adopting Guarani candidates and political 
positions. 
electoral outcomes 
21 Especially where public goods are concerned. 
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5. A Testable Conceptual Framework 
Our task is not only to explain the processes that comprise local government 
theoretically, but also to operationalize these ideas in such a way that they can be tested 
empirically through the type of qualitative, interview-based research used in Chapters 5 
and 6. Fortunately this is not difficult to do. Begin by dropping the staging of the 
previous model, which — if important for the theory — is not important for empirical 
work. This is because individual voting decisions are not observable, but overall voting 
outcomes are. Hence I can take electoral results as given and focus attention on the 
social and political dynamics of stage two (including examining political feedbacks into 
the unobserved electoral process of stage one), to which qualitative data are in any event 
better suited. To be useful, the new framework must relate to real, observed outcomes. I 
define these as the policy outputs determined by the institutions of government. Hence I 
collapse the model into an atemporal conceptual framework focusing on the institutions 
of local government: mayor, municipal council and oversight committee, and the 
decisions they make. I proceed by delving into qualitative attributes of the previous 
model's key relationships more carefully. These are characterized in such a way as to 
render them directly comparable as social actors or political agents that compete for 
influence or control over public institutions. Although I cannot observe the vote-cash 
pairs that private organizations offer elected officials, through my interviews I do 
indirectly observe their attempts to lobby government. And I observe what they obtain 
first-hand via policy outcomes. This suffices to allow deep, multi-faceted insight into 
how the system of governance operates in the districts I examine, as we shall see below. 
5.1 The Framework 
Local government is a hybrid. Its function is to produce local services and 
policies at the intersection of two market relationships and one organizational dynamic. 
Hence local government occurs at the confluence of two distinct forms of social 
interaction. Political parties and politicians are at the center of both market relationships. 
The first of these occurs between parties and individual voters. This can be thought of as 
the primary, or retail, political market in which parties exchange ideas and declarations 
of principle for votes;22 parties compete with promises and ideas to attract voters, who 
vote for the party or candidate that inspires the most confidence. The second market 
connects parties to private films, producer associations, and other economic and issue- 
22 Schlesinger (1984) describes a political market which is similar but not identical. 
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oriented interest groups. 23 This can be thought of as a secondary, or wholesale, political 
market in which specific policies or entire policy bundles, as well as broader influence 
over legislators and the policy-making process, are sold to interest groups in exchange 
for money.24,25 For simplicity, I assume from here onwards that civic organizations do 
not engage in this market; the assumption is supported by evidence from all nine case 
studies. The first of these relationships is intrinsic to the process of representative 
democracy. The second is derivative but compelling, arising from political parties' need 
to fund election campaigns and sustain party operations. 
It is important to emphasize the distinction between politicians/parties and 
government institutions: it is politicians and not governments who compete for votes in 
elections; likewise, it is not governments who sell influence in exchange for campaign 
and political funds, but the parties and politicians who control them. I follow Downs in 
defining party as "a team seeking to control the governing apparatus by gaining office in 
a duly constituted election."26 This raises a wealth of complex ethical issues concerning 
the mechanics of political finance and the limits of official responsibility. For purposes 
of the analysis that follows, I sidestep these issues by assuming that elected politicians 
engage in this secondary market as politicians, and not as governing officials, observing 
the organizational and behavioral constraints necessary to ensure this is so. The fact that 
such constraints are regularly violated in practice does not contradict the logic of the 
argument; nor its generality. 
The second form of social interaction in local government involves civil society 
conceived as a collectivity or set of collectivities — as opposed to atomized individuals — 
and their relationship with the institutions of government. Where governance is 
concerned local civil society operates like a complex of organizations, aggregating 
preferences and representing communities' needs, mediating community participation in 
the production of certain services, facilitating social expression and the assertion of local 
identity, and enforcing political accountability on the institutions of government. It is 
not useful to conceive of it as a quasi-market, either internally or in its dealings with 
government, as its dynamics are not founded on buying and selling. It is rather a set of 
24 Schlesinger explicitly rejects the possibility of such a market, on apparently moral grounds. I assert that 
the party system does operate in this fashon, as even casual observation of US politics illustrates. 
25 The relationship between campaign contributions and policy-making has been tested empirically, with 
positive results, by Ben-Zion and Eytan (1974), Palda and Palda (1985), and Poole and Romer (1985), 
amongst many others. 
26 op.cit, p.25. 
23 Interest groups form around specific issues as well, although this is more common in richer countries. 
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social organizations that develop their own norms of behavior and responsibility 
organically, and over time may develop stores of trust and credibility that enhance 
capacity, or may not. Local government depends on the relationships that collectively 
comprise civil society to elicit information necessary to the policy-making process, judge 
the efficacy of previous interventions, and plan for the future. Politicians also depend on 
these relationships to gauge public satisfaction with their performance between 
elections. 27 The organizational dynamic of civil society is thus intrinsic to the process of 
local governance. Figure 1 illustrates how civil society combines with the political 
markets described above to give rise to local government. In this diagram, the political 
parties which are most successful in competing for votes and resources win control of 
government institutions. These institutions then enter into a separate, more complex 
interaction with civic organizations that features varying degrees of feedback and social 
participation. 
Figure 1: A Model of Local Government 
In order for local government to be effective it is important that the market 
relationships and logic of social representation described above counterbalance each 
27 Bardhan (1996) makes the similar point that for decentralization to work, local government must be 
sensitive to the need for drawing on localities' local trust relationships. 
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other, and none dominate the others. A stable tension between the three elements creates 
a self-limiting dynamic in which the impulses and imperatives of interest groups can be 
contained within the bounds of political competition, and do not spill into the machinery 
of government nor erupt as civil strife. This is equivalent to allowing the economic, 
political and civic conditions outlined in the model above to obtain. Breaking this 
tension, on the other hand, can hobble government. Where the market for votes is weak 
or missing, government will tend to be undemocratic; where the economic market for 
political influence is weak, government may be insensitive to economic conditions; and 
where society's civic organizations are weak government will be lacking in information, 
oversight and accountability. In the interplay between these, the market for influence 
has the advantage of being a continuous process of exchange in which the priorities of 
economic interests are constantly brought to policy-makers' attention. By contrast, the 
electoral dynamic is binding on local governors only intermittently at elections. This 
lower periodicity is balanced however by the severity of the potential consequences — the 
ejection of politicians from power. These imperatives are therefore roughly balanced. 
Under usual circumstances, as discussed above, civil society is at a comparative 
disadvantage. Despite having the most pervasive network of the three, the instruments 
which civic leaders can deploy to influence policy define the extremes of costs and 
consequences. They carry in one hand the relatively inexpensive lever of public 
complaint and admonishment, including encouraging the grass-roots to vote in a 
particular way. But experience indicates that this tool is weak against well-financed 
politicians'with strong incentives to continue along a particular course. In its other hand 
society carries the threat of demonstrations and civil disobedience, culminating in civil 
revolt. This instrument is powerful indeed, but also very costly to deploy, and is only an 
effective threat when levels of social discontent have passed a given, relatively high 
threshold. The genius of Bolivian decentralization was to include civil society directly in 
the local governance process via oversight committees, thus making accountability an 
explicit and continuous process. Bolivian society now has a third instrument at its 
disposal: the ability to freeze all central disbursements to municipalities — and thus 
effectively cripple the vast majority of the country's districts — if it is dissatisfied with 
local policy. This, along with the direct insertion of the OC into the policy-making 
process, gives it a pet 	inanent voice and continuous participation in how it is governed. It 
allows public problems to be identified at an incipient stage, before discontent rises 
220 
Theorizing Local Government 
dangerously. 28 It also levels the playing field between the competing logics of market 
and representation that are intrinsic to local government. 29 But in doing so it increases 
the premium on social trust and responsibility and the coherence of social organizations, 
which enable civil organizations to effectively represent their interests before 
government. 
6. Conclusions 
Thus we see how careful consideration of a wealth of information from a very 
good and a very bad municipality yields a theory of local government which can 
untangle the conceptual knot of multi-dimensional policy space by incorporating realistic 
institutional features observed in the field. This theory is in turn resolved into a 
conceptual framework that can be tested with qualitative, interview-based information. 
Chapter 4 noted that while the fundamental argument in favor of decentralization is 
based on accountability and responsiveness, how these attributes come about is not 
elucidated. Theories lacking a convincing micro-political foundation for presumed 
mechanisms of accountability ultimately fail to explain why decentralized government 
should be more responsive than the centralized variety. We know how decentralization 
should work, but we do not know why it should. This failing is mainly due to the lack of 
a theory of local government. Failure to understand how local government works 
implies ignorance of how it differs from central government. 
This chapter provides a theory of local government. The key difference between 
local and central government, and the key to why decentralization works, is contained in 
the second stage of the local government game. There is nothing comparable in central 
government to the incentive-compatible social dynamic of sub-games focused on 
specific policy issues. Indeed nothing in central government can be comparable. 
Unelected agents will lack clear incentives to obtain necessary local information. And 
civic and private organizations will lack the means to affect policy. Under central 
government the first element of vote-cash pairs will not operate with local specificity; 
and the second half — in the absence of elections and hence the need to finance them —
will constitute bribery. Local interest groups will thus be limited to voting in national 
elections and contributing to national campaigns, and accountability for local policy 
28 The counter-example of Viacha, with its neutralized OC, highlights this point. 
29 Indeed, the timing of events in Charagua suggest this. The APG existed from the mid-1980s, but it was 
not until the first election after decentralization that everything changed. 
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decisions will not obtain. Hence our model of local government can explain not only the 
phenomena observed in Viacha and Charagua, but also the results of Chapters 2 and 3. 
By creating 198 municipalities and initiating second-stage dynamics throughout Bolivia, 
decentralization made government more responsive to local needs. It granted both 
political voice and real power to civic groups and the poor, as well as private-sector 
interests, and made policy makers accountable to the citizens they represent. Public 
investment became progressive in terms of wealth and need. 
The separation of political selection from policy decision in our model reflects 
Breton and Galeotti's (1985) distinction between the two principle views of the role of 
elections in democracy. In the first of these, elections serve primarily to choose a 
government, which governs so long as it retains the confidence of parliament. In the 
second, elections are primarily to signal public preferences to government, which seeks 
to satisfy them. The ideal of the first view is a sort of elected Hobbesian sovereign, 
while the ideal of the second is Athenian democracy. The distinction is all the more 
important because it is ignored by the median-voter model. 3° This paradigm conflates 
the two ideas, and the confusion is central to understanding its basic weakness. In the 
Athenian ideal, individuals present their own views directly by debating and voting on 
discrete legislative proposals. The problems of revealing and transmitting information 
are solved when citizens vote directly in assembly. In representative government, on the 
other hand, individuals vote for people to debate and decide legislative issues for them. 
Representatives are not many-stringed puppets who on any issue merely voice the views 
of their constituents. They are professionals whose job it is to inforni themselves about 
policy options and_act in their district's best interests. Voters, having delegated this 
responsibility, are thus free to get on with their lives. By positing elections as a 
mechanism not only for candidate selection but also preference revelation, the median-
voter model simultaneously invokes two conflicting views of representation, and creates 
an insoluble problem. The model proposed here solves the problem by separating the 
functions into two distinct stages of the government process. 
The chapter that follows will test the ideas developed here against evidence from 
seven additional Bolivian municipalities. But before doing so, it is instructive to do the 
same quickly for Viacha and Charagua. In Charagua the rural Guarani population was 
strongest in the market for votes, which they distributed between two parties, while 
30 As well as by much of the literature on representative government. 
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economic power was overwhelmingly concentrated in the hands of its cattle-ranchers. 
But Charagua's civic organizations were also in essence run by Guaranies through the 
APG, an organization as structured and disciplined as it is legitimate in the eyes of most 
residents. There was thus a tension between competing sources of power in Charagua 
which resulted in balanced government with substantial social participation. In Viacha 
the panorama was utterly different. There, both the market for influence and that for 
votes were dominated by the brewery and its political offshoot, the UCS. And civil 
society was divided along ethnic and historical lines, riven with hostilities and mistrust, 
which rendered its organizations incapable of cooperation and unable to work with 
government institutions in any substantive way. Local government was thus completely 
unbalanced. Having mastered the market dynamics out of which government arises, the 
UCS was able to perpetuate its corrupt and ineffective rule in the absence of any 
countervailing economic, political or social forces which might have moderated it or 
demanded accountability. The framework thus appears to explain the quality of local 
government in the two districts adequately. The next chapter examines seven more 
municipalities in order to tests its insights and extend its generality. 
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Testing the Teory: The Micro-Political Foundations of Government in 
Seven Bolivian Municipalities 
( 
1. Introduction 
So far Part II has examined the determinants of effective local government in two 
extreme cases of good vs. bad municipal performance by delving deeply into the social 
relations and economic and political dynamics which underlie governing institutions in 
each. I developed a model of local government which (i) describes how government 
works, and (ii) identifies key relationships between voters, firms, interest groups and 
civil society on the one hand, and elected politicians and the institutions of local 
government on the other. I showed how imbalances amongst these relationships can 
cripple accountability and distort the policy-making process, and located the 
fundamental causes of good and bad government in the economic structure of a district 
as it relates to the political party system, and in the cohesiveness and institutional 
capacity of its civil society. This chapter extends the analysis by applying the model to a 
further seven municipalities with diverse characteristics, in order to test its insights and 
generality and thereby refine its structure. 
The municipalities in question were studied at the same time and in the same 
way as Viacha and Charagua, through a systematic program of extensive semi-structured 
and unstructured interviews of local government and community leaders, key 
informants, and citizens at the grass-roots level. Detailed financial, administrative and 
geographic information was collected in each district.' As in Viacha and Charagua, the 
field work was largely focused on recording the opinions of people at the neighborhood 
and village level on the quality of public services and local government they received, 
and then determining how these outcomes came about. The municipalities were chosen 
to include Bolivia's main regions, ethnicities and cultures, and to mirror the country in 
terms of size, population, degree of urbanization, and economic base. The group thus 
"represents" Bolivia in the weak sense of representing each of its essential characteristics 
This is explained in more detail in Chapter 4. 
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in one or more of its number, and not in the strong sense of a representative sample used 
in the econometric work of Chapters 2 and 3. The absence of opportunities for statistical 
inference is hopefully more than compensated, however, by the depth of the analysis that 
this approach makes possible. 
Of the seven municipalities, two are on the altiplano: Desaguadero, perched on 
the edge of lake Titicaca by the Peruvian border, and Atocha, in the heart of Bolivia's 
southern mining country in Potosi. Two are in the valleys region of Bolivia between the 
altiplano and the eastern plain: Sucre, the historic seat of the Spanish audiencia and the 
country's constitutional capital, and Sipe Sipe, just east of Cochabamba, itself known as 
the "capital of the valleys". And three municipalities are in Bolivia's vast eastern region: 
Guayaramerin, a frontier town on the river Mamore which forms Bolivia's northern 
border with Brazil; Baures, further south and east and also in the department of the Beni; 
and Porongo, just off the main road twenty minutes southwest from Bolivia's second 
city of Santa Cruz. The seven are mixed in terms of population as well, ranging from the 
tiny Desaguadero and Baures, with 4,000 and 5,000 inhabitants respectively, through 
Porongo and Atocha, all small by Bolivian standards, to Sipe Sipe, Guayaramerin and 
Sucre, whose populations varying between 20,000 and 153,000 make them large for 
Bolivia. In terms of the rural/urban divide the group generally mirrors the country, with 
five rural municipalities ranging in urban share of the population from 0-43%: 
Desaguadero, Baures, Porongo, Sipe Sipe and Atocha; and two highly urban 
municipalities, Sucre and Guayaramerin, both with 86% of their populations in the city. 
Their physical sizes also vary, from Desaguadero and Porongo, small towns with modest 
catchment areas, to huge Baures which covers an empty swathe of land, rivers and 
marshes stretching from the main town to the mining communities on the river Itenez, on 
the border with Brazil. 
In economic and social terms the group is quite varied as well. Desaguadero and 
Sipe Sipe, in the more settled Andean region of Bolivia, have relatively stable mestizo 
and indigenous populations who speak a mixture of Spanish with Aymara or Quechua 
respectively, with Spanish preferred in town and the indigenous tongue in the 
countryside. Both are essentially farming areas, although Desaguadero combines an 
agricultural hinterland with a classic border-town economy based on transport and trade. 
Most migration is of the young departing for the cities of La Paz or Cochabamba, or the 
fertile lands of the east, and hence the populations of both are relatively ethnically 
homogeneous. On the far side of the country Baures shares some of these 
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characteristics, although its agriculture is more cattle-based and its nzestizaje is of white 
Spanish-speakers with indigenous speakers of the Baures dialect. Its location in the 
Bolivian north and the lack of a passable land route have kept Baures isolated from the 
rest of the country, blocking in-migration. Hence its population is a stable mix of a small 
white minority with a mestizo-indigenous majority. 
Atocha, Porongo and Guayaramerin, on the other hand, are essentially immigrant 
societies, with a majority of their inhabitants born elsewhere and a dissonant mix of 
languages, religions and ethnic groups. Their populations have changed dramatically 
over the past two decades, to the point where in the latter two many people from eastern 
and western Bolivia are virtually unable to communicate with each other. Other than 
their heterogeneity and demographic instability, however, the three municipalities have 
little in common. Atocha is a mining economy bolted onto a subsistence-level 
agricultural hinterland, and its migration is mostly of western Bolivians from the 
departments of Potosi, Oruro and La Paz. Demographic movements are highly sensitive 
to mineral prices, and flows of people in and out in recent years first slashed the district's 
population and then doubled it. In Porongo and Guayaramerin, on the other hand, there 
is abundant evidence of the long-term Bolivian pattern of migration from the 
agriculturally poor western highlands to the fertile lowlands of the east. In both, 
migrants from other parts of Santa Cruz and the Beni mingle with ex-miners and farmers 
from the highlands, and the remaining locals struggle to recall what their hometown was 
once like. In economic terms Porongo is closer to Sipe Sipe, an agricultural district close 
to a large city, while Guayaramerin is more like Desaguadero, with its border-town 
economy and a hinterland of poor farming villages. 
The seventh municipality, Sucre, stands apart as by far the largest of the group 
and sixth-largest in Bolivia, with a service-oriented economy based on government and 
the university, and well-established small industries. Sucre also has a fairly large 
hinterland extending several hours' drive to the north and west, where rural communities 
practice subsistence farming. Home to the self-styled bluest-blood descendants of 
Spanish colonizers, Sucre's mix of white, mestizo and indigenous has become even 
more heterogeneous in recent years as it has been joined by tens of thousands of ex-
miners and farmers from Potosi and Oruro, along with smaller numbers from the 
Bolivian east. These Aymara and Quechua-speakers have brought their native languages 
into a Spanish-speaking city which traditionally shunned the Quechua countryside, so 
adding another layer onto Sucre's traditional rural-urban divide. The divide is apparent 
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in Sucre's index of Unsatisfied Basic Needs , (UBN), where the value for the city, 0.388, 
is far superior to the rural value, 0.971. This difference is especially striking as Sucre 
has the second-best urban UBN value in the country; indeed, the difference between 
Sucre's urban and rural UBN values, and by implication the disparity between urban and 
rural provision of basic services, is the largest in Bolivia. This gap is reflected, albeit 
less dramatically, amongst the other six municipalities, with urban Guayaramerfn and 
near-urban Atocha registering significantly lower UBN values than rural Desaguadero, 
Baures, Porongo and Sipe Sipe. Figures 1-7 present a broad array of descriptive 
statistics for the seven municipalities. 
Lastly, the political complexion of municipal government in our districts is quite 
telling. Only three of the seven respected the political alliances which dominated 
national politics at the time: Sucre, where the mayor was sustained by a political 
coalition which reflected the 1993-97 national government, and Sipe Sipe and Baures, 
run by parties of the opposition (which assumed power in 1997). Each of the other four 
municipalities was run by coalitions which in one way or another spanned the national 
government-opposition divide. This suggests that local politics in these municipalities 
was not subordinate to national political strategies, but rather responded individually to 
local conditions and local imperatives. I return to this point in greater detail below. 
This chapter will not employ the high level of descriptive detail used in the 
previous one, preferring a more conceptual and analytic approach. The remainder of the 
chapter is organized as follows. Section two reviews how municipal government has 
changed in the seven districts since decentralization, both administratively and in terms 
of policy outputs, and considers how successful these changes have been. Section three 
examines the social, economic and political factors which underlie local governance, 
focusing on their most salient features. Section four examines how these factors 
combine to produce the institutions of local government, and hence the quality of the 
local governance system. Section five summarizes the analysis, highlighting notable 
comparisons and drawing lessons from the outliers. Section six modifies the model in 
light of the analysis and concludes. 
This index represents the gap between a municipality's basic needs and available public services, and is 
calculated from census data. A value of one represents maximum deprivation. 
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2. Local Government After Decentralization 
Decentralization brought about significant changes in the finances, 
administrations and policy priorities of our seven districts. But these changes were not 
uniform across the group. The municipal budgets and staffing of the smaller, less 
established districts grew spectacularly after 1994, while the older and more settled ones 
saw smaller gains. The Law of Popular Participation (LPP) increased central-local 
devolutions for all municipalities in Bolivia', and hence all municipalities saw their 
budgets rise. But in smaller districts with fewer sources of revenue these increases were 
enormous. Thus Baures' budget grew ten times, Atocha's and Porongo's grew 23 and 
24 times respectively, and Sipe Sipe's growth was technically infinite. 4 Districts with 
sources of own revenues before decentralization, on the other hand, saw increases which 
— while significant — were more modest: 470% in Guayaramerin, 138% in Desaguadero, 
and 40% in Sucre. 5 Municipal staffing levels show a similar pattern before and after 
1994. The poorer, more tenuous districts saw increases in personnel that ranged from 
62% in Sipe Sipe to 80% in Atocha and an impressive 1100% in Porongo, which before 
3 The main articles of the LPP are summarized in Chapter 1. 
4 From nothing to Bs. 2.7 million. 
See figures 8-14 for sectoral breakdowns. Sources: municipal interviews and Ministry of Finance 
database. 
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decentralization "had only one municipal employee, the chief municipal officer, who did 
everything."6 Desaguadero's payroll, by contrast, rose just 29%, and Sucre's actually 
fell by one-third. Lastly, the salaries municipalities paid their employees reflected this 
divide as well, staying roughly constant in Desaguadero and Sucre, doubling in 
Guayaramerin, and rising by considerably more in the rest. 7 
It is reasonable that the group would divide on these criteria between places 
where functioning municipal institutions pre-date the LPP, and places where they only 
sprang into being in 1994. In the former, "old" municipalities, local taxes had long 
permitted governing institutions to operate and provide public services, and hence the 
changes decentralization catalyzed, while not unimportant, were incremental. 8 The 
"new" municipalities, by contrast, essentially lacked local government before 
decentralization, and hence the reform marked a revolution in their local affairs. 9 It is 
interesting to note that the one municipality that did not exist at all before 
decentralization — Baures, previously an agency of the municipality of Magdalena — did 
not register the largest budgetary and payroll increases. That honor was taken by 
Porongo, followed by Atocha. This is an indication of just how desperate the state of 
many of Bolivia's small, rural municipalities was. Although these districts existed in 
theory, many of them — like Baures — may as well not have existed at all. 
It is particularly interesting to consider the municipalities' hiring practices and 
the technical competence of their staff in this light. That new municipalities did not 
enforce qualifications requirements for their personnel is not surprising. Their history 
was of struggling to find individuals to act as mayor or chief municipal officer with no 
administrative support and a salary which — in the best of circumstances — was risible. 
When the opportunity to hire a full complement of staff at realistic salaries arose, the 
local labor force was generally too small and unskilled to allow a careful selection of 
employees according to strict technical criteria. Hence mayors hired as opportunities 
arose, and there was a strong component across all four of "doing their best" under 
heavy constraints. 10 The old municipalities, on the other hand, already benefited from 
established bureaucracies, relatively high staffing levels, and a local pool of qualified 
labor. With new resources at their disposal, and given the extra responsibilities 
6 Silvio Rojas Aguilera, mayor, interview, Porongo, 7 April 1997. 
7  Interviews with the mayors and key municipal staff of all seven municipalities. See interview list for 
details. 
8  Interviews with the mayors and key municipal staff of Desaguadero, Guayaramerfn and Sucre. 
9  Interviews with the mayors and key municipal staff of Atocha, Baures, Porongo and Sipe Sipe. 
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decentralization imposed, one might expect them to have implemented a more rigorous 
policy of hiring by qualifications. But none of the three did so. In fact their personnel 
policies were worse than neutral in this respect, as all three operated quotas systems 
whereby staff were chosen by ruling political parties according to their electoral 
strength." 
The results, not surprisingly, were poor. Whereas local observers and grass-roots 
leaders in the new municipalities reported improvements in the quality of municipal 
employees since 1994, their similars in Sucre and Guayaramerin did not. "The 
municipality is more a political than a technical institution," said Sucre's General 
Secretary. "There are no educational requirements and lots of political pressure. Lots of 
[our] people are unprepared... it's a disaster." 12 Respondents in Desaguadero went 
further still, testifying that the municipal administration had actually worsened during 
this period. In the words of the mayor, municipal employees "were more capable and 
better paid before". 13 This begs the question of how political quotas arose in these 
districts. Quotas may have been the coincidental result of idiosyncrasies in each of these 
three municipalities, or they might be related systematically to their "oldness", some 
formalization of political bargaining arising out of repeated interactions. 
Decentralization also brought about significant changes in public investment in 
the seven municipalities. Consider figures 8-14, which compare public investment under 
central government during the last three years before decentralization with that of local 
government during the first three years after. Most striking is that central government 
invested nothing at all in three of the municipalities — Atocha, Desaguadero and Sipe 
Sipe — and in Baures invested only in transport. After decentralization, by contrast, the 
four carried out a varied menu of investment projects, in concert with the other three. 
Also compelling is the shift away from economic and urban infrastructure, which 
dominated investment pre-decentralization, in favor of human capital investment. 
Indeed, before 1994 energy, transport and urban development accounted for 78-100% of 
investment in three of the four municipalities that received any. After 1994, local 
governments' investments in education, water and health accounted for 70% or more of 
public investment in four districts, and between 41-51% in two others. Only in Sucre, 
curiously, did human capital investment remain low. 
1° ibid. 
11 Desaguadero, Guayaramerfn and Sucre, op. cit. 
12 Raimundo Candia, municipal general secretary (i.e. chief officer), interview, Sucre, 15 April 1997. 
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But variations in priorities are also evident amongst the decentralized 
governments. Focusing on investment after 1994, we see systematic differences 
between large and small municipalities' use of public resources. The large districts 14 in 
the group, Sucre, Guayaramerin and Sipe Sipe, invest much less in human capital: only 
35% of their portfolio on average vs. 71% for small districts. Conversely, large 
municipalities invest three times as much as small ones on urban development: 49% vs. 
16%. Among those that received no investment before decentralization, investment after 
is also concentrated in human capital in the range of 51-74% of their portfolios vs. 
13 Rosendo Mamani Quispe, mayor, interview, Desaguadero, 25 March 1997. 
14 I define "large" as those in the upper quintile of municipalities by population. 
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12-39% in urban projects and less for 
economic infrastructure. These 
magnitudes imply that human capital was 
the top priority of the worst-off 
municipalities in Bolivia — the smallest, 
poorest and most rural that were 
traditionally ignored by the state. This is 
consistent with the findings of Chapter 2, 
which concluded that it was the policy 
priorities of precisely these districts that 
drove national changes in investment 
patterns after decentralization. By contrast central government, which faced no external 
restrictions on its choice of investments, chose to focus instead on infrastructure projects 
in the cities. 
Given such large differences amongst the seven municipalities' administrations 
and policy decisions, it is important to ask how satisfied were the inhabitants of each? 
Were local governments open to their opinions and participation? What did they think 
of the public services they received, and in what regard did they hold town hall? The 
information from six months of fieldwork is abundant in this respect, and revealing. Top 
marks amongst civic leaders, grass-roots respondents, business, union and religious 
authorities, and other local notables clearly go to the youngest municipal government of 
the bunch, Baures. The quality of its investment projects and the public services it 
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provides was judged "good" or "very good" by all of the respondents I spoke to, a 
standard which none of the others approached. 15 Its investment planning system was 
based on village-level assemblies which discussed and approved project requests, on 
which local government then based its Annual Operating Plan (AOP). These meetings 
were reported to be extremely open and participatory — "even animals can attend," in the 
words of one respondent' s — and won the broad approval of the local population. And 
the mayor and municipal council were deemed of high quality and eager to serve their 
jurisdiction. "Here they work well and the people are content with them," the leader of 
Jasiakiri said of the council. "They're with the people." 17 Several respondents from 
both town and countryside testified approvingly that town hall had so far favored rural 
farmers, "as they have the greatest needs and are in the majority here," 18 and not cattle-
ranchers nor miners, whose needs were less pressing. Baurefios' contentment with their 
municipal government stood in stark contrast to their denunciation of the previous one, 
based in Magdalena, of which they were then a part. There was a broad consensus in 
Baures that Magdalena had ignored their needs and given them nothing, and had run an 
untransparent administration that was possibly corrupt. Self-government, they testified, 
had solved these problems. 
Second place in terms of popular satisfaction goes jointly to Porongo and Sucre. 
Most of their investment projects were described by respondents as "good" or "regular", 
with the balance of opinion favoring "good". It is notable, however, that rural 
communities' appraisals in Sucre were significantly lower than those of urban 
communities. The planning processes of both districts were described as reasonably 
open in principle, but in practice susceptible to personal influences or the capriciousness 
of municipal officers. For example, Sucre uses a well-designed participative planning 
system in which project ideas rise from neighborhood/community level through multiple 
stages of discussion and approval to city hall, where they are screened by technicians for 
feasibility, cost, and overall consistency. The resulting draft AOP then goes back down 
to the local level in its entirety to repeat the process of discussion and modification. But 
despite this exhaustively participative protocol, local government used its technical 
oversight to alter or ignore some communities' requests, telling Chuqui-Chuqui, 
15  All respondents were asked to rate public investment projects and the quality of local public services on 
the following scale: Very Bad — Bad — Regular — Good — Very Good. 
16 Oscar Duran, neighborhood council president, interview, Baures, 2 May 1997. 
" Juan Jahnsen, Jasiakiri community leader, interview, El Cairo, 3 May 1997. 
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nonsensically, "not to request a dike or water project because those were not in the 
AOP." 19 And in Porongo, the president of the oversight committee (OC) reported that 
several farming communities had changed their project requests during preparation of 
the 1996 AOP, in order to conform to an official list of "acceptable projects". 2° 
Both municipalities had mixed, but ultimately positive opinions of their 
municipal executive, and poor opinions of their municipal councils. Porongo's mayor 
was praised for his effort and good intentions in travelling throughout the district to meet 
the people. But many opined that his technical staff were of poor quality. And they 
singled out the municipal council for censure as highly politicized individuals most of 
whom lived in Santa Cruz, making them unresponsive to local needs. By contrast 
Sucre's urban majority seemed reasonably content with the quality of government they 
received, though they similarly reproached the municipal council as place-holders who 
obeyed their parties and ignored voters. But rural sucrenses denounced city hall for 
betraying them, declaring their condition to be the same or worse than before 
decentralization. "Up to now we've had nothing from popular participation," said 
Chuqui-Chuqu1. 21 "It doesn't respond to need locally. First one comes [from city hall] 
and says there's money for us, then another comes and reduces the amount, and in the 
end there's nothing."22 
Atocha occupies third place alone, with highly dispersed opinions of its 
investments and public services. Most opinions were clustered between "good" and 
"bad", but collectively covered the entire range. There seems to be no pattern to 
respondents' judgements between town and countryside, or fanning vs. mining 
communities. Atocha's planning regime was quite open and participative, and in fact 
seemed to reflect local inputs more faithfully than Sucre's or Porongo's, although the 
mayor did push to secure the approval of a fairly large pet project in defiance of local 
demands in 1997.23 Regarding the performance of the local executive branch, atocheitos 
were reticent, referring more generally to the changes decentralization had wrought. But 
18 Hugo Melgar Barbery and Erland Ayllon Parada, municipal council president (Mm) and member 
(independent, ex-MNR), interview, Baures, 2 May 1997. 
19 Claudio Torres, community leader, interview, Chuqui-Chuqui, 18 April 1997. 
20 Benedicto Bonilla Rojas, oversight committee president, interview, Porongo, 7 April 1997. 
21 As in Chapters 5 and 6, when referring to village-level testimony I often use the construction "Village X 
said" to mean "the leaders of Village X said", in the interest of parsimony; footnotes also receive this 
treatment in the interest of accuracy. 
22 Chuqui-Chuqui, op.cit. 
23 Raul Mamani Villca, oversight committee president, interview, Siete Suyos, 22 April 1997. The project 
in question is a cameloid (i.e. llamas, alpacas and vicuñas) development project. 
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the general perception seemed to be that town hall, while better than before, was still not 
good enough, especially as it ignored some rural communities entirely. "We've seen 
little change here," reported Chorolque, "but it was worse before." Although the mayor 
was regarded as well-meaning and reasonably competent, his municipal council was 
judged ignorant, uninterested, and ineffectual. Its president, one observer mentioned 
with contempt, did not know how to read. 24 Surprisingly, a number of respondents 
testified that the council had been even more politicized in previous years, and was 
forced to improve by the OC. 
Desaguadero, Guayaramerin and Sipe Sipe collectively bring up the rear. Like 
Atocha, popular verdicts on their investments and public services were dispersed over 
the entire range of possibilities, though most vary from "bad" to merely "regular". It is 
striking that planning procedures in all three cases were largely closed to popular input, 
dominated by municipal staff. While some projects did originate in community ideas, 
others did not, and communities had little or no say in project planning or execution, and 
no recourse for altering official plans. One technical officer in the municipality of 
Guayaramerin told me, "We reformulate the AOP as we see fit. We don't consult grass-
roots organizations because they bitch too much. We know we should, but we don' t." 25 
 In Sipe Sipe the community of Siquisiquia wanted a well, but'had to settle for a school 
when government refused to fund the former.26 Not surprisingly, popular assessment of 
the institutions of local government was poor in all three districts. It was worst in Sipe 
Sipe, where the previous mayor, under pressure to resign, switched jobs with the 
president of the municipal council. But popular opinion was not satisfied, and grass-
roots organizations forged a consensus to rescind their recognition of the oversight 
committee, which was seen as partial to the mayor, in order to appoint a new OC to 
investigate the new mayor. The leader of Mallco Rancho explained that their intention 
was to cause the suspension of central-government transfers in order to force him from 
power. 27 
24 Fr. Jose Dessart, parish priest, interview, Atocha, 25 April 1997. 
25 Alberto Albert, municipal technical advisor and ex-municipal council president, interview, 
Guayaramerin, 20 October 1997. 
26 Eduardo Ala, Celso Cuba and Andres Cuba, community leader, spokesman and officer, interview, 
Siquisiqufa, 29 May 1997. 
27 Guillermo Saavedra Crespo, Cesar Arnez Mondragon, Eduardo Cespedes and Fernando Montan Arnez, 
community president, vice-president, officer, and oversight committee vice-president, interview, Mallco 
Rancho, 28 May 1997. 
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Rank Municipality 
Investment 
Project 
Ratings* 
Project 
Planning** 
1 Baures Good-Very Good Very Open 
2 Porongo Good Fairly Open 
Sucre Good Open but Arbitrary 
3 Atocha Good-Bad Open but Distorted 
4 Desaguadero Regular-Bad Closed 
Guayaramerin Regular-Bad Closed 
Sipe Sipe Regular-Bad LG-Dominated+ 
Local Government 
Performance++ 
Rural 	Urban/Town 
Good - Much Improved 
Good Mayor, Poor Council 
Bad 	I Mediocre 
Mediocre - Not Good Enough 
Bad 	1 Mediocre 
Bad Mediocre 
Bad 
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Opinions in Guayaramerin were mixed. In the city, in the wake of a previous 
mayor widely considered corrupt and ineffective, people suspended judgement as they 
waited to see what the current one might accomplish. In the countryside, however, 
community leaders attacked the mayor for grossly favoring the city at their expense. But 
it was Desaguadero that had the most curious assessment. There urban opinion was that 
the municipality was marginally acceptable because it invested large sums in the 
countryside. But rural communities accused the mayor of depriving them of all 
resources and denying them political voice. Lastly, the municipal councils of all three 
districts were widely held in very low esteem as politicized, unresponsive institutions. 
And the councilmen of Sipe Sipe and Guayaramerin, in particular, were generally 
considered corrupt. "The municipal council," observed the director of the Guayaramerin 
Hospital, "is worthless."28 Figure 15 summarizes popular perceptions of municipal 
performance. 
Figure 15 
Sources: Author's interviews, observation and other fieldwork 
* Most common ratings as given by communities and grass-roots leaders 
** Degree of openness to local ideas, needs and participation 
+ LG = Local Government 
++ As rated by communities and grass-roots leaders; urban/rural differences noted 
where relevant 
3. Economics, Politics, Society 
What patterns can we glean from the successes and failures of our seven 
municipalities? How can such large differences in local government effectiveness be 
accounted for? I maintain that an explanation based on the quality of local government 
institutions focuses only on apparent reasons. More fundamental causes, as argued in 
28 Gabriel Sosa Salvatierra, hospital director, interview, Guayaramerin, 22 October 1997. 
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Chapters 5, 6 and 7, lie deep in the interactions of the local economy, political dynamics 
and social structure of each municipality. We take each in turn. 
3.1 The Local Economy 
Chapter 7 found that economic hegemony, or monopsony in the supply of money 
to the local political system, tends to reduce competition amongst political parties, and 
therefore political oversight of the institutions of local government. An open and 
competitive local economy, on the other hand, foments competition in politics, thereby 
increasing the diversity of ideas and policies that compete for public favor. This section 
examines the local economic structure of our seven municipalities. 
Our seven cases include a wide variety of economic activities. Baures, Porongo 
and Sipe Sipe are all farming communities. The mainstay of the inhabitants of Sipe Sipe 
is subsistence or near-subsistence agriculture on family plots, with no large landowners 
surviving the agrarian refollii. "The hacienda was bought out in 1953," the leader of 
Parotani, Sipe Sipe, explained. 29 Porongo is also a district of small farmers, but with 
higher levels of production that allow them to sell food to the city. Baures adds a cattle 
economy of 35,000 head to a similar agricultural base. The few large farms in the 
district belong to ranchers based in La Paz, Santa Cruz and Trinidad, and Baures' 
remaining ranchers are medium-sized to small, making it similar to the other two. 3°31 
 Baures, too, once had large land-owners whose farm workers were virtual slaves. 32 B t 
they entered decline in the 1970s and eventually died out. Partly as a result, land is not a 
source of social conflict. In a sparsely populated district, land is in abundance, easily 
available, and there is little competition for it. 33 In all three districts the towns primarily 
suppOrt the farming economy through commerce and agricultural services, and are 
essentially devoid of all other industry. 
Porongo stands out, however, due to its proximity to Bolivia's second city and its 
most dynamic, fastest-growing business center, Santa Cruz. The long-term agricultural 
decline that operated in Charagua affected Porongo as well, where falling food prices 
and the development of the urban economy reduced the appeal of inheriting the farm as 
it increased the luster of an urban, professional life. But because of its location, the 
29 Demetrio Orellana, community leader, interview, Parotani, 27 May 1997. 
30  Hugo Ayllon Parada, Cattlemen's Association president, interview, Baures, 2 May 1997. 
31 Grover Martinez Franco, mayor, interview, Baures, 2 May 1997. I adhere to local definitions, where 
large is more than 1,000 head of cattle, medium is 300-600, and small is less than 300. 
32 El Cairo, op. cit. See Chapter 4, Box 3: The Slavery of Captive Communities, for a description of the 
general phenomenon. 
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outcome in Porongo was diametrically opposed to that of Charagua. Here the sons of 
wealthy landowners, who migrated to the city for educations and then careers, stayed 
close enough to maintain weekend houses in the town and a strong interest in its affairs. 
Through their wealth and social position they were able to dominate local politics despite 
their urban residences and occupations. Hence a district that comprises a single, rural 
economy with few differences between town and countryside, where a commonality of 
economic interest should have prevailed, was captured by a wealthy enclave which 
served as a vector to import the concerns and priorities of the city into its midst. This 
had, as we shall see below, decisive effects on its politics and government. 
Sucre, Guayaramerfn and Desaguadero present a different case of more complex 
economies, where an agricultural hinterland coexists with an industrial/commercial hub. 
Despite being at opposite extremes of the size distribution, Sucre and Desaguadero share 
the characteristic of combining a modern, urban market economy with a rural sector of 
subsistence agriculture. In Desaguadero the urban economy is dominated by transport 
and trade with neighboring Peru, with some 300 vehicles per day passing through the 
town, most of them high-capacity trucks. 34 This traffic generates significant revenues 
for the municipality, and control of local government is lucrative. The small town's 
economy revolves around truck owners, truck drivers, and the businesses that serve 
them. Economic actors are mainly small, and there are no large owners. Desaguadero's 
farmers, on the other hand, work small plots and do not grow for export. The town's 
economic links are therefore stronger with the La Paz-El Alto conurbation than with the 
villages that stretch outward to the south and east. The fact that trade depends on the 
relative fortunes of Bolivia and Peru — two very volatile economies in recent years —
serves to strengthen the town's focus across the border, away from its hinterland. 
In Sucre, the city is largely a service economy, dominated by the institutions of 
national and departmental government, and the large, very old and prestigious 
Universidad Mayor y Pontificia San Francisco Xavier. Its biggest industrial concern, 
the cement company Fancesa, is a public film co-owned by the university, the prefecture 
and the municipality. After these, Sucre's most important economic institutions are its 
chocolatiers, hat makers and tanneries, none of them large. "Sucre was founded for 
bureaucratic reasons, not economic ones," the Chamber of Commerce's directors 
34 Alfredo Bravo Mujica and Mario Cerda Escalante, municipal councilmen (IVINR and ADN respectively), 
interview, Desaguadero, 24 March 1997. 
33 H. Ay116n, op.cit. 
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elaborated, "because the wives of the Spanish died giving birth in Potosf." 35 It was once 
run by a mining and landowning oligarchy, according to the District Director of 
Education, but the revolution of 1952-53 ended that, and there have been no dominant 
economic interests since. 36 Today the countryside is made up of poor family farms that 
grow potatoes, wheat and corn in the dry hills of Chuquisaca. With little surplus 
production, the cash economy is fragile and trade with the city is small. In both 
municipalities the two economies, rural and urban, are internally homogeneous, 
characterized by small-to-medium-sized actors and no dominant (private) interests. But 
there is little to connect them, and they coexist side-by-side, barely interacting. 
Guayaramerin consists of a highly urbanized municipality with an extensive rural 
hinterland which, alone amongst our group, comprises a single agribusiness economy. 
Like Desaguadero, it has the transport and trade-based economy of a frontier town. But 
unlike it, Guayaramerin also benefits from large agricultural enterprises, including 
almond, Brazil nut, and heart-of-palm packagers/exporters, cattle ranchers, loggers and 
timber merchants, and a significant retail sector that exploits exchange-rate movements 
between the Boliviano and Real. This last spans the barrier of legality, running to drugs 
and contraband. The nature of these businesses implies that the urban and rural 
economies are intertwined: wealthy businessmen have large rural landholdings and 
employ many villagers, and the economic conditions that large and small actors face —
given by weather, disease and infrastructure among others — are often the same. Unlike 
Sucre and Desaguadero, however, Guayaramerin's economy is dominated by a small 
group of powerful businessmen who collectively own much of the local economy and all 
of its large businesses. Some of the strongest among them are timber merchants and 
cattle ranchers, who also control the local political parties and through them local 
government, treated in more detail below. The most important two businessmen, 
"Cacho" and "Gigi", were locked in a battle for influence that is typical of the 
dominance of the business elite to which they belong. Hernan "Cacho" Vargas Rivera is 
the most powerful businessman in Guayaramerin, with Brazil nut, heart-of-palm, and 
river and land transport companies, two television stations, and 140,000 hectares of land 
in Pando. 37 His rival, Adridn "Gigi" Rivera, is a hotel-owner, president of the local 
35 Alfredo Yaiiez and Juan Carlos Sobut, directors of the Chamber of Commerce, interview, Sucre, 16 
April 1997. Sucre is located 1500m lower than the mining center of Potosi and has a dry, mild climate. 
36 Samuel Montellano Aparicio, district director of education, interview, Sucre, 14 April 1997. 
37 Hernan Vargas Rivera, agro-industrialist, TV station owner and ADN chief, interview, Guayaramerin, 21 
October 1997. 
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electricity cooperative, and money-lender at rates of 5-7% per month. 38 Their names 
came up often in my interviews throughout the district when respondents were asked 
"who runs the show". 39 While Cacho attempted to gain control of municipal policy via 
the local Accion Democratica Nacionalista (ADN) party, which he leads, Gigi refused to 
lend the electricity cooperative $37,000 unless the municipality agreed to assume the 
debt, thus ensnaring it in his web. Though Cacho raged against this "scandal", he also 
admitted that, in his view, "the municipality has become an instrument" of powerful 
interests in Guayaramerin.49 
Last of all is Atocha, where the economy is cleanly divided into two more or less 
equal parts: mining and subsistence agriculture. The former is centered on a number of 
mining communities4I made up of rows of small huts with few or no basic services, a 
level of deprivation which resembles Atocha's rural villages. At each one the miners are 
organized in a loose cooperative, and work individually or in teams in narrow, often 
dangerous stretches of tunnel. "The cooperative no longer has the solidarity it once did," 
the parish priest lamented. "Before everyone earned the same wage, but now each miner 
is left to his fortune." 42 By 1997 miners had fallen a long way since the heyday of 
Comibo1 43 and the COB,44 when the two organizations in essence ran Atocha. No large 
miners were left, and the district's leading figures were the rich townsfolk, many of them 
alcohol and coca salesmen, and its politicians, often the same individuals. These 
changes notwithstanding, miners retained a higher capacity to mobilize than any other 
group in Atocha. With their tradition of militancy and a strong organization, they were 
quick to march on the town to defend their interests if necessary, as the mayor had 
discovered more than once. 45 The other, agricultural economy was organized around the 
small, low-yielding family farms typical of the altiplano; as elsewhere, large landowners 
had not survived agrarian reform. This economy did not grow so much as persist in the 
high altitude of Atocha, weakly linked to the mining and urban sectors and largely 
38 Adrian Rivera, electricity cooperative president, money-lender and hotel owner, interview, 
Guayaramerin, 21 October 1997. The only bank in Guayaramerin is a branch of BIDESA, which dispenses 
local salaries but does not lend. 
39 Quien manda? in Spanish. 
4° Vargas R., op.cit. 
41 Chorolque, Animas, and Siete Suyos are the main ones. 
42 Dessart, op.cit. Fr. Dessart worked in Atocha for more than three decades. 
The state mining enterprise, formed in the 1952 revolution. 
44 The Bolivian Confederation of Labor, of which miners were traditionally the backbone. Between the 
1950s and the 1980s the COB deliberated economic policy directly with the employers' federation and the 
government of the day. 
Pablo Vittorio Ayala, mayor, interview, Animas, 22 April 1997. 
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Rank Municipality Principal Sectors* 
Size of 
Leading Actors 
1 Baures Cattle, Agriculture Medium/Small 
2 Porongo Agriculture, City Medium 
Sucre (rural) Agriculture Small 
(urban) Services, Small Industry Medium/Small 
3 Atocha Mining, Agriculture Small 
4 Desaguadero Transport, Trade & Agriculture Medium/Small 
Guayaramerin Transport, Trade, Industry, 
Commerce, Agriculture & Timber 
Large 
Sipe Sipe Agriculture Small 
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ignored by the town. Atocha itself was the commercial center where mineral traders and 
other mining services, as well as more general commerce, were based. Its fortunes were 
largely dependent on the mines, and it looked naturally to them in search of its future. 
Although the seven municipalities present a broad range of economic interests 
and structures, summarized in figure 16, it is evident that economic structure alone is 
insufficient to explain their divergence in local government performance. We turn now 
to the local political system. 
Figure 16 
Sources: Author's interviews, observation and other fieldwork 
* In rough order of importance 
3.2 The Local Political System 
Chapter 7 found that a vigorous and competitive local politics, marked by 
political entrepreneurship and policy innovation, was necessary for effective local 
government. It listed three conditions for this to obtain: (i) an open and transparent 
political system, (ii) a competitive party regime, and (iii) a substantive focus on local 
issues and local people. Of these, the first would seem to be present in the seven cases. 
Complaints were common in all of our municipalities about the vituperative nature of 
political discourse: "We're worse off than before," reported Mojotoro, Sucre. "Before 
there was no politics here. Now they have campaigns and fight for power."46 But there 
was a broad consensus everywhere, with the possible exception of Porongo (see below), 
that electoral chicanery and intimidation were ills of the past, and elections were now 
free and fair. "The elections were clean here," said Sucre's district director of education, 
46 Juan Velabaruta, Esteban Copa, Felipe Sapana and Sabanio Fernandez Alanoca, community leader, 
community, ex-leader, and officer, interview, Mojotoro, 18 April 1997. 
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in a typical response. "Before they stuffed ballot boxes — there were many 
irregularities."47 
The only district with a fully competitive party regime was Baures, where clearly 
delineated governing and opposition alliances existed which mirrored at least in form the 
national pattern of politics. Local government was in the hands of an ADN-MIR 
coalition, and the MNR was in opposition. Indeed although politics in such a small 
population had an undeniably cozy air, and politicians knew each other and their families 
personally and well, politics was quite competitive in Baures, with rival blocs vying to 
unseat each other in local elections. "There's a lot of politics in this town," said one 
observer, referring to how party loyalties ran deep in local society. "Yesterday the 
people [at the village festival] were absolutely divided by political party, each off to one 
side."48 Not surprisingly, Baures had the lowest rate of electoral absenteeism amongst 
the seven, at 24%. Perhaps as a result, politics was not dominated by powerful economic 
or other interests, but was open to all and represented a broad range of views. Indeed, in 
the previous election the MNR had coopted the indigenous vote Charagua-style by 
naming a Baurefio to its party list. 49 And unlike other municipalities, as we shall see 
below, municipal councilmen did not cover up each other's transgressions; thus two 
MNR councilmen from the 1995 election had not yet been recognized, pending 
allegations against them from the previous government. But despite political 
competition that was often sharp, politicians managed to work relatively smoothly 
together, and it is telling that Baures' worst political conflict during this period came 
from the outside. This happened when the (MNR) prefect unilaterally donated a 
generator belonging to the town of Baures to nearby El Cairo when the latter's, used to 
pump water, broke down. The municipal council and oversight committee intervened at 
the scene of a public commotion and prevented him from doing so. 50 Their action was 
widely applauded throughout the district, even in the village of El Cairo. 51 
In Sucre, Porongo and Atocha, by contrast, competition in the local political 
system was essentially absent. So disinterested were Sucre's politicians in political 
rivalry that MNR councilmen, upon winning the 1995 local election, voted to return the 
Socialist Vanguard German Gutierrez to the mayor's office, while they, the MBL and 
47 Montellano A., op. cit. 
" Sisters Pilar and Teresa and Prof. Oscar Velazquez, CETHA, interview, Baures, 4 May 1997. CETHA is 
a church-supported institution specializing in adult education. 
49 Juan Oni Antelo, municipal councilman (MNR), interview, Baures, 2 May 1997. 
50 Melgar and Aylion, op.cit. 
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their other electoral allies quietly split municipal patronage amongst themselves. 
Gutierrez was known as a competent and honest politician, and the MNR was happy to 
support such a front-man in order to avoid political strife over municipal power. Politics 
in Sucre was not, therefore, a real clash of ideas or opportunity to effect change, but 
rather the means by which the political class shared out the spoils of power amongst 
itself. In Atocha politics was less fractious, with three parties holding 74% of the vote, 
led by the MNR. These three held all five council seats between them, and were all 
allied in a governing coalition. The MNR, a party which brought together the miners, 
peasant smallholders, and a number of the town's rich men, considered itself the natural 
party of government in this region. And no one was willing to oppose it. Porongo was 
more like Sucre, but for quite different reasons. Here a small clique of urbanites — sons 
of the town who had left it for the city (see above) — captured control of local 
government and used it to further their own, foreign priorities. As in Atocha, they 
represented the rich of the town, except that they did not live in the town. 52 This small 
group of friends referred to themselves curiously as los residentes, or more ominously la 
fraternidad, and were distributed amongst all the main political parties in what was in 
effect, if not by design, a group strategy for political domination. Once in power they 
showed no party discipline and no desire to compete; the MNR mayor governed in 
coalition with the ADN and MIR and there was no political opposition. The terms of the 
local politiCal debate accordingly reflected not the problems and interests of most 
poronguenos, but rather those of the few amongst them who lived in Santa Cruz. 
The three municipalities also shared the problem of electoral absenteeism in rural 
areas: In Atocha this was largely due to a lack of identification documents amongst 
would-be voters in rural areas, compounded by identification and voter registration 
drives in the city and environs that never reached most of the district's villages. 53 Hence 
Atocha's urban and surrounding voters had a disproportionate say in its politics at the 
expense of the countryside. Sucre's absenteeism was fairly low in the city, but rose as 
distance from the center increased. Peri-urban dwellers often lacked documents, or were 
not registered to vote locally; rural villagers also lacked identification and — with no 
electoral tradition and a city hall closed to their needs — were uninterested in politics and 
51 E1 Cairo, op.cit. 
52 "Rich" here is a relative term specific to the local context of each case. 
53 Victorio A., op.cit.; Severo Garcia Candia, neighborhood council ex-president, interview, Atocha, 23 
April 1997. 
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politicians. 54 Thus the rural-urban gulf that divided Sucre revealed itself in politics as 
well. Absenteeism took on a different form in Porongo. There, a number of rural 
communities found themselves closer to polling centers in Santa Cruz than any of 
Porongo's three,55 and accordingly registered and voted in the former. Other residents, 
more typically, lacked the interest or identification to vote, and did not bother to register. 
Thus while Porongo's rate of absenteeism appears low at 28%, its "true" absenteeism 
was much higher, estimated by different observers at between 60% and 75%. 56 
The effect of high rates of absenteeism was to facilitate the manipulation of 
electoral results by means which, while perhaps not strictly illegal, were ethically 
dubious. Thus in Porongo the mayor cheerfully asked me, "Do you know how I won the 
election? I had more trucks than my opponent!" 57 And he burst out laughing. To the 
extent that he simply provided local voters with free transport, he was guilty only of a 
partisan effort to get out the vote in a district lacking transport. But several observers 
accused him and others of trucking in paid "voters" from other municipalities, in 
violation of election laws. 58 It is not clear that this in fact occurred, although the 
Mayor's boast provides cause for alarm. If it did, then Porongo stands out as the 
exception in our group to increasing electoral transparency. More generally, "residents" 
were resented for bringing their families from Santa Cruz to vote in Porongo, in an 
attempt to tip electoral results. 59 In such a setting, the ultimate effect of Porongo's quasi-
absentee voters was to facilitate the success of such strategies by reducing the overall 
vote tally, thus abetting outsiders' attempts to distort the local political system. 60 
As a result of these factors, all three municipalities suffered from weak political 
accountability. 61 In Atocha and Porongo, high absenteeism sapped the power of 
elections to elicit information or constrain government's policy decisions; strategic 
bargaining by councilmen in the indirect election of Sucre's mayor produced a similar 
result there. All three municipalities lacked the disciplining effect of an active 
54  Mojotoro, op.cit.; Walter Encino, community leader, interview, Potolo, 19 April 1997. 
55  In an area of 110,000 ha. 
56 Bonilla R., op.cit.; Herman Gutierrez Viveros and Romulo Oyola Morales, chief administrative officer 
and ex-mayor, and technical officer, interview, Porongo, 8 April 1997. 
57  Rojas A., op.cit. 
58 Bonilla R., op.cit.; Roberto Suarez, district doctor, interview, Porongo, 9 April 1997. 
59 Cecilia Bonilla, school association president, interview, Villa Guadalupe, 8 April 1997. 
60 The probability that an incremental voter (brought in from outside) will be electorally decisive is a 
decreasing function of the number of voters in the district. See Seabright (1996). 
61 refer here to the internal accountability of the local political system. For purposes of analysis, this is 
distinguished from the institutional accountability that the OC brings to bear within the local institutional 
framework 
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opposition on government decisions, with negative consequences for policy-making in 
each. Indeed, the only real opposition government faced in Porongo was beyond party 
politics, from the (real) residents of Porongo. This was voiced by the OC, which 
opposed certain investment projects considered of little benefit to most rural 
poronguetios. Atocha displayed a similar dynamic, in which an urban political game for 
control of the municipal apparatus was interrupted episodically by a more raw 
interaction of miners and municipal authorities in which the former marched, 
demonstrated and even took hostages in support of their demands. 62 This was how 
decisions of local importance were taken in Atocha, punctuating periods of personal and 
political harvest for elected officials. Porongo's OC, starved of funds, personnel, and 
bargaining power, was altogether less successful. To try to overcome this problem, its 
president proposed a new "micro-regional" party to contest local elections on behalf of 
rural farmers. The MBL, as it had done in Charagua, accepted. 63 But in Sucre neither 
foam of "external" opposition was present, and politics as a result remained strangely 
disconnected from local society. Perhaps because its urban population was so much in 
flux, parties did not have strong socio-economic identities. 64 Politics thus occurred in a 
sort of gap, an empty space between society and government where politicians hid, 
dealing quietly amongst themselves, with little incentive to seek change. 
Lastly come Desaguadero, Guayaramerin and Sipe Sipe, the three worst-
performers - of our group. All three had medium-to-high rates of absenteeism, between 
one-third and one-half of the electorate. Guayaramerin, with the highest rate, suffered 
what in terms of the model of Chapter 7 can be called a weak relationship in the primary 
political market for votes. The people there, a heterogeneous mix resulting from a 
migratory boom that lasted two decades, had little tradition of political participation, and 
hence a weak voting spirit. I return to this point below. In Desaguadero and Sipe Sipe, 
two more demographically settled districts, absenteeism was lower but still significant. 
This was due in large part to such factors as distance and lack of identification, 
especially in rural areas, discussed above. 
Perhaps not surprisingly given low voting participation, interest-group capture 
afflicted both Guayaramerin and Desaguadero, though not Sipe Sipe. In the former, 
62 Vittorio A., op.cit.; Albino Garcia Choque, Juan Bonifacio Onofre, Esteban Marcha Cachambre and 
Ivan Marca, miners' cooperative welfare officer, oversight officer, oversight officer and member, 
interview, Chorolque, 23 April 1997. 
63 Bonilla R., op.cit. It remained to be seen if this initiative would succeed. 
64 i.e. labor, landowners, owners of capital, etc. 
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money politics was a very strong phenomenon. Prominent businessmen — the spiritual 
descendants of the cattle barons of the past — were firmly in control of the major political 
parties, and through them local government, using their resources to fight elections and 
expedite their political strategies. And once in power, officials and their businesses 
profited from the contracts, contacts and policy-making powers that local government 
afforded to further their business interests. Thus when the MNR sought to prevent the 
re-election of Guayaramerin's long-time ADN mayor, who had won the popular vote,65 
 it offered the MBL councilman $30,000 for his vote. This councilman, an ex-priest of 
modest means, used the money to buy a local television station, and so became one of 
Guayaramerin's media magnates. 66 His vote elevated a prominent logging and timber 
merchant to the mayoralty of a district that contained large tropical forests. But it is 
notable that these political dealings occurred amongst individuals much more than 
amongst parties. Political alliances were much the same. Indeed, during my stay the 
mayor and senior ADN councilman inaugurated a new coalition between their respective 
parties with a karaoke duet in a local nightclub. This broke up the previous MNR-MBL 
pact. But the local ADN chief was unconvinced. "Ivan [the ADN councilman] and Tico 
[the mayor] don't seem to belong to any party anymore. They're just looking to 
accommodate themselves."67 Political competition in Guayaramerin was the province of 
narrow interests — i.e. individual businessmen — vying for control over the machinery of 
government and its policy-making. It was not a broader contest of ideas or ideologies, 
and in it broad collective interests were essentially unrepresented. Once elected, 
Guayaramerin's politicians were content to find an accommodation, and did little to 
oversee or discipline each other's activity. The fact that they were friends and members 
of the same restricted social set greatly facilitated this process. The fate of the previous 
mayor, widely accused of embezzlement but never investigated by the municipal council 
on which he still sat, was illustrative. 68 
Desaguadero, by contrast, was politically two separate municipalities — an urban 
one where politics happened, and a rural one where it did not. In a way similar in type, 
though smaller in scale, to Guayaramerin, urban politics in Desaguadero took the form 
of a contest amongst a business elite to occupy power and control municipal resources. 
Once elections were over, the spoils were divided amongst the victors and public life 
65  Guido Roca 
66 Vargas R., op.cit. Cacho owned Guayaramerin's two other TV stations. 
67 ibid. 
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resumed its cozy, quiet pace. But the fact that the assets of Desaguadero's biggest 
businessmen were literally on wheels — they could get into their trucks and drive away —
made them essentially opportunists and not entrenched interests in the sense of factory or 
land owners. Partly as a result of this, Desaguadero's politics was a less ruthless, less 
deliberate affair than Guayaramerin's, largely free of ideology or broader (national) 
strategies. With a substantive focus on patronage, and a mobile, changing elite, the 
district lacked political competition because in many ways it lacked substantive politics. 
Sipe Sipe went further still along this continuum. Like Desaguadero it had no 
entrenched interests, but unlike it no powerful businessmen either, and hence no money 
politics. Despite this the district hosted fairly strong political rivalries, with a MIR-
Condepa coalition ensconced in town hall, strong MBL sympathies amongst community 
groups, and constant frictions between the two. 69 But somehow this did not translate 
into substantive competition in the political realm. The job switch between the mayor 
and president of the municipal council showed that local politicians were willing to act 
demagogically to undermine such mechanisms of accountability. Politicians' desire to 
avoid political competition did not entirely stifle it, however, but rather re-located it 
outside the municipal council, in the hands of grass-roots organizations (GROs). Thus 
the discipline that competing parties might normally have injected into the political arena 
was instead provided outside it when Sipe Sipe's GROs mobilized to challenge the 
mayor. 
This combination of voter absenteeism and a lack of political competition led to 
weak accountability in all three districts, as it had in Atocha, Porongo and Sucre, 
facilitating the self-perpetuation of prominent politicians and amplifying their discretion 
once in government. In Desaguadero and Guayaramerin citizens had yet to learn how to 
use the political system to enforce accountability on government officials. Sipe Sipe, by 
contrast, was in the middle of an experiment in which civic activism attempted to 
remedy the problem by challenging its root cause — the political dominance and 
manipulations of the Condepa-MIR coalition. By substituting for political parties, GROs 
sought to loosen the grip of a small coterie of politicians on their municipal government, 
and so regain control of local affairs. Unfortunately this research ended before it was 
clear whether the experiment would succeed or fail. 
68 ibid. "Tilly" Rodriguez was widely denounced by people throughout Guayaramerin. 
69 Demetrio Orellana, community leader, interview, Parotani, 27 May 1997. 
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Rank Municipality 
Interest 
Group 
Capture? 
Electoral 
Absenteeism 
Open, Competitive 
Political System? 
1 Baures No Low Yes 
2 Porongo Yes High* No 
Sucre No Low/Medium No 
3 Atocha No High No 
4 Desaguadero Yes Medium No 
Guayaramerin Yes High No 
Sipe Sipe No Medium Yes, outside MC+ 
Testing the Theory in Seven Municipalities 
It is interesting that there was no evidence of political capture in three of the six 
municipalities where political accountability failed. None of these — Atocha, Sipe Sipe 
and Sucre — had interest groups sufficiently powerful to dictate to local government. 
This implies that the dual failure of political opposition and electoral participation is 
sufficient to undercut accountability in the local political system even in districts that 
lack dominant interests, thus leaving municipalities prey to the volition of their leaders. 
Not surprisingly, respondents in three of these districts, Sucre, Porongo and 
Guayaramerin, and to a lesser extent Desaguadero as well, reported a loss of faith in 
governments which did not answer for their actions, and a loss of interest in politics. In 
Sucre the re-election of Gutierrez, who came in second, had caused many voters 
throughout the district to despair "because one wins the election but another winds up in 
power."7° "The people here feel that their vote has no value," added an observer in 
Guayaramerin. "It's all cooked between them [politicians], so why vote?" 71 This 
worsened the problem of absenteeism, which in turn made it easier for elites to 
perpetuate themselves and decreased their accountability — a vicious cycle that was 
potentially difficult to break. Figure 17 summarizes our districts' political 
characteristics. 
Figure 17 
Sources: Authoi 's interviews, observation and other fieldwork 
* Many adults are unregistered or registered elsewhere: see text 
+ Competitive politics occurs outside the municipal council and 
largely outside the party-political system: see text 
70 Juan Jose Bonifaz, general advisor to the prefect, interview, Sucre, 15 April 1997. 
71 Sr. Ana Lopez, NGO director, interview, Guayaramerin, 22 October 1997. 
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3.3 Civil Society 
Chapter 7 conceptualized the role of civil society in local governance as an 
institution that aggregates preferences and represents community needs, mediates 
community participation in the production of public services, facilitates social expression 
and the assertion of local identity, and enforces political accountability on the institutions 
of government. Whatever organizational form civil society takes — and in Bolivia the 
distance from mining cooperatives to pre-conquest ayllus is great — its institutional 
coherence and ability to mobilize grass-roots participation around a particular goal are 
fundamental to its ability to participate in the local governance process. These qualities 
are in turn dependent upon people's ability to communicate effectively with each other, 
the degree to which they share interests and priorities, and ultimately the trust which they 
invest in their leaders and in each other. Unfortunately such characteristics are 
subjective social traits, and thus difficult to measure reliably. Hence this section 
examines communities' ethnic and organizational heterogeneity, and the (objective) 
existence of an encompassing socio-economic interest,72 as proxies for ease of 
communication and similarity of social priorities. 73 It also uses interview responses as 
evidence for the existence of trust. Taken together, these attributes point to levels of 
institutional ability and coherence which vary significantly amongst our seven civil 
societies. 
With five rural and three urban GROs, Baures comprised a compact society 
where whites lived largely in town, indigenous people in the countryside, and mestizos 
in both. The district had some 720 indigenous residents, 74 and people of mixed race 
made up the majority. But the social implications of this ethnic diversity were less than 
elsewhere in Bolivia due to the greater degree of assimilation by Baurefio natives and 
mestizos. In linguistic ten-ns, for example, 93% of Baures' people spoke only Spanish, 
5% Spanish plus a native tongue, and 0.1% a native tongue only; this compares starkly 
with Bolivian averages of 32%, 19% and 43% respectively. 75 Baurefios' dress was 
essentially Western dress, largely free of distinguishing features such as the multi-
layered skirts and bowler hats of the altiplano, and mixed Battrefio-Spanish surnames 
abounded, indicating a high rate of intermarriage. Consistent with this, observers 
72 Olson (2000). My use of this concept is explained in Chapter 7. 
73 Respectively and jointly. Heterogeneity points to both characteristics, whereas encompassing interest 
refers mainly to the latter. 
74 Self-identified. 
75 1992 census. 
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reported smooth social relations among these groups, and described Baures as "pacific". 
"Here everyone gets along well," said the nuns from CETHA. "All participate equally 
in each others' feast days." 76 Indeed, the controversy surrounding the generator and the 
prefect "was the first time since 1704 that there was a commotion in the town," the head 
of one GRO reported.77 
Good social relations can partly be explained by the similar economic interests of 
its citizens, whether indigenous, mestizo or white. As explained above, Baures 
comprised a single agricultural and cattle economy devoid of industry, lacking in trade, 
where small and medium-sized landowners prevailed. Town and countryside faced 
similar economic incentives, and when the countryside prospered the town did too. 
There was, thus, an encompassing interest in Baures, and one that expressed itself in a 
context of social harmony using a common language, Spanish. This bred a similarity of 
outlook that transcended politics and reached down into the social realm; as their goals 
were similar, the social organizations they employed to advance them were similar too. 
Rural and urban communities alike described their communities as "grass-roots 
organizations",78 using the language of the 1994 LPP reform, so eschewing the 
opposition between "indigenous/original communities" and urban "neighborhood 
councils" common in the rest of Bolivia. We might expect trust to flourish in such a 
context, and in Baures it did. "The distribution of money is much better now," said the 
head of Jasiakiri's GRO, explaining that his community was willing to forego 
investments in one year so that resources might flow to other communities. "Now 
communities take turns to receive investment. It's good this way." 79 This leader valued 
cooperation as such, illustrating an attitude that was common throughout the district. 
With high levels of trust, a clear encompassing interest, and social relations that 
were close and smooth, Baures' civil society boasted a high level of institutional 
coherence and the ability to involve the people in their local government. Its geography 
may well help to explain these characteristics. Isolated by large plains that flooded half 
the year, its only reliable link to the rest of Bolivia was by air. With only 5,133 
inhabitants, and outside Bolivia's main west-east migratory flows, it comprised a micro-
society with its own rules, traditions and social patterns of interaction. It was a stable 
population that changed little from year to year, and its inhabitants knew that conflicts 
77 Oscar Duran, president of the Nicolas Carageorge neighborhood council, interview, Baures, 2 May 1997. 
76 	• Sisters Pilar and Teresa and Prof. Oscar Velazquez, op.cit. 
78 Organizaciones Territoriales de Base in Spanish, or OTB s. 
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with their neighbors would not go unnoticed, nor become much diluted. With only the 
most limited of outside recourse, Baurefios got along because they had to. 
In Atocha, Porongo and Sucre, by contrast, deep-seated ethnic and cultural 
differences had significant implications for the social dynamics and organizational 
abilities of civil society. In Sucre the major difference was between rural and urban 
sectors. The former was a large but fairly uniform area of 103 rural communities 
populated by peasant farmers who spoke Quechua before Spanish, and worked their own 
land using mainly pre-modern methods. The latter was a highly urbanized, Spanish-
speaking, industrial and service economy where migration over the past fifteen years 
from the western highlands, the eastern lowlands, and a large stream of students from 
Brazil had relentlessly pushed the city's boundaries outwards, and profoundly changed 
its ethnic composition. This was reflected in the city's linguistic makeup, where only 
32% speak Spanish exclusively, 11% a native language, and 52% Spanish plus a native 
language. Unlike other Bolivian cities, Sucre lacked strongly marked social strata; the 
city was abundant in the middle and working classes, and had almost no rich 
inhabitants. 80 But the differences between urban and rural Sucre were dramatic 
nonetheless, and the district was essentially two municipalities — one agricultural and 
socially homogeneous, the other (post-)industrial and socially mixed. 
Like Sucre, Porongo had also seen large influxes of migrants during the past two 
decades, in this case from Chuquisaca, the valleys of Santa Cruz, and the western 
highlands. Although the district was older than the city of Santa Cruz, most of its rural 
communities were formed recently by migrants from the west, and social heterogeneity 
was high. Entire villages of recently arrived chuquisaquetios alternated on Porongo's 
map with villages of orureflos, and others where provenance was mixed. Many recent 
arrivals spoke Spanish quite poorly, and often had significant trouble communicating 
with each other when their native languages differed. Language barriers were 
compounded by differences of attire, diet, and religion, to the point where poronguenos 
commonly regarded each other as foreign and mutual suspicion impeded collective 
action. This was especially true of the "residentes", whose antipathy towards colla81 
migrants exceeded that of the town's native inhabitants. Atocha suffered public 
divisions of comparable magnitude, though of a very different character. Local society 
79 Jasiakiri, op.cit. 
SO Yailez and Sobut, op.cit.; Jaime Gallo Garabinto, municipal councilman (MIR), interview, Sucre, 15 
April 1997. There was general agreement on this point. 
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was divided between cooperativist mining communities, subsistence farming 
communities, and a market town that served both. Each had its own traditions and 
history, and its own folins of organization. The population of rural villages was fairly 
stable: Quechua-phones who spoke some Spanish, with little in-migration and a small 
but stead outflow. Miners were almost entirely recent migrants from throughout western 
Bolivia who preferred Spanish to their native tongues and were ethnically mixed. And 
the town, which also preferred Spanish, contained a significant floating population of 
traders and salesmen that waxed and waned as mineral prices rose and fell. 81 While 
town-dwellers organized themselves into long-standing neighborhood councils, and 
mining communities mobilized around the officials of their elected cooperative, rural 
farmers had only weakly adopted the local institutions of the peasants' union, and a 
number of villages had no representative institutions at al1. 83 
The constituent groups in all three districts faced divergent economic incentives 
and priorities; in none was there an encompassing interest around which society could 
rally. Atocha's miners depended fundamentally on the price of minerals for their 
prosperity, while its farmers operated in a separate economy with little surplus 
production and little trade with the mines or town. The town sold the miners supplies 
and bought their product, and hence shared their interests while largely ignoring the 
countryside. The situation was similar in Sucre, where the city's scale and sophistication 
isolated it even more from its rural hinterland. If Atocha turned its back on the 
countryside, Sucre was hardly aware that it existed. "The villages — they're screwed," 
Fancesa's general manager asserted, "because of their own characteristics." 84 . Only in 
Porongo were the interests of town and countryside broadly aligned, despite having the 
most comprehensively mixed population, across both town and villages, of the three. 
Here town and country alike comprised single, agricultural economy, richer and more 
fertile than the other two, which sold its surplus to the nearby city. The town served the 
agricultural hinterland, and what was good for the latter was good for the former. It was 
thus all the more striking that this latent encompassing interest did not assert itself, but 
was undermined by interloping "residents" with fundamentally different priorities who 
nevertheless managed to dominate local government. 
81 A Bolivian term for highlanders. 
82 Garcia C., op.cit. 
83 	• Villa Solano, for example, reported that its first attempt to form a GRO had failed when the elected 
leader disappeared from Atocha. 
84 Fernando Beltran, FANCESA (cement company) general manager, interview, Sucre, 18 April 1997. 
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Unsurprisingly, trust was at a low ebb in all three districts. In Porongo social 
differences were simply too great, and the population too unsettled, for trust to have 
developed amongst divergent communities. And in Sucre the lack of contact between 
contiguous populations prevented trust from being born. Urban leaders were largely 
unaware of the concerns of the villages, and rural leaders complained that municipal 
officials refused to see them when they visited the city. 85 But Atocha was the most 
extreme case, where a lack of trust between villages and town became active distrust 
where mining communities were concerned. At Chorolque, for example, miners took 
project evaluators from the Social Investment Fund hostage for two days, demanding 
that a delayed water project be approved for construction. 86 With a history of militancy 
and direct political action, Atocha's miners did not believe the assurances of their local 
and national authorities, and possessed the means to take matters into their own hands. 
With low trust, a subverted encompassing interest, and levels of heterogeneity so 
high that many of its people could not speak to each other, Porongo's civil society 
suffered from institutional weakness and little ability to mobilize around a goal. 
Although some of its civic leaders were determined and knowledgeable, the social body 
had too many cleavages too coalesce, and as a result lay dormant before local authorities, 
unable to initiate policy discussions or defend its interests. In Atocha, the miners stood 
alone in their coherence and organization, much more involved in the selection, design 
and execution of public investment projects than farming or urban communities. 
Amongst these three there was little interaction, low levels of trust, and no encompassing 
interest. Hence civic mobilizations were of and for miners, and Atochan society as a 
whole was dysfunctional. In a broadly similar pattern, Sucre functioned for all intents 
and purposes as two independent societies, each in its own way internally consistent. 
Urban society was able to overcome significant heterogeneity to organize itself 
reasonably effectively around neighborhood priorities. Rural society, by contrast, had 
far fewer social differences and much stronger institutions. But with low levels of trust 
between the two and little in common beyond the municipal budget, their interaction — 
such as it existed — took the form of a zero-sum contest for public investment which 
urban groups were strongly placed to win. Sucre's society, as a collective, was 
dysfunctional. 
86 Chorolque, op.cit. 
85 Potolo, op.cit. 
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Desaguadero and Guayaramerin offer social panoramas similar to the previous 
three, while Sipe Sipe stands out for its relative homogeneity. Located in the fertile 
valleys of Cochabamba, Sipe Sipe was an agricultural municipality centered on a market 
town. Its population spoke Quechua and Spanish throughout the district, with no 
apparent ethnic or cultural divides between town and countryside beyond a tendency to 
favor Spanish in the former. Interestingly, the communities of Sipe Sipe assumed 
similar organizational forms regardless of whether they were urban or rural. Although 
local respondents referred to Comites CilliCOS or juntas vecinales in urban areas and the 
peasant's union in the countryside, their underlying structures were very similar, with 
secretarios generales for leaders, and officers elected according to a rotating system 
throughout. In Desaguadero, however, the difference between urban and rural 
communities was significant. The district was composed of eleven rural communities 87 
 where Aymara and (some) Spanish were spoken, and two urban associations where 
Spanish prevailed. Rural communities were organized into either traditional malikus 
originarios or local branches of the peasant's union, as is common in the region. These 
institutions, in the words of Alba, et.al., 
"are a form of social expression and a process of collective decision-making that 
surprise the outsider with their degree of participation and democratic respect... They 
operate more by consensus than by majority vote... [and have a] highly evolved system 
of jobs and authorities that organize the internal life of the community... and assure its 
articulation with society at large." ss 
The two organizational forms are functionally very similar, as to a great extent 
union authorities took on the duties of the pre-existing indigenous authorities during the 
revolution of 1952-53; name changes were largely semantic, and at the community level 
the underlying participative social structures remained. 89 Desaguadero's urban 
associations, by contrast, featured leaders elected by majority vote and the hierarchical 
structures typical of modern representative democracy. But the difference did not end 
there. The town, unusually, was split between two different organizational forms: a 
neighborhood council, and the Comuniclacl San Pedro, each comprising roughly half its 
87 Interview evidence is at variance with official statistics on this point. I assume interview subjects' figure 
of eleven is correct, and ascribe discrepancy with the official number to two causes: (i) several 
communities joining to form a single GRO, and (ii) the high dispersion/low spatial density of many of 
Desaguadero's communities. 
88 Xavier Albo, Armando God -Inez, Kitula Libermann and Francisco Pifarrd, Para Comp render Las 
Cultural Rurales en. Bolivia, MEC/CI:KA/UNICEF:La Paz, 1990, pp.48-56. 
89 ibid. 
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2,000 inhabitants. 90 These structural differences were reflected in Desaguadero's social 
dynamics. Though they professed to work well together, distrust was evident between 
the two communities of the town. And the subsistence farmers and fishermen of 
Desaguadero's rural villagers reported no contact with their urban peers, and no 
participation in larger municipal affairs beyond "their" school or water project. 91 
 Meanwhile, urban GROs — heavily involved in municipal business alongside their local 
government institutions — were indifferent to the needs of the villages. 92 
Guayaramerin was made up of eight rural and two urban GROs, and though 85% 
of its population claimed Spanish as their language, many also understood Portuguese. 
Like Desaguadero, it had the highly mixed population of a thriving border town. But 
unlike it, Guayaramerin was the product of a migratory boom that multiplied its 
population thirteen times during the previous half-century. 93 As a result it was a 
relatively new town, the sum of many cultures and ethnic groups, with relatively little 
unity amongst its diverse population. "There is mutual tolerance here," said Sr. Ana of 
Caritas, "but the people don't relate much amongst themselves. Each group celebrates 
its own feast day."94 It was also a "very complex society", where enormous wealth 
rubbed shoulders with abject poverty95 and drugs, prostitution and alcoholism 
abounded. 96 New social organizations were slow to form in a context of high 
demographic flux, which provided local politicians with a valuable opportunity. When 
community groups finally did organize, it was at the instigation of local government. 
But rather than catalyze the sort of social self-organization that has been the rule 
throughout Bolivia, the government of Guayaramerin provided a channel for political 
parties to penetrate a weak and easily divisible civil society during GRO formation, and 
so colonize civic institutions for political ends. 97 According to the secretary of the 
Chamber of Commerce, 
"The GROs are terrible here...they're totally politicized. They make midnight deals in 
search of payoffs.... GROs don't consult their members before making decisions — 
90 Respondents insisted that the two forms were different, though they seemed unable to articulate the 
difference clearly. 
91 Juan Nina Quispe, oversight committee vice-president and neighborhood council president, interview, 
Desaguadero, 25 March 1997. 
92 Urban respondents' approval of the LPP based on supposed large investments in the countryside, which 
were denied by rural respondents, is evidence of this. See the end of section 2, above. 
93 Sosa S., op.cit. According to him, the city's population rose from 3,000 to 38,000 over 54 years. 
94 Sr. Ana Lopez, Director of Caritas (NGO), op. cit. 
95 ibid. 
96 Fr. Julio Corredor, parish priest, interview, Guayaramerin, 19 October 1997 
97 Manlio Roca, port (customs) manager, ex-mayor and ex-MP, interview, Guayaramerin, 21 October 
1997. 
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rather the leaders meet with the parties, receive money, and then commit their 
misdeeds."98 
By falling under the sway of the parties, GROs became complicit in the endemic 
corruption of Guayaramerin's local government. Such collusion was both a symptom of, 
and contributing factor to, the lack of social mobilization in Guayaramerin. Had 
organized civil society preceded politics, it might not have been coopted so easily, nor so 
thoroughly, by the parties. Instead GROs became political franchises that stifled civic 
participation in government. "The people are like children here," the 1 ° de Mayo 
community explained. "They receive a misery [from local government] and are happy 
with that." 99 Lacking an autochthonous organization and excluded by their civic leaders, 
the people of Guayaramerin lay dormant before the government they had elected. 
Both Guayaramerin and Sipe Sipe benefited from an encompassing interest. 
Agriculture provided this interest in Sipe Sipe, and bound the farming countryside to its 
agricultural market town. Good years for the farmers were good years for the 
townspeople too, and all tended to benefit from the same policies. The situation was 
similar in Guayaramerin, where urban and rural sectors were intertwined in a modern 
agribusiness economy, as is explained in detail above. This gave city and countryside 
similar interests, and facilitated collective action for the progress of the municipality. 
"The development of this town has been through the money of its own citizens," 
reported the parish priest. "They pooled their efforts to form their own water, telephone, 
and other cooperatives" in order to provide basic services and improve the local standard 
of living. 1°° These efforts were spearheaded by the city's well-organized business elite, 
which formed a powerful, all-party, pro-Guayaramerin lobby. They benefited from 
growth throughout the district, and hence favored a comprehensive local development. 
If public services were better in richer than poorer areas, this was due as much to the 
financial constraints of cooperatives in a context of rapid population growth as to 
discrimination by the governing class. By contrast Desaguadero, with a much smaller 
and less developed urban center, consisted of two distinct economies, and hence two 
separate sets of interests. The town was dominated by transport and related businesses 
that serviced the large volume of trade that daily coursed through it; the countryside 
hosted subsistence agriculture which sold little to, or through, the town. Hence while the 
98 	• Simoni Casangeli, Chamber of Industry and Commerce secretary, interview, Guayaramerin, 21 
October 1997. 
99 	• 	• Dionisia Cuellar Perez, Emilse Choquere and Santiago Mendez, community officers, interview, 1 a de 
Mayo, 23 October 1997. 
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villages were turned inwards, the town looked out to Peru and La Paz, and there was no 
encompassing interest for the two to share. 
In questions of trust, Guayaramerin was similar to Porongo while Desaguadero 
was similar to Sucre. Guayaramerin's migrant peoples were simply too diverse and too 
unaccustomed to each other for trust to blossom amongst them. And the politicization of 
its civic institutions served to replace the logic of cooperation that operates at their core 
with a logic of (political) competition. Thus, on the few occasions when the practice of 
local government brought Guayaramerin's social groups into contact, it was not so much 
to organize collective action as to do battle on behalf of their political patrons. A process 
which might otherwise have promoted trust served instead to undermine it further. And 
in Desaguadero, social and economic diversity was magnified by isolation. Although 
they lived next to each other, its town and village populations had so little contact of any 
sort that trust was practically impossible. In Sipe Sipe, on the other hand, the situation 
was very different. With a culturally homogeneous and stable population, and a similar 
model of social organization throughout the district, the conditions were well-established 
for trust to develop. And the fact that Sipe Sipe's GROs were able to coordinate their 
efforts outside the ambit of formal politics with the aim of overturning a politicized and 
unpopular mayor indicates that it did. 
High heterogeneity and low levels of trust left society institutionally crippled in 
Desaguadeto and Guayaramerin. In the latter case, a latent and potentially powerful 
encompassing interest was counteracted through the active subversion of society's 
organizational structure by political parties intent on widening the sphere of political 
competition. In the former, civic institutions with relatively high ability and legitimacy 
in the countryside, and medium ability in town, had almost no interactions with each 
other, and — devoid of mutual trust — were, like Sucre's, collectively dysfunctional. Of 
the three districts, only Sipe Sipe boasted the conditions necessary for a coherent and 
active civil society to emerge. Its younger GROs dated from the 1950s agrarian reform 
period, while the older ones trace their history back to the pre-conquest villages of the 
Inca and Tiawanacota civilizations. With a homogeneous population, widespread civic 
trust, a clear encompassing interest, and strong civic traditions of participation in 
community government, Sipe Sipe's GROs enjoyed high levels of popular legitimacy 
and an ability to mobilize residents for collective action. Given this, its rank amongst the 
10° J. Corredor, op.cit. 
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Rank Municipality 
Social 
Heterogeneity 
Encompassing 
Interest Trust 
Institutional 
Coherence & 
Ability (ICA) 
1 Baures Low Yes High High 
2 Porongo High Yes* Low Low 
Sucre High No Low Low** 
3 Atocha Medium No Low Low+ 
4 Desaguadero High No Low Low" 
Guayaramerin High Yes Low Low 
Sipe Sipe Low Yes High High 
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lowest tier of municipalities is surprising. As we shall see below, this can be explained 
in part as a transition dynamic: GROs were still learning to use the (new) system of 
municipal government to their advantage, and once they did the persistence of 
unresponsive local governments would become very much more difficult. Figure 18 
summarizes the districts' social characteristics. 
Figure 18 
Sources: Author 's interviews, observation and other fieldwork 
* Latent encompassing interest 
• ** Rural high + urban medium = collectively low 
+ Rural low + urban medium + mining communities high = collectively low 
4. The Local Governance System 
This section turns to the question of how the economic, political and social 
factors identified above interact within the confines of the legal-political framework to 
determine the quality of local governance. Although these factors account for the deep 
logic of local government, they operate through the proximate causes of governing 
institutions. Hence this section will also trace how economics, politics and society 
jointly determine the quality and character of the municipal council, oversight 
committee, and the local executive branch (mayor) in each of our seven municipalities. 
4.1 Baures 
Baures was a small, ethnically and culturally homogeneous municipality where 
both town and countryside were bound together in a single agricultural and cattle 
economy. Small to medium-sized farms predominated, and there were no conspicuously 
powerful economic interests. Such a small, isolated district provided its residents with 
strong incentives to get along, and life in Baures had a familial, cozy air. Civil society 
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was well-organized into urban and rural community associations that had high 
organizational ability and benefited from broad popular legitimacy. As a result, these 
associations were able to both involve the people in the governance process and engage 
with official institutions in town on an equal footing. Politics was quite competitive and 
party identity was strong, perhaps in part because of a previous administration widely 
reviled as corrupt and ineffective. All of these factors combined to produce a high-
quality local governance system that was focused on voters and responsive to their 
needs. In terms of the model of Chapter 7, there was balance between the political 
markets for votes and influence and the logic of social representation as mediated by 
Baures' civic associations (see figure 19 below). The inherent tension between these 
three elements created a self-limiting dynamic in which the pressures of local interest 
groups were contained within the bounds of political competition, and did not spill into 
the machinery of local government nor erupt as civil strife. This served to create 
responsive institutions of local government. 
Thus the municipal council was responsive and highly attuned to local needs. 
Respondents affirmed that the council met with them regularly, and commented 
approvingly of its work with the mayor to solve local problems and respond to their 
demands. 101 "The councilmen respond mostly to the people," said the leader of El 
Cairo, echoing the general sentiment. "They don't take account of who voted for them 
and who didn't, but rather of the needs of everyone." 102 The mayor, too, was held in 
high esteem throughout the district. First elected in 1996, he had been confirmed in his 
post the following year and was judged far superior to his predecessor. Like the council, 
the mayor was credited with planning projects well and distributing municipal resources 
equitably, including for the first time the district's small villages. 103 Lastly, the oversight 
committee was described as well-intentioned and moderately active, but lacking the 
funds to perform its role properly. "It's a job that demands a lot, but they aren't paid 
anything," explained councilman Oni Antelo. 104 Nonetheless the OC was credited with 
successfully mediating local demands during the yearly budget planning exercise, and 
more generally with consulting townspeople and villagers before acting. Perhaps 
because of the legitimacy it so generated, the only time it opposed municipal policy it 
101 Hugo Ayllon Parada, Cattlemen's Association president, interview, Baures, 2 May 1997. 
102 E1 Cairo, op.cit. 
103 El Cairo, op.cit.; Jasiakiri, op.cit.; Srs. Pilar and Teresa, and Velazquez, op.cit. 
104 Oni Antelo, op.cit. 
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won. 105 Together, these three institutions produced good-quality local government in 
Baures that was accountable to voters and focused, instead of politics, on their needs. 
The generator incident exemplified this. It is not surprising that baureflos were satisfied 
with the quality of government they received and rated public investment projects 
highly. 
Figure 19: The Local Governance System in Baures 
4.2 Sucre 
Sucre, in comparison a huge, diverse, and highly urbanized district, was in some 
ways also a sleepy municipality. Its two major social divisions were: (i) city vs. 
countryside, and (ii) native-born sucrenses vs. recent (urban) immigrants. Civil society 
in the countryside was well organized by village associations, keepers of the traditions 
and identity of Sucre's peasant farmers; city society was organized by neighborhood 
councils and other civic associations which, though many were still in the process of 
formation, enjoyed reasonable levels of legitimacy amongst their members. But between 
the two there was essentially no contact and very little in common, social, economic or 
otherwise. As an institutional whole, civil society in Sucre did not work. The local 
05 The OC was able to have a fence, originally planned for a sports field, re-assigned to the local cemetery 
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economy was similarly divided between a hinterland of subsistence agriculture and an 
urban economy of services and small-to-medium sized industry, with little integration 
between the two. Surprisingly given its size, the city lacked large firms or other 
dominant private interests. To a large extent this was reflected in Sucre's politics, which 
was uncompetitive to the point of being inert. Parties did not represent societal interests 
or sectors. Rather than compete on ideas in the foreground of municipal life, they 
preferred to remain in the background, carving up official patronage amongst themselves 
in a broad cohabitation, behind the façade of a popular mayor from a minor party. With 
political debate stifled, politics became a cozy enclave from which politicians had little 
incentive to emerge. 
In terms of the model, the cash market for influence between parties and private 
interests was very weak, while the market for votes was comprehensively subverted by a 
non-competitive party regime. The division and weakness of civil society completed 
local government's isolation from local needs, and from incentives to meet them. Figure 
20 illustrates Sucre's local governance system. I leave similar illustrations for the 
remaining districts to the reader. Together, these factors produced a curious mix of 
competence and detachment in city hall. On the one hand, the institutions of government 
were isolated by an anti-dynamic in which no one fought to control them. But on the 
other hand, a capable, and even sophisticated, municipal administration toiled at the 
center of this vacuum to ensure that local services never fell below minimally acceptable 
levels. Perhaps because of its history as a center of government under both the Spanish 
and the republic, Sucre had developed a tradition of competent municipal administration, 
with well-trained operational officials, some of the best budgeting and IT systems in 
Bolivia, and an unusually high rate of local tax collection. Local government in Sucre 
was thus a well-maintained but rudderless ship, drifting without direction. 
The municipal council certainly did not provide leadership. Independent 
observers, unenthusiastic about their government, reserved their greatest scorn for 
Sucre's councilmen, who were judged almost universally to obey their parties and ignore 
voters. "They are unprofessional and incoherent," reported the manager of FANCESA. 
"They're interested in other things, not the city nor municipal govemment." 1°6 
 Communities urban and rural alike asserted that councilmen were poor-quality and did 
not represent them or their aspirations. Sucrenses had a higher opinion of their mayor, 
in order to keep out stray dogs. 
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though opinion was divided between city and countryside. Urban dwellers appeared to 
be reasonably content with their local executive, while rural villagers reported that 
municipal resources never arrived; they judged their condition as bad as before 
decentralization or worse, to the point where some wanted to secede from the district. 107 
 While the mayor pursued important investment projects in the city, he was criticized for 
offering the villages "little patches that distract them but don't satisfy their needs".' °8 
 The weakness of civil society meant that most rural (and many urban) communities did 
not have the capacity to draw up project plans, or lobby government to answer their most 
pressing needs. This, along with Sucre's political vacuum, meant that the mayor faced 
few binding external incentives, and hence responded to public needs largely on account 
of his own preferences. 
Instead of seeking to overcome the urban/rural divide, government 
institutionalized it by establishing an independent oversight committee for each. While 
this might at first appear to be a reasonable response to heterogeneity, its effect in 
practice was to weaken civil society still further before institutions of government which 
had not, after all, themselves divided. In the event, both OCs were poor. The urban 
consensus held that its OC was ineffective, repeatedly failing to provide project 
oversight, with only its vice president complying with his duties. The performance of 
the rural OC was more variable, suffering from its own weakness and the hostility of 
some midLlevel municipal authorities; the few good reports it merited from village 
leaders stood out amongst a mass of negative opinion. Thus a surprisingly sophisticated 
and effective administrative apparatus coexisted alongside an ineffective municipal 
council, a weakly accountable mayor, and a divided OC. It is not surprising that public 
investment responded only tepidly to popular demand, and that satisfaction with local 
government was only lukewarm. Sucre's investment planning system was symptomatic 
of its local government: the municipality employed a well-designed, comprehensive, 
iterative planning procedure that carefully incorporated participation throughout. But it 
also took advantage of its influence and technical competence to distort some 
communities' requests arbitrarily. Unusually for Bolivia, Sucre's municipal government 
was the largest local actor. It had significant power over civil society, not the other way 
around, and this showed in the way the district was governed. 
106 Beltran, op.cit. 
108 J. Bonifaz, op.cit. 
107 Potolo, op.cit. 
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4.3 Porongo 
Small, rural and poor, Porongo was in some ways similar to Baures, with an 
economy dominated by small family farms, no industry, and no powerful interests in 
residence. But its population was much more mixed by years of migration, to the point 
where most poronguelios were recently arrived Quechua-speakers who did not share the 
local diet, religion or other traditions. Nonetheless conflict was rare amongst these 
diverse groups, who shared very similar economic interests. What might have been a 
quiet, consensual public life amongst Porongo's residents was instead riven and distorted 
by its residentes, a powerful and relatively wealthy group of ex-poronguelios who lived 
in the industrial economy of nearby Santa Cruz and ran the municipality from their urban 
enclave. They used their money and status to dominate local politics, which accordingly 
turned on their particular concerns. By and large these were the children of the leading 
lights of the town, who left to study and work in Santa Cruz. They assuaged feelings of 
rootlessness or disorientation in the city by conjecturing a happy, bucolic past consisting 
largely of games and traditional crafts set in a rural idyll. This they then sought to 
recreate and impose on the actual residents of Porongo. Hence the Civic Committee for 
Women, composed of "residents", hoped soon to offer local women courses in "dress- 
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making, pastry-making, knitting and traditional artisanery," its president reported. 109 
 "There's no inventory of the town's cultural patrimony," she added worriedly, 
explaining her proposal for a museum of local culture. In effect, the "residents" sought 
to turn a dynamic community in the midst of significant economic and demographic 
change into a museum of their imagined past, a sort of zoo filled with the traditions and 
symbols they themselves had left behind. Not surprisingly, this was resisted by a 
population that never knew such a past, and who did not want it as their future. The real 
interests and problems of rural Porongo were unable to penetrate this evocative haze, and 
in this way the residentes' fixation with the town's plaza central displaced the 
agricultural priorities of a rural economy. 
The urban elite was able to get away with this because of the fragmented nature 
of Porongo's civil society, and because they completely dominated its politics. The 
district's many and diverse migrant groups distrusted each other and, often too weak to 
organize amongst themselves, were unable to establish broad civic associations that 
spanned the district's villages and ethnicities. Thus splintered, civil society could neither 
effectively represent grass-roots demand to local government, nor mobilize popular 
support against the ruling elite. Meanwhile local politics — completely uncompetitive —
offered no recourse. Local parties were all colonized by "residents", and all allied 
together in the municipal council. With no political opposition, party dynamics in 
Porongo comprised a sharing out of power amongst the "residents", something 
facilitated by high voter absenteeism in the countryside. In terms of the model, the cash 
market for influence between parties and private interests was very strong, and in turn 
undermined the market for votes and policies; the entire political system, in effect, 
represented a single narrow interest group. At the same time, the logic of social 
representation was interrupted by civil society's institutional weakness. It is thus not 
surprising that local government in Porongo was neither representative of nor responsive 
to the people. 
Thus municipal councilmen, four of five of whom lived in Santa Cruz, were 
widely judged untransparent, oblivious to local needs, and primarily concerned with 
their own or their parties' interests.' 10 They held more council sessions in Santa Cruz 
than Porongo, and were accused by many of conspiring to exclude poronguelios 
109 Marta Oyola Morales, president of the Civic Committee for Women, interview, Porongo, 7 April 1997. 
Oyola lived in Santa Cruz but came to Porongo "every weekend". 
11y The order of priorities is telling. 
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including the OC — from municipal business by keeping the times and places of their 
meetings secret. The mayor, on the other hand, was an attractive and expansive ex-
footballer from Santa Cruz whose populist instincts took him deep into the countryside 
regularly. Public opinion credited him with good intentions but criticized his officers as 
poor and unaccountable, and reproached his administration more generally for operating 
in a desultory, capricious manner. Much of this was blamed on politicians' residence in 
the city, which complicated coordination with officials in town and helped obscure 
responsibility. But it is notable that neither was subject to external political or economic 
constraints which might otherwise have modified their behavior. Lastly, respondents 
agreed that the oversight committee was lucky to have a president who was honest and 
hard-working. But the mayor and municipal council worked equally hard to obstruct 
him and exclude the OC from official decision-making, denying him the office to which 
he was entitled and refusing to provide transport. Given no resources and civic 
organizations too weak to either support him or oppose the municipality actively, the 
ability of this modest farmer to hold government to account was minimal. In the words 
of one community leader "they've left him all alone." 111 As a result, and despite a 
healthy moral authority, the OC in Porongo was weak. 
With a weak OC, a terminally unresponsive municipal council, and a mayor with 
more will than ability to satisfy voters, it is not surprising that the quality of government 
was mediocre, but rather that it was not worse. This can largely be attributed to the 
mayor's desire for popularity, which led him to make investments which — community 
leaders agreed — satisfied some of their needs, and led to modest improvements in public 
services. Such is the value of leadership in a governing system which otherwise would, 
in all likelihood, have performed even worse. Porongo's bridge project exemplified the 
system out of which it came. This, the star investment in the municipal portfolio, was set 
to connect an uninhabited point fifteen kilometers east of the town with the exclusive 
neighborhood of Equipetrol in Santa Cruz. But local faimers sold their produce in a 
different part of the city, for which this bridge was not useful. And with no extant road 
connecting the town to the bridge site, it was not difficult to judge the bridge either a 
prestige project or a piece of land speculation, designed to urbanize the near bank of the 
river and multiply property prices. In either case, those who stood to benefit were the 
"residents" and not Porongo's rural population. 
• Villa Guadalupe, op. cit. 
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4.4 Atocha 
Atocha sits alone on the third rung of municipal quality, with an economy 
diversified to the point of disjointedness. Local economic actors were almost entirely 
small-scale, and divided cleanly between cooperative mining and subsistence family 
farms, with little to connect the two. As the town's economy was built around mining 
services and trade in minerals, urban interests were more receptive to miners' demands 
than those of rural farmers. This bias was compounded by high electoral absenteeism in 
the countryside, which gave villagers little voice inside local government. The political 
system as a whole was uncompetitive, with a three-party governing coalition holding 
three-quarters of the vote and no active opposition. It was also primarily an urban 
phenomenon, focused on control of the apparatus of local government, and thus 
intrinsically sterile. Real political interaction, in the sense of genuinely opposed interests 
competing over resources, occurred sporadically outside formal politics, in Atocha's 
streets and plazas, when the miners mobilized and marched on city hall in defense of 
their interests. Civil society was also clearly divided in Atocha, between highly 
organized immigrant miners with a large capacity for mobilization, poor and poorly 
organized native farmers in the countryside, and the merchants and employees in town 
who were relatively well-off and well-placed to lobby local government. 
The irony of Atochan politics was that the two groups with significant power to 
influence policy and capture resources — miners and merchants — were precisely the 
groups most dependent on the highly cyclical mining industry, and hence the most 
willing to abandon the district when the industry slumped. Recent history had illustrated 
this dramatically, with Atocha's mines abandoned wholesale in the late 1980s, followed 
by an upswing a decade later which more than doubled the district's population. Hence 
those who were most adept at securing public investment were also those with the least 
incentive to invest in their communities themselves. Meanwhile those who combined 
the worst level of public services with the clearest long-term interest in the prosperity of 
their communities — Atocha's peasant farmers — suffered the weakest ability to mobilize 
to press local government with their needs. With sterile politics and a civil society that 
was divided and incoherent, it is not surprising that Atocha's government performed 
poorly. Local public opinion reflected this. In terms of the model, the cash market for 
policies and influence operated normally, while the primary political market for votes 
was in large part strangled by electoral absenteeism and an uncompetitive party system. 
The divided and institutionally crippled nature of civil society completed a governance 
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system which was imbalanced and inequitable. Hence public resources and attention in 
Atocha were skewed towards areas where they were least needed — the town — and least 
sustainable over time — the mines — while ignoring those areas — rural villages — where 
need was greatest and investments most likely to prove sustainable. The municipality 
went so far as to allocate resources to miners from adjacent districts before its own 
villagers. 
The failure of Atochan politics was seen most clearly in its municipal council. 
The least impressive of Atocha's institutions of local government, it was largely inactive 
and headed by an illiterate president. Councilmen seemed rarely to leave the town, and a 
strong public consensus held that they responded primarily to their parties "due to their 
own ignorance". 112 With little incentive to tend to villagers' needs, the council focused 
on urban issues and the simplistic politics of municipal patronage. In the words of the 
OC president, "Initiatives aren't followed up from year to year. There's little 
coordination amongst parties and between governing periods. This is bad for projects 
and for municipal work." 113 The mayor, on the other hand, was regarded as well-
meaning and honest, but lacked administrative ability and leadership. Although he made 
special efforts to reach out to rural villages, the combination of his own background and 
the highly partial political environment in which he operated led him also to favor the 
town and miners. In institutional terms, the oversight committee stood between the 
mayor and municipal council, divided like the society it represented. Of its six members, 
three worked conscientiously to represent civic opinion in public debate, but two 
members were inactive and a third — the vice president — had escaped to Potosi. A lack 
of resources and the presence of only one member, the secretary, in the town further 
hampered the OC's effectiveness. Nevertheless, community leaders agreed that the OC 
was effective in overseeing and modifying government policy, especially in the town 
and main mining centers. But transport to farming villages was more difficult, and there 
its effect was scarcely felt. Thus government in Atocha consisted of a reasonably 
competent mayor working with an ignorant and ineffective municipal council, and an 
oversight committee that was fairly capable but faced severe institutional limitations. 
The result was mediocre policy-making which skewed investment towards those with 
the loudest political voice, and ignored those with greatest need. Like Porongo, this case 
highlights the importance of leadership: with a compromised system of local governance 
112 Vi 	• ctorto A., op.cit. 
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and weak public institutions, Atocha was pregnant with the possibility of even worse 
government. That it was merely mediocre is testament in large part to the mayor's good 
will and the OC president's leadership. 
4.5 Desaguadero 
Desaguadero heads the trio of worst-performers in our group. A rich border 
town with abundant own-revenues, it's government was lucrative to hold and local 
businessmen vied to run it. But despite a large and valuable trade with neighboring Peru, 
Desaguadero's main economic interests — transport firms and related businesses that 
serviced cross-border trade — were small and medium sized, with no dominant actors. 
The fact that the most important businesses were mobile implied that these interests, by 
and large, were not entrenched, and hence more sensitive to the costs of political 
involvement than elsewhere. Socially Desaguadero was really two municipalities, with 
two economies and two civil societies quite disconnected. Rural Desaguadero, though 
well-organized at the village level, was too poor to mobilize itself at the district level, 
and hence remained splintered and weak in the face of urban society. The town's GROs, 
by contrast, were better-financed and — living on the municipality's doorstep — found it 
much easier to catch government's attention. They were able to dominate civic 
discourse to the exclusion of rural concerns and interests, but were themselves divided 
between two organizational forms, which sapped their institutional strength. Lastly 
politics, iri the sense of ideology or national party dynamics, barely mattered in 
Desaguadero. Local politics was about occupying power, and although a formal 
opposition existed politics was not competitive. Rather it was an accommodative pursuit 
free of substantive political discourse, where the sharing out of spoils was punctuated by 
periodic elections in which a changing business elite sought to gain control of the 
instruments of power. With no political accountability, limited social oversight from 
urban areas, and none from the countryside, local government was free to be 
manipulated at will by the interest groups that captured it, responding grudgingly to 
urban demands and ignoring those of the villages. Local governance was worse in rural 
areas than in town, and overall quality was poor. In terms of the model, the cash market 
for policy influence was healthy and dominated the political market for votes, itself 
undermined by an uncompetitive party system. Meanwhile civil society, twice divided, 
113 Mamani V., op.cit. 
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was too ill-informed and too weak to hold politicians to account. It is thus not surprising 
that disappointment with local government was rife at the grass-roots level. 
The municipal council exemplified local government's failings. A broad 
consensus held that it was thoroughly politicized, attuned to the needs of the parties and 
insensitive to its voters. "It's all politics," said the leaders of Titijumi and Huancollo, 
describing the council's work. 114 Tellingly, not even townspeople could explain how it 
functioned, though some evidence suggested the council was cowed and manipulated by 
the mayor. The mayor himself, and his staff, received poor reviews from his 
constituents, though a number attributed this to his short time in office. Subject to little 
social or political oversight, he could do as he pleased, as the town's 70% share of the 
investment budget — twice its share of population — indicated. But so far he had done 
little. Lastly, the oversight committee reflected the lay of the district. Its presidency 
alternated between the two urban GROs, never going to any rural member, and hence the 
OC — like the municipal council — remained in the grip of the town. This, however, was 
less significant that it might have been, as the OC was convincingly ineffective. Some 
residents accused them of ignoring their duties and others of taking bribes to do so. 
When I arranged to interview its president he did not arrive — I later found him with his 
(OC) officers on a street corner, literally falling down drunk: 115 The vice president, to 
whom I did speak, professed ignorance about one of the town's largest investment 
projects. "I demand to know which are our most important objectives," he thundered at 
me, "as soon as possible!" 116 With the institutions responsible for oversight and 
accountability either politicized or suborned or both, leaving the municipal executive 
free of external discipline, local government was no better than mediocre and possibly 
corrupt, and largely ignored its residents' needs. 
4.6 Guayaramerin 
Guayaramerin was a complex combination of extremes of wealth and power in a 
context of high social diversity, which produced a very particular political dynamic. The 
city had been transformed by the migratory boom of the post-war period, which 
multiplied its size and filled it with people and cultures from throughout Bolivia. With 
different languages and traditions, Guayaramerin's many ethnicities jostled each other in 
114 Justo Jose Apaza, community leader, interview, Desaguadero, 25 March 1997; Constantino Aruquipa 
and unnamed, school association president and member, interview, Desaguadero, 25 March 1997. 
115 The following day he was still too ill to see me. 
116 Nina Q., op.cit. 
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the streets and markets of the city, but found it difficult to trust each other or even, in 
some cases, to communicate. This impeded cooperation at the neighborhood level, and 
civic organizations were slow to form. When they finally did, it was under the tutelage 
of local government. This effectively allowed Guayaramerin's political parties to 
intervene in community formation for the sake of partisan advantage. Civil society was 
thus party-politicized, making GRO leaders beholden to political masters and 
neutralizing community groups as an independent source of authority in the district. In 
Putnam's terms, the horizontal linkages of civic organizations were instigated by 
political parties for explicitly partisan ends, rendering them unable to conduct effective 
oversight of politicians, and unlikely to promote their constituents' interests in the 
political process. Politics, meanwhile, was the preserve of local power-brokers, defined 
by the agreements they reached, and not the domain of collective action nor action on 
behalf of the collectivity. There was little ideology and little adherence to national 
strategies; this was not a politics of ideas, but rather of power and of influence. In part 
no doubt because society was fractured, the people of Guayaramerin had a weak 
tradition of political participation. The elitist conduct of policy sapped the legitimacy of 
politics and people's belief in the possibility of voice. Electoral absenteeism was high. 
Like Atocha, this in turn facilitated the efforts of a business and political elite to keep 
themselves in power through a variety of means. 
But the defining feature of Guayaramerin was its economy — rich, diverse, and 
thoroughly dominated by a small coterie of powerful businessmen who also ran the 
city's important public and private institutions. Hence the president of the municipal 
council was also head of the telephone cooperative, the mayor was a prominent timber 
merchant, and the head of the local ADN owned two of the district's three television 
stations, along with several agribusiness and transport concerns. Guayaramerin was thus 
run by a pro-business, of-the-business alliance primarily interested in the growth of the 
local economy, as well as in distributing municipal business amongst themselves. They 
admitted little public debate before key municipal decisions, and kept official accounts, 
investment plans (including the OAP), and other records very much out of the public 
eye. Once in power they left political divisions aside and behaved as a clan, providing 
no restraint on each others' actions and ignoring each others transgressions. They 
adhered to a trickle-down philosophy, and were more interested in accumulation than in 
actively oppressing any group in particular. But because their cause was pro-growth and 
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their interests encompassed essentially the entire local economy, private accumulation 
had historically led to public accumulation too. 
This business elite proved adept at developing Guayaramerin during the decades 
when it was a forgotten provincial town with few public resources because it was able to 
marshal private resources for the collective good when the question at hand was also a 
business priority. Thus electricity and telephone service were both brought to the city 
through cooperatives led by prominent local businessmen; and much street paving and 
the decoration of the central plaza were made possible through private contributions. 
But this model of "governance", which relied on informal contacts and private 
agreements, proved deficient at running a more complex municipal government that 
presided over a large rural hinterland. The advent of decentralization brought the district 
significant public resources, the administration of which demanded transparency and 
extensive consultation. And the business elite was not good at this. In terms of the 
model, the primary market for votes and policies was weak on account of an elite-
dominated, uncompetitive party system. The cash market for policies and influence, on 
the other hand, was very strong indeed. And the logic of social representation was 
comprehensively undermined by the political capture of community organizations. Thus 
GuayaramerIn's local governance system was severely imbalanced, and it is no surprise 
that the municipality proved biased towards the city and insensitive to local needs. 
Guayaramerin's municipal council was in some ways the institutionalization of 
its ruling elite, populated as it was by prominent locals. But whatever their abilities as 
businessmen, as councilmen they rated very poorly. "The priest," said one observer, 
referring to the MBL councilman," is a demagogue.... The rest of the council is 
useless."'" Popular opinion held that they responded to their own interests and to those 
of their parties, and even the council president conceded that their parties told them what 
to do. 118 The leader of the de Mayo community described the effects of such 
politicization: "When we go to see them [councilmen] in Guayaramerin to request 
something or discuss some concern, they ask us what party we belong to. If we answer 
their own party, then we're attended very well." 119 The mayor appeared to be somewhat 
more effective and less aggressively political, although he benefited from the 
comparison with a detested predecessor. The popular consensus held that he had 
117 Simoni, op.cit. 
118 Nincevic, op.cit. 
119 0 de Mayo, op.cit. 
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brought about some improvements in the city, but had had little or no effect in the 
countryside. A number of observers accused him of promoting conspicuous 
infrastructure projects while ignoring the more important needs of the populace. 12° 
 "There are big problems here, and the municipality is dedicated to small things," said the 
parish priest.''' Many others reproached him for refusing to meet with GRO 
representatives, and obstructing participation generally. '22 To the extent that the mayor 
cultivated an image of effectiveness, this was largely a façade, a shield behind which the 
ruling elite could strike the serious deals implicit in running a large municipality. 
Guayaramerin's oversight committee, lastly, was different in its overt 
politicization from those of our six other municipalities. Political parties largely 
determined its composition through their manipulation of GROs; OC candidates ran 
political-style campaigns, and its president promptly identified himself as an ADN man. 
But most importantly of all, city hall held the power to change the OC leadership if it 
chose, and had wielded it in the past.' 23 Thus compromised by the parties, the OC was 
neutralized as an independent authority and had little say in official decisions. With a 
politicized and unresponsive municipal council, a posturing mayor who obstructed 
popular participation, and an oversight committee infiltrated and neutralized by political 
parties, popular dissatisfaction with local government was virtually assured, and was 
forthcoming. But city hall seemed oblivious to such considerations. The mayor shifted 
municipal alliances with ease after the ADN took power in La Paz, and the business of 
governing continued undisrupted. 
4.7 Sipe Sipe 
Our last municipality, Sipe Sipe, was different from the other worst-performing 
districts in several important ways. Unlike Desaguadero and Guayaramerin, it 
comprised a homogeneous agricultural economy in which the town provided markets 
and agricultural services for farmers in the villages. And with no haciendas remaining 
after 1953, the district lacked dominant — or even large — economic actors. But common 
economic interests did not lead to a government responsive to people's needs, and this 
was in part the fault of politics. Sipe Sipe's party system was uncompetitive, afflicted by 
demagoguery and an insider dynamic that allowed the mayor, when forced to resign 
120 Catalayud, op.cit. 
121 Herrera, op. cit. 
122 Catalayud, op.cit. 
123  1a de Mayo, op.cit. 
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under a cloud of suspicion, to swap jobs with the president of the municipal council and 
continue in government. Fairly low electoral participation rates facilitated such 
manipulations by the political elite to remain in power. In this way the political system 
was rendered unresponsive to popular concerns, and real, substantive political 
competition occurred instead outside formal politics, spearheaded by GROs and the 
oversight committee. Sipe Sipe's civil society was well suited to this role, with strong 
institutional characteristics arising from a high degree of ethnic and cultural 
homogeneity that allowed it to mobilize around common goals effectively. Its civic 
associations were well-established, some from before the Spanish conquest and others 
from the 1950s, with strong traditions of self-government and popular mobilization. But 
a local government both politicized and involuted failed to exploit its potential, and 
community groups had little participation in the planning or execution of municipal 
projects. This helps to explain popular discontent with Sipe Sipe's government, 
criticized throughout the district as unresponsive to local needs. It also explains why 
civil society was plotting to seize the reins of power and overthrow the mayor. Old, 
organized, and largely excluded from the local governance system, civic organizations 
had both the means to fight local authorities and the will to do so. In terms of the model, 
the secondary market for policies and influence, given feeble economic actors, operated 
weakly, while the market for votes and policies was disrupted by an untransparent, anti-
competitive party system. And the logic of social representation, which should have 
flourished in a context of social coherence, was artificially disrupted by authorities who 
connived to stifle it. 
The municipal council exemplified many of the flaws of government in Sipe 
Sipe. A highly politicized body, it was a forum for political intrigue and widely believed 
to be corrupt. Popular consensus held that councilmen obeyed first their own pockets 
and then their parties, before considering the needs of the voters. The mayor and 
municipal executive displayed similar characteristics, dictating which investment 
projects a number of communities received and excluding popular participation from the 
government process generally. "The municipality thinks the AOP is a sacred 
document," reported the leaders of Mal'co Rancho. r'4  Popular consensus held that 
government and public services had improved little or not at all since decentralization 
"because politicians cheat us [and] the municipality spends money according to its own 
124 — montan, et.al., op.cit. 
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The Local Governance System Summarized 
Rank Municipality 
( 1 ) 
Open and 
Competitive 
Economy 
(2) 
Civil 
+ 	Society 
ICA* 
(3) 
+ Competitive ==> 
Politics 
(4) 
Responsiveness and 
Accountability of 
Governance System 
1 Charagua 4 5 5 5 
Baures 4 5 5 5 
2 Porongo 2 1 9 
Sucre 3 3 3 3 
3 Atocha 4 2 2 
4 Desaguadero 4 2 1 
Guayaramerin 1 1 1 1 
Sipe Sipe 5 4 2 3 
Viacha 1 1 
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convenience." 125 Lastly, the oversight committee failed to oversee municipal business 
adequately on account of its own ignorance and inactivity. When asked about a major 
water project almost on his doorstep, the OC president proved utterly uninformed. GRO 
leaders agreed that the OC did little to fulfill its official duties, accusing its leader of 
partiality to the mayor. With a mayor and municipal council that were politicized, 
unresponsive and corrupt, and an oversight committee ignorant and complicit with the 
authorities it was bound to oversee, local government did not perform well. And the 
people of Sipe Sipe, naturally, were discontent. But the striking fact about the system of 
local governance in Sipe Sipe was the ability and willingness of its civic organizations to 
confront the problem directly. The decentralization law strengthened their hand by 
granting them control of the OC, which in turn gave them the means to challenge the 
mayor and a chance to overthrow him. 
Figure 21 
Sources: Author's interviews, observation and other fieldwork 
* Institutional Coherence and Accountability 
Columns 1, 2 and 3 summarize the information in figures 16, 18 and 17. 
Values: 1 = lowest, worst; 5 = highest, best 
Viacha and Charagua added for purposes of comparison. 
4.8 Summary and Comparisons 
The table in figure 21 summarizes the main factors used in the above analysis. It 
does this by mapping the information in figures 16, 18 and 17 into three columns 
respectively, which correspond to the following concepts: (i) openness and 
competitiveness in the local economy (vs. hegemony or dominance by a few 
125 Siquisiquia, op.cit. 
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firms/actors); (ii) civil society's institutional coherence and ability; and (iii) an open, 
competitive political system marked by political entrepreneurship and policy innovation. 
As is argued in section three and demonstrated in section four above, these variables are 
key to explaining the quality of a district's governing institutions, and hence the quality 
of governance received. Mapping is done by assigning each municipality a value 
between one and five, where one is lowest (worst) and five is highest (best). While the 
value for each district is primarily based on that of the relevant column in figures 16-18, 
it also attempts to summarize the information in each table more generally. The 
schematization implicit in such notional values is a necessary compromise in order to 
present a large and diverse amount of information succinctly. 
Together, these economic, social and political factors determine the fourth 
column, the overall responsiveness and accountability of the local governance system. 
In simple terms, this captures the extent to which citizens are able to make local 
government do things for them, where government is construed to include the mayor, 
municipal council, and oversight committee. The column summarizes citizen's 
responses to a variety of questions put to them in my extended interviews. As argued in 
the previous section, the responsiveness of a district's governing institutions maps 
directly into people's perceptions of government quality, as given by their satisfaction 
with the public services and policy they receive. The ranking of municipalities in figure 
21 demonstrates this — rank is according to popular perceptions, and closely tracks the 
values of column four. A comparison with figure 15 provides further corroboration. 
The obvious exception to this analysis is Sipe Sipe, where a mediocre level of 
government responsiveness and accountability is associated with performance that is 
significantly worse. In other words, the model predicts a higher quality of government 
than respondents reported. This is because the district possessed two of the three 
conditions necessary for good local government: a competitive economy, and a high 
level of social coherence; but the third — a competitive local politics — was actively 
stymied by machinations of the mayor and municipal council. But Sipe Sipe's civil 
society, mobilized around a common goal, was taking the necessary steps to overturn the 
mayor. This implies that the local governance system, if temporarily diverted by the 
strategies of its officials, was in the longer term responsive to the demands of the people. 
Hence Sipe Sipe's low rank must be judged a transitory phenomenon — the district was 
likely to perform closer to the model's prediction soon. 
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A less obvious exception is Porongo, ranked by its respondents in the second tier 
of districts but with economic, social and political scores that are significantly worse. Its 
combination of economic dominance by a small group of friends, a fractured civil 
society lacking trust, and an almost comically uncompetitive political regime should 
have secured it a place at the bottom of the table. That it did not is largely attributable to 
the populist instincts of its mayor. This illustrates the difference leadership can make, 
and the power of personality in a municipal system as systematically undermined as 
Porongo's. But it is instructive to remember the lesson of Chapter 7: leadership is not 
entirely exogenous. The comparison with Sipe Sipe permits further refinement —
leadership is likely to be exogenous only in the short term, but determined endogenously 
by municipal characteristics in the longer term. Unscrupulous political agents will tend 
to operate in municipalities where government oversight and accountability are crippled 
by economic monopoly, distorted political competition or deep-set social antagonisms. 
Whereas in Sipe Sipe a responsive political system prepared to eject bad politicians who 
sought to pervert it, Porongo's dormant civil society if anything attracted them. Over 
time the quality of government in Porongo was likely to fall more easily than rise, 
dependent as it was on the quality of its leadership. Hence both cases comprise 
exceptions that prove the rule, confirming the value of the model. 
Another telling comparison is between the Atochan communities of Chorolque 
and Villa.Solano, or for that matter any of a number of unformed communities in 
Porongo and elsewhere. In the former, a pre-existing social unit organized around a very 
strong economic incentive — the miners' cooperative — took on GRO responsibilities 
quickly and effectively, and was highly involved in project selection, supervision and 
execution. Civil society in Villa Solano, meanwhile, was still asleep, relatively 
unorganized and uninvolved in its own governance. This highlights the role of social 
organization per se, as distinct from demographic characteristics. It implies that a 
community can take advantage of existing social organizations established for different 
purposes to mobilize collective efforts in the interests of local government. The fact that 
the people of Chorolque were migrants from across the altiplano and no community had 
operated there a only few years earlier, whereas Villa Solano was stable and 
homogeneous, underscores the point. But Chorolque also illustrates how the operational 
characteristics of the underlying organization can spill over into local governance, not 
always with salutary effects. In this case, the miners' strong tradition of political 
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activism led them to take FIS officials hostage in order to demand further investments. 
The long-term effects of this action on local investment were unlikely to be positive. 
Guayaramerin is notable as the only case where political competition preceded 
the organization of civil society. Politicians' success in colonizing community 
organizations there suggests that civic institutions must precede political parties if they 
are to act as checks and balances on their exercise of power. The logic of social 
organization must be different from the narrow logic of factionalism, patronage and 
electioneering. Where parties literally precede civil society, they place themselves in a 
prime position to capture social groups as they are formed, and manipulate them for 
partisan — and not civic — ends. The comparison of Guayaramerin, where citizens made 
no attempt to change municipal policy, with Sipe Sipe, where they organized to 
overthrow the mayor, makes this clear. 
With respect to the oversight committee, the comparison between Baures and 
Sipe Sipe is similar to that between Charagua and Viacha, and hence supports the 
interpretation in Chapter 7: where the mayor and municipal council represent their voters 
and respond effectively to popular demand, the function of the oversight committee is 
greatly diminished. It only becomes a binding constraint when one or both institutions 
malfunction. And if the OC itself is neutralized as a decision-making body, civil society 
must rely on its own devices. But as the experiences of both Viacha and Sipe Sipe 
vividly demonstrate, when society is coherent and well-organized it is more than capable 
of defending its interests. 
The final, small but compelling, observation concerns Baures and its separation 
from the municipality of Magdalena two years into the decentralization process. While 
it was subordinate to Magdalena, Baures was comprehensively ignored by town hall. 
There was no local governance system in operation, as the sub-district received few 
resources, and few GROs were organized. But after separation, local government 
flourished in Baures. Neighborhood and community groups sprang up to participate in 
policy decisions, and public resources were invested equitably according to 
communities' greatest needs. Public services improved considerably, and the people 
applauded their local government. This transition from stasis to governance is an 
illustration of the potential of decentralization. The exemplary experience of such a tiny 
population suggests that decentralization in Bolivia can be taken further, driving 
democracy even deeper into the roots of society. 
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5. Conclusions: Refining the Model 
As fine-tuned above, the model of the local governance system can explain the 
quality of government in all nine municipalities, including Viacha and Charagua as well 
as the two outliers. More importantly, it is sufficiently sensitive to distinguish between 
cases that alternative-theories would expect to be similar, but which in fact show very 
different levels of performance. A common claim, for example, is that performance is a 
positive function of municipal size or wealth, as smaller/poorer municipalities lack the 
human and financial resources to confront the problems of government. But such a 
theory can not explain the position of Guayaramerin, one of the largest and wealthiest 
districts, at the bottom of the list, nor that of tiny Baures at the top. Another argument, 
found frequently in the political science literature, is that the presence of dominant 
interests leads to interest-group capture, and hence unresponsive government. But this 
only explains performance in one of our worst-performing group — Guayaramerin — and 
not the other two. Lastly, my own results in Chapters 2 and 3 imply that small, rural 
municipalities are more sensitive to local needs than their larger, urban cousins. But the 
two smallest districts in our group — Baures and Desaguadero — sit at opposite extremes, 
while the largest and most urban — Sucre — lies near the top. The model developed above 
can explain all of these apparent contradictions. It can also explain why the underlying 
quality of governance in Sipe Sipe was better than it appeared, and why government 
could be expected to improve suddenly there. 
The greater amount of information available from adding seven cases to our 
original two permits a rough sort of "sensitivity analysis" of the different elements of the 
model in order to gauge their relative importance. Consider the positions of Baures and 
Sipe Sipe in figure 21. This suggest that all three determinants must rate highly in order 
for government to perform well. Having two good factors is not enough, nor indeed is 
one. But closer examination reveals that economic structure is least well correlated with 
the fourth column. Politics and civil society track overall responsiveness and 
accountability better, suggesting that they jointly determine government quality. But at 
this point it is instructive to ask: which of these factors is exogenous and which is 
endogenous? It is easy to see that the local economy is essentially given. It is part of the 
superstructure within which politics and civic organizations operate, and — short of 
revolution or expropriation — changes too slowly to be determined in any useful sense by 
the other factors in the model. The institutional capacity of civil society is also 
280 
Testing the Theory in Seven Municipalities 
exogenous. Although it will develop and change over time, internalizing the incentives 
generated by its environment more rapidly than economic structure can, it is ultimately 
dependent on characteristics such as culture, language, encompassing interest and trust —
characteristics which should remain exogenous in a political economy model of 
government. 
A competitive political system, on the other hand, is different — dependent as it is 
upon the constellation of economic and other interests at the local level, as well as on 
political participation by citizens and turnout at elections. According to their strength 
and their behavior, a district's private interests can monopolize its politics or contribute 
to openness and competition; and voters can make their demands known and hold 
politicians to account, or not, by the extent to which they vote and participate in policy 
discussions. Thus assuming a legal and institutional framework that guarantees a secret 
ballot, fair vote count, and free entry of political agents — essential assumptions for any 
democratic system — competitive politics is determined endogenously. Poor or corrupt 
leaders can emerge spontaneously, of course, but over time the character not only of 
political leadership, but of the entire political system, will be given by the interactions of 
civil society and economic structure. This is borne out by the preceding analysis, which 
shows this process in action in our seven municipalities. Figure 22 presents these 
relationships graphically, and shows how they relate to the previous model of local 
governance. In essence this model is a restatement of the previous one. But whereas the 
first model is structural, representing the main actors involved in the local government 
process, this one is dynamic, focusing on the interactions between these actors, and the 
chain of causality that leads to government responsiveness and accountability. 
Lastly a question: what sorts of interventions can improve the quality of local 
government? Very generally, and assuming that legal guarantees of free and fair voting 
are in place, figure 22 suggest that civil society should be the key object of such 
policies. If economic structure is exogenous and changes slowly, then efforts to increase 
the responsiveness and accountability of government institutions can usefully focus on 
strengthening civic organizations, increasing their participation in the policy debate and 
their influence on the local political system. Such efforts should take account of how 
civic groups enter the local governing process and which are the key inputs they provide, 
as discussed above. Principal amongst these is continuous feedback on grass-roots needs 
and the effectiveness of government action. This can serve to complement a voting 
mechanism which is intermittent and un-graduated, and thus unsuited for prompting 
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incremental policy changes. In so doing, it can help to counterbalance the influence of 
private interests on politicians, which tends to be both continuous and compelling, and to 
lead in the long term to patronage and insularity in the local political system. But 
national authorities and development practitioners alike should be very wary when 
planning such strengthening activities. The fundamental point of decentralization is that 
decisions are made locally, according to local priorities. Outsiders must take care not to 
disrupt this process. Hence their policy interventions must be discrete and highly 
targeted, and focused above all on enhancing the insertion of civil society into the local 
governance system. 
289 
Economic Structure 
Testing the Theory in Seven Municipalities 
Figure 22: Two Models of Local Government 
(i) Structural Model 
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After long and detailed analysis of decentralization and the quality of local 
government in Bolivia, it is time to weave together the strands of our various conclusions 
and consider what we have learned. 
Bolivia's 1994 decentralization reform changed not only the allocation of public 
monies amongst the country's 311 municipalities, but more importantly national patterns 
of investment. Chapter 2 demonstrated that investment changed significantly in the 
social sectors (education, water & sanitation, water management, and possibly health), 
agriculture and urban development. Econometric results further showed that changes in 
the social sectors and agriculture are positively related to objective indicators of local 
need — for example, investment in education and water & sanitation rose after 1994 
where illiteracy rates were higher and water and sewerage connection rates lower, 
respectively. Decentralization thus made government more responsive in Bolivia by re-
directing investment in public services to areas of greatest need. It is an impressive fact 
that large shifts in national investment aggregates were driven by Bolivia's smallest, 
poorest municipalities investing newly-devolved resources in their highest-priority 
projects. But how precisely did decentralization achieve such effects? What social or 
political mechanisms link needs to policy? As discussed in Chapter 1, many 
contributions to the literature invoke the idea that local government is "closer" to 
demand, and responsiveness follows in some unspecified way. This account, though not 
unattractive, is insufficient as an explanation of broad behavioral change as it simply re-
locates the question: Why does closeness matter? How does it operate? Why does local 
government behave so differently? 
Chapter 3 explored these questions, examining how central and local government 
decisions are made by modeling the policy decisions of each econometrically. Local 
government invested progressively in terms of need in agriculture and the social sectors 
—five of the six sectors studied; central government invested progressively nowhere, and 
regressively in terms of need in health, agriculture, and water & sanitation. So far this 
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confirms the pattern of Chapter 2. More interestingly, under both regimes private sector 
lobbies were associated with investment reductions in some sectors, notably health, 
while the presence of civic organizations led to investment increases in others, notably 
education and water. At the simplest level this points to the existence of political 
economy mechanisms under both central and local government through which private 
sector and civic groups influenced policy outcomes. But the stark differences between 
the two regimes noted above imply that such mechanisms function in quite different 
ways. 
Most importantly, civic lobbies and private interest groups have a much greater 
effect on policy-making under local government than central government. While the 
data do show that the center "listened" to local demands, it did so in only the 50% of 
municipalities in which it chose to invest before decentralization. These were Bolivia's 
bigger, wealthier municipalities where service provision and the existing stock of 
infrastructure were greater. Local governments, by contrast, listened essentially 
everywhere. The resulting investment patterns reflect this. Whereas local investment 
was economically progressive and responsive to local needs, the center invested where 
need was lower, wealth higher, and ignored scores of small districts entirely. Taken 
together, the results suggest a nuanced explanation of this behavior. The competitive 
interplay of local political forces combines with the discipline of local elections under 
decentralization to ensure that public officials are well-informed about voters' 
preferences, and held accountable for the policies they pursue. Decision-makers' 
incentives are more closely aligned to citizens', and the effect is strong enough to appear 
in national trends. In such a system of governance even poor citizens have voice and 
may participate in the policy debate. By contrast, central government's response to local 
priorities is muted by distance, incentives and extraneous (e.g. political) considerations. 
In terms of processing local signals the center is simply less efficient than the periphery, 
and the resulting policies reflect this. 
This explanation is consistent with a simple model of public investment in which 
local government is more sensitive to local preferences, but central government has a 
technical or organizational advantage in the provision of public goods. Thus the 
periphery knows better what local citizens want, but the center can produce services of a 
given quality more cheaply. By varying the parameters of this tradeoff I can show that 
decentralization will lead to increased investment and better targeting in some sectors, 
and decreased investment in others. A simple extension of this model that embeds the 
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objective functions of both regimes in a negotiations framework goes further. By 
locating central government in a "national capital", with its own particular interests and 
policy goals, and making policy outcomes the result of bargains between center and 
periphery, such a model can explain the two central facts of decentralization in Bolivia: 
(1) the sharp fall in the geographic concentration of investment, and (2) the sea-change 
in the uses of investment away from infrastructure towards the social sectors. 
Provocative as they are, these approaches raise a number of deeper questions 
about local government which must be answered if we are to fully understand 
decentralization and the effects it brings about. Why should local government be more 
sensitive to local information? Why is it more accessible to different social groups? 
Amongst decentralized municipalities, why are some more responsive or effective than 
others? The quantitative approach of the first part of this dissertation has several 
strengths, not least the generality of the insights it provides: the trends I identify in the 
data hold across all of Bolivia's 310 municipalities, and my conclusions are thus national 
in scope. But both its data and its estimation techniques are too blunt to allow us to push 
our conclusions further. Contrast, for example, the insignificance of indicators of civic 
and private lobbies in Chapter 2 with their overriding importance in Chapters 5 to 8. 
Raw qualitative evidence establishes clearly that these actors mattered to the quality of 
decentralized government, yet numerous econometric estimations failed to detect this. 
Answering the questions above requires us to understand the tangle of social and 
economic forces which underlie the institutions of local government. We must 
characterize in qualitative terms the actors that compete for power in a political 
environment, and understand the complex relationships between them. 
Hence part two, where extensive qualitative analysis based on hundreds of hours 
of interviews and observation built up detailed case studies of nine municipalities after 
decentralization. Chapters 5 and 6 tackled these questions by examining local 
government very closely in the best and worst of these in order to determine how 
government works in each, and which factors explain their differences. In Viacha 
government was unresponsive, violent and corrupt. This was largely due to the mayor's 
successful efforts to short-circuit public accountability by sabotaging the institutions of 
government, leaving them unable to carry out their role in the governance system, and 
him free to deform local policy in his own and his party's interests. In Charagua, by 
contrast, governance was participative and responsive, led by strong institutions of 
government which produced high-quality policy outputs. Careful consideration of how 
286 
Conclusion 
policy is made, from the perspectives of all the major and intermediate players in each 
district, showed that the performance of public institutions was thinly grounded in the 
local economy, political system, civil society, and the interactions amongst them. 
Chapter 7 pushed the analysis further, showing that a vigorous local politics marked by 
competition is conducive to effective government; the policy innovation and political 
entrepreneurship thus enabled tend to arbitrage away distortions in political 
representation and voice. And an open, competitive local economy is in turn conducive 
to competitive politics, to the extent that it increases the diversity of ideas and policy 
proposals that compete for public favor, as well as intensifying the enforcement of 
accountability over local officials. Lastly, where civic organizations are resilient they 
can aggregate preferences, represent community needs, enforce political accountability, 
and otherwise facilitate the participation of civic groups — including the poor — in a 
governance process which might otherwise be easily dominated by firms and business 
interests. 
Although compelling in light of the facts, this explanation of government in 
Viacha and Charagua is still too loose to be fully satisfying. Chapter 7 accordingly 
moved towards a more explicit model by identifying information and accountability as 
the key conditions necessary for high-quality, responsive government. Where 
economics, politics and society interact favorably as described above, information and 
accountability will obtain in the local government process; where they do not, one or 
both will be absent. I then derived a simple, two-stage model of local government 
inductively from the experiences of the two districts. In the first stage, control rights 
over public institutions and resources are allocated to particular politicians via elections. 
The second stage consists of a number of single issue sub-games in which civic and 
private actors lobby elected officials to implement the policies they prefer. Through this 
two-stage structure, the model provides an elementary solution to the problem of 
preference revelation in multi-dimensional policy space that has bedeviled public choice 
theory for decades. More prosaically, it also explains the policy outputs described in 
Chapters 5 and 6. 
But in this form the model is not empirically tractable given the type of 
qualitative data available. Hence I operationalized it by collapsing the structure into an 
atemporal, single-stage framework focused on the real institutions of government: the 
mayor, local council and oversight committee, and their interactions with the major 
economic, political and social actors in a given district. This approach construes local 
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government as a nexus of two political markets and one organizational dynamic. In the 
primary (retail) market, political parties offer policy-related ideas and values in exchange 
for votes. This corresponds to stage one above. In the secondary (wholesale) market, 
policy bundles and influence over the policy-making process are sold to interest groups 
in exchange for money, corresponding to stage two. Meanwhile, civil society inserts 
itself into the local government process through its own organizational dynamic, 
transmitting local preferences and political opinions/complaints upwards to elected 
authorities, and information on government proposals and policy conditions downwards 
to the grass roots. This element is essential, as local government depends on the 
relationships that collectively comprise civil society to elicit detailed information for use 
in policy-making, judge the efficacy of past interventions, and plan for the future. 
In order for local government to be effective, these three relationships must 
counterbalance each other and none dominate the other. Such a stable tension leads to a 
self-limiting dynamic where pressures from various interest groups are contained within 
the bounds of political competition. Breaking this tension can hobble government, 
leaving it undemocratic when the primary political market is impaired, insensitive to 
economic conditions when the secondary political market is distorted, and unaccountable 
and uninformed when the insertion of civil society is blocked. Because of the 
organizational heterogeneity of civic groups, and because the currency of their influence 
is often hard to measure — unlike the votes or money of other actors — this last element is 
the most complex and difficult to observe of the three. But it lies at the heart of the 
stage-two process described above, playing an important role in the transmission of 
information and enforcement of accountability. 
Chapter 8 refined the conceptual framework further by using it to analyze 
evidence from seven additional municipalities, testing its generality and resilience 
against new data. The model explained the quality of government in this diverse group 
of districts well, and was sufficiently sensitive to distinguish between cases that 
alternative theories would expect to be similar, but which in fact performed quite 
differently. Specifically, its combination of economic, political and social arguments 
permits greater analytical precision than any one independently could achieve. This was 
illustrated pointedly in the case of the outlying municipality, Sipe Sipe, which according 
to the analysis should have enjoyed moderately good government, but instead languished 
at the bottom of the scale. After my research was complete, Sipe Sipe's citizens —
supported by strong civic organizations and an open, competitive economy — challenged 
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their wayward authorities and were able to secure a change in local leadership. The 
improvement in the quality of government they ultimately achieved returned the district 
to a level of performance more in line with the model's prediction. 
Chapter 8 further confirmed that information and accountability are at the core of 
a good policy-making process, and by extension that the insertion of civil society into the 
local governance system is an important component of responsive government. This is 
not to say that economic structure and the political system are not important — they are. 
But these fields have been plowed extensively in the past, and their effects are well 
understood. The role of civic organizations in the governing process, by contrast, is less 
well understood. How is successful insertion achieved? In a competitive political 
dynamic, private interests offering cash — and thereby immediate and even continuous 
gratification — to elected officials enjoy an advantage over civic groups. The latter's 
comparative advantage lies in potential votes, a more distant, less constant enticement. 
Facing such a challenge, the organizational cohesion, norms of behavior, and stores of 
trust and credibility that civic groups develop can crucially level the field of political 
competition. And a level playing field essentially defines the conditions for successful 
insertion of civil society into a governing regime. Where such conditions obtain, 
evidence from Bolivia shows that accountability is likely to become an explicit and 
continuous element of local government. The grass roots gain a permanent voice, and 
substantive participation in how they are governed. And the quality of government 
improves. 
As this synopsis demonstrates, the addition of a detailed qualitative approach to 
an econometric methodology allowed me to combine generality and consistency with 
empirical depth and richness. Useful on its own, this also facilitated the identification of 
social mechanisms amongst the many actors and variables in question. By interpreting 
quantitative results in light of qualitative findings I was able to engage in theory 
selection, using case studies to rule out alternatives that correlations permitted but direct 
observation did not. The ultimate goal of my mixed methodology was to establish 
patterns of causality that explained the broad results of part one, and answered the deeper 
questions posed in part two. This was largely achieved. 
Finally, put method aside and consider in a nutshell what decentralization did to 
Bolivia. Decentralization led to major changes in national policy by making government 
more responsive to real local needs. It did so via the creation of hundreds of local 
governments throughout the country. These proved more sensitive to local conditions, 
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and more accessible to lobbying and grass-roots pressure, than a central administration 
that simply abandoned large expanses of territory as convenience dictated. The superior 
responsiveness of local government is a product of the structure of local governance, 
which I model as a two-stage game. Indeed, the effectiveness of decentralization as 
policy reform is largely the result of enabling second-stage sub-game dynamics 
throughout the country, where previously no policy-making took place. In so doing, 
decentralization engaged thousands of neighborhood councils, peasant communities, 
ayllus and mallkus that pre-date the Spanish conquest, as well as interest groups and 
business associations which previously had no voice in how their communities were run. 
By locating real resources and political power in municipal institutions it reached out to 
rich and poor strata alike offering them the means to improve their lives, and thus a 
concrete incentive to participate. 
This changed not only the form of government in Bolivia, but also its substance. 
The relatively few central officials stationed beyond national and regional capitals before 
1994 had almost no incentive to concern themselves with local demands. Career success 
was determined by ministerial fiat unrelated to local outcomes in distant districts. 
Second-stage games did not exist in the provinces, and officials — who could afford to 
ignore local interest groups — fixed their gaze thinly on La Paz. In a sparsely populated 
country twice the size of France with a per-capita income of $2/day, poor groups beyond 
the main few cities could realistically expect to wield no influence on central 
government policy, especially on such issues as schools, and street lighting. Business 
interests and the rich might eventually hope to gain some favors from the center, but 
throughout most of the country ordinary citizens' ordinary concerns were effectively 
shut out. Decentralization changed this by creating local authorities beholden to local 
voters. Throughout the national territory it put real power over public resources in the 
hands of ordinary citizens. And it changed the way the country is run. 
This dissertation has ultimately been about the possibility of change, and its 
message is hopeful. The reform of institutions and their associated incentives can bring 
about significant, nationwide changes in social and political behavior in the space of a 
few years. The Bolivian experiment argues against Putnam's assertion that policy 
performance is determined by thousand-year historical conditioning. When reform 
creates the opportunity to establish social organizations that improve group welfare, 
people can rise to the challenge and succeed. This includes the very poor and oppressed. 
The conditions necessary for reform to prosper are a complex of economic, political and 
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social characteristics, and may well be lacking as often as they are present. But under 
the right circumstances, decentralizing resources and political authority can generate real 
accountability where none existed before and improve the quality of government a 
society achieves. 
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A1.1: Summary of Principal Component Variables, PCV Constituents, and Needs 
Variables 
Variable Obs 	Mean Std. Dev. Mn Max 
Principal Component Variables 
Pvt Sector 302 -3.2400E-09 1.5298 -0.3015 18.0787 
eereg cm 306 202.7255 1229.8060 0 14117 
eereg ea 306 0.5556 2.0973 0 30 
eereg_fi 310 2.6097 26.7243 0 454 
Pr Planning 310 2.3600E-09 1.5915 -2.7175 2.2313 
catastur 310 0.1581 0.3654 0 1 
dpoacoor 310 0.8548 0.9991 0 4 
dpoaotro 310 0.6968 1.1790 0 4 
epoaham 310 0.8355 0.3713 0 1 
evalres 310 0.8226 0.3826 0 1 
idenalc 310 0.7968 0.4030 0 1 
idencons 310 0.4129 0.4932 0 1 
idencv 310 0.7323 0.4435 0 1 
idenpdm 310 0.3742 0.4847 0 1 
info ed 310 0.5581 0.4974 0 1 
info sa 310 0.5839 0.4937 0 1 
pcbn94 310 0.3032 0.4604 0 1 
plat sye 310 0.5839 0.4937 0 1 
reconu a 310 0.6839 0.4657 0 1 
Civil Insts 303 2.4000E-09 2.2150 -2.1130 14.5313 
cv 310 0.6419 0.4802 0 1 
indig2 310 0.6290 3.5208 0 51 
jvec2 310 8.9548 26.2524 0 247 
otbregi 308 34.25 41.3093 0 299 
otbregi2 310 46.9226 49.6351 0 339 
otbs e 307 50.2280 59.0375 0 520 
otbs_pj 305 43.8557 52.5067 0 416 
otbsoli 308 40 43.9176 0 323 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Mn Max 
Training 310 -5.4000E-09 1.6762 -2.8227 4.2889 
capadpe 310 0.2516 0.4346 0 1 
capcil 310 0.2 0.4006 0 1 
capci2 310 0.5710 0.4957 0 1 
capdis 310 0.4871 0.5006 0 1 
caplemu 310 0.3452 0.4762 0 1 
caporad 310 0.3 0.4590 0 1 
capprin 310 0.3613 0.4812 0 1 
capprop 310 0.3903 0.4886 0 1 
temaorad 310 0.5065 0.5008 0 1 
temaprop 310 0.4290 0.4957 0 1 
temadis 310 0.3161 0.4657 0 1 
temacz 310 0.5194 0.5004 0 1 
if 310 1.64E-08 1.523458 -1.5591 5.08641 
sitotal 310 0.4355 0.4966 0 1 
siotro 310 0.2226 0.4167 0 1 
sisin ad 310 0.1548 0.3623 0 1 
sisin ai 310 0.6968 0.4604 0 1 
sisinidp 310 0.3258 0.4694 0 1 
sicom 310 0.2806 0.4500 0 1 
impresor 310 0.2903 0.8737 0 10 
Need Variables (See Database Key) 
sa minsa 310 32.0264 20.0876 0 85.5147 
sa otro 310 4.3985 7.4206 0 65.2706 
desmod 294 8.2202 4.4993 0 26.2548 
dilos 310 0.9161 0.2776 0 1 
analf 310 30.4638 15.8231 5.5 78.7 
ed alfa 310 69.0462 15.9098 21.2128 94.5433 
edana6 310 26.5292 13.1925 6.3780 69.7183 
dile 310 0.5032 0.5008 0 1 
sin alca 310 76.1424 21.8893 14.6586 100 
sin_agua 310 74.3487 21.1723 17.9204 100 
neita4pc 304 0.0014 0.0108 0 0.1517 
infot4pc 286 6.0100E-05 0.0006 0 0.0095 
deslevh 294 23.0698 7.2684 0 57.1429 
sin luz 310 76.0124 25.4209 5.9936 100 
aguanr 310 67.6176 23.3971 10.4521 100 
alca sin 310 76.2768 21.8418 14.6586 100 
alca otr 310 16.1283 16.3147 0 64.1026 
agues_ 
agua f
dv
v 
310 
310 
8.9680 
16.7037 
10.3644 
13.7505 
0 
0 
56.4501 
65.9341 
ague ft 310 6.7107 7.1615 0 48.2235 
teatr4pc 304 28300E-05 8.3400E-05 0 0.0007 
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Principal Component Variables 
Interpretation 
Civil Institutions: This is an indicator of the number organizations and institutions of 
local civil society. It rises in all the variables, especially in the more general measures. 
We interpret it as a proxy for the strength of local civil institutions. 
Private Sector: This PCV rises in the number of private businesses registered locally. 
We construe it as an indicator of the dynamism of the local private sector. 
Training: This variable rises in categories of training (i.e. institutional strengthening) 
received by the municipality and falls in those requested but not yet received. Hence we 
interpret it as a measure of the intensity of capacity-building efforts undertaken by/for 
local government. 
Information Technology: This PCV rises in the IT systems - hardware and software 
(especially software) - at the disposal of each municipality. 
Project Planning: This PCV loads positively where municipalities use information on 
education and health when planning projects, where sectoral regulations are followed in 
water & sanitation, where a Municipal Development Plan exists, and where councilmen 
and oversight committees identify investment projects using the MDP and urban 
cadaster. It loads negatively where the mayor is the one who identifies investment 
projects, and where problems arise with the Annual Operating Plan. This is thus a 
straightforward indicator of informed project planning which follows consensual and 
open procedures. 
Eigenvectors 
For the eigenvectors that follow, factor loadings on the raw variables can be read 
vertically down each column. 
293 
Appendix 1: Chapter 2 Data and Methodology 
A1.2 
Eigenvectors 
Variable 
CIVIL INSTITUTIONS 
1 
TRAINING 
Eigenvectors 
Variable 1 
cv 0.09745 capadpe 0.28556 
indig2 0.01988 capcil 0.30671 
jvec2 0.29229 capci2 0.2612 
otbregi 0.4194 capdis 0.2793 
otbregi2 0.43286 caplemu 0.34451 
otbs_e 0.42137 caporad 0.38803 
otbs_pj 0.42934 capprin 0.37869 
otbsoli 0.42372 capprop 0.34559 
temacz -0.14204 
temadis -0.20036 
PROJECT PLANNING 	temaorad -0.22559 
Eigenvectors 	 temaprop -0.18667 
Variable 1 
catastur 0.04701 
dpoacoor -0.00839 INFORMATION TECH. 
dpoaotro -0.07581 Eigenvectors 
epoaham 0.00306 Variable 1 
evalres 0.07426 sitotal 0.51744 
idenalc -0.00973 siotro 0.36119 
idencons 0.0145 sisin_ad 0.42748 
idencv 0.09214 sisin_ai -0.27289 
idenpdm 0.14818 sisinidp 0.28173 
info ed 0.53349 sicom 0.38812 
info_sa 0.51649 impresor 0.3385 
pdm94 0.14019 
plan_sye 0.56911 
reconu_a 0.24654 PRIVATE SECTOR 
Eigenvectors 
Variable 	1 
eereg_cm 0.61675 
eereg_ea 	0.56212 
eereg_fi 
	
0.55103 
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A1-1: Summary of Principal Component Variables, PCV Constituents, and Needs Variables 
Variable 	Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Principal Component Variables 
Economic 1 309 -7.58E-09 3.379288 -5.5154 10.761 
Economic 3 309 6.60E-10 1.950959 -6.8422 4.3846 
catvi_10 310 12.98603 22.74078 0 91.93 
catvi_11 310 9.743513 11.40623 0 76.923 
catvi_hi 310 21.45342 20.4527 0 85.893 
catvi_lo 310 53.01626 28.3189 0.1603 98.041 
catvi_me 310 2.800774 6.003828 0 58.654 
cocina 310 63.18565 14.03657 15.138 90.726 
comb_hi 309 18.05282 21.35939 0 89.7 
comb_lo 309 80.73161 21.95467 2.4997 100 
comb_me 309 1.044559 1.860857 0 14.339 
comb_otr 309 0.1710101 0.3831445 0 4.1667 
cuartol 310 33.29116 11.54638 10.569 76.514 
cuarto2 310 34.75675 8.07081 16.239 76.613 
cuarto2f 310 68.04791 11.18261 37.435 95.505 
cuarto3 310 17.61446 5.533153 2.7523 31.902 
cuarto4 310 8.462401 3.735846 0.4032 18.883 
cuarto4m 310 14.33763 6.984188 1.7431 34.756 
cuarto5 310 5.875234 3.778269 0 18.358 
dorms] 310 75.54401 11.86857 38.859 98.396 
dorms2 310 18.96714 7.565 1.6043 38.425 
dorms2f 310 94.51115 5.055565 74.934 100 
dorms3 310 4.07507 3.498517 0 16.578 
dorms4 310 1.014941 1.16489 0 6.1956 
dorms4m 310 1.41378 1.66395 0 8.917 
dorms5 310 0.3988394 0.5531117 0 4.3393 
ecact 310 55.97236 10.76106 15.233 80.622 
ecactm 310 38.5921 10.1737 8.1356 60.096 
ecdesm 310 18.08835 15.75617 0 100 
ecina 310 43.51541 10.89542 19.257 84.767 
ecinam 310 62.55553 6.075064 40.87 84.848 
ecocum 310 38.8383 10.20898 7.8571 60.507 
hogar_ta 310 4.258899 0.7635836 2.04 6.32 
partbru 310 43.52524 8.523663 11.61 63.05 
ppdorm2 310 37.45356 10.59514 14.793 75.956 
ppdorm4 310 33.72842 4.095746 16.279 43.478 
ppdorm5 310 28.81803 8.967728 5.3763 58.871 
Demogr I 308 1.22E-09 1.507338 -1.8943 7.413 
Demogr 2 308 -2.61E-09 1.260633 -2.7652 5.0168 
pobpc.0 308 16.45709 27.28928 0 100 
pobpc.r 308 89.4978 110.0184 0 1947.4 
rel_cato 310 78.60554 11.02218 26.85 94.858 
rel_evan 310 11.92324 8.643937 0.6503 62.183 
rel_ning 310 2.507558 1.987785 0 13.657 
id_sine 310 0.4922058 0.8702676 0 7.69 
id trad 310 23.18218 20.93228 0 81.408 
inmasc 310 102.4356 15.32378 71.17 232.39 
Altiplano 310 0.4741935 0.5001409 0 1 
Orient 310 0.2580645 0.4382771 0 1 
Politics 295 -2.42E-09 1.226105 -3.1397 4.4445 
oficial 295 0.8440678 0.3634075 0 1 
margen93 306 15.45389 11.62267 0 60.714 
nulo93 306 4.20045 3.433944 0 35.949 
ausent93 306 139.8737 83.67695 12.766 628.92 
ausent95 310 67.93136 28.09571 0.3436 175.61 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
CG Auditing 308 -4.60E-10 1.504751 -1.341 5.6282 
fis 308 0.4448052 0.4977529 0 1 
inejpr_a 310 0.5774194 0.4947685 0 1 
inejpr_m 310 0.1483871 0.356058 0 1 
inejpr_s 310 0.4548387 0.4987614 0 1 
sisin_ad 310 0.1548387 0.3623357 0 1 
sayco 310 0.3516129 0.4782458 0 1 
sayco_a 310 0.2967742 0.4575748 0 1 
sayco_o 310 0.2483871 0.88839 0 8 
Mun Adm 1 303 -2.58E-09 2.089446 -5.5917 6.6973 
Mun Adm 2 303 3.49E-09 1.758446 -4.2158 2.7704 
alc_co 310 0.8548387 0.3528329 0 1 
alc_de 310 0.8096774 0.3931903 0 1 
con_co 310 0.4064516 0.4919649 0 1 
con_de 310 0.3290323 0.4706214 0 1 
cuenpu_a 310 0.1032258 0.3047455 0 1 
cuenpu_c 310 0.583871 0.4937124 0 1 
cuenpu_o 310 0.4580645 0.4990439 0 1 
evte_co 310 0.283871 0.451604 0 1 
evte_de 310 0.2258065 0.4187883 0 1 
invdir 310 0.3064516 0.4617649 0 1 
invpub 310 0.2129032 0.4100217 0 1 
manpro_d 310 0.3483871 0.4772297 0 1 
manpro_u 310 0.2741935 0.4468283 0 1 
otro_co 310 0.0483871 0.2149298 0 1 
otro_de 310 0.0580645 0.2342435 0 1 
plieg_ad 310 0.8193548 0.3853459 0 1 
plieg_ca 310 0.8451613 0.3623357 0 1 
plieg_pu 310 0.8483871 0.3592251 0 1 
pliego 310 0.7419355 0.4382771 0 1 
progcont 310 0.5774194 0.4947685 0 1 
regcon 310 0.4612903 0.4993053 0 1 
salar_pc 304 1082.977 1205.953 50 8300 
salar co 304 1042.796 1186.592 20 8300 
suped a 310 0.3709677 0.4838449 0 
suped c 310 0.5483871 0.4984578 0 
supsa_a 310 0.3419355 0.4751251 0 
supsa_c 310 0.5451613 0.4987614 0 
supsa_o 310 0.5709677 0.4957382 0 
usmanfun 310 0.3806452 0.4863305 0 
Pr Planning 310 2.36E-09 1.591479 -2.7175 2.2313  
catastur 310 0.1580645 0.3653913 0 
dpoacoor 310 0.8548387 0.9991384 0 
dpoaotro 310 0.6967742 1.178964 0 
epoaham 310 0.8354839 0.3713427 0 
evalres 310 0.8225806 0.3826409 0 
idenalc 310 0.7967742 0.4030498 0 
idencons 310 0.4129032 0.4931518 0 
idencv 310 0.7322581 0.4434982 0 
idenpdm 310 0.3741935 0.4846964 0 
info_ed 310 0.5580645 0.49742 0 
info_sa 310 0.583871 0.4937124 0 
pdm94 310 0.3032258 0.4603951 0 
plan_sye 310 0.583871 0.4937124 0 
reconu_a 310 0.683871 0.4657157 0 
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Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Civil Insts 303 2.40E-09 2.214992 -2.113 14.531 
cv 310 0.6419355 0.4802064 0 1 
indig2 310 0.6290323 3.520784 0 51 
jvec2 310 8.954839 26.25241 0 247 
otbregi 308 34.25 41.30934 0 299 
otbregi2 310 46.92258 49.63505 0 339 
otbs_e 307 50.22801 59.03749 0 520 
otbs_pj 305 43.85574 52.50669 0 416 
otbsoli 308 40 43.9176 0 323 
Pvt Sector 302 -3.24E-09 1.529804 -0.3015 18.079 
eereg_cm 306 202.7255 1229.806 0 14117 
eereg_ea 306 0.5555556 2.09727 0 30 
eereg_fi 310 2.609677 26.72428 0 454 
Training 310 -5.40E-09 1.676235 -2.8227 4.2889 
capadpe 310 0.2516129 0.4346415 0 1 
capcil 310 0.2 0.4006467 0 1 
capci2 310 0.5709677 0.4957382 0 1 
capdis 310 0.4870968 0.5006416 0 1 
caplemu 310 0.3451613 0.4761895 0 1 
caporad 310 0.3 0.4589985 0 1 
capprin 310 0.3612903 0.4811511 0 1 
capprop 310 0.3903226 0.4886113 0 1 
temaorad 310 0.5064516 0.5007667 0 1 
temaprop 310 0.4290323 0.4957382 0 1 
temadis 310 0.316129 0.4657157 0 1 
temacz 310 0.5193548 0.5004331 0 1 
IT 310 1.64E-08 1.523458 -1.5591 5.0864 
sitotal 310 0.4354839 0.4966218 0 1 
siotro 310 0.2225806 0.4166515 0 1 
sisin_ad 310 0.1548387 0.3623357 0 1 
sisin_ai 310 0.6967742 0.4603951 0 1 
sisinidp 310 0.3258065 0.4694331 0 1 
sicom 310 0.2806452 0.4500409 0 1 
impresor 310 0.2903226 0.8736913 0 10 
Variable 	Obs 	Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Need Varia bles (See Database Key) 
sa_minsa 310 32.02643 20.08756 0 85.515 
sa_caja 310 5.670032 6.809536 0 41.654 
sa_noat 310 11.03071 9.780051 0 62.888 
deslev 294 22.03739 6.866404 0 50 
dilos 310 0.916129 0.2776424 0 1 
sandia2 310 -1.928033 24.44059 -143.9 106.09 
sandial 310 5.874423 66.25567 -161 228.34 
sa_ong 310 3.192237 5.423862 0 33.078 
analf 310 30.46375 15.82312 5.5 78.7 
dile 310 0.5032258 0.500798 0 1 
edndial 310 -0.8299529 57.22902 -222.15 254.76 
edana6 310 26.52921 13.1925 6.378 69.718 
ed_anal S 310 30.17335 15.69695 5.45 76.7 
ni_low 309 60.43372 13.94498 24.507 88.391 
ni_univ 309 1.210297 2.366874 0 18.984 
edndia2 309 -1.046648 46.17628 -173.02 202.3 
sin_alca 310 76.14236 21.88933 14.659 100 
sin_alc2 310 6275.256 2919.245 214.87 10000 
alca_pr 310 20.24793 20.40181 0 80.818 
alca_sin 310 76.27676 21.84184 14.659 100 
sbndial 310 -4.155377 129.5403 -279.55 381.73 
mingi4pc 298 0.0001408 0.0006317 0 0.0069 
infot4pc 286 0.0000601 0.0005954 0 0.0095 
desso4pc 306 5.05E-06 0.0000217 0 0.0002 
museo4pc 307 0.0000197 0.0000834 0 0.0007 
merca4pc 304 0.0014271 0.0108282 0 0.1517 
uvndial 286 -0.0000284 0.0003887 -0.0058 0.0016 
infr24pc 276 0.0040978 0.0119325 0 0.1522 
deslevh 294 23.06979 7.268409 0 57.143 
deslevm 294 21.10056 8.681828 0 92.308 
matad4pc 307 0.0002166 0.0008352 0 0.0072 
agndial 294 -0.2505279 39.43929 -87.602 116.49 
viver4pc 307 0.0000261 0.0001473 0 0.0019 
agua_nr 310 67.61759 23.39711 10.452 100 
rhndial 310 -4.155377 129.5403 -279.55 381.73 
sin_agua 310 74.34871 21.17225 17.92 100 
sin_agu2 310 5974.549 2824.562 321.14 10000 
drena4pc 301 0.0000975 0.0010796 0 0.0176 
rhndia2 310 -3.57418 128.9131 -281.48 394.54 
agua_dv 310 8.967957 10.36443 0 56.45 
agua_fv 310 16.70372 13.75046 0 65.934 
agua_ft 310 6.710726 7.161523 0 48.224 
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Principal Component Variables 
Interpretation 
Economic: The first PCV loads positively on indicators associated with wealth (i.e. 
stocks) and higher income (flows), and negatively on those that indicate poverty and 
lower income. Notice especially the loadings on number of rooms per house, bedrooms 
per house, and type of cooking fuel. It additionally loads negatively on economically 
active population and positively on the economically inactive, but these values are much 
lower than those for wealth. Thus PCV1 is an indicator of wealth and income, rising in 
both. The third PCV, by contrast, loads negatively on high wealth and positively on low 
wealth, and — interestingly — consistently negatively on economically active women. Its 
most important characteristic, though, seems to be that it rises in family size (see 
household size and people per bedroom), which is broadly consistent with loading 
positively on measures of poverty. These two PCVs should thus be opposite in sign 
where both are significant. 
Demographic: The first PCV loads positively and strongly on Protestants and rural 
dwellers, and negatively on Catholics and urban dwellers. Religion is by far its strongest 
factor. It also decreases in Spanish-speakers and men. PCV2 loads similarly to PCV1, 
but here the strongest factors surround the urban-rural divide, as well as native-language 
speakers, in which it is positive. 
Political Disaffection/Protest: This PCV increases strongly with absent and null votes 
— a traditional sign of electoral protest in Bolivia — while loading negatively on oficialista 
mayors (i.e. affiliated with the ruling (national) coalition) as well as the 1993 municipal 
margin of victory. I interpret this as an indicator of political disaffection and protest. 
Civil Institutions: This is an indicator of the number organizations and institutions of 
local civil society. It rises in all the variables, especially in the more general measures. I 
interpret it as a proxy for the strength of local civil institutions. 
Private Sector: This PCV rises in the number of private businesses registered locally. I 
construe it as an indicator of the dynamism of the local private sector. 
Training and Capacity -Building: This variable rises in categories of training (i.e. 
institutional strengthening) received by the municipality and falls in those requested but 
not yet received. Hence I interpret it as a measure of the intensity of capacity-building 
efforts undertaken by/for local government. 
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Information Technology: This PCV rises in the IT systems - hardware and software 
(especially software) - at the disposal of each municipality. 
Central Government Auditing: This variable is difficult to characterize succinctly, 
though its interpretation is fairly clear. It loads positively on those administrative or 
reporting processes which constitute some form of external lever of central on local 
government. Thus, central government audits, municipal performance reports upwards, 
and the involvement of the Social Investment Fund (a central executive agency) all 
appear positively here, and signify direct and indirect ways in which the central state can 
exert influence on local government activities. 
Municipal Administration: While these variables include many raw indicators, the 
strongest effects are as follows. The first PCV loads positively on variables related to 
clear and transparent municipal procedures for purchases and contracting, on mayoral 
discretion and on councilmen's salaries, and negatively on councilmen's discretion. I 
interpret this variable as indicative of the character of local governance, rising where a 
strong local executive administers under clear guidelines and regulations, and is 
(actively) overseen by a strong (i.e. well-paid) council. The second PCV loads positively 
on the municipal council's discretion in contracting, and especially strongly on council 
oversight of education and health services. Thus I interpret this PCV as indicative of an 
activist council, whose power comes at the expense of the mayor. The second PCV is 
thus not strictly opposed to PCV1, but rather different from it in thrust, representing an 
alternative way of organizing municipal affairs. 
Project Planning: This PCV loads positively where municipalities use information on 
education and health when planning projects, where sectoral regulations are followed in 
water & sanitation, where a Municipal Development Plan exists, and where councilmen 
and oversight committees identify investment projects using the MDP and urban 
cadaster. It loads negatively where the mayor is the one who identifies investment 
projects, and where problems arise with the Annual Operating Plan. This is thus a 
straightforward indicator of informed project planning which follows consensual and 
open procedures. 
Eigenvectors 
For the eigenvectors that follow, factor loadings on the raw variables can be read 
vertically down each column. 
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ECONOMIC 
Eigenvectors 
Variable 
Appendix 
1 	3 
2: Chapter 3 Data and 
A1.2 
TRAINING 
Eigenvectors 
Variable 
Methodology 
1 
catvi_10 0.01611 	0.10921 capadpe 0.28556 
catvi_11 -0.04421 	0.05136 capci 1 0.30671 
catvi_hi 0.2084 	-0.22678 cap ci2 0.2612 
catvi_lo -0.15851 	0.06463 capdis 0.2793 
catvi_me 0.06087 	-0.04372 c aplemu 0.34451 
cocina 0.06745 	0.33713 caporad 0.38803 
comb hi 0.21759 	-0.24884 capprin 0.37869 
comb to -0.21306 	0.26048 capprop 0.34559 
comb_me 0.00795 	-0.19621 temacz -0.14204 
comb_otr 0.03941 	-0.10044 temadis -0.20036 
cuartol -0.06973 	-0.36405 temaorad -0.22559 
cuarto2 -0.11508 	0.21652 temaprop -0.18667 
cuarto2f -0.15519 	-0.22 
cuarto3 0.05774 	0.30183 
cuarto4 0.1403 	0.16415 INFORMATION TECH. 
cuarto4m 0.20285 	0.11295 Eigenvectors 
cuarto5 0.23616 	0.04638 Variable 1 
dormsl -0.26864 	-0.1017 sitotal 0.51744 
do rms2 0.23697 	0.16318 siotro 0.36119 
dorms2f -0.27588 	0.00522 sisin_ad 0.42748 
dorrns3 0.2747 	0.01897 sisin_ai -0.27289 
dorms4 0.26493 	-0.04564 sisinidp 0.28173 
dorms4m 0.26059 	-0.05572 sicom 0.38812 
donns5 0.22596 	-0.07148 impresor 0.3385 
ecact -0.1933 	0.10251 
ecactm -0.11158 	-0.01077 
ecdesm -0.0263 	0.04999 CENTRAL GOVT. AUDITING 
ecina 0.19549 	-0.09642 Eigenvectors 
ecinam 0.04078 	0.0789 Variable 1 
ecocum -0.10776 	-0.01538 fis 0.14973 
hogar_ta 0.15305 	0.23915 inejpr_a -0.03459 
partbru -0.19109 	0.06026 inejpr_m 0.22346 
ppdorm2 -0.03901 	-0.25241 inejpr_s 0.04035 
ppdorm4 0.1756 	0.13713 sisin_ad 0.29205 
ppdorm5 -0.0338 	0.23506 sayco 0.59704 
sayco_a 0.56841 
sayco_o 0.39998 
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Eigenvectors 
Variable 
pobpc.0 
pobpc.r 
rel_cato 
rel_evan 
rel_ning 
id_sine 
id_trad 
inmasc 
DEMOGRAPHIC 
1 	2 
MUNICIPAL 
Eigenvectors 
Variable 
alc_co 
alc_de 
con_co 
con_de 
cuenpu_a 
cuenpu_c 
cuenpu_o 
evte_co 
ADMINISTRATION 
1 	2 
	
-0.16648 	-0.51111 
0.1533 	0.30239 
-0.62433 	0.17965 
0.58003 	-0.13934 
0.41205 	-0.04415 
0.21585 	0.17824 
0.0192 	0.64723 
-0.07623 	-0.37817 
0.14604 
0.11469 
-0.17274 
-0.14717 
-0.12553 
0.11299 
0.05624 
0.18976 
0.05317 
0.10791 
0.12842 
0.14487 
-0.0198 
0.0764 
0.07114 
-0.04196 
evte_de 0.18947 0.009 
invdir 0.09721 -0.02975 
POLITICAL PROTEST invpub 0.15408 -0.06359 
Eigenvectors manpro_d 0.18016 0.02777 
Variable 1 manpro_u 0.16696 0.04719 
oficial -0.19005 otro_co 0.10092 -0.11738 
margen93 -0.21741 otro_de 0.08356 -0.11557 
nulo93 0.35565 plieg_ad 0.33515 -0.02376 
ausent93 0.60371 plieg_ca 0.3401 -0.00287 
ausent95 0.65243 plieg_pu 0.31971 0.00514 
pliego 0.33117 0.01178 
progcont 0.15912 0.11538 
PROJECT PLANNING regcon 0.19798 0.01987 
Eigenvectors salar_pc 0.27672 -0.08343 
Variable 1 salar_co 0.27409 -0.08945 
catastur 0.04701 suped_a -0.01201 -0.43222 
dpoacoor -0.00839 suped_c -0.03946 0.437 
dpoaotro -0.07581 supsa_a -0.07613 -0.42273 
epoaham 0.00306 supsa_c 0.0346 0.44233 
evalres 0.07426 supsa_o 0.05436 0.33874 
idenalc -0.00973 usmanfun 0.17885 0.05964 
idencons 0.0145 
idencv 0.09214 
idenpdm 0.14818 CIVIL INSTITUTIONS 
info ed 0.53349 Eigenvectors 
info_sa 0.51649 Variable 1 
pdm94 0.14019 cv 0.09745 
plan_sye 0.56911 indig2 0.01988 
reconu_a 0.24654 jvec2 0.29229 
otbregi 0.4194 
otbregi2 0.43286 
PRIVATE SECTOR otbs_e 0.42137 
Eigenvectors otbs_pj 0.42934 
Variable 1 otbsoli 0.42372 
eereg_cm 0.61675 
eereg_ea 0.56212 
eereg_fi 0.55103 
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ADN 	 Accion Democratica Nacionalista 
AGACOR 	 Cattle Ranchers' Association of the Cordillera 
AOP 	 Annual Operating Plan 
APG 	 Guarani People's Association 
Cabi 	 Capitania del Alto y Bajo Izozo 
CAO 	 Eastern Agricultural Congress 
CBN 	 Cerveceria Boliviana Nacional 
CIPCA 	 Center for the Investigation and Promotion 
of the Peasantry 
COB 	 Bolivian Confederation of Labor 
Comibol 	 Bolivian (State) Mining Company 
Condepa 	 Conciencia de Patria 
DDE 	 District Director of Education 
DDH 	 District Director of Health 
FIS 	 Social Investment Fund 
GRO 	 Grass-Roots Organization 
Incerpaz 	 Industrias de Ceramica Paz (Viacha) 
LPP 	 Law of Popular Participation 
MBL 	 Movimiento Bolivia Libre 
MNR 	 Movimiento Nacionalista Revolucionario 
NGO 	 Non-Governmental Organization 
OC 	 Oversight Committee 
0C1 	 Official OC 	(distinction valid 
0C2 	 Opposition OC 	only for Viacha) 
PASE 	 Programa de Apoyo Solidario a las Escuelas 
SOBOCE 	 Sociedad Boliviana de Cementos 
UCS 	 Uni6n Civica de Solidaridad 
*Norms of abbreviation and capitalization adhere to most common usage in Bolivia. 
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KEY - Bolivia Database 
EjecProg 
Municipal spending by source, across sectors (in thousands of Bs.) 
Variable 
TotG 
	
General Total, All Sectors (1994-1996) 
Totl Total, Internal Resources (1994-5) 
TGN 
	
Treasury (1994-5) 
RRPP Own Resources (1994-5) 
PP 
	
Decentralized Funds (1994-5) 	 _E Expenditures 
ACom Community Contribution (1994-5) _P Budgeted (1995 only) 
Otro 
	 Other (1994-5) 
Tran Transfers (Budgeted 1996 only 
TotE 
	
Total, External Resources (1994-5) 
Cred External Credit (1994-5) 
Dona 
	
Donations (1994-5) 	 [Tran = TGN + ACom] 
Municipal spending, sectoral detail 
Sectors 	Code 
1 Educacion y Cultura Ed 
2 Urbanismo y Viviend UV 
3 Energia 	 En 
4 Saneamiento BasiccSB 
5 Transportes 	Tr 
6 Agropecuario 	Ag 
7 Salud y Seguridad SSa 
8 Multisectorial 	Mu 
9 Industria y Turismo IT 
10 Comunicaciones 	Co 
11 Hidrocarburos 	HC 
12 Recursos Hidricos RH 
Sources 
Total General 
Total !Memo 
TGN 
XRecursos Propios Participacion Popular Aporte Cornunitario Otros 
Transferencias 
Total Externo 
Credito 
Donaciones 
Code 
TotG 
Totl 
TGN 
RRPP 
PP 
ACom 
Otro 
Tran 
TotE 
Cred 
Dona 
_E Expenditures 
_P Budgeted 
* DMA No Municipality Number in Alphabetical Order by Department and then Municipality Name 
Base 95 
Variable Definition 	(CNPV June 3, 1992) 
Dept Department 
No Municipality Number 
Name Municipality Name 
No.Dept Department Number 
Pobl Population 
Indig Number of Indigenous Communities 
CCamp Number of Peasant/Campesino Communities 
JVec Number of (Urban) Neighborhood Councils [Juntas Vecinales] 
OTBSoli Number of GRO's [OTB's] that Applied to Register with the Central Government 
OTBRegi Number of Grass-Roots Organizations [OTB's] Registered 
CV Vigilance Committee Operating [0,1] 
EdifEsc Number of School Buildings 
TotAulas Number of Classrooms 
EstEsc Number of Schools 
TotBanco Number of School Desks 
TotMatri Number of Students Registered 
TotDoc Number of Teachers 
* Stprdoc Student/Teacher ratio [=totmatrVtotdoc] 
FIS FIS Project Currently Being Implemented [0,1] 
Ed.Alfa Literacy Rate (%) 
Ed.Asis Attendance Rate Education 
* Ed.Asis2 Square of Att Rat 
NI.Nunca Never Attended 
NI. Basic Basic [Grades 1-5] 
NI.Inter 
NI.Medio 
Primary 	} 	[Grades 6-8] 
Secondary 
NI.Tecni Technical Training 
NI.Norma 
NI.Univ 
Teacher Training School 
University 
Educational Attainment Rates 
NI.Otro Other 
NI.Igno Unknown 
* NI.More Above Basic (=NI.Inter 	NI.Otro 
* NI.IM NI.Inter + NI.Medio 
* NI.High NI.Tecni + Norma + Univ 
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* NI. High2 
* NI.Low 
* NI.Low2 
Sa.Asis 
* Sa.Asis2 
Agua.DV 
Agua.FV 
* Agua.Dom 
Agua.FT 
Agua. NR 
Alca.Pub 
* Alca.Pr 
Alca.CS 
Alca.Ot 
Alca.Sin 
NBI 
JPFBase 
Pob.0 rb 
Pob.Rur 
Horn.Tot 
Horn .0 rb 
Hom.Rur 
Muj.Tot 
Muj.0 rb 
Muj. Rur 
pp'95 
Nuc.Esc 
Fort.Pao 
Fort.lns 
Oficial 
Marg93 
NBI.0 
NBI.R 
IDH 
IDH = Indice de Desarrollo Humano 
Saldos 
Variable 
Saldo 
Saldopct 
Adj saldo 
Asaldpct 
Square of Ni.High 
NI.Nunca + NI.Basic 
Square of NI.Low 
Attendance 	Health Care 
Square of Att Rat 
Internal Plumbing 
External Plumbing 
Plumbing [=Agua.DV+FV]r 	Water 
Public Standpipes 
None 
Public Sewerage 
Private Sewerage 
Septic Tank Sewerage 
Other 
None 
Unsatisfied Basic Needs 
Urban Population 
Rural Population 
Male Population 
Urban Male Population 
Rural Male Population 
Female Population 
Urban Female Population 
Rural Female Population 
Schooling Nucleus Present [0,1] 
Received Institutional Strengthening in Budget Preparation [0,1] 
Institution that Carried Out Strengthening 
Mayor's Party Belongs to National Governing Coalition [0,1] 
Electoral Margin Between Winner and Runner-Up, Mayoral Race (%) 
Unsatisfied Basic Needs, Urban Areas 
Unsatisfied Basic Needs, Rural Areas 
Definition  
Total Saldos to December 1996 
Saldos as % of yearly PP disbursement 
Saldos to December 1996 (excluding 1/2 Dec disbursement) 
% (net of 1/2 Dec disbursement) 
Appendix 4: Data Key 
* Above denotes created variables. 
Created 
Esfiscal 
	
Own Resources as % of Total Budget, 1994-5 only [(=rrpp_e/totg_e)*100] 
Sectors 	 Code 
1 Educacion y Cultura Ed 
2 Urbanismo y Viviend UV 
3 Energia 	En 
4 Saneamiento BasiccSB 
5 Transportes 	Tr 
6 Agropecuario 	Ag 
7 Salud y Seguridad SSa 
8 Multisectorial 	Mu 
9 Industria y Turismo IT 
10 Co m un icacio nes 	Co 
11 Hidrocarburos 	HC 
12 Recursos Hidricos RH 
Variable 	Definition  
Impl 	Implementation rate [=(XXtotg_e/XXtotg_p)*100] 
pcbd_e 	Percent of total expenditures P(XXtotg_e/totg_e)*1001 
pcbd_p 	Percent of total budgeted resources [=(XXtotg_p/totg_p)*100] 
rppc_e Percent of own resources spent in sector [=(XXrrpp_e/rrpp_e)*1I 
prcp_e 	Per capita expenditures [=XXtotg_e/pobl] 
prcp_p Per capita budgeted resources [=XXtotg_p/pobl] 
prcx e 	Per capita (aggregate) expenditures [=XXtotg_e/pob94_6] 
prcx_p Per capita (aggregate) budgeted resources [=XXtotg_p/pob94_' 
posXXpc1/2 Tobit left-censored interval data, post-D (I. data formatted for int 
prcp_e 
Edprst_e 
Edprst_p 
Pobpc.0 
Pobpc. r 
Edifprst 
Stpredif 
Aulaprst 
Stpraula 
Total investment per capita [=totg_e/pobl] 
Per student education expenditures [=Edtotg_e/totmatri] Boliviatot only 
Per student budgeted resources [=Edtotg_p/totmatri] Boliviatot only 
Urban population (%) 
Rural population (%) 
School buildings per student enrolled [=EdifEsc/Totmatri] 
Students enrolled per school building [=Totmatri/EdifEsc] 
Classrooms per student enrolled [=Totaulas/Totmatri] 
Students enrolled per classroom [=Totmatri/Totaulas] 
303 
Appendix 4: Data Key 
Alfa2 
	
Ed_alfaA2 
Nunca2 Nl_nunca^2 
Medio2 
	
Nl_medio^2 
Altiplan Regional dummy 
Valley 
	
Regional dummy 
Orient Regional dummy 
	 Second Trip to Bolivia 	  
Electoral Data 
ADN93, MNR93, IU95, MIR95 Party voting share as % of Emitidos, 1993 and 1995 municipal elections 
Valido93, Blanco93, Nulo93 as % of Emitidos 
NValid93 
	
No Validos as % of Emitidos [=(Blancos+Nulos)/Emitidos] 
Ausent93 Ausentes as % of Emitidos (i.e. not % of Inscritos) 
cADN, cMNR, cMIR, cTotal Number of Concejales elected per political party, 1995 municipal election only 
cLeft 
	
No. of concejales from MBL, MIR, IU, Eje, MRTKL, MPP, MKN, VR-9 & FRI 
cRight No. of concejales from MNR & ADN 
cSwing 
	
No. of concejales from UCS & Condepa 
cTechno No. of concejales from MNR, ADN, MBL & MIR 
cMajor 
	 No. of concejales from MNR, ADN, UCS, MIR & condepa 
cMinor No. of concejales from MBL, IU, Eje, MRTKL, MPP, VR9, FRI, MKN 
Created 
Margen93/5 
Left93 
Left95 
Right93 
Right95 
Swing93/5 
Major93/5 
Minor93/5 
Techno93/5 
Electoral margin (%) between 1st and 2nd placed parties, 1993 and 1995 municipal elections 
MBL, MIR, IU, Eje, MRTKL, VR-9, ASD, FRI, 1993 municipal elections 
MBL, MIR, IU, Eje, MRTKL, MPP, VR-9, FRI, MKN, 1995 municipal elections 
MNR, ADN, FSB, 1993 municipal elections 
MNR, ADN, 1995 municipal elections 
UCS, Condepa, 1993 and 1995 municipal elections 
(Parties with populist political practice and policies, and which recently have provided swing 
votes in parliament to sustain one or another governing coalition) 
MNR, ADN, UCS, MIR, Condepa, 1993 and 1995 municipal elections 
(Larger parties with significant national presence) 
All other parties, 1993 and 1995 municipal elections 
(Smaller parties without significant national presence) 
MNR, ADN, MBL, MIR, 1993 and 1995 municipal elections 
(Parties with qualified technical specialists, and that advocate technocratic policies) 
PDMs (Plan de Desarrollo Municipal) 
PDM94 	 Existence of PDM [0,1] (i.e. one of 94 muns. whose PDMs have been compiled & registered) 
PDMmTot, PDMpTo Total of PDM in amount (Bs'000) and no. of projects requested 
PDM yearly subtotals across sectors, 1995-2001 
Year Requested  
5 	1995 
6 	1996 
7 	1997 
8 	1998 
9 	1999 
0 	2000 (2001 data for Villa Tunari transferred to 1999.) 
PDM X 
_M Amount (Bs'000) demanded 
_P Number of proyects demanded 
PDMs, sectoral detail 
Sectors 	Code 
1 Educacion y Cultura Ed 
2 Urbanismo y Viviend UV 
3 Energia 	En 
4 Saneamiento BasiccSB 
5 Transportes 	Tr 
6 Agropecuario 	Ag 
7 Salud y Seguridad SSa 
8 Multisectorial 	Mu 
9 Industria y Turismo IT 
10 Corn unicaciones 	Co 
11 Hidrocarburos 	HC 
12 Recursos Hidricos RH 
13 Minero 	 Mi 
Year Requested 
95 	1995 
96 	1996 
97 	1997 
98 	1998 
99 	1999 
0 	2000 (2001 data for Villa Tunari transferred to 1999) 
X 	PDMpv 	Present Value of sectoral demands prioritized by year 
(i.e. sum of discounted yearly totals) 
PDMpvc 	Per-capita PV of sectoral demands [=PDMpv/pobl] 
PDIvlx 	Preference index, vs. education [=PDMXXpv/PDMEdpv] 
PDM X _M Amount (Bs'000) demanded _P Number of proyects demande 
Ex: pdmedp99 - cross-section data (Bolivia.dta) 
pdmedm - cross-sectional, time-series data (BoIxt.dta) 
Sectors 
	Code 
1 Educacion y Cultura Ed 
2 Urbanismo y Viviend UV 
3 Energia 	En 
4 Saneamiento BasiccSB 
5 Transportes 	Tr 
6 Agropecuario 	Ag 
7 Salud y Seguridad SSa 
8 Multisectorial 
	
Mu 
9 Industria y Turismo IT 
10 Comunicaciones 
	Co 
11 Hidrocarburos 
	HC 
12 Recursos Hidricos RH 
13 Minero 
	 Mi 
DIF X 
Years 
42 1994/6 - 1992/3 [=EdTotg_e - PSIBEd92] 
41 1994/6 - 1991/3 [=EdTotg_e - PSIBEd91] 
47 1994/6 - 1987/93 [=EdTotg_e - PSIBEd87] 
Created  
pc2 per capita, 1994/6 - 1992/3 [difedpc2= difed42/pobl] 
Ex: DIFEd42 - Difference in educational investment, 1994/6 - 1992/3 
DIFEdpc2 - Difference in per capita educational investment, 1994/6 - 1992/i 
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pdmedx - cross-section data (Bolivia.dta) 
Created 
Year 
pdmedmpc 
pdm uvm pc 
pdmenmpc 
pdmsbm pc 
pdmtrmpc 
pdmagm pc 
pdmsam pc 
pdmmumpc 
pdm itm pc 
pdmcom pc 
pdmhcmpc 
pdm rhm pc 
pdmmimpc 
pdmmpc 
pdmuvmpu 
pdmagmpr 
Year variable for PDM-prioritized spending: 1995-2000 
Per capita Education spending prioritized in the PDM, by year [=pdmedm/pobl] 
Per capita Housing and Urban Development spending prioritized in the PDM, by ye 
Per capita Energy spending prioritized in the PDM, by year 
Per capita Water & Sewerage spending prioritized in the PDM, by year 
Per capita Transport spending prioritized in the PDM, by year 
Per capita Agriculture spending prioritized in the PDM, by year 
Per capita Health spending prioritized in the PDM, by year 
Per capita Multisectoral spending prioritized in the PDM, by year 
Per capita Industry & Tourism spending prioritized in the PDM, by year 
Per capita Communication spending prioritized in the PDM, by year 
Per capita Hydrocarbons spending prioritized in the PDM, by year 
Per capita Water Management spending prioritized in the PDM, by year 
Per capita Mining spending prioritized in the PDM, by year 
Total prioritized investments per capita [=pdmm/pobl] 
Housing & Urban Development spending prioritized in the PDM per urban resident, py year 
[=pdmuvm/pob_urb] (28 obs./yr) 
Agriculture spending prioritized in the PDM per rural resident, by year [=pdmagm/ b_rur] 
Bolxt.dta 
PSIB (Public Sector Investment Budget) 
Central government (pre-decentralization) investment in each municipality by sector (Bs'000), 1987-1993 IBolivia.dtz 
Years 
PSIB >< 87 1987-1993 
91 1991-1993 
92 1992-93 
pb7/1 Sectoral share as % of total investment (i.e. percent of bu 
PSI 
	
[=(PSIBXX87/PSIB87)"100] 
pc7/2 Sectoral investment per capita [=PSIBXX92/pobl] 
ps7/1 Sectoral investment per student (only for Education) 
[=PSIBEd87/totmatri] 
preXXpc1/2 Tobit left-censored interval data, pre-D (I. data formatted 
Ex: PSIBEd87 - Central government education investment by municipality, 1987-93 
PSIBSB91 - Central government water & sewerage investment by municipality, 71. 
PSIBAg92 - Central government agriculture investment by municipality, 1992-93 
PSIAgpb7 - Central government agriculture investment as % of total, 1987-93 
PSIEdpc1 - Central government per-capita education investment, 1991-93 
PSIEdps1 - Central government per-student education investment, 1991-93 
Central & Local government investment in each municipality by sector (Bs'000), 1987-1996 1Boliviaxtdtal 
Ex: PSIBEd - Central & Local education investment by municipality, 1987-96 
PSIBEdpc - Central & Local per-capita education investment by municipality, 198 
Differences in Investment Pre- and Post-Decentralization 
Decentralized-Centralized investment, by sector and municipality 
Sectors 	Code 
1 Educacion y Cultura Ed 
2 Urbanismo y Viviend UV 
3 Energia 	En 
4 Saneamiento BasiccSB 
5 Transportes 	Tr 
6 Agropecuario 	Ag 
7 Salud y Seguridad SSa 
8 Multisectorial 	Mu 
9 Industria y Turismo IT 
10 Comunicaciones 	Co 
11 Hidrocarburos 	HC 
12 Recursos Hidricos RH 
13 Minero 
Inc 
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* No investments in this sector during 1994-96. 
SAYCO (Administration & Control Systems) 
Carried out through 5 June, 1997 by the Comptroller General (CG) 
sayco_a 	SAYCO audits (1 or more) carried out by Central Government of Municipal Governments [0,1] 
sayco_e No. of evaluations carried out by CG of municipal implementation of recommendations from previc 
sayco_o 	No. of other audits carried out by CG, including Income & Expenditure, Public Works, Payment of 
sayco Any of the above [0,1] 
Indicadores Sociodemograficos y Proyecciones de Poblacion (CD-Rom) 
Hogares 	No. of Households 
Percentage of Households Who Cook With: 
Comb_Len 	Wood 
Cornb_Gua Guano 
Comb_Car 	Charcoal 
Comb_Ker Kerosene 
Comb_Gas 	Natural Gas 
Comb_Ele Electricity 
Comb_NoC 	None/Doesn't Cook 
Comb_Otr Other 
* Comb_Lo 	Low-income households by cooking fuel [=Comb_Len + Comb_Gua + Comb_NoC] 
* Comb_Me Medium-income households by cooking fuel [=Comb_Car + Comb_Ker] 
* Comb_Hi 	High-income households by cooking fuel [=Comb_Gas + Comb_Ele] 
Percentage of Households by Type of Health Care &Facilities:  
Sa_MinSa 	Ministry of Health Facilities 
Sa_Caja State/Private Insurers 
Sa_ONG 	NGO/Church 
Sa_Priv Private 
Sa_Farm 	Pharmacy 
Sa_Yati Traditional Healer 
Sa_Otro 	Other 
Sa_NoAt Doesn't Receive Health Care 
Sa_SinEs 	No Answer 
Percentage of Households by Religion: 
Rel_Cato 	Catholic 
Rel_Evan Evangelical 
Rel_Otro 	Other 
Rel_Ning None 
Rel_SinE 	No Answer 
Sociodemographic Indicators: 
InMasc 	 Masculinity Index (Men/100 Women) 
Ed_Ana15 Illiteracy Rate (Among Over-15's) 
Ed_2Asis 	School Attendance Rate 
InDepEc Economic Dependency Index [(0-6 yrs + Ec. Inactive)/Ec. Active * 100] 
PartBru 	Labor Participation Rate 
Hogar_Ta Average Household Size 
Percent of Population Without Access to: 
Sin_Agua 	Water 
* Sin_Agu2 Square of water 
Sin_Luz 	Electricity 
* Sin_Luz2 Square of electricity 
Sin_Alca 	Sewerage 
* Sin_Alca2 Square of sewerage 
Among Over 6's: 
EdAlfa6 	Literacy Rate 
EdAlfaM6 Literacy Rate, Female (Women as `)/0 of all Literates) 
EdAna6 	Illiteracy Rate 
EdAnaM6 Illiteracy Rate, Female (Women as % of all Illiterates) 
Among Over 7's: 
EcAct 	 Economically Active Population (% of Total) 
EcActM Women as % of the Economically Active Population 
EcOcu 	 Employment Rate 
EcOcuM Women as % of the Employed 
EcDes 	 Unemployment Rate 
EcDesM Women as % of the Unemployed 
Edna 	 Economically Inactive Population (`)/0 of Total) 
EcInaM Women as % of the Economically Inactive Population 
Percentage of Population that Speaks: 
Id_Cast 	Spanish 
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Id_Que 	 Quechua 
Id_Aym Aymara 
Id_Gua 	 Guarani 
Id_OtrN Other Native Tongues 
Id_Nat 	 Native Tongue [= any of 4 above] 
Id_CyQ Spanish & Quechua 
Id_CyA 	 Spanish & Aymara 
Id_CyG Spanish & Guarani 
Id_CyON 	Spanish & Other Native 
Id_CyN Spanish & Native [= any of 4 above] 
Id_Otras 	Other Combinations 
Id_Extr Foreign Language 
Id_SinE 	No Answer 
* Id_Eur At least one European language [=Id_Cast + Id_CyN + Id_Extr] 
* Id_Trad 	Only indigenous language(s) [=Id_Nat + Id_Otras] 
Category of Housing by Predominant Construction Materials (% of total): 
CatVi_1 	Best: Brick, Cement or Stone Walls & Floors 
CatVi_2 
CatV1_3 
CatVi_4 
CatV1_5 
CatVI_6 
CatVi_7 
CatVi_8 
CatVi_9 
CatVi_10 	Worst: Cane, Palm or Log Walls & Dirt Floors 
CatVi_11 Other Combinations 
* CatVi_Lo 	Low-income households by housing category (=CatVi_7 + 8 + 9] 
* CatVi_Me Medium-income households by housing category [=CatVi_4 +5 + 6] 
* CatVi_Hi 	High-income households by housing category =[CatVi_1 + 2 + 3] 
Percentage of Households by Number of Rooms: 
Cuarto1 	 1 
Cuarto2 2 
Cuarto3 	 3 
Cuarto4 4 
Cuarto5 	 5 or more 
* Cuarto2f 1 or 2 [=Cuartol+Cuarto2] 
* Cuarto4m 	4 or more [=Cuarto4+Cuarto5] 
Percentage of Households by Number of Bedrooms: 
Dormsl 	 1 
Dorms2 2 
Dorms3 	 3 
Dorms4 4 
Dorms5 	 5 or more 
* Dorms2f 1 or 2 [=Dormsl+Dorms2] 
* Dorms4m 	4 or more [=Dorms4+Dorms5] 
Cocina Household Has a Kitchen or Room for Cooking? 
Number of People per Bedroom: 
PPDorm2 	Less than 2 
PPDorm4 2 to 4 
PPDorm5 	More than 4 
New Data - UDAPSO & INE 
Population Projections for: 	 INE 
Pob95 	 1995 
Pob96 1996 
Pob97 	 1997 
Pob98 1998 
Pob99 	 1999 
Pob00 2000 
Pob970_4 	Population, 0-4 yr. olds, 1997 
* Pob94_6 Aggregate 3-yearly population 1994-6 	[=Pobl+Pob95+Pob96] 
Vaccination Rates (per thousand 0-4 year olds) 
Vac_Pol 	Polio 
Vac_DPT DPT 
Vac_BCG 	BCG 
Vacunas Total Vaccinations 
Malnutrition Rate Amon Children Examined Medically: 
DesLevH 	 Low 
DesModH Boys Moderate 
DesSevH 
DesLevM 
Appendix 4: Data 
Severe 
Low 
Key 
DesModM Girls Moderate 
DesSevM Severe 
DesLev Low 
DesMod Total Moderate 
DesSev Severe 
* DesMS Total Moderate+Severe V 
* DesTot Low+Moderate+Severe INE 
Analf Illiteracy Rate UDAPSO 
Analf H 	 Male Illiteracy Rate 
AnalfM Female Illiteracy Rate 
Inasis 	 School Non-Attendance Rate 
InasisH Male School Non-Attendance Rate 
InasisM 	Female School Non-Attendance Rate 
Type of Health Car e: 
Sa_For 	Formal 
Sa_Inf Informal 
Sa_NA 	 Doesn't Receive Health Care 
No. of Grass-Roots Organizations (OTBs): 
Indig2 	 Indigenous Communities 
CCamp2 Peasant/Campesino Communities 
JVec2 	 (Urban) Neighborhood Councils 
OTBregi2 Total Registered GROs [=above 3] UDAPSO 
Variables 
1st PC 
2nd PC 
3rd PC 
1st PC 
2nd PC 
1st PC 
2nd PC 
1st PC 
2nd PC 
3rd PC 
let PC 
2nd PC 
1st PC 
1st PC 
2nd PC 
3rd PC 
1st PC 
2nd PC 
3rd PC 
4th PC 
1st PC 
2nd PC 
3rd PC 
4th PC 
Economic: nbi nbi_u nbi_r idh comb* indepec 
partbru hogar_ta ec* catvi* cuarto* dorms* 
cocina ppdorm* 
Demographic: pobpc.0 pobpc.r rel* inmasc id_* 
Political (Broadest): oficial marg93 cadn ccondepa cmbl cmir cmnr cucs ceje 
cfri ciu cmpp cm rtkl cmkn cvr9 ctotal adn* asd* condep* eje* frig* fsb* iu* mbl* 
mir* mnr* mrtkl* ucs* vr9* valido* blanco* nulo* nvalid* ausent* margen* mkn* 
mop* left* right* major* minor* swing* techno* cleft cright cswing ctechno cmajor 
Civil Institutions: eereg* indig* ccamp* jvec* otb* cv 
Training: fort_pao cap* 
tema* 
Financial Performance: esfiscal inopto* intntto4 intntto5 intntto6 trctto* coptrto* 
Information Technology: sicom siotro sitotal computa impresor 
External Processes: fis inejpr* sisin* sayco* 
Internal Processes: pdm pdm94 epoa* dpoa* manfun usmanfun salar_pc 
salar_co alc_co alc_de con_co con_de evte_co evte_de invpub invdir otro_co 
otro_de info_sa info_ed info_sye plan_sye reconu* rnanpro_* progcont 
procomme pliego plieg_* regcon inventar suped_* supsa_* cuenpu_* iden* pm* 
catast* estprein preinvan preintir pscf* evalres 
Principal Component 
* pcecl 
* pcec2 
* pcec3 
* pcdem 1 
* pcdem2 
* pcpolx1 
* pcpolx2 
* pcci1 
* pcci2 
• pcci3 
* pctrl 
* pctr2 
* pcfpl 
* pcitl 
* pcit2 
* pcit3 
* pcepl 
* pcep2 
* pcep3 
* pcep4 
* pcipl 
* pcip2 
* pcip3 
* pcip4 
Interacted Need-Training Variables 
* sandial 	sa_minsa*pctrl 
* sandia2 sa_noat*pctrl 
* edndial 	analf*pctrl 
* edndia2 ni_nunca*pctrl 
* sbndial 	sin_alca*pctrl 
* sbndia2 mingi4pc*pctrl 
* uvndia1 
	
infot4pc*pctrl 
* uvndia2 infr24pc*pctrl 
* agndia 1 
	
deslevh*pctrl 
* agndia2 matad4pc*pctrl 
* enndial 	sin_luz*pctr1 
* rhndia1 sin_alca*pctrl 
* rhndia2 	 sin_agua*pctrl 
* itndial coli4pc*pctrl 
ins 
Steve Pischke 
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Labour Economics 
Problem Set 6 
1. A firm has an elasticity of demand for labor of -0.4. Suppose the firm experiences an 
increase in productivity such that at every level of employment its output is 2 percent 
higher than before. What will happen to the number of workers hired by the firm? 
2. Firms' labor demand is given by the equality of 
w = VMP 
For a competitive firm, VMP = pf'(L). Suppose instead that a firm operates as a 
monopoly in the product market but faces perfect competition in the labor market. 
(a) Derive VMP in this case. Is labor demand going to be higher or lower in this 
case than for a firm facing perfect competition in the product market? Explain 
why. 
(b) Suppose a firm's short-run production function is given by 
y = f(L) = 4./1, 
and it's (inverse) product demand curve is 
P = 20 — —1 y 2 
The firm can hire labor at a wage rate of £12. How many workers will the firm 
hire? What level of output does the firm produce? What price will it charge? 
(c) One reason behind deregulation in many markets like air travel, telephones, and 
utilities was that regulation was not really effective, so that regulated firms would 
basically act like monopolies, and deregulation would make markets more compet-
itive. Suppose the market in which the firm in (b) sells its product is deregulated 
and becomes competitive. The product price falls to £15. Also suppose that 
deregulation does not affect the labor market in which this firms hires workers. 
How many workers are hired now and how much output does the firm produce? 
(d) Discuss the effect deregulation would have in the long-run when the firm can also 
adjust its capital stock. Is the labor demand response of the firm going to be 
larger or smaller than in the short run? 
1 
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Censo Municipal - 1997 
Variable 	Definition  
Population Served (No. People, Heads of Households?) by Basic Services (1997): 
1.2 Agua_c 	Potable Water 
* Agua_pc 	Potable Water, percent of population served by 
* Agua_pc2 	Square of potable water, percent of population served by 
Alca_c 	Sewerage 
* Alca_pc Sewerage, percent of population served by 
* Alca_pc2 	Square of sewerage, percent of population served by 
Elec_c Electricity 
* Elec_pc 	Electricity, percent of population served by 
* Elec_pc2 	Square of electricity, percent of population served by 
Basura_c 	Garbage Disposal 
* Basu_pc 	Garbage Disposal, percent of population served by 
* Basu_pc2 	Square of garbage disposal, percent of population served by 
Drenaj_c 	Storm Drainage 
* Dren_pc 	Storm Drainage, percent of population served by 
* Dren_pc2 	Square of storm drainage, percent of population served by 
Telef_c Telephones 
* Tele_pc 	Telephones, percent of population served by 
* Tele_pc2 	Square of telephones, percent of population served by 
Alum br_c 	Public Lighting 
Multi-use courts 
Coliseums 
Sports Fields 
Other Sports Facilities 
Museums 
Theaters 
Libraries 
Cultural Centers 
Sporting & Cultural Infra. 
(sum of the above) 
* Alum_pc 	Public Lighting, percent of population served by 
* Alum_pc2 	Square of public lighting, percent of population served by 
1.3.1 Existing Infrastructure as of 1994 & 1998, Sporting and Cultural: 
Poli4 	 before 1994 
Poli8 after 1994 
Coli4 	 before 1994 
Coli8 after 1994 
Cancha4 	 before 1994 
Cancha8 after 1994 
InfOtro4 	 before 1994 
InfOtro8 after 1994 
Museo4 	 before 1994 
Museo8 after 1994 
Teatro4 	 before 1994 
Teatro8 after 1994 
Biblio4 	 before 1994 
Biblio8 after 1994 
Cultura4 	 before 1994 
Cultura8 after 1994 
* infral_4 before 1994 	 
* infra1_8 	 after 1994 
* change 1994-7 
Markets 
Slaughterhouses 
Refrigerators 
Parking Lots 
Fair Grounds 
Parks 
Zoos 
Municipal Nursery (i.e. 
Plants) 
Cemetery 
Commercial & 
Recreational Infra. (sum of 
above 9) 
Storm Drainage 
Solid Waste Disposal 
(Landfills) 
Commercial and Recreational Infrastructure . 
1.3.2 Mercado4 	 before 1994 
Mercado8 after 1994 
Matad4 	 before 1994 
Matad8 after 1994 
Frigo4 	 before 1994 
Frigo8 after 1994 
Parqueo4 	 before 1994 
Parqueo8 after 1994 
Feria4 	 before 1994 
Feria8 after 1994 
* infra2_4 	 before 1994 
* infra2_8 
Zoo4 
Zoo8 
before 199444 
 after 1994 
before 1994 
after 1994 
1.3.3 Vivero4 before 1994 
Vivero8 after 1994 
Cement4 
after 1994 
after 1994 	 
before 1994 
Cement8 
Parque4 
Parque8 
* infra2_d 	 change 199 -7 
Drenaje4 before 1994 
Drenaje8 	 after 1994 
* Drenajed change 1994-7 
DesSol4 	 before 1994 
DesSol8 after 1994 
* Dessold 	 change 1994-7 
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Wastewater Treatment 
Lagoons 
Public Urinals 
Other Hygienic Services 
Combined Water & 
Sanitation (sum of above 
3)  
before 1994 
after 1994 
change 1994-7 
before 1994 
after 1994 
change 1994-7 
before 1994 
after 1994 
change 1994-7 
before 1994 
after 1994 
change 1994-7 
Multi-use courts 
Coliseums 
Sports Fields 
Other Sports Facilities 
Museums 
Theaters 
Libraries 
Cultural Centers 
Sporting & Cultural Infra. 
(above 8) 
Markets 
Slaughterhouses 
Refrigerators 
Parking Lots 
Fair Grounds 
Parks 
Zoos 
Municipal Nursery (i.e. Plant 
Cemetery 
Commercial & 
Recreational Infra. (sum of 
above 9) 
Storm Drainage 
Solid Waste Disposal (Landfill: 
Wastewater Treatment Lagoor 
Public Urinals 
Other Hygienic Services 
Combined Water & 
Sanitation (sum of above 
3) 
Per Capita 
[.)Upobl] 
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Laguna4 
Laguna8 
* Lagunad 
Mingi4 
Mingi8 
* Mingid 
OtroHig4 
OtroHig8 
* Otrohigd 
* Sanbas_4 
* Sanbas_8 
* Sanbas_d 
* Poli4pc 
* Coli4pc 
* Canch4pc 
* InfOt4pc 
* Museo4pc 
* Teatr4pc 
* Bibli4pc 
* Cultu4pc 
* infra4pc 
* Merca4pc 
* Matad4pc 
* Frigo4pc 
* Parqu4pc 
* Feria4pc 
* Parqe4pc 
* Zoo4pc 
* Viver4pc 
* Cemen4pc 
* infr24pc 
* Drena4pc 
* DesSo4pc 
* Lag un4pc 
* Mingi4pc 
* OtroH4pc 
* Sanba4pc 
1.4.1 Municipal Educational Services: Early Education 
EscPu_i 	 Public 
EscPr_i No. of Facilities 	Private 
EscTot_i 	 Total 
MatPu_i 	 Public 
MatPr_i No. of Students 	Private 
MatTot_i 	 Total 
DocPu_i 	 Public 
DocPr_i No. of Teachers 	Private 
DocTot_i 	 Total 
EAdPu_i 	 Public 
EAdPr_i No. of Administrators 	Private 
EAdTotj 	 Total 
* StEsPu 	\Jo. Students/School (Facility Public 
* StDoPu_i No. Students/Teacher Public 
1.4.2 Municipal Educational Services: Primary School 
EscPu_1 	 Public 
EscPr_1 No. of Facilities 	Private 
EscTot_1 	 Total 
MatPu_1 	 Public 
MatPr_1 No. of Students 	Private 
MatTot_1 	 Total 
DocPu_1 	 Public 
DocPr_1 No. of Teachers 	Private 
DocTot_1 	 Total 
EAdPu_1 	 Public 
EAdPr_1 No. of Administrators 	Private 
EAdTot_1 	 Total 
* StEsPu_1 	'lo. Students/School (Facility Public 
* StDoPu_1 No. Students/Teacher Public 
1.4.3 Municipal Educational Services: Secondary School 
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Public EscPu_2 
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EscPr_2 	 No. of Facilities 	Private 
EscTot_2 	 Total 
MatPu_2 	 Public 
MatPr_2 No. of Students 	Private 
MatTot_2 	 Total 
DocPu_2 	 Public 
DocPr_2 No. of Teachers 	Private 
DocTot_2 	 Total 
EAdPu_2 	 Public 
EAdPr_2 No. of Administrators 	Private 
EAdTot_2 	 Total 
* StEsPu_2 	\Jo. Students/School (Facility Public 
* StDoPu_2 No. Students/Teacher  Public 
* EscPu_12 	 Public 	 Primary & secondary 
* EscPu j2 Total No. of Facilities 	Public Early education through second 
* EscPu_1m 	 Public 	 Primary, secondary & multigrad 
1.4.4 Municipal Educational Services: Further Education 
EscPu_3 
EscPr_3 
EscTot_3 
MatPu_3 
MatPr_3 
MatTot_3 
DocPu_3 
DocPr_3 
DocTot_3 
EAdPu_3 
EAdPr_3 
EAdTot_3 
No. of Facilities 
No. of Students 
No. of Teachers 
No. of Administrators 
Public 
Private 
Total 
Public 
Private 
Total 
Public 
Private 
Total 
Public 
Private 
Total 
1.4.5 Municipal Educational Services: Multigrade 
EscPu_m 	 Public 
EscPr_m No. of Facilities 	Private 
EscTot_m 	 Total 
MatPu_m 	 Public 
MatPr_m No. of Students 	Private 
MatTot_m 	 Total 
DocPu_m 	 Public 
DocPr_m No. of Teachers 	Private 
DocTot_m 	 Total 
EAdPu_m 	 Public 
EAdPr_m No. of Administrators 	Private 
EAdTot_m 	 Total 
1.4.6 Municipal Educational Services: Boarding Schools 
EscPu_n 
EscPr_n 
EscTot_n 
MatPu_n 
MatP r_n 
MatTot_n 
DocPu_n 
DocP r_n 
DocTot_n 
EAdPu_n 
EAdPr_n 
EAdTot_n 
No. of Facilities 
No. of Students 
No. of Teachers 
No. of Administrators 
Public 
Private 
Total 
Public 
Private 
Total 
Public 
Private 
Total 
Public 
Private 
Total 
1.4.7 Municipal Educational Services: Alternative  Education 
EscPu_a 
EscPr_a 
EscTot_a 
MatPu_a 
MatPr_a 
MatTot_a 
DocPu_a 
DocPr_a 
DocTot_a 
EAdPu_a 
EAdPr_a 
EAdTot_a 
No. of Facilities 
No. of Students 
No. of Teachers 
No. of Administrators 
Public 
Private 
Total 
Public 
Private 
Total 
Public 
Private 
Total 
Public 
Private 
Total 
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Created (Per Capita Education indicators) 
Early Education 
* espupci 	 Public 
* esprpci No. of Facilities 	Private 
* estopci 	 Total 
* mapupci 	 Public 
* maprpci No. of Students 	Private 
* matopci 	 Total 
* dopupci 	 Public 
* doprpci No. of Teachers 	Private 
* dotopci 	 Total 
* eapupci 	 Public 
* eaprpci No. of Administrators 	Private 
* eatopci 	 Total 
Primary School 
* espupci 	 Public 
* esprpci No. of Facilities 	Private 
* estopci 	 Total 
* mapupci 	 Public 
* maprpci No. of Students 	Private 
* matopci 	 Total 
* dopupci 	 Public 
* doprpci No. of Teachers 	Private 
* dotopci 	 Total 
* eapupcl 	 Public 
* eaprpci No. of Administrators 	Private 
* eatopci 	 Total 
Secondary School 
* espupc2 	 Public 
* esprpc2 No. of Facilities 	Private 
* estopc2 	 Total 
* mapupc2 	 Public 
* maprpc2 No. of Students 	Private 
* matopc2 	 Total 
* dopupc2 	 Public 
* doprpc2 No. of Teachers 	Private 
* dotopc2 	 Total 
* eapupc2 	 Public 
* eaprpc2 No. of Administrators 	Private 
* eatopc2 	 Total 
* espupcl2 	 Public 	 Primary & secondary 
* espupci2 Total No. of Facilities 	Public Early education through second 
* espupclm 	 Public 	 Primary, secondary & multigrad 
Further Education 
* espupc3 	 Public 
* esprpc3 No. of Facilities 	Private 
* estopc3 	 Total 
* mapupc3 	 Public 
* maprpc3 No. of Students 	Private 	 Per Capita 
* matopc3 	 Total 
* dopupc3 	 Public 
* doprpc3 No. of Teachers 	Private 
* dotopc3 	 Total 
* eapupc3 	 Public 
* eaprpc3 No. of Administrators 	Private 
* eatopc3 	 Total 
Multigrade 
* espupcm 	 Public 
* esprpcm No. of Facilities 	Private 
* estopcm 	 Total 
* mapupcm 	 Public 
* maprpcm No. of Students 	Private 
* matopcm 	 Total 
* dopupcm 	 Public 
* doprpcm No. of Teachers 	Private 
* dotopcm 	 Total 
* eapupcm 	 Public 
* eaprpcm No. of Administrators 	Private 
* eatopcm 	 Total 
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Appendix 4: Data Key 
Boarding Schools 
* espupcn 	 Public 
* esprpcn No. of Facilities 	Private 
* estopcn 	 Total 
* mapupcn 	 Public 
* maprpcn No. of Students 	Private 
* matopcn 	 Total 
* dopupcn 	 Public 
* doprpcn No. of Teachers 	Private 
* dotopcn 	 Total 
* eapupcn 	 Public 
* eaprpcn No. of Administrators 	Private 
* eatopcn 	 Total 
Alternative Education 
* espupca 
* esprpca 
* estopca 
* mapupca 
* maprpca 
* matopca 
* dopupca 
* doprpca 
* dotopca 
* eapupca 
* eaprpca 
* eatopca 
1.5.1 HEALTH - Health Posts: 
EstPu_pu 	No. of Facilities 
AuxPu_pu 	No. of Medical Assistants 
MedPu_pu 	No. of Doctors 	 Public Sector 
SAdPu_pu 	No. of Administrators 
1.5.2 Doctors' Offices: 
EstPu_cm 	No. of Facilities 
CamPu_cm 	No. of Beds 
MedPu_cm 	No. of Doctors 
	 Public Sector 
AuxPu_cm 	No. of Medical Assistants 
SAdPu_cm 	No. of Administrators 
1.5.3 Health Centers (with limited in-patient facilities): [Centres de Salud 
EstPu_cs 	No. of Facilities 
Cam Pu_cs 	No. of Beds 
MedPu_cs 	No. of Doctors 
AuxP u_cs 	No. of Medical Assistants 
SAdPu_cs 	No. of Administrators 
* EstPu_1 No. of Facilities 
* MedPu_1 	No. of Doctors 
* AuxPu_1 	No. of Medical Assistants 
1.5.4 Health Clinics: [Policlinicos] 
EstPu_pc 	No. of Facilities 
CamPu_pc 	No. of Beds 
MedPu_pc 	No. of Doctors 
AuxPu_pc 	No. of Medical Assistants 
SAdPu_pc 	No. of Administrators 
1.5.5 Basic Hospitals: 
EstPu_hb 	No. of Facilities 
CamPu_hb 	No. of Beds 
MedPu_hb 	No. of Doctors 
AuxPu_hb 	No. of Medical Assistants 
SAdPu_hb 	No. of Administrators 
* EstPu_2 	No. of Facilities 
* CamPu_2 	No. of Beds 
* MedPu_2 	No. of Doctors 
* AuxPu_2 	No. of Medical Assistants 
Public 
No. of Facilities 	Private 
Total 
Public 
No. of Students 	Private 
Total 
Public 
No. of Teachers 	Private 
Total 
Public 
No. of Administrators Private / 
Total 
Public Sector 
Public Sector 
Primary Level 
(Health Posts 
through Health 
1.5.6 General Hospitals: 
EstPu_hg 
EstP r_hg 
EstTo_hg 
Cam Pu_hg 
Cam P r_hg 
CamTo_hg 
MedPu_hg 
MedPr_hg 
MedTo_hg 
AuxPu_hg 
   
No. of Facilities 
 
Public 
Private 
Total 
Public 
Private 
Total 
Public 
Private 
Total 
Public 
No. of Beds 
 
No. of Doctors 
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AuxPr_hg 	I No. of Medical Assistants 'Private 
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AuxTo_hg 	 Total 
SAdPu_hg 	 Public 
SAdTo_hg 	 Total 
1.5.7 Pharmacies:  
FarPu 	 Public 
FarTot 	 Total 
1.5.8 Other Health Services:  
SOtroPu 	 Public 
SOtroTot 	 Total 
Created (Per Capita Health Indicators) 
* epu.pupc 	No. of Facilities 
* mpu.pupc 	No. of Doctors 
* apu.pupc 	No. of Medical Assistants 
* spu.pupc 	No. of Administrators 
* epu.cmpc 	No. of Facilities 
* cpu.cmpc 	No. of Beds 
* mpu.cmpc 	No. of Doctors 
* apu.cmpc 	No. of Medical Assistants 
* spu.cmpc 	No. of Administrators 
* epu.cspc 	No. of Facilities 
* cpu.cspc 	No. of Beds 
* mpu.cspc 	No. of Doctors 
* apu.cspc 	No. of Medical Assistants 
* spu.cspc 	No. of Administrators 
* epu.1 pc No. of Facilities 
* m pu.1 pc 	No. of Doctors 
* apu.1 pc No. of Medical Assistants 
* epu.pcpc 	No. of Facilities 
* cpu.pcpc 	No. of Beds 
* mpu.pcpc 	No. of Doctors 
* apu.pcpc 	No. of Medical Assistants 	
Per Capita 
* spu.pcpc 	No. of Administrators 
* epu.hbpc 	No. of Facilities 
* cpu.hbpc 	No. of Beds 
* mpu.hbpc 	No. of Doctors 
* apu.hbpc 	No. of Medical Assistants 
* spu.hbpc 	No. of Administrators 
* epu.2pc No. of Facilities 
* cpu.2pc 	No. of Beds 
* mpu.2pc 	No. of Doctors 
* apu.2pc No. of Medical Assistants 
* epu.hgpc 	No. of Facilities 
* cpu.hgpc 	No. of Beds 
* mpu.hgpc 	No. of Doctors 
* apu.hgpc 	No. of Medical Assistants 
* spu.hgpc 	No. of Administrators 
* FarPupc 	No. of Pharmacies 
* SOtrPupc 	No. of Other Health Services 
* segmiMpc 	Health Ins., Mothers Benefiting 
* segmiNpc 	Health Ins., Children Benefitin 
1.6 Number of Economic Entities Registered, By Sector: 
EEReg_Mi 	Mining 
EEReg_In 	Industry 
EEReg_EA 	Electricity 
EEReg_Cn 	Construction 
EEReg_Cm Commerce 
EEReg_Tr 	Transportation & Storage 
EEReg_Fi 	Finance 
EEReg_CS 	Community, Social & Personal Services 
EEReg_RH 	Restaurants 
EEReg_To 	Total 
1.7.1 Municipal Government's Infrastructure & Basic Services: 
Ham Ed_p 
Ham Ed_a 
Ham Ed_o 
HamCa_p 
HamCa_a 
HamCa_o 
HamTe_p 
HamTe_a 
Building/Offices 
 
Owned 
Rented 
Other 
Owned 
Rented 
Other 
Owned 
Rented 
  
Houses 
 
Land/Lots 
 
    
No. of Administrators SAdPr_hg Private 
FarPr Private No. of Facilities 
SOtroPr Private No. of Facilities 
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HamTe_o 	I 'Other 
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Ham lOt_p 
HamlOt_a 
HamlOt_o 
Ham Inf_p 
Ham Inf_a 
Ham Info 
 
Other 
 
Owned 
Rented 
Other 
Owned 
Rented 
Other 
 
Total Infrastructure 
 
HamLuz 	Electricity 
HamAgua 	Potable Water 
1.7.4 Municipal Government's Assets: 
Ham Ve_to 	 Total 
HamVe_2x Vehicles 	2WD 
HamVe_4x 	 4WD 
HamTrac Tractors 
Ham Moto 	Motorcycles 
Ham Bici Bicycles 
Ham Maqui 
	
Other Construction Equipment 
Ham Muebl 
	
Furniture 
HamCompu 	Computers 	 Ojo! - Not the same as SISIN computers 
Ham lm pre 	Printers 
Ham Fotoc 	Photocopiers 
Ham MEsc 	Typewriters 
HamCalc 	Calculators 
HamOtAct 	Other Assets 
* Ham Activ 	Total Assets [=sum of all assets above] 
2.A.1 Training & Capacity Building Received by the Municipal Government: 
* Cap 	Any training or capacity building below received [0,1] 
* Captot Sum of training programs received 
CapPP 	Participative Planning 
CapPrOp 	Operations Programming 
CapPre Budgeting 
CapCZ 	Cadaster & Zoning (Surveying/Property Appraisal) 
CapDis Districting 
CapFEP 	Project Formulation & Appraisal 
CapAdPr 	Project Administration 
CapPrIn Investment Programming 
CapOrAd 	Administrative Organization 
2.A.2 CapAdPe 	Personnel Administration 
CapAdBS 	Goods & Services Administration 
CapCI1 Internal Control 
2.A.3 CapCl2 	Accounting 
CapTCP 	Treasury & Credit 
CapAdTr 	Tax Administration 
CapLeMu 	Municipal Legislation 
2.A3', Training & Capacity Building Requested by the Municipal Government: 
* Tema 	Any training or capacity building below requested [0,1] 
* Ternatot 	Sum of training programs requested 
TemaPP 	Participative Planning 
TemaPrOp 	Operations Programming 
TemaPre 	Budgeting 
TemaCZ 	Cadaster & Zoning (Surveying/Property Appraisal) 
TemaDis 	Districting 
TemaFEP 	Project Formulation & Appraisal 
TemaAdPr 	Project Administration 
TemaPrin 	Investment Programming 
TemaOrAd 	Administrative Organization 
2.B.1 Municipal Development Plan (PDM - from the Participative Planning Exercises): 
PDM 	Municipality has a PDM [0,1] 
2.B.2 Local Institutions/Actors Who Helped Devise the PDM: 
FPdmOtb 	Grass-Roots Organizations 
FPdmCV 	Vigilance Committee 
FPdmDDE 	District Education Authorities 
FPdmUGS 	Health Sector Development Unit 
FPdmDLS 	Local Health Authorities 
FPdm DLE 	Local Education Authorities 
FPdmFIS 	Social Investment Fund 
FPdmFDC 	Campesino Development Fund 
FPdm Igle 	Church 
FPdmCoop 	Cooperatives 
FPdmAsPr 	Producers Associations 
FPdmONG 	NGO's 
FPdmOtro 	Other Private Groups 
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Total Permanent 
Employees 
Executive Level 
Technical 
Administrative 
Low Skilled Workers 
Service/Support 
Temporary 
Al Employees 
Total Permanent 
Employees Per Capita 
Executive Level Per Capita 
Technical Per Capita 
Administrative Per Capita 
Low Skilled Workers Per . 
Capita 
Service/Support Per Capita 
2.B.3 Who wrote the PDM? 
EPdmHAM 	Municipal Government Authorities 
EPdmONG 	NGO's 
EPdmCon 	Consultants 
EPdmPrin 	Independent Professionals 
EPdmPref 	Prefectural Authorities 
EPdmOtro 	Other 
2.C.1 Who wrote the 1997 Annual Operating Plan? 
EPoaHAM 	Municipal Government Authorities 
EPoaONG 	NGO's 
EPoaCon 	Consultants 
EPoaPrIn 	Independent Professionals 
EPoaPref 	Prefectural Authorities 
EPoaOtro 	Other 
What & how many difficulties were encountered during the process of writing it? 
* Dpoa 	Any of the difficulties below encountered [0,1] 
* DPoaTot 	Sum of difficulties encountered 
DPoalnfo 	Informational Problems 
DPoaConc 	Consensus Problems 
DPoaCoor 	Coordination Problems 
DPoaOtro 	Other Problems 
2.D.2 Information Systems Used by Municipal Governments: 
SICOM 	SICOM 
SlOtro Other Standard Packages (SICOPREFOX, SICOPREUNIX, LEXUS, SIEF, OTR( 
SITotal 	Any of the above 
2.D.3 Frequency of Municipal Spending Reports to Higher Levels of Government: 
InEjPr_m 	Monthly 
InEjPr_s 	Semesterly 
InEjPr_a 	Annually 
InEjPr Any of the above 
2.F.1 Municipal Empi 
EmplH_To 	 Men 
EmplM_To Women 
Empl_To 	 Total 
EmplH_Di Men 
EmpIM_Di 	 Women 
Empl_Di Total 
EmplH_Te 	 Men 
EmplM_Te Women 
Empl_Te 	 Total 
EmplH_Ad Men 
EmplM_Ad 	 Women 
Empl_Ad Total 
EmplH_Ob 	 Men 
EmplM_Ob Women 
Ernpl_Ob 	 Total 
EmplH_Se Men 
EmpIM_Se 	 Women 
Empl_Se Total 
EmplH_Ev 	 Men 
EmplM_Ev Women 
Empl_Ev 	 Total 
EmplH Men 
EmpIM 	 Women 
Empl Total 
* Emphtopc 	 Men 
* Empmtopc Women 
* Emptopc 	 Total 
* Emphdipc Men 
* Empmdipc 	 Women 
* Empdipc Total 
* Emphtepc 	 Men 
* Empmtepc Women 
* Emptepc 	 Total 
* Emphadpc Men 
* Empmadpc 	 Women 
* Empadpc Total 
* Emphobpc 	 Men 
* Empmobpc Women 
* Empobpc 	 Total 
Emphsepc Men 
* Empmsepc 	 Women 
* Empsepc Total 
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No. of Taxpayers 
Amount Collected 
No. of Taxpayers 
Amount Collected 
No. of Taxpayers 1996 
Amount Collected 
No. of Taxpayers Change 1994-6 
Amount Collected 
Total No. Registered (1996) 
No. of Taxpayers 1994 
Amount Collected 
No. of Taxpayers 1995 
Amount Collected 
No. of Taxpayers 1996 
Amount Collected 
Total No. Registered (1996) 
No. of Taxpayers 1994 
Amount Collected 
No. of Taxpayers 1995 
Amount Collected 
No. of Taxpayers 1996 
Amount Collected 
Total No. Registered (1996) 
No. of Taxpayers 1994 
Amount Collected 
No. of Taxpayers 1995 
Amount Collected 
No. of Taxpayers 1996 
Amount Collected 
otal No. Registered (1996) 
1994 
1995 
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Men 
Women 
Total 
Men 
Women 
Total 
* Emphevpc 
* Empmevpc 
* Empevpc 
* Emphpc 
• Empmpc 
* Emppc 
2.F.2 Municipal Operational Manual: 
Man Fun 	Existence Of 
UsManFun 	Use Of 
2. F.3 Municipal Councilmen's Salaries: 
Salar_PC 	President of the Council 
Salar_Co 	Councilman 
2.F.5 Municipal Hiring & Firing Procedures: 
Alc_Co 
Alc_De 
Con_Co 
Con_De 
EvTe_Co 
EvTe_De 
InvPub 
lnvDir 
Otro_Co 
Otro_De 
	 Other 
2. G.3 Further Questions About Social Services: 
Info_Sa 	Municipal Government Has 
Info_Ed Information On 
Info_SyE 
Info. Is Used for Planning? Plan_SyE 
Health ReCoNu_S 	Sectoral Regulations 	
Education ReCoNu_E Applied To New 	
Water & Sewerage ReCoNu_A 	Constructions In: 	
Social Services (i.e. any of the above) ReCoNu 
Mun. Government Provides School Breakfast? DesEsc 
Local Health Authority Operates Here DILOS 
Local Education Authority Operates Here DILE 
2.G.4 Number Who Benefit from the Mothers' & Children's Insurance (1996): 
SeguMI_M 	No. of Mothers 
SeguMl_N 	No. of Children 
2.G.5 How Many Grass-Roots Organizations Exist in This Municipality? 
OTBs_e 	Estimated 
OTBs_pj 	Legally Registered 
2.H.1 Taxes & the Tax Base: 
Tributa 	Mun. Government Collects Local Taxes? 
Temporary Per Capita 
All Employees Per Capita 
(1997 Pop. Projections) 
According to Technical 
Evaluation 
Mayor's Prerogative 
Municipal Council's 
Prerogative 
Public Invitation 
Direct Contracting 
Hiring 
Firing 
Hiring 
Firing 
Hiring 
Firing 
Hiring 
Hiring 
Hiring 
Firing 
Health 
Education 
Health or Education 
ImPBI_N4 
ImPBI_M4 
ImPBI_N5 
Im PBI_M5 
ImPBI_N6 
ImPBI_M6 
* Impbi_nd 
* Impbi_rnd 
ImPBI_N 
I m PVA_N4 
I m PVA_M4 
I m PVA_N5 
Im PVA_M5 
Im PVA_N6 
Im PVA_M6 
Im PVA_N 
ImTIV_N4 
ImTIV_M4 
ImTIV_N5 
ImTIV_M5 
ImTIV_N6 
ImTIV_M6 
1mTIV_N 
2.H.2 Im Pat_N4 
Im Pat_M4 
Im Pat_N5 
Im Pat_M5 
I m Pat_N6 
Im Pat_M6 
Im Pat_N 
Real Estate & Property 
Taxes 
Motor Vehicle Tax 
Real Estate & Vehicle 
Transaction Tax 
Municipal Licenses & 
Permits 
Specific Sales Tax (i.e. on 
Chicha) 
Other Taxes & Charges 
Discretionary Municipal 
Taxes 
Total Municipal Taxes 
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No. of Taxpayers 
Amount Collected 
No. of Taxpayers 
Amount Collected 
No. of Taxpayers 
Amount Collected 
Total No. Registered (1996) 
No. of Taxpayers 
Amount Collected 
No. of Taxpayers 
Amount Collected 
No. of Taxpayers 
Amount Collected 
Total No. Registered (1996) 
No. of Taxpayers 
Amount Collected 
No. of Taxpayers 
Amount Collected 
No. of Taxpayers 
Amount Collected 
Total No. Registered (1996) 
No. of Taxpayers 
Amount Collected 
No. of Taxpayers 
Amount Collected 
No. of Taxpayers 
Amount Collected 
No. of Taxpayers 
Amount Collected 
1994 
1995 
1996 
1994 
1995 
1996 
1996 
1995 
Change 1994-6 
1994 
1995 
1994 
1996 
Mun. Administrative 	Exists 
Procedures Manual 
	
Is Used 
Mun. Formulates Hiring/Contracting Plans 
Procedures Exist for Small Purchases 
Local Gov. Draws Up Bidding Documents for Municipal Purchases? 
Invitations are Published? 
Bids are Assessed? 
Contracts are Adjudicated? 
Mun. Government has Regulations for Contracting? 
Mun. Government Does Inventories of its Assets? 
Mayor 
Municipal Council 
Grass-Roots Organizations 
Mayor 
Municipal Council 
Grass-Roots Organizations 
Mayor 
Municipal Council 
Grass-Roots Organizations 
Who Supervises the 
Performance of Local 
Education Authorities? 
Who Supervises the 
Performance of Local 
Health Authorities? 
Gives Public Account of 
Their Performance? 
ImTas_N4 
ImTas M4 
ImTas_N5 
ImTas_M5 
ImTas_N6 
ImTas_M6 
ImTas_N 
ImCE_N4 
ImCE_M4 
ImCE_N5 
Im CE_M5 
ImCE_N6 
ImCE_M6 
Im CE_N 
ImOtr_N4 
ImOtr_M4 
ImOtr_N5 
ImOtr_M5 
ImOtr_N6 
ImOtr_M6 
ImOtr_N 
* Imtot_n4 
* Imtot_m4 
* Imtot_n5 
* Imtot_m5 
* Imtot_n6 
* Imtot_m6 
* Imtot_nd 
* Imtot_md 
2.1.1 Municipal Administration: 
ManPro_D 
ManPro_U 
ProgCont 
ProComMe 
2.J.1 Pliego 
Plieg_Pu 
Plieg_Ca 
Plieg_Ad 
RegCon 
Inventar 
SupEd_A 
SupEd_C 
SupEd_O 
SupSa_A 
SupSa_C 
SupSa_O 
CuenPu_A 
CuenPu_C 
CuenPu_O 
3.1 Budgetary Revenues and Expenditures: 
Ingreso4 	Revenues 
Gasto4 Expenditures 
Balan4 	Budget Surplus (Deficit) 
IngGast4 	Revenues/Expenditures 
3.2 Ingreso5 	Revenues 
Gasto5 Expenditures 
Balan5 	Budget Surplus (Deficit) 
IngGast5 	Revenues/Expenditures 
1994 
1995 
1996 
Total, 1994-6 
1994 
3.3 Ingreso6 
Gasto6 
Balan6 
IngGast6 
* Ingreso  
Revenues 
Expenditures 
Budget Surplus (Deficit) 
Revenues/Expenditures 
Revenues 
* Gasto 	Expenditures 
* Balan Budget Surplus (Deficit) 
* IngGast 	Revenues/Expenditures 
3.4 Municipal Revenue Indicators: 
InOpTo4 
	
Operating Revenue/Total Revenue 
InTNTTo4 
	
Local Tax and Non-Tax Revenue/Total Revenue 
TrCtTo4 
	
Transfers/Total Revenue 
CopTrTo4 
	
National Revenue-Sharing/Total Revenue 
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1995 
1996 
Total, 1994-1996 
1994 
1995 
1996 
Total, 1994-1996 
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3.5 InOpTo5 	Operating Revenue/Total Revenue 
InTNTTo5 	Local Tax and Non-Tax Revenue/Total Revenue 
TrCtTo5 Transfers/Total Revenue 
CopTrTo5 	National Revenue-Sharing/Total Revenue 
3.6 InOpTo6 	Operating Revenue/Total Revenue 
InTNTTo6 	Local Tax and Non-Tax Revenue/Total Revenue 
TrCtTo6 Transfers/Total Revenue 
CopTrTo6 	National Revenue-Sharing/Total Revenue 
* IngrTNT 	Total Local Tax and Non-Tax Revenues 
* InTNTTo 	Local Tax and Non-Tax Revenue/Total Revenue 
3.7 Municipal Spending Indicators: 
PerGTo4 	Personal Services/Total Expenditure 
NPerGTo4 	Non-Personal Services/Total Expenditures 
MySGTo4 	Materials & Supplies/Total Expenditure 
ActGTo4 	Real Assets (i.e. Buildings, Equip.)/Total Exp. 
GCorGTo4 	Current Expenditures/Total Expenditure 
PerlTo4 	Personal Services/Total Revenue 
NPerlTo4 	Non-Personal Services/Total Revenue 
MySITo4 	Materials & Supplies/Total Revenue 
ActITo4 Real Assets (i.e. Buildings, Equip.)/Total Rev. 
GCorlTo4 	Current Expenditures/Total Revenue 
3.8 PerGTo5 	Personal Services/Total Expenditure 
NPerGTo5 	Non-Personal Services/Total Expenditures 
MySGTo5 	Materials & Supplies/Total Expenditure 
ActGTo5 	Real Assets (i.e. Buildings, Equip.)/Total Exp. 
GCorGTo5 	Current Expenditures/Total Expenditure 
PerlTo5 	Personal Services/Total Revenue 
NPerlTo5 	Non-Personal Services/Total Revenue 
MySITo5 	Materials & Supplies/Total Revenue 
ActITo5 Real Assets (i.e. Buildings, Equip.)/Total Rev. 
GCorlTo5 	Current Expenditures/Total Revenue 
3.9 PerGTo6 	Personal Services/Total Expenditure 
NPerGTo6 	Non-Personal Services/Total Expenditures 
MySGTo6 	Materials & Supplies/Total Expenditure 
ActGTo6 	Real Assets (i.e. Buildings, Equip.)/Total Exp. 
GCorGTo6 	Current Expenditures/Total Expenditure 
PerlTo6 	Personal Services/Total Revenue 
NPerlTo6 	Non-Personal Services/Total Revenue 
MySITo6 	Materials & Supplies/Total Revenue 
ActlTo6 Real Assets (i.e. Buildings, Equip.)/Total Rev. 
GCorlTo6 	Current Expenditures/Total Revenue 
* SerPer Total Personal Services 
* SerNPer 	Total Non-Personal Services 
* PerGTo Personal Services/Total Expenditure 
* NPerGTo 	Non-Personal Services/Total Expenditures 
* GastCor 	Total Current Expenditures 
* GCorGTo 	Current Expenditures/Total Expenditure 
* PerlTo Personal Services/Total Revenue 
* NPerlTo 	Non-Personal Services/Total Revenue 
* GCorlTo 	Current Expenditures/Total Revenue 
4.1.1 Project Selection in the Municipalities: 
IdenPdm 	PDM is used to identify Investment  Projects? 
IdenAlc 
IdenCon 
IdenCons 
IdenTec 
IdenCV 
IdenPob 
IdenOtro 
Who Else 
Identifies/Initiates Projects? 
Mayor 
Municipal Council 
Councilmen 
Technical Specialists of the Mun. Government 
Vigilance Committees 
Local Population 
Other 
4.1.2 Other Instruments Used to Identify Investment Projects: 
• PMCat 	Any of instruments below used to identify projects [0,1] 
* PMCattot 	Sum of instruments below used to identify projects 
PMOrdTer 	Territorial Ordering Plan 	 0 rdenamiento Territorial 
PMUsoSue 	Municipal Land Use Plan 
PMArProt 	Mun. Protected Areas Plan 
PMArUrb 	Mun. Zoning/Urban Areas Plan 
PMSect Sectoral Master Plans 
CatastUr 	Urban Cadaster 
CatastRu 	Rural Cadaster 
4.2.1.Are Project Design Documents/Technical Studies Produced Prior to Investment: 
EstPrein 	Yes 
4.2.1. Indicators Used to Evaluate Projects: 
PreinVan 	Net Present Value 
322 
Appendix 4: Data Key 
PreinTir 	Internal Rate of Return 
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4.2.2. Project Programming & Execution - Physical Supervision and Financial Control (1996): 
PSCFs_Pr 	No. of Projects 
PSCFs_Fu 	No. of Personnel 
PSCFn_Pr 	No. of Projects 
PSCFn_Fu 	No. of Personnel 
* Pscfs_ra 	Projects per Supervisor 	Physical Supervision 
* Pscfn_ra 	Projects per Supervisor 	Financial Control 
4.2.3. Are Project Results Evaluated in the Operational Phase? 
EvalRes 	Yes 
4.3.1 Forms of Access to the Investment Information System (SISIN): 
SISIN_AD 	Direct Access 
SISIN_Al 	Indirect Access (via the Prefecture) 
SISIN_AN 	No Access 
4.3.2 /T Equipment Available for Use with SISIN: 
Computa 	Computers 
Impresor 	Printers 
4.3.3 SISIN Subsystems Used by the Municipal Government: 
SISINidp 	Project Identification 
* Above denotes created variables. 
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APPENDIX 5: INTERVIEWS 
BOLETA DE ENTREVISTA 
ALCALDE, CONCEJAL, COMITE DE VIGILANCIA 
I DATOS DE CONTROL 
1. Entrevistador: 	 2. Hora: 	3. Fecha: 	 
4. Persona(s) entrevistada(s), cargo y ocupacion anterior: 
5. Lugar de entrevista: 	  
II ETAPA DE PREPARACION DEL PROYECTO 
6. Visite el proyecto XXX. Me gustarla que me cuente como participo la comunidad en 
la fase de preparacion del proyecto (incluyendo negociaciones con financiadores y 
preparacion tecnica) 
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7. Quien y cam° se decidio quien ejecutarla el proyecto? 
III ETAPA DE EJECUCION 
8. COmo participa(o) la OTB en la ejecucion del proyecto, y porque? 
9. Ha habido algun problema durante la ejecucion? De que tipo(s) y si se ha(n) resuelto, 
como? 
10. En su opini6n se estan tomando en cuenta las opinions (y necesidades) de los 
usuarios para la ejecucion del proyecto? 
322 
Appendix 5: Interview Questionnaires and Guides 
11. Se sabe quiet.' se hard cargo del servicio cuando que se termine la obra? COmo se ha 
decidido? 
12. Que responsabilidad tiene el municipio y que responsabilidad la (comunidad, 
localidad, empresa privada u ONG) para el mantenimiento del proyecto (refaccion, 
reposicion...)? 
IV GOBIERNO MUNICIPAL Y SATISFACCION 
13. El sistema municipal de la ley de participacion responde mejor que antes a las 
necesidades o intereses de esta poblacion (esta mejor atendida que antes)? Porque? 
14.En la Ley de PP se dice que un alcalde puede ser removido de su puesto. Cree usted 
que esta disposicion es buena? Porque? 
15. A quien obedecen mas los consejales - a los partidos o a la gente que voto por ellos? 
0 es lo mismo? Como es aqui? 
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16. En el tiempo que lleva la participaciOn popular, en este municipio se ha trabajado en 
los siguientes servicios. Como calificaria usted el resultado de este trabajo? (MB, B, R, 
M, MM) {en caso de no haber intervencion explicar tambien porque} 
check calif 	 Porque 
Educaci6n ( ) ( ) 
Salud ( ) ( ) 
Agua ( ) ( ) 
Residuos solidos ( ) ( ) 
Eliminacion de excr. ( ) ( ) 
Riego ( ) ( ) 
Electricidad ( ) ( ) 
Caminos ( ) ( ) 
17. Ud. cree que la distribucion de los recursos disponibles entre las localidades o barrios 
de este municipio ha mejorado con la ley de PP? Porque? 
18. Se ha elaborado un PDM para este municipio? Como lo esta usando? 
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19. Como fue aqui el proceso de elaboracion del PAO de 1997? {pausa} Hay alguna 
institucion que les esta dando apoyo? En que? 
20. Ud. recibe presiones de la gente local para hacer o no hacer ciertos proyectos? 
Como se expresan estas presiones? Ud. les hace caso? Quien consigue mas? 
21. El Comite de Vigilancia es activo en este municipio? Cuantas veces se ha opuesto a 
algan proyecto o gasto de la alcaldia? Como se resuelven estos conflictos? 
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22. Desde la participacion popular, este municipio se ha beneficiado mas, menos o igual 
que otros municipios? Porque? 
23. Las intimas elecciones fueron limpias? Igual que antes o mejor? 
24. Que proporci6n de los adultos votaron en la ultima eleccion? Porque no votO mas 
gente? 
25. La reforma de la PP esta dando poder a los que nunca antes mandaron, o siguen 
mandando los de siempre? Que grupos sociales se benefician mas? 
26. Que sugerencias tiene usted para mejorar la administraci6n municipal en este caso 
especifico? 
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27. Que sugerencias tiene para mejorar el control social en este municipio? 
V. CAPACIDAD TECNICA Y RECURSOS HUMANOS 
28. Cuanta gente (NO ELECTA) de planta trabaja en la alcaldla ? Podria hacerme el 
organigrama general? Cual es el rango salarial y el tipo de formacion por nivel? {solo 
alcalde} 
NIVEL 	PERS.-NIVEL 	RANGO SALARIALFORMACION 
DIRECTIVO 
EJECUTIVO 
OPERATIVO 
APOYO 
29. Cuales eran las caracteristicas del personal antes de la ley de PP? (cantidad de 
personal, salarios y nivel de estudios? {solo alcalde} 
30. Que sistemas de informacion y contabilidad se han implementado en el municipio? 
Cuantos de estos desde 1994? {solo alcalde} 
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31. Han recibido alguna capacitaciOn tecnica o administrativa? Como fue? Algin otro 
tipo de apoyo? 
32. Ademas de las empresas que concursan por proyectos, el municipio contrata alguna 
parte de su trabajo a empresas privadas? {por ejemplo} Que y a que empresas y por 
cuales montos? Como ha cambiado esto desde 1994? {solo alcalde} 
VII OBSERVACIONES Y COMENTARIOS 
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BOLETA DE ENTREVISTA 
COMITE DE VIGILANCIA - 2da Ronda 
I DATOS DE CONTROL 
1. Entrevistador: 	 2. Hora: 	3. Fecha: 	 
4. Persona(s) entrevistada(s), cargo y ocupacion anterior (y partido politico): 
5. Lugar de entrevista: 	  
II HETEROGENEIDAD Y CONFLICTO SOCIAL 
6. A que se dedica la gente por aqui (en su mayoria)? 	  
7. Que idiomas (y dialectos) se utilizan mayormente por aqui? 	  
8. Hay mucha migracion a o de esta zona? De donde? 	  
9. Que diferentes tipos de instituciones actuan de OTB's en este municipio? 	 
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10.La gente de las comunidades en este municipio son similares o hay diferentes grupos 
(etnicos o culturales)? Como son diferentes? [etnia, religion, idioma, comida, 
vestimenta, costumbres, actividad economical 	  
11.Las varias comunidades de este municipio se llevan bien, o hay conflictos o pugnas 
entre ellos? 	  
12.Han habido desacuerdos (entre las OTB's) dentro del Comite de Vigilancia? 
III NECESIDADES Y LA PRIORIZACION DE PROYECTOS 
13. En que sectores esta invirtiendo el municipio principalmente este afio? 
A. 	  
B. 	  
C. 	  
14. Una vez terminados estos proyectos, la comunidad seguira pidiendo mas proyectos 
de educacion/salud/agua y saneamiento, o pediran ya inversions en otros sectores? 
Como que? (e.g. caminos, riego) Porque? 
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15. Las OTB's estan usando un criterio de necesidad? Al tener mas adultos en esta 
comunidad con mas educacion (o atencion en salud, o agua potable y saneamiento 
basic° en sus casas) igualmente hubieron pedido estos proyectos? 
A. 	  
B. 	  
C. 	  
16. Se cumplio con el POA del alio pasado a cabalidad? Porque no? Que factores 
intervinieron para que no se ejecutara el POA completo? Existen fallas en el sistema 
de presupuestacion y ejecucion? 
17. Le falto plata al municipio para realizar todos los proyectos del POA? [Si Sil==> 
Como decidieron cuales proyectos se ejecutaban y cuales no? En que instancia de 
tomo esta decision? Hubo consulta con las OTB's? el CV? 
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IV QUE ES UN BUEN GOBIERNO? 
18. La gente de este municipio esta contenta con su gobierno municipal? Torque? 
19. Que hace que un gobierno municipal sea bueno? 	  
20. Que hace que un acalde sea bueno? [honestidad, actividad, capacidad tecnica, 
apoyo politico del gobierno, que escuche, que Naga lobbying frente al gobierno, 
que coopere?] Su alcalde es bueno? 
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21. Que hace que un Consejo Municipal/concejal sea bueno? [honestidad, actividad, 
capacidad tecnica, apoyo politico del gobierno, que escuche, que Naga lobbying 
frente al gobierno, que coopere?] Su Consejo Municipal es bueno? 
22. Que tendrfa que hacer el alcalde de este municipio para ser mejor alcalde? El 
Consejo Municipal? 	  
23. Con que funciones deberfa cumplir una OTB optimarnente? 	  
24. Las OTB's trabajan solamente con el gobierno municipal, o tambien con los partidos, 
los empresarios y/o terratenientes? Como y cuando? 
25. Que diferencia una buena OTB de una mala OTB? [funciones, estructura, 
operacion] 	  
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26. Que es mas importante para que el gobierno municipal sea bueno, tener buen alcalde, 
buen consejo municipal, o buen comite de vigilancia? Cual de los tres es mas 
podersoso aqui? Los tres trabajan juntos aca o hay conflictos? 
V EL REGIMEN PARTIDARIO LOCAL 
27. Quienes son las personas en las listas locales del partido? Que actividades tienen? 
(Cual es su rol en la sociedad local?) 
28. Como fueron escogidos ellos? [Procedimiento: titulares y suplentes] Hubo 
consulta popular? o entre las bases del partido? Cuando y como? A que sector 
dentro del partido local representan? 
29. Que sector del electorado local se suponia que votaria por ellos? Fue asi? 
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30. El jefe local del partido como Rego a serlo? Como ascendio la escalera local del 
partido? Podria ser derrocado? Como? [enfasis en desempetio local vs. lo que 
quiere el partido nacional] 
31. Como es la relacion entre los partidos gobernantes y los empresarios/terratenientes/ 
comerciantes/profesionales locales? Ellos aportan mucho dinero a los partidos? 
Como lo hacen? 
VI JERARQUiA POLITICA Y ADMINISTRATIVA E INDEPENDENCIA 
32. Ud. tiene el apoyo de su partido local? nacional? Como se expresa este apoyo? 
[Campacias - plata, movilizaciones, organizacion] 
33. Ud. tiene la libertad politica para manejar el (supervisar al) municipio y tomar las 
decisiones de la forma que Ud. yea mejor, o se ye limitado desde afuerapor el 
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partido? Ocurren conflictos o contradicciones entre lo que es mejor para el 
municipio y lo que el partido exige? 
34. En el caso de conflicto entre el municipio y la prefectura, quien se impone? Ha 
sucedido esto? Como fue? 
35. De que manera ha impactado el cambio de gobierno en el funcionamiento del 
municipio? El gobierno municipal tiene mas o menos apoyo que antes? De donde? 
VII OBSERVACIONES 
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BOLETA DE ENTREVISTA 
ORGANIZACIONES TERRITORIALES DE BASE 
I DATOS DE CONTROL 
1. Entrevistador: 	2. Hora: 	3. Fecha: 	 
4. Persona(s) entrevistada(s), cargo y ocupacion: 
5. Lugar de entrevista: 	  
II DATOS GENERALES DE LA LOCALIDAD 0 BARRIO 
6. Cuanta gente vive en esta comunidad o barrio: 	  
7. A que se dedica la gente por aqui (en su mayoria): 	  
8. Cuenteme un poco coma es la historia de esta (comunidad, localidad o barrio) {0.10: 
poner enfasis en fechas, momentos clave, migraciones} 
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9. Que idiomas (y dialectos) se utilizan mayormente por aqui? 	  
10. Que instituciones de base existen en esta (comunidad, localidad o barrio) y que 
funciones cumplen? {mencionar primero la que es OTB y despues el resto} 
11. Que otras instituciones colaboran con la gente en esta (comunidad, localidad o 
barrio), en que y con que grupos? 
III IDENTIFICACION DE PROYECTOS 
12. Que proyectos tienen en ejecuciOn con recursos de la participacion popular? Que 
institucion participa econOmicamente? 
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A 	  
B 	  
C 	  
13. Cuanta gente se beneficiary de estos proyectos? 
A 	 B 	 C 	  
14. Quin es esta gente? 
A 	 B 	 C 	  
15. Cuando se inicio y cuando esperan terminar estos proyectos? 
B 	 C 	  
IV ETAPA DE PREPARACION 
16.Los bienes o servicios que ofreceran los proyectos, una vez terminados, ya existian o 
los tendran por primera vez aqui? 
A 	 B 	 C 	  
17.En su opinion estos proyectos satisfacen una necesidad real? 
A 	 B 	 C 	  
18. C6mo surgi6 la idea de hacer estos proyectos? {a quien se le ocurri6, como Ilego a 
ser de conocimiento publico, era algo que queria la mayoria, como se priorizo...} 
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19. Que otras ideas o proyectos tenia esta (comunidad, localidad o barrio) y no se haran 
por lo menos en este alio? Porque? 
20. Que otras ideas o proyectos tiene esta (comunidad, localidad o barrio) y sf se haran 
este alio? 
21. Quien y como se completo la documentacion para hacer los proyectos? Fueron 
consultados los beneficiarios sobre detalles tecnicos o economicos? 
22. Sabe Ud. cuanto cuesta este proyecto y quienes ponen los recursos (y en que 
proporcion)? 
A 	 B 	 C 	  
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23. Sabe usted si alguien de la comunidad participo en las negociaciones con los 
organismos de apoyo financiero? 
24. Sabe Ud. quien y como se decidio quien ejecutaria los proyectos? 
V ETAPA DE EJECUCION 
Contratista ( ) Autoconstruccion ( ) 
25. Existe alg6n responsable del control del dinero, de la calidad, de los plazos y/o de los 
materiales por parte de la comunidad? Como se decidio esa responsabilidad? 
26. Ha habido algun problema durante la ejecucion? De que tipo(s) y si se ha(n) resuelto, 
como? 
VI ETAPA DE ADMINISTRACION 
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27. Quien se hard cargo de el servicio una vez que se terminen las obras? Como se ha 
decidido? 
28. Que responsabilidad tiene el municipio y que responsabilidad la (comunidad, 
localidad, empresa privada u ONG) para la mantencion de los proyectos? 
A: 	  
B: 	  
C: 	  
VII GOBIERNO MUNICIPAL Y SATISFACCION 
29. El sistema municipal de la ley de participacion responde mejor que antes a las 
necesidades o intereses de esta poblacion (esta mejor atendida que antes)? 
30. En la Ley de PP se dice que un alcalde puede ser removido de su puesto. Cree usted 
que esta disposicion es buena? Porque? 
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31. A quien obedecen mas los consejales - a los partidos o a la gente que voto por ellos? 
Como es aqui? 
32. Con cuales de los siguientes servicios cuenta esta comunidad? En cuales se han 
hecho proyectos con la PP? Como califica usted el resultado de este trabajo? (MB, B, R, 
M, MM) {en caso de no haber intervencion explicar tambien porque} 
	
check PP calif 	 Caracteristicas/Porque 
Educacion 	) 	) 	) 	  
Salud 	) 	) 	) 	  
Agua 	 ) 	) 	) 	  
Resids solidos ( ) 	( ) 	( ) 	  
Elimin. excr. ( ) ( ) 	( ) 	  
Riego 	) 	) 	) 	  
Electricidad 	( ) ( ) 	( ) 	  
Caminos 	) 	) 	) 	  
Otros 	( ) ( ) ( ) (ESPECIFICAR) 
33. Ud. tree que la distribucion de los recursos disponibles entre las localidades o barrios 
de este municipio ha mejorado con la ley de PP? Porque? 
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34. Desde la participacion popular, este municipio se ha beneficiado mas, menos o igual 
que otros municipios (en la calidad de inversion y gasto)? Porque? 
35. Las Illtimas elecciones fueron limpias? Igual que antes o mejor? 
36. Que proporcion de los adultos votaron en la Ultima eleccion? Porque no voto mas 
gente? 
37. La reforma de la PP esta dando poder a los que nunca antes mandaron, o siguen 
mandando los de siempre? Que grupos sociales se benefician mas? 
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38. El Comite de Vigilancia es activo en este municipio? Esta realmente vigilando los 
proyectos en esta localidad/barrio? En caso de problemas, como se resuleven? 
39. Que sugerencias tiene usted para mejorar la administracion municipal en este caso 
especifico? 
40. Que sugerencias tiene para mejorar el control social en este barrio/localidad? 
VIII OBSERVACIONES Y COMENTARIOS 
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BOLETA DE ENTREVISTA 
ORGANIZACIONES TERRITORIALES DE BASE — 2da Ronda 
I DATOS DE CONTROL 
1. Entrevistador: 	2. Hora: 	3. Fecha: 	  
4. Persona(s) entrevistada(s), cargo y ocupacion: 
5. Tipo de OTB entrevistada: 	  
6. Lugar de entrevista: 	  
II HETEROGENEIDAD Y CONFLICTO SOCIAL 
7. A que se dedica la gente por aqui (en su mayoria)? 	  
8. Que idiomas (y dialectos) se utilizan mayormente por aqui? 	  
9. Hay mucha migraci6n a o de esta zona? De donde? 	  
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10. Ademas de la suya, que otras tipos de instituciones dieron origen a OTB's en este 
municipio? [Sindicato Campesino, Allyu, Junta Vecinal,etc.] 
11. La gente de otras comunidades en este municipio, es gente similar a Uds. o son 
diferentes? Como son diferentes? [etnia, religion, idioma, comida, vestimenta, 
actividad economical 	  
12. [Si Si]==> Cuanto contacto tienen con esas otras comunidades? A veces trabajan o 
cooperan con ellos? Han hecho alga proyecto con una de estas otras comunidades? 
Como fue? 
13. Ha habido alguna pugna o conflicto con alguna de las otras comunidades/OTB's en 
este municipio? 
14. Han habido desacuerdos (entre las OTB's) dentro del Comite de Vigilancia? 	 
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15. La alcaldia favorece a alguna OTB en particular, o tienen todas las mismas 
oportunidades y acceso al municipio? 
III QUE ES UN BUEN GOBIERNO? 
16. La gente de esta OTB esta contenta con su gobierno municipal? Porque? 	 
17. Que hace que un gobierno municipal sea bueno? 	  
18. Sienten que su gobierno municipal los representa a Uds. y sus intereses? Porque? 
(De que manera?) 
19. Que hace que un acalde sea bueno? [honestidad, actividad, capacidad tecnica, 
apoyo politico del gobierno, que escuche, que haga gestiones frente al gobierno, 
que coopere?] Su alcalde es bueno (regular o malo)? 
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20. Que hace que un Consejo Municipalkoncejal sea bueno? [honestidad, actividad, 
capacidad tecnica, apoyo politico del gobierno, que escuche, que haga gestiones 
frente al gobierno, que coopere?] Su Consejo Municipal es bueno (regular o 
malo)? 
21. Que hace que un (Presidente de) Comite de Vigilancia sea bueno? [honestidad, 
actividad, capacidad tecnica, apoyo politico del gobierno, que escuche, que haga 
gestiones frente al gobierno, que coopere?] Su Comite de Vigilancia es bueno 
(regular o malo)? 
22. Que tenclria que hacer el alcalde de este municipio para ser mejor alcalde? El 
Consejo Municipal? 
23. Con que funciones deberia cumplir una OTB optimamente? La OTB trabaja 
solamente con el gobierno municipal, o tambien con los partidos, los empresarios y/o 
terratenientes? Como y cuando? 
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24. Que diferencia una buena MB de una mala OTB? [funciones, estructura, 
operacion] Como podria su OTB funcionar mejor? 
25. Cual es mas importante para que el gobiemo municipal sea bueno, tener buen 
alcalde, buen consejo municipal, o buen comite de vigilancia? Cual de los tres es 
mas podersoso aqui? Los tres trabajan juntos aca o hay conflictos? 
26. En el caso de conflicto entre el municipio y la prefectura, quien se impone? Ha 
sucedido esto? Como fue? 
27. De que manera ha impactado el cambio de gobiemo en el funcionamiento del 
municipio? Ud. tiene mas o menos apoyo que antes? De donde? 
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IV EL REGIMEN PARTIDARIO LOCAL 
28. Quienes son las personas en las listas locales del partido? Que actividades tienen? 
(Cue es su rol en la sociedad local?) 
29. Como fueron escogidos ellos? [Procedimiento: titulares y suplentes] Hubo 
consulta popular? o entre las bases del partido? Cuando y como? A que sector 
dentro del partido local representan? 
30. Que sector del electorado local se suponla que votaria por ellos? Fue asi? 	 
31. El jefe local del partido como llego a serlo? C6mo ascendio la escalera local del 
partido? [enfasis en desemperio local vs. lo que quiere el partido nacional] 
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32. Como es la relacion entre los partidos gobernantes y los empresarios/terratenientes/ 
comerciantes/profesionales locales? Estos ultimos aportan mucho dinero a los 
partidos? A cuales? Como lo hacen? 
V. OBSERVACIONES 
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GUiA DE ENTREVISTAS 
ALCALDE, CONCEJAL Y COMITE DE VIGILANCIA 
4. Concej ales 
• # Concejales 
• de que partido? 
• de que localidad? 
• que profesion/ocupacion anterior? 
5. Lugar y signification de entrevista (la seccion, 2a seccion, etc.) 
6. ParticipaciOn de la comunidad 
• a quien se le ocurrio? 
• tomo se priorizo? 
• cOmo se comunico a la gente? 
• como se fij6 la contraparte? cuanto es? 
18. PDM 
• quien hizo el PDM? 
• cOmo se hizo? que metodologia? 
23. Elecciones limpias 
• "antes" = 20-30 atios atras 
25. Los que mandan 
• ejemplo de los madereros del Beni 
26. Cuantas secretarias hay? Cuantos choferes? 
33. Me puede recomendar cuales OTB's, barrios u otros serlan especialmente 
interesantes para visitar y charlar? 
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34. Tiene algtin estudio, diagnostic° o folleto de informaciOn sobre el municipio? Me lo 
puede mostrar/regalar? 
ORGANIZACIONES TERRITORIALES DE BASE 
8. Momentos claves (ejs.) 
• sublevacion indigena 
• Reforma Agraria 
11. Quien tiene la representacion de la OTB? 
37. Elecciones limpias 
• "antes" = 20-30 dios atras 
39. Los que mandan 
• ejemplo de los madereros del Beni 
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GUiA DE ENTREVISTA 
INFORMANTE CLAVE 
1. Tiene buenas relaciones con la alcaldia? La HAM facilita u obstaculiza su trabajo? 
Como apoya la alcaldia a su sector? Que proyectos hay? 
2. Como se relacionan Uds. con otros organismos e instituciones locales (1 41-..AA., 
ONG's, OTB's, etc.)? 
3. La HAM sirve a todo el municipio de 	, o solo a una parte/sector? 
4. Su organizacion/empresa tributa aqui en el municipio? Cuanto tributa? 
5. Como se podria aumentar los recursos propios del municipio? 
6. Quien manda aca? Quien mandaba antes? Mediante que mecanismos se articula su 
poder? Cuando y porque cambio? 
7. Cuales son los conflictos sociales que hay aca? 
8. Como califica Ud. el trabajo del alcalde? del Consejo Municipal? Como se podria 
mejorar? 
9. Que porcentaje de la gente ha votado en la Ultima eleccion? Porque no voto mas? 
Como compara con elecciones pasadas (20-30 afios anis)? 
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INFORMANTE CLAVE - 2da Ronda 
Oficial Mayor Financiero/Administrativo 
1. Han hecho un PDM en este municipio? 
2. Como fue el proceso de hacer el POA en este municipio el aiio pasado? 
3. Se cumplio con el POA a cabalidad? Porque no? Que factores intervinieron para 
que no se ejecutara el POA completo? Existen fallas en el sistema de 
presupuestacion y ejecucion? 
4. Le falto plata al municipio para realizar todos los proyectos del POA? De donde 
falto plata? {Coparticipacion, Fondos, TGN, ONG's u otra institucion?] 
5. De no haber suficientes fondos para ejecutar el POA entero, como decidieron cuales 
proyectos se ejecutaban y cuales no? En que instancia de tomo esta decision? Hubo 
consulta con las OTB' s? el CV? 
Empresarios Locales 
1. A Ud. le es mas facil influenciar a los politicos locales, o a los nacionales mediante 
la CEPB? Que tipo de dialog() o presi6n ejerce Ud. sobre el municipio? 
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BOLETA DE ENTREVISTA 
JEFE LOCAL DEL PARTDO 
I DATOS DE CONTROL 
1. Entrevistador: 	 2. Hora: 	3. Fecha: 	  
4. Persona(s) entrevistada(s), cargo y ocupacion anterior: 
5. Lugar de entrevista: 	  
II El Regimen Partidario Local 
6. Como se eligieron las listas locales del partido? [Procedimiento: titulares y 
suplentes] Hubo consulta popular? entre las bases del partido? Cuando y c6mo? 
7. Quienes son estas personas? Que actividad tienen? Cudl es su rol en la sociedad 
local? 
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8. Porque fueron elegidos ellos? Qui6n dentro del partido los apoyo? A que sector 
dentro del partido local representan? Estan asociados con algun sector nacional en 
particular? 
9. Que sector del electorado local se suponfa que votaria por ellos? Fue asi? 	 
10. En caso de perder la eleccion, estos candidatos fueron cambiados, o entraran de 
nuevo en las listas en la proxima eleccion? 
11. Cual es su actividad econ6mica? su profesi6n? (su papel en la sociedad local)? 
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12. C6mo llego Ud. a ser jefe local del partido? C6mo ascendio la escalera local del 
partido? Podrfa ser derrocado? Como? [enfasis en desempeiio local vs. to que 
quiere el partido nacional] 
13. Cuan fuerte es la relacion entre el partido local y el nacional? Con que frecuencia se 
consultan decisiones al partido nacional? Que tipo de decisiones? Son necesarias 
estas consultas? Que pasa si no se hacen? 	  
14. Que otro tipo de control tiene el partido nacional sobre el local? Como se ejerce? 
15. Como es la relaciOn entre su partido y los empresarios/terratenientes/comerciantes/ 
profesionales locales? 
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16. Los empresarios locales aportan mucho dinero al partido? Como lo hacen? 	 
17. El partido consulta a los empresarios locales antes de fijar listas? antes de eligir 
politicas? A las OTB's? A alguna otra institucion? 
18. Ud. tiene el apoyo del partido local? nacional? Como se expresa este apoyo? 	 
III OBSERVACIONES 
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JEFE DEL PARTIDO NACIONAL 
1. C6mo es la estructura organica de su partido? Como es que surgen las expresiones 
locales del partido? Existen oficiales locales, o todo es dirigido desde la prefectura o 
desde La Paz? [enfasis en la estructura Local y Deptal. vs. Nacional] 
2. C6mo son compuestas las listas locales de su partido? De donde saca su partido 
candidatos municipales? Que tipo de gente es? 
3. Que influencia tiene la estructura central de su partido en la seleccion de candidatos, 
y que influencia tiene la estructura local? Quien pesa mas? 
4. Que papel juega la plata (contribuciones al partido, personas o grupos pudientes) en 
este proceso? 
5. C6mo son escogidos los lideres locales del partido? De donde vienen? Que tipo de 
gente son? [enfasis en desempelio local vs. vinculos con el partido nacional] 
6. El partido central tiene corn° sancionar a candidatos o lideres locales que se 
desmarcan politicamente o eticamente? Cuales son los mecanismos? 
7. El partido tiene lineas fuertes para la administracion municipal, o mas bien permite 
que los municipios busquen el exito de su propia manera? (hay un "paquete" de 
medidas que todo municipio debe implementar?) 
8. Como se resuelven las pugnas politicas locales? El partido nacional o departarnental 
interviene en ellas? Con que frecuencia se consultan decisiones al partido nacional? 
Que tipo de decisiones? Son necesarias estas consultas? Que le pasa al partido local 
si no las hace? 
9. Existe algun otro tipo de control del partido nacional sobre el local? Como se 
ejerce? [ideologicos, econOrnicos, burocraticos?] 
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Community and Grass-Roots Organizations 
Atocha: Severo Garcia Candia, neighborhood council ex-president, interview, Atocha, 
23 April 1997. 
Chorolque: Albino Garcia Choque, Juan Bonifacio Onofre, Esteban Marcha Cachambre 
and Ivan Marca, miners' cooperative welfare officer, oversight officer, oversight 
officer and member, interview, Chorolque, 23 April 1997. 
Villa Solano: Geronimo Ayala Hernandez, community officer, interview, Chorolque, 23 
April 1997. 
Baures 
Hugo Ayllon Parada, Cattlemen's Association president, interview, Baures, 2 May 1997. 
Conrad Bruckner, cattle rancher, interview, Baures, 4 May 1997. 
Elwin Bruckner, prefect, interview, Baures, 1 May 1997. 
Grover Martinez Franco, mayor, interview, Baures, 2 May 1997. 
Hugo Melgar Barbery and Erland Ayllon Parada, municipal council president (MIR) and 
member (independent, ex-MNR), interview, Baures, 2 May 1997. 
Dimitri Ojopi, oversight committee president, interview, Baures, 2 May 1997. 
Juan Oni Antelo, municipal councilman (MNR), interview, Baures, 2 May 1997. 
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Srs. Pilar and Teresa and Oscar Velazquez, CETHA (adult education center officers), 
interview, Baures, 4 May 1997. 
Ginger Yapiz, Social Investment Fund departmental director, interview and site visits, 
Baures, 1 May 1997. 
Community and Grass-Roots Organizations 
Baures: Oscar Duran, neighborhood council president, interview, Baures, 2 May 1997. 
El Cairo: Manuel Chipeno Valdivieso, community leader, interview, El Cairo, 3 May 
1997. 
Jasiakiri: Juan Jahnsen, community leader, interview, El Cairo, 3 May 1997. 
Tujure: Gustavo Chonono Churipui, community leader, interview, El Cairo, 3 May 
1997. 
Charagua 
Florencio Antuni Sanchez (a), oversight committee president, interview, Charagua, 1 
April 1997. 
Florencio Antuni Sanchez (b), oversight committee president, interview, Charagua, 30 
October 1997. 
Wilfredo Anzoategui Vaca, hospital director, interview, Charagua, 30 October 1997. 
Oscar Hugo Aramayo Caballero, district director of education, interview, Charagua, 4 
April 1997. 
Jose Duran, Social Investment Fund finance director, interview, 3 October 1997. 
Nelson Egiiez Gutierrez, MNR chief, interview, Charagua, 30 October 1997. 
Edgar Gutierrez Hurtado (a), ADN chief, interview, Charagua, 28 October 1997. 
Edgar Gutierrez Hurtado (b), district officer, interview, Charagua, 28 October 1997. 
Juan Carlos Gutierrez, Cattle Ranchers' Association of the Cordillera president, 
interview, Charagua, 1 April 1997. 
Rolando Gutierrez, municipal councilman (MNR), interview, Charagua, 2 April 1997. 
Dante Hurtado Salse, oversight committee secretary, interview, Charagua, 30 October 
1997. 
Fernando Murioz Franco, Social Investment Fund departmental director, interview, 
Santa Cruz, 31 March 1997. 
Eulogio Nuriez, CIPCA director (NGO) and municipal adviser, interview, Charagua, 2 
April 1997. 
Rosario Pantoja de Cuellar, education center director, interview, Charagua, 4 April 1997. 
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Pedro Fidel Ribera Caballero, member of the directorate of AGACOR, interview, 
Charagua, 30 October 1997. 
Fr. Luis Roma, parish priest, interview, Charagua, 29 October 1997. 
Fr. Gabriel Sequier (Tianou Pirou), parish priest, interview, Izozo, 3 April 1997. 
Luis Saucedo Tapia (a), mayor, interview, Santa Cruz, 31 March 1997. 
Luis Saucedo Tapia (b), mayor, interview, Charagua, 1 April 1997. 
Luis Saucedo Tapia (c), mayor, interview, Charagua, 27 October 1997. 
Julian Segundo Chipipi, municipal councilman (MNR), interview, Charagua, 2 April 
1997. 
Crispin Solano Menacho, municipal councilman (MBL) and ex-oversight committee 
president, interview, Charagua, 28 October 1997. 
Abelardo Vargas Portales, municipal council president (ADN), interview, Charagua, 1 
April 1997. 
Abelardo Vargas Portales and Abilio Vaca, municipal council president and councilman 
(ADN and MBL) respectively, interview, Charagua, 28 October 1997. 
Roberto Vargas, chief financial officer, interview, Charagua, 30 October 1997. 
Lt.Col. Fair Eduardo Villaroel, army garrison commander, interview, Charagua, 2 April 
1997. 
Community and Grass-Roots Organizations 
Acae: Israel Romero Macuendi and Florencio Altamirano, community leader and 
community member, interview, Acae, 2 April 1997. 
La Brecha: Francisco Chavez Flores, Delcio Moreno Candia, Mario Arreaga, Andres 
Chavez Flores, Vicente Moreno, and Licelio Cuellar Martinez, community leader, aid 
to the capitanfa, hospital administrator, nursing assistant, school association president 
and Alto Izozo district deputy, interview, La Brecha, 3 April 1997. 
La Brecha: Francisco Chavez, Alberto Rodriguez and Ignacio Alvarez, community 
leader, adviser to the capitanla grande, and community member, interview, La Brecha, 
28 October 1997. 
Charagua: Walter Garcia Juarez and Jorge Cortez Romero, community association 
president and community member, interview, Charagua, 3 April 1997. 
Charagua: Omar Quiroga Antelo, neighborhood council president, interview, Charagua, 
30 October 1997. 
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Charagua Station: Abelino Sanchez Ramirez, neighborhood council vice-president, 
interview, Charagua Station, 30 October 1997. 
Copere Brecha: Leoncio Pabaroa and Javier Yupico, interim community leader and ex-
leader, interview, Copere Brecha, 29 October 1997. 
El Espino: Pablo Carrillo and Marcial Arumbari, community leader and officer, 
interview, El Espino, 4 April 1997. 
El Espino: Paul Carrillo, Ricardo Melgar and Marcial Arumbari, community leader, 
community member, and community officer, interview, El Espino, 31 October 1997. 
Isiporenda: Hilda Ibaiiez vda. de Castro and Vidal Duran Sala, community leader and 
adviser, interview, Isiporenda, 29 October 1997. 
Kapiwasuti: Demetrio Caurey and Florencio Altamirano, president of the community 
irrigation committee and infrastructure officer, interview, Kapiwasuti, 2 April 1997. 
Rancho Nuevo: Luis Garcia and Hip()lito Sirari Ena, community founder/adviser to the 
capitania, and community leader, interview, Rancho Nuevo, 28 October 1997. 
Taputami: Josue Aiduare and Florencio Aiduare, community leaders, interview, 
TaputamI, 2 April 1997. 
Yapiroa: Pablo Diego Vaca and David Segundo, community leader and adviser, 
interview, Yapiroa, 3 April 1997. 
Desaguadero 
Luis Gonzalez, Social Investment Fund departmental director, interview, Desaguadero, 
22 March 1997. 
Alfredo Bravo Mujica and Mario Cerda Escalante, municipal councilmen (MNR and 
ADN respectively), interview, Desaguadero, 24 March 1997. 
Rosendo Mamani Quispe, mayor, interview, Desaguadero, 25 March 1997. 
Juan Nina Quispe, oversight committee vice-president and neighborhood council 
president, interview, Desaguadero, 25 March 1997. 
Unnamed, primary and secondary school directors, and various members of the school 
association, interview, Desaguadero, 24 March 1997. 
Community and Grass-Roots Organizations 
Azafranal: Augusto Ibarlez Ayoroc, Lucio Quispe and Leonardo Saiga Torres, school 
principal, school advisor, and primary school director, interview, Azafranal, 26 March 
1997. 
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Azafranal: Dionisio Lopez, unnamed and unnamed, community leader and two officers, 
interview, Desaguadero, 25 March 1997. 
Comunidad San Pedro: Faustino Mamani Chura and Seferino Torres, water committee 
president and secretary, interview, Desaguadero, 25 March 1997. 
Desaguadero (neighborhood council): Pastor Huaywa Nino, water committee vice-
president, interview, Desaguadero, 25 March 1997. 
Huancollo: Constantino Aruquipa and unnamed, school association president and 
member, interview, Desaguadero, 25 March 1997. 
San Pedro Okorani: Nicolas Condori Laura, Cresostomo Ticona and Felipe Apaza 
Callisaya, community leader, general officer and school officer, interview, San Pedro 
Okorani, 26 March 1997. 
Titijumi: Justo Jose Apaza, community leader, interview, Desaguadero, 25 March 1997. 
Vitunkani: Francisco Quispe Huanca, Venturo Quispe, Juan Quispe Fernandez and 
Mario Quispe, community leader, justice officer, education officer, and community 
member, interview, Vitunkani, 26 March 1997. 
Yanal: Pascual Fernandez, Eulogio Limachi and unnamed, community leader, school 
association president and community education officer, interview, Desaguadero, 25 
March 1997. 
Guayaranzerin 
Alberto Albert, municipal technical advisor and ex-municipal council president, 
interview, Guayaramerin, 20 October 1997. 
Fr. Fernando Bendoraitis, health NGO director, interview, Guayaramerin, 19 October 
1997. 
Zacarias Catalayud, oversight committee vice-president, interview, Guayaramerin, 20 
October 1997. 
Fr. Julio Con-edor, parish priest, interview, Guayaramerin, 19 October 1997. 
Orlando del Rio, oversight committee secretary, interview, Guayaramerin, 5 June 1997. 
[AG] 
Pedro Noel Herrera Delgado, departmental forest inspector, interview, Guayaramerin, 21 
October 1997. 
Sr. Ana Lopez, NGO director, interview, Guayaramerin, 22 October 1997. 
Carlos Luna, chief officer, interview, Guayaramerin, 5 June 1997. [AG] 
Elias Mesquita Coimbra, mayor, interview, Guayaramerin, 20 October 1997. 
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Ivan Nincevic Landivar, municipal council president (ADN) and telephone cooperative 
president, interview, Guayaramerin, 20 October 1997. 
Carmelo Parada Zarco, chief magistrate, interview, Guayaramerin, 21 October 1997. 
Adrian "Gigi" Rivera, electricity cooperative president, money-lender and hotel owner, 
interview, Guayaramerin, 21 October 1997. 
Erasmo Roca, municipal councilman (ADN), interview, Guayaramerin, 6 June 1997. 
[AG] 
Manlio Roca, port (customs) manager, ex-mayor and ex-MP, interview, Guayaramerin, 
21 October 1997. 
Ruth Roca, Zacarias Catalayud, Orlando del Rio and Jose Guali, oversight committee 
president, vice-president, secretary and member, interview, Guayaramerin, 5 June 
1997. [AG] 
Elio Simoni Casangeli, Chamber of Industry and Commerce secretary, interview, 
Guayaramerin, 21 October 1997. 
Gabriel Sosa Salvatierra, hospital director, interview, Guayaramerin, 22 October 1997. 
Hernan "Cacho" Vargas Rivera, agro-industrialist, TV station owner and ADN chief, 
interview, Guayaramerin, 21 October 1997. 
Community and Grass-Roots Organizations 
1' de Mayo: Dionisia Cuellar Perez, Emilse Choquere and Santiago Mendez, community 
officers, interview, 1' de Mayo, 23 October 1997. 
Cachuela Esperanza: Angelica Mendez de Languideiz, Maria Doris Soleto de Otubo and 
Rodolfo Otubo Sanchez, community officer and oversight committee member, 
community education officer, and community member, interview, Cachuela 
Esperanza, 6 June 1997. [AG] 
Guayaramerin: Ruben Dario Melgar Ailez, neighborhood council president, interview, 
Guayaramerin, 21 October 1997. 
Porongo 
Benedicto Bonilla Rojas, oversight committee president, interview, Porongo, 7 April 
1997. 
Felix Dominguez Parada, district director of education, interview, Porongo, 7 April 
1997. 
Fernando Muiloz Franco, Social Investment Fund departmental director, interview, 
Santa Cruz, 5 April 1997. 
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Hernan Gutierrez Viveros and Romulo Oyola Morales, chief administrative officer and 
ex-mayor, and technical officer, interview, Porongo, 8 April 1997. 
Martha Oyola Morales, Women's Civic Committee president, interview, Porongo, 7 
April 1997. 
Silvio Rojas Aguilera, Ricardo Larachi and Jose Mario Bejarano Saucedo, mayor, 
municipal council president (MIR) and municipal councilman (ADN), interview, 
Porongo, 7 April 1997. 
Roberto Saavedra Gutierrez, municipal councilman (ADN), interview, Porongo, 10 
April 1997. 
Roberto Suarez, district doctor, interview, Porongo, 9 April 1997. 
Community and Grass-Roots Organizations 
Las Cruces: Walter Cespedes Montalvan, community leader, interview, Las Cruces, 9 
April 1997. 
Nueva Palestina: Clemente Cerezo Vargas, community leader, interview, Nueva 
Palestina, 10 April 1997. 
Porongo: Aida Velazco Susano, neighborhood council president, interview, Porongo, 9 
April 1997. 
San Simon: Agrian Amador, community leader, interview, Terebinto, 10 April 1997. 
Terebinto: Vicente Roca Menacho and Alejandro Garcia Gutierrez, community leader 
and oversight committee member, and peasant's union leader, interview, Terebinto, 10 
April 1997. 
Villa Guadalupe: Cecilia Bonilla, school association president, interview, Villa 
Guadalupe, 8 April 1997. 
Sipe Sipe [all AG] 
Rogelio Duran, mayor and ex-municipal council president, interview, Sipe Sipe, 27 May 
1997. 
Justo Mercado Chavez, oversight committee president, interview, Sipe Sipe, 27 May 
1997. 
Alfredo Taja, municipal councilman and NGO head, interview, Quillacollo, 28 May 
1997. 
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Community and Grass-Roots Organizations 
Malleo Rancho: Guillermo Saavedra Crespo, Cesar Arnez Mondragon, Eduardo 
Cespedes and Fernando Montan Arnez, community president, vice-president, officer, 
and oversight committee vice-president, interview, Mallco Rancho, 28 May 1997. 
Parotani: Demetrio Orellana, community leader, interview, Parotani, 27 May 1997. 
Siquisiquia: Eduardo Ala, Celso Cuba and Andres Cuba, community leader, spokesman 
and officer, interview, Siquisiquia, 29 May 1997. 
Urinsaya: Amadeo Cartajira, community leader, interview, Urinsaya, 29 May 1997. 
Sucre 
Alejandro Arancibia and Gladys Campos, district director of health and health district 
manager, interview, Sucre, 15 April 1997. 
Fernando Beltran, FANCESA (cement company) general manager, interview, Sucre, 18 
April 1997. 
Juan Jose Bonifaz, general advisor to the prefect, interview, Sucre, 15 April 1997. 
David Borda, Social Investment Fund departmental director, interview, Sucre, 14 April 
1997. 
Raimundo Candia, municipal general secretary (i.e. chief officer), interview, Sucre, 15 
April 1997. 
Raimundo Candia, municipal general secretary (in lieu of mayor), interview, Sucre, 17 
April 1997. 
Gregorio Corso, municipal education officer, interview, Sucre, 15 April 1997. 
Jaime Gallo Garabinto, municipal councilman (MIR), interview, Sucre, 15 April 1997. 
Samuel Montellano Aparicio, district director of education, interview, Sucre, 14 April 
1997. 
Sixto Rosas Venegas and Carlos Cors, oversight committee president and vice-president, 
interview, Sucre, 16 April 1997. 
Roxana Sarmiento, municipal planning and coordination officer, interview, Sucre, 15 
April 1997. 
Rene Subieta, municipal chief technical officer, interview, Sucre, 14 April 1997. 
Juan Torrico, NGO director, interview, Sucre, 16 April 1997. 
Alfredo YatIez and Juan Carlos Sobut, Chamber of Commerce directors, interview, 
Sucre, 16 April 1997. 
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Community and Grass-Roots Organizations 
Chuqui-Chuqui: Claudio Torres, community leader, interview, Chuqui-Chuqui, 18 April 
1997. 
Mojotoro: Juan Velabaruta, Esteban Copa, Felipe Sapana and Sabanio Fernandez 
Alanoca, community leader, community, ex-leader, and officer, interview, Mojotoro, 
18 April 1997. 
Potolo: Walter Encinas, community leader, interview, Potolo, 19 April 1997. 
Sucre: Jorge Chaira Piuca and Marcial Javier Perez, neighborhood council president and 
education officer, interview, Sucre, 17 April 1997. 
Sucre: Javier Tango Aramayo, neighborhood council president, interview, Sucre, 16 
April 1997. 
Viacha 
Reynaldo Aguilar, district director of health, interview, Viacha, 10 October 1997. 
Celestino Arauz, sub-prefecture general secretary (disputed), interview, Viacha, 9 
October 1997. 
Juan Carlos Blanco, CBN bottling plant director, interview, Viacha, 16 October 1997. 
Edwin Callisaya, mayor, interview, Viacha, 18 March 1997. 
Jose Luis Claros, CBN production supervisor, interview, Viacha, 21 March 1997. 
Donato Cuellar Cusi, Agapito Yujra, Manuel Colque and Carmelo Quispe, municipal 
councilmen (all UCS), interview, Viacha, 15 October 1997. 
Lt.Col. Adolfo Davila Chacon, 1 st Division, GADA 231 commander (local army 
garrison), interview, Viacha, 19 March 1997. 
Luis Gonzalez, Social Investment Fund departmental director, interview and site visits, 
Viacha, 17 March 1997. 
Fr. Justino Limachi, parish priest, interview, Viacha, 16 October 1997. 
Gladys Lozano, sub-prefect, interview, Viacha, 17 March 1997. 
Maria Luisa Lucuy, district director of education, interview, Viacha, 15 October 1997. 
Oscar Alfonso Magnani Meyta and Franklin Carlo Megillanes, district director of 
education and education technician, interview, Viacha, 21 March 1997. 
Rolando Marin Ibafiez, chief financial officer, interview, Viacha, 17 March 1997. 
Max Mercado Mozo, federation of neighborhood councils (2) president, interview, 
Viacha, 11 October 1997. 
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Carlos NUriez, Sociedad Boliviana de Cementos (SOBOCE) financial director, interview, 
Viacha, 19 March 1997. 
Tomas Palacios Rodriguez, Condepa chief, interview, Viacha, 15 October 1997. 
Luis Paz, Incerpaz CEO, interview, Viacha, 15 October 1997. 
Huber Quintela Alarcon (a), municipal council president, interview, Viacha, 10 October 
1997. 
Huber Quintela Alarcon (b), MNR chief, interview, Viacha, 16 October 1997. 
Huber Quintela Alarcon and Esteban Ticona, municipal councilmen (MNR and 
Condepa), interview, Viacha, 18 March 1997. 
Remigio Quispe Mendoza, Walter Patzi Paty and Nemesio Mamani Fernandez, 
oversight committee (1) president, federation of neighborhood councils (1) president 
and federation officer respectively, interview, Viacha, 18 March 1997. 
Jorge Rada, chief financial officer, interview, Viacha, 15 October 1997. 
Edgar Robles, mayor, interview, Viacha, 10 October 1997. 
Antonio Soto, MIR chief, interview, Viacha, 10 October 1997. 
Esteban Ticona, municipal councilman, interview, Viacha, 9 October 1997. 
Hipolito Tovar, Alejandro Yujra Laura and Rony Morales Quispe, oversight committee 
(2) president, vice-president and officer, interview, Viacha, 19 May 1997. 
Hipolito Tovar and Rony Morales Quispe, oversight committee (2) president and officer, 
interview and site visits, Viacha, 21 May 1997. 
Community and Grass-Roots Organizations 
Canton Chama: Severo Guarachi Ramos, community officer, interview, Viacha, 17 May 
1997. 
District Five: Alicia Rodriguez, women's leader, interview, Viacha, 17 May 1997. 
District Six: Ger6nimo Colque Velarde, community officer, interview, Viacha, 17 May 
1997. 
Nazacara: Juan Laurel Hinojosa, Dona Francisca Plata de Maldonado, Julio Choque 
Huanca and Jaime Gomez, community coordinator, community leader, education 
officer and school director, interview, Nazacara, 14 October 1997. 
Rosapata: Marcelino Chuy Quenta, Cecilio Plata Flores, Teodoro Casita Ticona and 
Daniel Mamani Churra, community leader, community education officer, school 
teacher and school teacher, interview, Rosapata, 14 October 1997. 
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Santa Ana de Machaqa: Francisco Juliano Paz, community officer, interview, Viacha, 18 
March 1997. 
Santa Ana de Machaqa: Jose Quezo Cusi, Lorenzo Julian and Olga Cusi de Julian, 
community leader, teacher and electoral notary, and Plan Intenzacional liaison, 
interview, Santa Ana de Machaqa, 23 March 1997. 
Titik'ana Tacaca: Genaro Mamani Chiri, Gumercindo Vito Guarachi, Saturnino Tola 
Mamani, and Doroteo Callisaya Mamani, community leader, district officer, 
representative to the Federation of Ayllus and indigenous communities of Ingavi 
Province (FACOPI), and community officer, interview, Titik'ana Takaka, 20 March 
1997. 
Viacha: Simon Canavi Rojas, community officer, interview, Viacha, 17 May 1997. 
Villa Santiago de Chacoma: Eulogio Choque and Valentin Atahuichi Callisaya, cantonal 
officer and community construction officer, interview, Villa Santiago de Chacoma, 11 
October 1997. 
National 
Gonzalo Aguirre, congressional representative (MBL), interview, La Paz, 30 September 
1997. 
Joaquin Aramburo, Social Investment Fund regional director, interview, La Paz, 25 
February 1997. 
Eduardo Araujo, Social Investment Fund director of project implementation, interview, 
La Paz, 18 February 1997. 
Rodolfo Araujo, coordination secretary, Ministry of the Presidency, interview, La Paz, 
25 February 1997. 
Ruben Ardalla, officer, Democratic Development and Citizen's Participation, interview, 
La Paz, 21 February 1997. 
Percy Bacareza, information officer, National Secretariat of Rural Development, 
Ministry of Human Development, interview, La Paz, 2 October 1997. 
Mauricio Balcazar, director of Encuestas y Estudios (polling company) and ex-minister 
of communications, interview, La Paz, 13 october 1997. 
Amparo Ballivian, World Bank economist, interview, La Paz, 18 February 1997. 
Erika Brockmann, senator (MLR), interview, La Paz, 6 October 1997. 
Fernando Cajias, ex-prefect (La Paz), interview, La Paz, 25 February 1997. 
Ricardo Calla, researcher, interview, La Paz, 7 March 1997. 
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Juan Carlos Franco, Social Investment Fund regional director, interview, La Paz, 28 
February 1997. 
Manuel Contreras, Catholic University Public Policy Program director, interview, La 
Paz, 5 March 1997. 
Jorge Dockweiler, municipal councilman (La Paz), interview, La Paz, 5 November 1997. 
Luis Gonzalez, Social Investment Fund departmental director, interview, La Paz, 5 
March 1997. 
Armando Godinez, anthropologist, numerous conversations, La Paz, February - May and 
September — November 1997. 
George Gray-Molina, UDAPSO sub-director, interview, La Paz, 17 February 1997. 
Paulino Guarachi, sub-secretary of rural development, Ministry of Human Development, 
interview, La Paz, 6 March 1997. 
Enrique Ipiria, ex-minister of human development and ex-secretary of education, 
interview, La Paz, 26 February 1997. 
Mauricio Lea Plaza, director of participative planning, Ministry of Human Development, 
interview, La Paz, 29 September 1997. 
Alberto Leyton, director of public investment, Ministry of Economic Development, 
interview, La Paz, 6 May 1997. 
Alberto Leyton, sub-secretary of public investment, Ministry of Economic Development, 
interview, La Paz, 23 September 1997. 
Eduardo Mac Lean, municipal adviser (La Paz), interview, La Paz, 21 February 1997. 
Fernando Medina, sub-secretary of popular participation, Ministry of Human 
Development, interview, La Paz, 5 May 1997. 
Fernando Medina, sub-secretary of popular participation, Ministry of Human 
Development, interview, La Paz, 25 September 1997. 
Javier Medina, officer, Secretariat of Rural Development, interview, La Paz, 6 March 
1997. 
Carlos Hugo Molina, secretary of popular participation, interview, La Paz, 10 March 
1997. 
Rodney Pereira, UDAPE researcher and universiity professor, interview, La Paz, 25 
February 1997. 
Javier Reyes, director of public investment, Ministry of Economic Development, 
interview, La Paz, 5 November 1997. 
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Gonzalo Rojas, director for investment and analysis, Secretariat of Popular Participation, 
interview, La Paz, 27 February 1997. 
Freddy Teodovitch, senator, interview, La Paz, 6 November 1997. 
Carlos Toranzo, economist, ILDIS (research foundation), interview, La Paz, 3 March 
1997. 
Enrique Toro, ADN national chief, interview, La Paz, 16 October 1997. 
Javier Torres Goitia, sub-secretary of health, interview, La Paz, 13 October 1997. 
David Tuchschneider, World Bank rural development officer, interview, La Paz, 14 
February 1997. 
David Tuchschneider, World Bank rural development officer, interview, La Paz, 3 May 
1997. 
Miguel Urioste, congressional representative and MBL party leader, interview, La Paz, 3 
October 1997. 
Jorge Urquidi, general adviser to the prefect, interview, La Paz, 13 October 1997. 
N.B. [AG] denotes interviews conducted by Armando Godinez, anthropologist and 
assistant researcher. 
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